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GHANA: FROM FRAGILITY TO RESILIENCE? 
UNDERSTANDING THE FORMATION OF A NEW POLITICAL SETTLEMENT 
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ABSTRACT 
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During the late 1970s Ghana was described as a collapsed and failed state. In 
contrast, today it is hailed internationally as beacon of democracy and stability 
in West Africa. In light of Ghana’s drastic image change from a fragile and even 
collapsed polity to a resilient state, this thesis contributes to the statebuilding 
debate by analysing the social change that occurred.   
Grounded in a critical theory approach the thesis applies a political settlement 
analysis to explore how power is distributed and changed over time between 
contending social groups; exploring the extent to which this is embedded in 
formal and informal institutional arrangements. 
Ghana’s 2012 elections serve as an empirical basis and lens to observe the 
country’s current settlement. This approach enables a fine grained within-case 
comparison with Ghana’s collapsed post-independent settlement. The analysis 
illustrates that while there has been no transformation of the Ghanaian state, 
however, continuous incremental structural change has occurred within it, as 
demonstrated by a structurally altered constellation of power.   
While internationally propagated (neo-)liberal economic and political reforms 
had a vital impact on the reconstruction process of state-society relations, 
Ghana’s labelling as “success story” evokes the distorted idea of a resilient 
liberal state. The sustainability of Ghana’s current settlement characterised by 
electoral competitive clientelism depends on a continued inflow of foreign capi-
tal. So far the mutually beneficial interest of portraying Ghana as a resilient 
state by its elites and donors ensures the flow of needed financial assistance 
to preserve the settlement.    
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The danger of a single story: 
 
The single story creates stereotypes and the problem with stereo-
types is not that they are untrue, but that they are incomplete.  
They make one story become the only story. 
 
Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie (2009) 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Intrastate violent conflict emerged as the dominant and most deadly type of 
conflict after the end of World War II (Davenport and Gates 2014). With the fall 
of the Berlin Wall and a general demise of state socialism developed a widely 
shared conviction amongst international actors how to address intrastate post-
conflict situations. Throughout the 1990s statebuilding, based on the Western 
liberal state model, became the new standard approach to conflict resolution. 
The emphasis on the state was reinforced by the fact that interrelated fields like 
Security Studies – particularly after 9/11 –, Development Research and Peace 
and Conflict Studies identified “weak states” especially in Africa1 and Asia no 
longer merely as regional security threats (Tull 2011: 5). Rather they came to be 
considered as problematic in two ways. First, they are seen as being less capa-
ble of providing security, order and socio-economic development for their own 
citizens. Secondly, unstable states do not appear suited for serving as building 
blocks of the current international system and are perceived in an era of interna-
tional terrorism as a challenge to global security (Boege et al. 2008: 2). As a 
consequence, the promotion of liberal statebuilding – conceptualized as liberal 
democracy with a free market economy – has become the remedy for develop-
ment and global peace (Chandler and Sisk 2013: xx; Tull 2011: 5).  
International peace support operations became without further ado the main 
instrument for international actors to dabble with the statebuilding strategy 
which focused on institutional reforms with the aim of strengthening democracy, 
security and economic growth. In response to these developments, academia 
produced plenty of studies scrutinizing the operational details of interventions of 
external actors in conflict-ridden states and their efforts of liberal peacebuilding. 
Soon this “problem-solving” strand of research was complemented by critical 
scholars arguing that statebuilding is not merely a technical exercise in conflict 
management limited to enhancing the capacities and effectiveness of state insti-
tutions. Rather, they pointed out that the endeavour is inherently political and 
power-based. According to critical scholars, the liberal peace project represents 
the globalization of a particular model of domestic governance, whereby the 
core determines the acceptable international standards on how states should 
                                            
1
 For brevity “Africa” will be used interchangeably with “Sub-Saharan Africa” in this thesis to 
refer to the region of countries south of the Sahara. 
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organize themselves internally (Pugh (2005); Bain (2006) and Chandler (2006) 
and Pugh and Turner (2006)). Spreading the liberal peace with its emphasis on 
establishing Weberian states reaffirms the state as the central political unit and 
thereby also the current order of the international system. Put differently, critical 
scholars have focused on how the liberal peace project is reproducing the prevail-
ing global order with all its inherent power relations and imbalances.  
The practice of liberal peace operations however does not only impact on 
power relations between states. The externally driven implementation and re-
forms of state institutions primarily and abruptly affect – although possibly only 
temporarily – relations of power between different societal groups within states. 
For institutions are not neutral structures; they embody and cast relations of 
power between contending politicized societal groups. This in turn has grave 
ramifications on a state, its base in society, and thus the general workings of the 
state. So far Peace and Conflict Research – and in particular the academic lit-
erature on statebuilding – has paid very little attention to understanding pro-
cesses of change with regards to power relations within states of the Global 
South, and African states in particular. In addition, African Studies and its focus 
on the state has paid much attention to patterns of continuity. It has focused 
significantly less on identifying and analysing social change that has actually 
occurred, whether this change has been caused by outside interventions, or by 
more “organic” processes, or interplay of the two.  
Against this background, the thesis focuses on the case study of Ghana. 
Post-independence, the Ghanaian state had been quite fragile, plagued by eco-
nomic woes and frequent, reoccurring military coups. Just within fifteen years, 
Ghanaians had undergone five coups d’états each resulting in regime change. 
Besides, the steadily growing fiscal and trade deficits coupled with price in-
creases for some goods of over 1000% reflected the country’s economic volatili-
ty. Due to aggravating economic crises and the persisting political fragility, by 
the late 1970s, the Ghanaian state was considered a collapsed and failed polity 
(Hutchful 2002: 101; Chazan 1983: 320; Rothchild 1995: 50). 
In contrast, today Ghana is hailed internationally as a beacon of democracy 
and stability in West Africa (Osafo-Danso 2015; Tietaah 2012: 210; Handley 
2008: 3). The country’s remarkable macroeconomic recovery and (re-
)democratization process form the basis of the currently dominant narrative of 
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Ghana’s image as ‘African success story’. Since Ghana’s return to multiparty 
democracy in 1992, each president has been abiding by constitutional term lim-
its, and Ghanaians have held six consecutive, tightly contested, yet (relatively) 
peaceful general elections. As a result, voters succeeded in changing 
their governments twice through the ballot box. These achievements are not 
only exceptional given Ghana’s history; they make the country also stand out in 
regional comparison and suggest indeed a rather resilient polity. 
Given Ghana’s drastic image change from a fragile and even collapsed poli-
ty towards a resilient state, this thesis aims to contribute to the statebuilding 
debate by evaluating occurred social change in Ghana. Founded in a critical 
theory approach and a fine grained within-case comparison, the thesis’ main 
objective is to understand the social changes Ghana has undergone throughout 
the late 1970s till today. It will explore whether one can speak of any structural 
changes or transformation of the Ghanaian state and if so, to what extent and 
how this has taken place. Whether the changes are procedural or structural, 
profound or temporary is crucial to understanding the future dynamics of the 
Ghanaian state, and indeed potentially further afield. The two main research 
questions guiding the analysis in this thesis are therefore as follows:  
1) Has the Ghanaian state undergone any fundamental structural 
change, and if so, to what extent? 
 
2) If applicable, how did Ghanaian society manage to undergo this 
process of social change? 
To address these two main research questions the thesis applies a Gram-
scian inspired political settlement analysis. Thereby the thesis assumes that 
state institutions are not neutral structures per se, but rather shape and are 
characterized themselves by power relations between contending politicized 
societal groups of unique context-specific processes. Resting on a critical politi-
cal economy approach a political settlement is therefore defined as the distribu-
tion of power in a given society between contending social forces and how this 
is embedded in and reflected by formal and informal institutional arrangements 
of the state. Following Gramsci the thesis argues that the nature of the constel-
lation of power between contending politicized societal groups and how this is 
embedded in formal and informal institutional arrangements of the state deter-
mines the workings and therefore form of a state. Thus, to evaluate from a criti-
cal political economy perspective whether the Ghanaian state has undergone 
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any structural social change over the last few decades, the thesis explores if 
constellations of power within Ghanaian society have shifted; and how far this 
has impacted on the workings of the Ghanaian state. To tackle this endeavour 
the thesis proceeds as follows.  
Chapter two outlines the Gramscian tinted political settlement framework al-
lowing for a nuanced and in-depth case study analysis incorporating state-
building and societal dynamics to evaluate social change in Ghana. The chapter 
moves on to contextualize the endeavor of a political settlement analysis in an 
African context by outlining the broader historical context of state formation in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. It concludes with sketching out and critically reflecting on 
the methodological approach applied for the thesis.  
Based on the theoretical framework developed in chapter two, which em-
phasizes the importance of historically grown structures and power relationships 
between politicized societal groups, chapter three outlines Ghanaian political set-
tlements in historical perspective. To grasp the historical roots of societal and 
elite conflict in Ghana, the first part outlines key social dynamics under colonial 
rule. These have shaped Ghana’s politicized societal cleavages most of which 
continue to form the basis of political and social conflict until today. Building on 
these key prerequisites, the subsequent section sketches out the emerging 
constellation of power in Ghana’s immediate post-independent state and how 
these have been embedded and reflected in formal and informal institutions. It 
will be argued that due to the leading role of the state in the economy, Ghana’s 
post-independence settlement was characterized by an entanglement of the 
political and economic sphere causing capital accumulation to occur mainly 
through access to the state. This structure led to fierce elite competition over 
the state and shaped its neopatrimonial character. Ghana’s elites’ competition 
was reinforced by the highly fragmented nature of its society along ethnic lines 
as one of its key politicized societal cleavage. It was further amplified by a lack 
of elite consensus – fuelled by systemic rivalry at the international level – with 
regards to ideological and thus institutional set up, in particular for Ghana’s 
economic sphere.  A high rotation of fiercely competing civilian ruling coalitions 
was the consequence. Despite competing ruling coalitions’ ideological differ-
ences and varying support bases in society, neither civilian nor military ruling coa-
litions till the early 1980s managed to alter the historically grown and deeply en-
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trenched power constellations in Ghana institutionally embodied by an over-
taxation of the productive entrepreneurs in the rural areas in favour of the state’s 
urban masses’ consumption. Hence, while ruling elites fluctuated rather frequent-
ly in Ghana’s post-independence settlement, the power constellation embedded 
in the structures was characterized by continuity. By the end of the 1970s Gha-
na’s post-independence institutionalized “urban vampire state” (see Frimpong-
Ansah 1991) eroded the state’s economic base. In fact, it led to Ghana’s fiscal 
and economic breakdown and resulted in the disintegration and collapse of the 
entire state system. In contrast, the last section of chapter three will illustrate 
that Ghana’s more recent historical developments provide the building blocks 
for the currently dominant narrative of its image as “African success story”. 
Ghana’s remarkable macroeconomic recovery coupled with its (re-
)democratization process including incumbent presidents abiding by term limits 
and two relatively peaceful turnovers of power through the ballot box, are not only 
exceptional in view of Ghana’s history. These achievements make Ghana also 
stand out in regional comparison and suggest, albeit rather simplistically, that 
the country has arrived at a profoundly new place. In line with the research 
questions, chapters four to six are devoted to critique this narrative and aim to 
present a more nuanced analysis of achieved social change in Ghana.   
To empirically ground the fine grained within-case comparison between 
Ghana’s post-independence and current political settlement, chapter four 
zooms in on Ghana’s 2012 elections as a lens to observe the workings of the 
current Ghanaian state and lays the foundation for a detailed outline of Ghana’s 
current political settlement presented in chapter five. Why do elections matter in 
the context of analysing constellation of powers in Ghana? Elections are crucial 
events in political cycles, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, because they em-
body the struggle over political power and the distribution of mostly scarce re-
sources. Consequently, in most states of the Global South there is an impera-
tive to win elections. During election times politicized societal cleavages come 
to light more clearly. Moreover, informal institutions like political patronage net-
works manifest themselves and are decisive for comprehending the general 
workings of the current Ghanaian state. Elections generally pose an opportunity 
for change – at least of actors and therefore of who might get what of the na-
tional cake – so that stakes tend to be high. In the case of Ghana analysing the 
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electoral framework provided a reasonable starting point with regards to which 
formal institutions to focus on while grasping their inherent distribution of power. 
Since elections have for most of Ghana’s post-independence period been a 
constant institutional feature, using elections as a lens also provided a refer-
ence point to assess in how far there has been any structural change with re-
gard to the working of the Ghanaian state.  
Based on Ghana’s 2012 electoral politics outlined in chapter four, chapter 
five illustrates that the workings of the Ghanaian state of today are in fact very 
reminiscent of those of Ghana’s post-colonial state. However, the thesis argues 
that despite these continuities it would be misleading to assert nothing has 
changed at all in Ghanaian society. It will be argued that while there has not 
(yet) been a transformation of the Ghanaian state, continuous incremental 
structural change has occurred within it. For the thesis claims that the constella-
tion of power within the Ghanaian state has been altered in three different di-
mensions: namely the (1) relationship between the elites, (2) between the elite 
and non-elite as well as (3) amongst the non-elite.  
Chapter six as last substantial chapter of this thesis analyses how Ghana-
ian society has managed this process of social change and hence arrived at a 
new constellation of internal relations of power. The analysis acknowledges that 
internationally propagated (neo-)liberal economic and political reforms had a 
vital impact on the reconstruction process of state-society relations in Ghana 
and that it is remarkable that this process of social change has been achieved. 
At the same time the thesis points out that Ghana’s labelling as an “African suc-
cess story” evokes a distorted idea of a resilient liberal state. For the sustaina-
bility of Ghana’s current political settlement characterised by electoral competi-
tive clientelism depends on a continued inflow of foreign capital. So far the mu-
tually beneficial interest of portraying Ghana as a resilient state by its elites and 
donors ensures the flow of needed financial assistance to preserve the settle-
ment. If this form of state might be able to provide a path to long-term political 
stability and economic prosperity remains to be seen.  
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II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, CONTEXTUALIZATION AND METHODO-
LOGICAL APPROACH  
[T]here is a need to provide an analytical framework that does justice to the process of 
social change actually taking place in Africa today.  
Chabal, Africa: The Politics of Suffering and Smiling 
 
This chapter aims to develop a theoretical framework allowing for a nuanced and 
in-depth case study analysis incorporating statebuilding and societal dynamics to 
evaluate social change in Ghana. To begin, the chapter traces the main concepts 
of Antonio Gramsci in relation to state formation and changes of forms of states. 
It illustrates why Gramsci’s ideas are fruitful in relation to a critical statebuilding 
debate and, in particular, with regards to analysing states in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Subsequently, it outlines the analytical framework of a political settlement devel-
oped from a Gramscian perspective. The chapter moves on to highlighting rele-
vant aspects of Africa’s history evolving around state formation and statebuilding. 
Thereby, it links the theoretical approach to the setting of state formation in Sub-
Sahara Africa and contextualizes the previously developed analytical framework 
as well as the subsequent context-specific chapters on state formation in Ghana. 
The chapter concludes with substantiating the choice to rely on Ghana’s 2012 
elections as a window to observe the country’s current political settlement, before 
outlining in more detail and critically reflecting on the applied methods used for 
data collection and interpretation.  
 
 
2.1 Theoretical framework 
The first section of the chapter presents the rationale for a Gramscian-tinted 
analytical framework for a fine-grained case study analysis of social structural 
change in Ghana and addresses the main points of critique of such an endeav-
our. It outlines Gramsci’s thoughts on forms of states and opportunities of social 
change before moving on to translate his work into a political settlement ap-
proach used as the analytical framework for this thesis. 
 
2.1.1 Engaging Gramsci in the field of statebuilding 
Over the past decade, the academic fields of peace and conflict studies, securi-
ty, as well as development research, have been concerned with the relationship 
between violent conflict, the performance of states and global security. Weak 
states have been identified as problematic in two ways. First, they are seen as 
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being less capable of providing security and order for their own  citizens; sec-
ond, unstable states do not appear suited for serving as building blocks of the 
current international system (Boege et al. 2008: 2). As a result, the promotion of 
statebuilding based on the Westphalian state model – conceptualized as liberal 
democracy with a free market economy – has become the remedy for develop-
ment and global peace (Chandler and Sisk 2013: xx; Call and  Wyeth 2008).   
In this context, critical peace scholarship has grappled with the ideological 
assumptions of peace support operations which have become a main instru-
ment of international actors to dabble with the statebuilding strategy. The critical 
strand of academic work on statebuilding evolved as a response to the initial 
scholarly work focusing on the operational details of peace operations. The 
main argument brought forward by critical scholars has been that liberal 
statebuilding is not merely a technical exercise in conflict management limited 
to enhancing the capacities and effectiveness of state institutions. Rather, it is 
political and power-based. The liberal peace project is seen as the globalization 
of a particular model of domestic governance, whereby the core determines the 
acceptable international standards on how states should organize themselves 
internally (Pugh 2005; Bain 2006; Chandler 2006; Pugh and Turner 2006). 
Spreading the liberal peace with its emphasis on establishing Weberian states 
reaffirms the state as the central political unit and thereby reproduces the pre-
vailing global order with all its power relations and imbalances. 
The practice of peace operations, however, does not only impact on power 
relations between states. The externally driven implementation and adjustment 
of state institutions primarily and abruptly affect – although possibly only tempo-
rarily – relations of power between different social groups within states. This, in 
turn, has grave ramifications on a state, its base in society, and thus the general 
workings of the state.  
Meanwhile, the statebuilding discourse has shifted its focus from external 
actors and their impact on state institutions towards the role of grassroots de-
velopments and bottom-up approaches including actors from civil society, the 
private sector and the elite. This shift from “outside to inside” has added key 
variables to explaining the promotion or frustration of peace and stability. How-
ever, so far, the debate on pathways out of fragility fails to bridge and carve out 
the interplay between a variety of actors and institutions. The academic litera-
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ture on statebuilding has paid little attention to scrutinizing power relations with-
in states of the Global South, and African states in particular, and to under-
standing processes of its change. A further-reaching and holistic approach, tak-
ing the historical development of political and economic institutions into account, 
as well as their link to the society in which they are embedded, could enable us 
to engage in a better understanding of political orders in the Global South and 
identify their opportunities for change. This is where Gramsci comes in.  
Antonio Gramsci engages in his writings Quaderni del Carcere (The Prison 
Notebooks) with the process and challenges of the formation of the Italian na-
tion state.  He explores how the form of the Italian state could change, and 
analyses the role of the relationship between civil society and the state in this 
opportunity for change. Guided by his desire to develop thoughts for political 
action, Gramsci stresses two points which are interrelated and crucial in relation 
to the statebuilding discourse today. First, his writings echo the recognition that 
each state is unique. He writes:   
[T]he internal relations of any nation are the result of a combination 
which is ‘original’ and (in a certain sense) unique: these relations must 
be understood and conceived in their originality and uniqueness if one 
wishes to […] direct them (Forgacs 2000: 230-31).  
By shifting the attention to the internal relations – relations of power between 
different social groups – of a state, Gramsci enables us to recognize different 
forms of states and to analyse their social basis. This brings us to Gramsci’s 
second key point in the context of the debate on statebuilding. For Gramsci, the 
state is not solely made up of political institutions, government, top political 
leaders and personalities with direct governmental responsibilities (Morton 
2003: 158) or what he identifies as “political society”. Approaches limiting them-
selves to “political society” have been derogatorily labelled by Gramsci as stat-
olatry (Forgacs 2000: 237-38). According to him, the state includes as well:  
[…] the entire complex or practical and theoretical activities with which the 
ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to 
win the active consent of those over whom it rules (Morton 2003: 158). 
Thus, political society and civil society together form Gramsci’s concept of the inte-
gral state which is set in contrast to a statolatry one. With his focus on state-society 
complexes, Gramsci presents a much wider theory of state (ibid.). Instead of taking 
the state and its institutions as given, he focuses on the political struggles of unique 
social forces within a state and how these relate to the development of its specific 
form (Morton 2003: 157). Gramsci’s reflections on different forms of states, power 
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and social transformation provide a reasonable starting point to engage more pro-
foundly with existing realities in the Global South.  
One might rightly point out that Gramsci’s writings reflect a particular time 
and set of circumstances and, therefore, demur the broader applicability of his 
ideas to today‘s time and the context of statebuilding in the Global South (see 
Burnham 1991, Germain and Kenny 1998). Yet, engaging Gramsci in the dis-
course on statebuilding is not a matter of exporting his analytical framework 
one-to-one to temporal or geographical contexts different from his own. Noth-
ing could be further from the spirit of Gramsci’s thought than developing an 
analytical framework that claims to present a timeless set of concepts to ex-
plain the world (Cox 1983: 163). As Robert Cox (1983: 162) points out, Gram-
sci continuously adjusts his own ideas according to specific historical circum-
stances. This is illustrated by the fact that some of his theoretical concepts, 
such as the passive revolution vary slightly throughout his writings. The idea 
behind claiming Gramsci for the discourse of statebuilding and state formation 
in the context of Ghana is to engage with his ideas and to develop them with 
further adjustments to the time and context where and when they are applied. 
Gramsci himself drew on writings of authors such as Machiavelli, Marx and 
Sorel who developed their concepts in different times and contexts. Moreover, 
Gramsci’s concepts which were originally developed for and on the level of the 
state have been transferred and applied to the global level (see Cox 1981; 
Cox 1983; Gill 1993; Murphy 1998; Van der Pijl 1997; Bieler and Morton 
2001). They form today a fundamental strand of critical IR theory. Gramsci’s 
ideas also feed into the fields of development and peace and conflict studies, 
yet so far, not explicitly, as will be demonstrated later (see section 2.1.3).   
Before turning to an attempt to engage Gramsci for an analytical framework 
for the statebuilding discourse in today’s Global South, and Ghana in particular, 
the following section outlines a brief summary of his main ideas and concepts 
related to forms of states, power and social transformation. 
 
2.1.2 Gramsci: On forms of states, power and social transformation  
 
Relations of forces, hegemony and historic bloc 
Gramsci dedicates his political analyses to understanding the resilience of capitalist 
states in Europe. He scrutinizes why the socialist movement had failed in Italy, and 
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how the fascist regime succeeded to rule the Italian state. Gramsci seeks to pre-
sent an analysis of social change that informs a novel strategy of political action to 
change the form of the Italian state (Forgacs 2000: 189; Simon 1991: 23). 
Even though his political thought was greatly influenced by Marxist tradition, 
he critiques Marx’s proclaimed link between economic crises and political trans-
formation as too automatic (Moolakkattu 2009: 441). Gramsci disagrees with 
Marx’s mechanistic form of historical materialism which implies a theoretical 
separation of the economic dimension from the social and political ensemble 
and as the reduction of this ensemble to its economic causes (Forgacs 2000: 
422). In his view, Marx’s “historical economism" (Forgacs 2000: 189) is neither 
a suitable theoretical basis to understand differences between forms of states, 
nor does it represent an adequate basis for a novel strategy on how to change 
the form of the Italian state.  
According to Gramsci (Forgacs 2000: 190) “changing socio-economic cir-
cumstances do not of themselves ’produce’ political changes.” They only set the 
conditions in which such changes become possible. What is crucial, in bringing 
about these changes, are the ’relations of force[s]’ […]”. Put differently, the con-
figuration of social forces is characterizing the form of a state and key for com-
prehending social change in any society (Simon 1991: 69). Civil society is here-
by the sphere in which diverse social forces compete with one another over in-
fluence and dominance (Simon 1991: 27). Thus, relations of social forces within 
civil society are also relations of power, so that power is diffused throughout civil 
society (Simon 1991: 29).  
According to Gramsci, certain social forces, e.g., a class, can become heg-
emonic in the sphere of civil society. In this context, hegemony means the lead-
ership of an alliance of various social forces (Forgacs 2000: 422). Gramsci does 
not limit the concept of relations of forces to the relationship of power between 
the working class (labour) and the bourgeoisie (capital). In fact, he underlines 
the importance of other social forces not arising directly out of the relations of 
production (Simon 1991: 24-29). This is important because social class differ-
ences – created through industrialization in Europe – still are much less deep 
and sharp in Africa than in Europe (Davidson 1994: 212-13). Once a group has 
managed to gain the consent of other social forces through creating and main-
taining a system of alliances by means of political and ideological struggle, it 
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achieves leadership and thereby state power (Simon 1991: 23-24; Germain and 
Kenny 1998: 17). Gramsci points out that this leadership is based on the eco-
nomically central role of the leading force. It is secured politically by that group 
making economic concessions and sacrifices to its allies in civil society (For-
gacs 2000: 422).  
However, Gramsci evenly stresses the role of ideas, norms and values in the 
process of gaining a hegemonic position in civil society (Forgacs 2000: 205). For 
an alliance between social forces to become hegemonic in the sphere of civil so-
ciety it needs to disseminate its ideas, and other social forces must embrace 
those. Gramsci considers an “intellectual and moral reform” – a transformation of 
popular consciousness, of people’s way of thinking and feeling – necessary, in 
order to establish hegemony in any given society (Simon 1991: 26). Therefore, 
one would be falling short to restrict Gramsci’s concept of hegemony to pure 
economic dominance and power in a neo-realist understanding. Rather, hegem-
ony in a Gramscian sense should be understood as being based on coercion as 
well as consent. A dominant group rules over, but effectively also with, rather 
than against all subordinate groups in civil society (Germain and Kenny 1998: 
17). Hence, in Gramsci’s historical materialism, ideas and material conditions are 
always bound together, mutually influencing one another and not reducible one to 
the other (Cox 1983: 168). When a dominant force succeeds in becoming hege-
monic in civil society and control of the state, this constellation is described by 
Gramsci as an historic bloc. It is a constellation of a temporary hegemonic alli-
ance of a broad bloc of social forces in a society under the leadership of a cur-
rently dominant social force in the economic, cultural and political sphere (Ger-
main and Kenny 1998: 10).  
Gramsci’s concept of the historic bloc implies vital consequences for the 
socialist struggle. First, the political struggle of the working class for socialism 
could not be restricted to winning state power. It has to be extended to the 
whole of civil society (Simon 1991: 28-29). In order to gain control over a state it 
is, according to Gramsci, necessary to win a substantial measure of hegemony 
in the state’s civil society (Simon 1991: 29). Robert Cox (1983: 167) describes 
this entanglement between state and society as a “solid structure”. Gramsci 
himself refers to it as the integral state: political society plus civil society (For-
gacs 2000: 235; Simon 1991: 72-73). With power being diffused throughout civil 
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society, it follows that power constellations are as well embodied in the coercive 
apparatuses of the state (Simon 1991: 73). 
In brief, for Gramsci the constellation of power between different social 
forces in civil society is key for understanding the form of a state and its possi-
bility for change. Civil society is hereby the sphere in which a dominant social 
group organizes consent and hegemony. It is also the sphere where subordi-
nate social forces may organize their opposition and construct an alternative 
hegemony (Simon 1991: 27). According to Gramsci, a coalition of social forces 
can achieve a firm grip on state power if it manages to combine its leadership in 
the economic sphere with the leadership in civil society (Simon 1991: 28). The 
interconnection between political society, civil society and the economic sphere 
implies that power constellations between social forces are embedded in institu-
tions (Simon 1991: 74), including political institutions such as electoral frame-
works governing political representation and access to allocation of resources in 
democratic polities. For Gramsci, the notion of the state only becomes meaning-
ful if it includes the underpinnings of the political structure in civil society (Cox 
1983: 164), and takes into account the position of social forces in the economic 
sphere. In this regard he can be deemed a pioneer of critical political economy.  
 
How forms of states change – or not  
Besides understanding different forms of states, Gramsci is interested in path-
ways to alternative orders; how forms of state can change over time. In this con-
text his concept of organic crisis is significant. An organic crisis is a crisis of the 
entire state system. It occurs when the hegemony of the ruling forces is at risk 
and likely to disintegrate (Forgacs 2000: 218; Simon 1991: 38). Thus an organic 
crisis is a crisis of hegemony (Forgacs 2000: 218). The previously hegemonic 
social group is challenged from below and loses its ability to hold together a 
cohesive bloc of social alliances (Forgacs 2000: 427). As a consequence, a 
struggle aiming at establishing a new balance of social forces will erupt leading 
to a reshaping of institutions as well as the formation of new ideologies (Simon 
1991: 39). In such a situation, formerly subordinate social forces have an oppor-
tunity to build up a broad movement challenging the existing order. They will try 
to shift the previous balance of forces in their favour and establish their counter-
hegemony. Former hegemonic social forces however will strive to build a new 
system of alliances which will re-establish their hegemony (Simon 1991: 39). 
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Gramsci refers to the formerly ruling forces as traditional or conservative forces. 
In contrast, forces striving to change the existing order are labelled as progres-
sive (Forgacs 2000: 218-221).   
A common outcome of an organic crisis is that traditional ruling forces manage 
to re-establish a new hegemony under their leadership (Forgacs 2000: 218). For 
previously hegemonic forces are much quicker in reorganizing themselves than 
rival subordinate forces. They may make sacrifices to slightly adjust to the new 
situation by reshuffling their personnel from their pool of numerous trained cadres 
and by adapting their programmes. To reconstitute their hegemony, former ruling 
forces might also resort to a strategy which Gramsci calls transformism. It implies 
co-opting of (potential) leaders of subaltern forces, either individuals or even the 
absorption of entire groups (Cox 1983: 166; Forgacs 2000: 430).  
Cox (1983: 166-67) points out that transformism is not restricted to human 
beings, but might as well be applied to ideas. Thus, transformism can also be 
used as a strategy to assimilate and domesticate potentially “challenging” ideas 
by adjusting them to the policies of the dominant coalition. This obstructs the 
formation of organized opposition to the existing order (Cox 1983: 167).  
In a nutshell, in an organic crisis former ruling forces have an edge over 
subordinate forces which allow them to reabsorb the power slipping from their 
grasp (Forgacs 2000: 218). An organic crisis can therefore result in an historic 
situation in which a new political formation comes to power through changes 
mainly arranged by former hegemonic forces (from above) without leading to a 
fundamental reordering of social relations. Forgacs (2000: 428) describes such 
a situation as a passive revolution in Gramscian terms.  
However, other scholars interpret Gramsci’s concept of a passive revolution 
differently. This inconsistent understanding of Gramsci’s concept might follow 
from the fact that he applies it to different historical situations. First, Gramsci 
uses it to describe the Risorgimento, an historical epoch during which the Italian 
bourgeoisie achieved power without relying on the masses (from below), similar 
to the French Revolution. Gramsci then extends his concept of the passive 
revolution to other liberal movements of the post-1815 restoration. Eventually 
he also includes fascism, which modernized the economy “from above” by pen-
etrating the political power of the laissez-faire bourgeoisie and the organized 
working class in Italy (Forgacs 2000: 428).  
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In contrast to Forgacs, Simon (1991: 26), therefore, defines a passive revo-
lution as “relatively far-reaching modifications […] to a county’s social and eco-
nomic structure from above, through the agency of the state, and without relying 
on the active participation of the people.” The tenor of academics regarding the 
interpretation of Gramsci’s concept of the passive revolution seems to be, that it 
evolves around the introduction of changes – to whatever degree – by ruling 
coalitions, rather than these changes being driven by popular masses. Thus a 
passive revolution is also described as a “revolution from above” (Simon 1991: 
25; Cox 1983: 166).  
Coming back to the possible outcomes of an organic crisis, there is a third 
potential option besides the successful establishment of a counter-hegemony or 
the re-creation of hegemony under the leadership of the previous hegemonic 
forces. According to Gramsci (Forgacs 2000: 270), a dialectic of revolution-
restoration can occur, resulting in a situation where neither the new nor the old 
forces can triumph. None is capable of establishing a new hegemony. The op-
posing forces balance each other in such a way that a continuation of the con-
flict can only end in their mutual destruction. In the wake of such a stalemate a 
third force might intervene – Robert W. Cox (1983: 166) speaks about a “strong 
man” – subjugating what is left of the conflicting forces (Forgacs 2000: 269). 
Gramsci calls this Caesarism. He distinguishes between progressive and reac-
tionary forms of Caesarism. Reactionary Caesarism describes a situation in 
which the intervening force supports the regressive – former hegemonic – forc-
es to triumph (Forgacs 2000: 270), whereas progressive Caesarism refers to 
the third force aiding the progressive force – previously subordinated groups – 
to succeed (Forgacs 2000: 269).  
The various concepts and thoughts Gramsci recorded in his Prison Notebooks 
relate to state formation and change of forms of states and do not represent a co-
herent or fine-tuned theory of state. However, Gramsci’s work does provide a very 
valuable basis for developing a theoretical framework aimed at understanding dif-
ferent forms of states even today and how these have, and might change, over 
time. The next section aims at developing an analytical framework from a Gram-
scian perspective which can assist in engaging with particularities of states in Sub-
Saharan Africa today and their opportunities for change.   
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2.1.3 A political settlement approach – a derivation from Gramsci’s thought 
A critical political economy (CPE), or a Gramscian inspired approach, is not new 
to debates about statebuilding. However, few scholars explicitly draw on Gram-
sci’s thoughts. In the emergent literature on statebuilding from a CPE perspec-
tive, the concept of political settlement is given a prominent place. Mushtaq Khan 
(1995) developed this concept in the academic area of development economics 
and has shaped the concept of political settlement as it tends to be referred to in 
today’s policy discourse on statebuilding.  It resembles strongly Gramsci’s con-
cept of the historic bloc. Leading scholars, practitioners and institutions in the 
fields of development and peace and conflict studies, i.e., Fritz and Menocal 
(2007), Whaites (2008), Barnes (2009), DFID (2009, 2010), Di John and Putzel 
(2009), Parks and Cole (2010), Brown and Grävingholt (2011), advance Khan’s 
concept of political settlement and redefine it for the statebuilding discourse. 
While there remains conceptual ambiguity as to what constitute political settle-
ments, most authors share the viewpoint that relations of power within a state are 
crucial because they shape the character and performance of formal state institu-
tions. Moreover, all draw attention to the fact that state-society relations matter. 
Despite acknowledging this fact, most authors tend to conceptualize political set-
tlements as the product of negotiations or rather bargains between elites (see 
Whaites (2008), Di John and Putzel (2009) DFID (2009; 2010) Parks and Cole 
(2010), Gleason et al. (2011), Sharan (2011)). Thus, they focus primarily on hori-
zontal quarrels between elite factions. Also David Hulme (2015) critiques that 
today’s political settlement analysis tends to be elite-centered and lacks integra-
tion of civil society conceptually. With current political settlement analysis tilting to 
neglect vertical struggles, which are decisive for linking elites to the wider society, 
these current political settlement approaches stand in stark contrast to Gramsci’s 
emphasized concept of an integral state.  
The next sections will sketch out a rough analytical framework closely based 
on Gramsci’s thought which aims to address this shortcoming. Despite its proximity 
to Gramsci’s work, the presented framework will incorporate phrasings used by 
more recent CPE approaches to statebuilding. It will suggest a definition of political 
settlement; address which aspects to look into while analysing a particular settle-
ment and present thoughts on how a settlement might change – or not. Since the 
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main objective of this thesis rests on analysing social change in Ghana, the ques-
tion when to speak of a new political settlement also will be addressed.  
 
What is a political settlement? 
This thesis conceptualises political settlement as the distribution of power in a 
society between contending social groups and to what extent it is embedded in 
formal and informal institutional arrangements of the state. Khan (2010: 4) in 
contrast defines a political settlement as:  
a combination of power and institutions that is mutually compatible 
and also sustainable in terms of economic and political viability.  
Hence for Khan a political settlement only exists once a balance has been 
achieved between the distribution of power in society and the distribution of 
economic benefits upheld through state institutions. My definition deviates from 
Khan’s in that it does not require a balance between the power in society and 
the power emanating from state institutions. Rather several constellations are 
possible within a political settlement: matching, not matching, partly match-
ing/adapting to changes. A political settlement with a mutually compatible com-
bination of power and institutions is likely to be more stable, but not decisive for 
constellations of power to exist. In Gramscian terminology, a stable political set-
tlement is synonymous with an historic bloc. 
The constellation of power within society embedded in its formal and informal 
institutions of a state characterizes the form of a state. This in turn is decisive for 
how this particular state is working. Political settlements evolve through historical, 
ongoing political processes  in which elite factions – Khan (2010) and Whitfield 
(2011) refer to them as higher-level factions – compete for political power to 
guarantee an acceptable distribution of economic benefits for themselves. The 
term ‘faction’ is in this thesis understood as a social group or sub-group formed 
along politicized societal cleavages. These societal fissures have been engen-
dered by country specific historical social dynamics and in the African context 
form along, for example, ethnic, religious and/or socio-economic lines. The hori-
zontal quarrel between higher-level factions is however just one aspect of this 
process. The vertical relations between higher-level factions and their support 
bases amongst ordinary citizens – lower-level factions (see Khan (2010) and 
Whitfield (2011)) – is another important aspect shaping a political settlement.  
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According to Whaites (2008: 4), elites can rarely take their constituencies for 
granted. Thus higher-level factions compete for political power to gain access to 
resources for themselves and their support base amongst the lower-level factions. 
To highlight the importance of state-society relations, the development literature 
refers to a “two-level game” (Parks and Cole 2010: viii; Whaites 2008: 4).  
Following Khan (2010), I will define distribution of power as “the relative hold-
ing power of different social groups and organizations contesting the distribution 
of resources”. Holding power is partly based on income and wealth – or as 
Gramsci would phrase it, the economic role of groups in society and their material 
capabilities –, but also on historically rooted capacities of different groups to or-
ganize and mobilize individuals in society (Khan 2010). Hereby social groups’ 
capacity to disseminate ideas in society, and ensure that other social factions 
embrace them, plays a crucial role. This reflects Gramsci’s concept of forging 
hegemony – an historic bloc – based on coercion and consent consisting of high-
er and lower level factions (see section 2.1.2). It is perpetuated by the critical 
masses’ contentment with distribution of resources based on the existing power 
relations in the political, economic and cultural sphere. 
It is crucial to point out that different ruling coalitions can reign within the 
same political settlement or even historic bloc. In the case of Ghana, “hegemonic 
elites” are made up of different higher-level factions holding up together one his-
toric bloc. In the subsequent sections, I will therefore use the term “ruling coali-
tion” to conceptualise competing higher-level factions who represent key actors 
forging the same historic bloc.  A change of the ruling coalition as embodied by 
another political party coming to power through an election should not be equated 
with a crisis of, or decline of, hegemony. 
Another key aspect which needs to be included in an analysis of Ghana’s 
political settlement is the global level. Gramsci does not identify the global level 
as a crucial dimension in his writings on state trans- and formation. This is 
probably the case since Italy, the state Gramsci primarily focused on, had a 
completely different position in the international system than Ghana. Further-
more, globalization has taken on a different magnitude since Gramsci’s era.  
Robert Cox applies Gramsci’s ideas on hegemony to the global level in the 
1980s. He argues that power constellations of social forces at the national level 
can transcend the level of the state (Cox and Sinclair 1996: 137). By exceeding 
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the national level, these constellations can form hegemonies at the global level. 
Thereby national power constellations are impacting on power relations within 
the global arena (ibid; Morton 2003: 160).  
With regards to different forms of states in today’s globalized world, it seems apt 
to pick up on Cox’s approach and to turn it upside down, and to take external influ-
ences on political settlements into account (see Cox 1983: 171). Thus, the analysis 
presented in this thesis looks also at how external actors and global structures have 
impacted on Ghana’s internal constellation of powers. Again, it appears adequate to 
give attention to the question as to how far external actors and global structures 
have been impacting on material capabilities as well as the dominance of ideas and 
norms within Ghanaian society and state. Based on Gramsci’s work and his empha-
sis on the interplay between actors, institutions and ideas at different levels, the ana-
lytical framework guiding the analysis of Ghana’s political settlement will orient itself 
on the rough categories outlined in the figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1 Gramscian inspired reference points for the analysis of a politi-
cal settlement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
How do settlements change – or not? 
Given the fact that this thesis aims at analysing social change in Ghana through 
a political settlement framework, the question arises “How do settlements al-
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of power within society change. This could occur in different dimensions: (1) the 
relationship between higher-level factions can change, (2) between higher-level 
and lower-level factions and (3) amongst lower-level factions. So a toehold is to 
focus on the context specific, dominant social groups at these different levels. 
The prime question is when does an historic bloc lose its capability to hold to-
gether its cohesive cross-higher-level faction and societal alliances?  
According to Gramsci, the hegemony of ruling forces is at risk or likely to dis-
integrate if higher-level factions do not live up to the economic and/or ideological 
expectations of those lower-level factions building the elite’s support base in civil 
society (Forgacs 2000: 218). Certain lower-level factions previously propping up 
the ruling forces might break away and realign with other forces in civil society. 
Going a step further, it is also possible that the entirety of lower-level factions 
building the ruling coalition’s support base revoke their backing for the higher-
level factions. Discontent might be expressed through non-compliance with rules 
at different levels of intensity, organization of strikes, blockage of the implementa-
tion of particular policies and, in some cases, violence can be the consequence 
(Khan 2010: 31-32) (see section 3.3.2 for the case of  Ghana).  
Another scenario Gramsci envisions is that formerly subordinate groups 
might succeed in organizing a significant coalition in civil society challenging the 
position of hegemonic elites (Forgacs 2000: 218). This might be the case when 
formerly subordinate groups become economically more important or evolve as 
a stronger ideological force within civil society. In a situation where hegemonic 
elites are challenged in their position from below, they are likely to slightly adjust 
to the new situation. Challenged hegemonic elites will try to co-opt leaders of 
subaltern forces. By including leaders of lower-level factions previously exclud-
ed from the hegemonic elite, they will try to absorb entire groups to conserve 
their hegemonic position (see section 3.3.3 for the case of Ghana).  
As Cox (1983: 166-67) has pointed out, hegemonic forces can also simply 
co-opt the ideas brought forward by social groups gaining strength, in order to 
maintain their position (Gramsci’s concept of transformism). Either way, these 
situations are likely to result in a new political formation coming to power – pos-
sibly more inclusive higher and lower-level factions – without necessarily result-
ing in fundamental changes of the political order and its workings. 
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Besides challenges from the lower-level factions, there also might evolve 
discontent or changes of power amongst and within higher-level factions (see 
section 3.3.3 for the case of Ghana). The recent literature on statebuilding from 
a critical political economy perspective takes this into account by putting inter-
elite and intra-elite quarrels at the centre of discussions on political settlements 
(Laws 2012: 8-11). Disaffection of powerful higher-level factions with the current 
settlement could manifest itself in attempts to push for institutional change aim-
ing at redistributing power and benefits. Strong groups could strive for legal at-
tempts to reverse institutions (Khan 2010: 31), or also resort to violence. If low-
er-level factions are very weak in relative terms to higher-level factions, chang-
es to a country’s social and economic structure can be driven largely by elites 
(see chapter 6 for the case of Ghana). Hence change can be imposed from 
above (Gramsci’s concept of passive revolution) and not only generated, de-
manded or supported from below.  
Gramsci also mentions the constellation in which neither old nor new forces 
– originating from above or below – manage to become dominant. In such a 
stalemate a “big man” might intervene, subjugating what is left of the conflicting 
forces (Caesarism) and supporting either the former hegemonic forces or the 
newly-risen ones to prevail eventually (see section 3.4 for the case of Ghana). 
The specific case study of Ghana presented throughout the subsequent chap-
ters will demonstrate how different elements of the scenarios described above 
can feature simultaneously and consecutively in a given society. 
 
When to speak of a new political settlement?  
Closely linked to the question how a political settlement changes is the question 
“How to identify a new political settlement from a previous one?” and hence 
identify structural change. Relations of power are subject to constant change. 
Therefore every analysis of a settlement will be limited to a snapshot of a cur-
rent constellation of power relations. The potential fluidity of settlements makes 
it difficult to determine their end or beginning. To tackle this issue, Laws (2012: 
24) suggests drawing on formal institutional arrangements and particular events 
such as peace agreements, elite pacts and constitutional change. While all of 
these certainly point to possible changes in a political settlement, not each 
transfer of government within a given political system represents necessarily the 
beginning of a new settlement. As Whaites (2008: 7) points out, changes of 
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government can also be a reshuffling of elites where structures and rules of 
power remain the same. Thus, the question when to speak of a new political 
settlement comes down to “To what degree power relations have to change and 
in which domain?”.  
Following Gramsci’s concept of an ‘integral state’, relations of power can 
change amongst higher-level factions, between higher-level and lower-level 
factions, as well as amongst lower-level factions. Eventually any change of 
power constellation will be reflected in formal and informal institutions of the 
state and their inherent distribution of resources and benefits to different social 
factions. Based on this interlinkage between actors and institutions one might 
roughly think of three different possible scenarios: (1) distribution of power in 
society matches the power embedded in institutions of the state; (2) distribu-
tion of power in society diverges severely from the distributional benefits allo-
cated by institutions and (3) distribution of power in society differs slightly from 
those embedded in institutions of the state, but political society is in the pro-
cess of adapting to these changes.  
Case one represents a political settlement as envisioned by Khan in which 
a balance between forces in civil society and political society has been achieved 
and these are mutually reinforcing each other through their content with the in-
stitutions and their embedded distributive effects. This scenario describes a ra-
ther stable constellation of power relations or as Gramsci would say an historic 
bloc. Yet, the question is how can such a settlement remain sustainable over 
time if power dynamics are subject to constant flux? Building upon the theoreti-
cal concepts outlined so far, a political settlement seems likely to be sustaina-
ble, if the following different aspects apply:   
 
‒ higher-level factions bargain over and agreement on, as well as acceptance 
of institutions reflecting given power constellation – homegrown horizontal 
pact rather than externally prescribed institutions. Higher-level factions’ bar-
gain is thereby not purely understood as formal negotiations, but includes 
as well the informal ongoing quarrel to change formal institutions (e.g., the 
electoral framework in the case of Ghana; see chapter 4 and 6); 
 
‒ higher-level factions have support of their followers based on fulfilling their 
expectations (vertical pact in economic and ideological 
terms/responsiveness as characteristic of state-society relations) (e.g., the 
provision of a minimum of macroeconomic stability in the case of Ghana; 
see chapter 6);  
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‒ horizontal and vertical pact must be economically and ideologically viable 
over time; 
 
‒ political settlement needs to be adaptable, meaning institutions are mallea-
ble. They adjust or rather are altered according to changed power relations 
in society through constant higher-level factions’ bargain/continuous infor-
mal quarrel. 
 
By addressing the characteristic of adaptability of a sustainable settlement, it 
becomes evident that each long-term viable settlement will go through phases 
of slight transitions (scenario 3).  At the same time a settlement is not infinitely 
malleable, so that eventually a new settlement will occur.  
I believe it is important to emphasize and to acknowledge also accumulated 
incremental changes within a state. Therefore I will speak about a new settle-
ment when a series of smaller and/or larger changes in the constellation of 
power in both spheres – political society and civil society – have taken place 
which are going in a similar direction.  However, these changes might not be so 
severe that they transform the political order, the form of the state, and thereby 
revolutionize its workings (see figure 2.2).  A new political settlement can sug-
gest changes within the system or it can imply a transformation of the system. 
Obviously, any boundary one might draw in this context is more or less vague 
and contestable. Conceptualizing a political settlement as relations of power 
which are subject to constant change makes this inevitable.  The breakdown of 
a settlement seems slightly easier to identify than determining the starting point 
of a new one. Hence the first Ghana-specific chapter of this thesis not only sets 
the vital historic context for the analysis, but also narrates the organic crisis and 
collapse of Ghana’s (old) post-independence settlement.  
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Figure 2.2 Change within and of a form of state 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Contextualization: African states’ historical trajectories  
Resulting from the choice of a critical theory approach, I share the view that the 
world does not radically reinvent itself, but rather evolves. A polity or society is 
not born on an entirely clean slate because there is no absolute revolution erad-
icating all that has been before. Ideas, institutions and relationships be-tween 
actors survive and adapt from one era to another. Following Gramsci, I ascribe 
historically grown structures great importance and believe that a scholar who 
wishes to understand the present must know something about the past. The 
second section of this chapter is therefore devoted to sketching out the broader 
historical context of state formation in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Thereby it contextu-
alises the above outlined analytical framework of political settlement as well as 
the subsequent case study of the Ghanaian state. What follows does neither 
aim at providing a brief outline of African history, nor a critical summary of the 
state of the art of the academic discourse on the “African state”. Given the var-
iation and complexity of African states and societies, the following section simp-
ly aspires to extract relevant themes and patterns of African history that help to 
understand the development of salient social cleavages and dynamics of state 
formation and their repercussions on statebuilding processes in Africa today.  
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2.2.1 Structures and institutions  
Many contemporary challenges of statebuilding in Africa stem from changes 
associated with the establishment of colonial rule (Iliffe 2007: 267). As far-
reaching as colonial legacies are, socioenvironmental structures, institutions, 
ideas and dominant groups of actors, which have evolved over millennia of pre-
colonial African history, influenced the colonial experience and continue to be a 
powerful force shaping postcolonial African states (Reid 2012: 297; Iliffe 2007: 
267; Herbst 2000: 28-29). 
Prior to European colonization, Africa had an extensive history of precoloni-
al polity formation (Iliffe 2007: 71-82). Historians and anthropologists demon-
strate the vast variety and complexity of precolonial African political systems 
and challenge the notion that political complexity only exists in hierarchical, cen-
tralized polities (see McIntosh 1999). Despite significant diversity of precolonial 
African polities, scholars tend to distinguish broadly between two types of pre-
colonial political organization: (1) so called decentralized, amorphous, seg-
mented or “stateless” political systems; and (2) centralized polities (Reid 2012: 
25; Iliffe 2007: 71-82).  
Low population densities combined with the production of relatively small 
economic surpluses, led to the fact that during most of Africa’s precolonial histo-
ry a significant portion of African people lived in social formations based on lin-
eage (kinship) with no single centre of power (Shumway 2013;  Iliffe 2007: 71). 
Rather, decentralized precolonial political systems were characterized by dif-
fuse and multicentric power structures. Examples of such precolonial polities 
are the one of the Igbo people, who live in today’s Southeast Nigeria (Reid 
2012: 25; Mamdani 1996: 41), or the precolonial Bunyoro-Kitara polity based in 
today’s Western Uganda (Robertshaw 1999: 124). Africa’s heterarchical pre-
colonial political structures indicate pathways to political organisation, in which 
overlapping and decentralized political institutions are integrated by forms of 
corporate power that withstand, or at least curb, the evolution of social hierarchy 
(Monroe 2013: 20; Crumley 1995). Many of these polities were characterized by 
independent village governments led by groups of elders (Davidson 1994: 70). 
The strength of kinship (family-ties), combined with a shared language and be-
liefs that bound people to their rulers – or to their ancestral shrines and spirits – 
as well as age-grades, served as “cement” uniting a community’s numerous 
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families or family-groups into one polity (ibid). Shared ritual practice and sym-
bolism – which scholars label as “creative power” – were vital elements for fos-
tering and maintaining social cohesion within segmented political systems (see 
Monroe 2013: 20; Maret 2012: 315-318). 
At the same time, the continent was also home to centralized precolonial 
political systems like the kingdoms of the Asante (parts of today’s Ghana), Luba 
(today’s Southern Democratic Republic of Congo) and Great Zimbabwe (de 
Maret 2012: 316). Some heterarchical polities evolved over time into more cen-
tralized political organizations such as the Zulu state (Reid 2012: 65-71). Long-
distance and transcontinental trade enabled Africans in some cases to recast 
segmented polities into hierarchical (militaristic) empires (Iliffe 2007: 188). Also 
the adoption of Christianity and Islam – which provided a unifying religious ide-
ology, e.g., for the empire of Aksum (situated in today’s Ethiopia) or the king-
doms of Mali and Songhay – triggered occasionally a reconfiguration of pre-
colonial polities (see Monroe 2013: 23-27).  
While external influence introduced new forces to the process of state for-
mation in Africa, these did not supersede the old. Rather they interacted, collid-
ed, and sometimes coalesced with the old forces into a new political order (Iliffe 
2007: 189). The incorporation of ideas and resources acquired through trans-
continental trade into African elites’ indigenous political strategies was a vital, 
but not the only, path towards centralized African polities (Monroe 2013: 20). 
There are undeniably autochthonous origins of centralised polities across the 
continent (Monroe 2013: 17). The vast amount of diverse socio-political and 
environmental circumstances gave birth to different state forms in Africa. These 
differed not only amongst each other, but also immensely from their European 
counterparts at the time. 
Today’s notion of the concept of the state is strongly linked with control of 
territory (Herbst 2000: 36). From a European historical perspective, this empha-
sis is unsurprising. In the 15th century, population density began to increase 
significantly in Europe. As a result, land became scarce and European nations 
began to fight for it (Herbst 2000: 15). The continuous aggressive competition 
for territory compelled leaders to maintain a secure area – the political core (cit-
ies) – plus a fortified buffer zone (rural areas), which would in case of loss, help 
to protect the centre. Through establishing direct rule in the buffer zones, Euro-
 27 
 
pean leaders were capable of securing, but also of expanding, the borders of 
their states. This approach not only helped to protect the state from its external 
competitors, but contributed at the same time to the internal consolidation of an 
hegemonic state (Herbst 2000: 14). The increase of population density altered 
the European political geography and made it crucial for the core political areas 
to physically control their hinterland. Successful European statebuilding was 
accordingly characterized by far-reaching links between the cities and their sur-
rounding rural territories (ibid.). This Eurocentric conceptualization of the state 
as a centralized, hierarchical bureaucracy tends to dominate the current dis-
course on statebuilding processes and related policy debates. 
In contrast, land was plentiful in pre-colonial Africa and compared to Eu-
rope, China or Japan the continent was sparsely populated (Iliffe 2007: 1-2 and 
71; Herbst 2000: 37). Consequently, territorial competition was not a main con-
cern. In addition to the abundance of land, African farmers mainly relied on rain-
fed agriculture for cultivation rather than irrigation systems (Iliffe 2007: 1). Thus, 
they hardly invested in any specific piece of farmland (Herbst 2000: 38). The 
combination of large amounts of open land and rain-fed agriculture meant that 
control of territory was often uncontested because it was easier and cheaper to 
flee from rulers than to fight them (Herbst 2000: 39; Iliffe 2007: 71; Clapham 
1999: 29). Africa’s divergent political geography had a significant impact on the 
formation of its pre-colonial polities (Herbst 2000: 57). Rather than broadcasting 
power from the core to the hinterland, power was perceived as a series of con-
centric circles radiating out from the core (Herbst 2000: 45; Clapham 1999: 29). 
Emphasis was placed on the political centre and physical control tended to di-
minish over distance (Herbst 2000: 56; Iliffe 2007: 72). Permanent, precisely 
defined boundaries were therefore rare for precolonial African polities and con-
stant movement in terms of population resettlement was common practice.  
Opposing political geographies have resulted in different state forms in Africa 
and Europe. A Eurocentric conceptualization of the state tends to ignore the di-
verse array of political contours of precolonial African polities (Monroe 2013: 21; 
Davidson 1994: 69). It fails to acknowledge that precolonial African elites drove 
the process of state formation by adapting to and manoeuvring divergent socio-
environmental conditions (Monroe 2013: 20). They resorted to various modes of 
power which shaped the form of their polities (Monroe 2013: 17). The Eurocentric 
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conceptualisation of the state which is shaping the model of statebuilding policies 
today, misses implied repercussions vital for understanding processes of 
statebuilding in contemporary Africa  (see also Herbst 2000).  
 
2.2.2 Norms and ideas  
Because our emphasis on agency was to the exclusion of institutions, we failed to his-
toricize agency, to understand the extent to which colonial institutions did shape the 
agency of the colonized  
Mamdani, Beyond Settler and Native as Political Identities:  
Overcoming the Political Legacy of Colonialism  
From precolonial to colonial times there was no fundamental break in the way 
power was exercised on the African continent (Herbst 2000: 61). Colonial rulers 
faced the same political geography as African rulers had centuries before (Iliffe 
2007: 193; Herbst 2000: 29-30). However, the colonialists’ strategy to rule in 
and over the African continent engendered long-lasting identities which shaped 
and amplified social cleavages in Africa (Reid 2012: 218-221).   
After the slow European intrusion into Africa during the 19th century, Europe-
an powers had partitioned the continent into demarcated territorial spheres of 
interests by the early 1900s (Davidson 1994: 5). Driven by expectations to gain 
long-term advantages from acquired colonies, European powers strove to estab-
lish territorial hegemony within the political units they had created through fixed 
and arbitrary frontiers (Reid 2012: 117; Iliffe 2007: 203). Because Europeans fo-
cused on maximizing their own benefits, colonial administration was established 
as cost-effectively as possible. The resulting modes of colonial governance dif-
fered considerably across the continent (see Reid 2012). Yet, with a comparative-
ly small physical presence on the continent and faced with the task to exert au-
thority over vast, inhospitable territories marked by low population density, colo-
nial officials could not avoid relying on African agents (Iliffe 2007: 205).  
The British established “indirect rule” as the mode of colonial governance, 
which relied on chiefs as vital pillars of the administrative structure. But not only 
British colonial states’ needed fixed, delineated identities for administrative pur-
poses. Hence, colonial powers strove to develop “tribes” as rigid categories for 
Africans (Reid 2012: 219; Davidson 1994: 70). Often, such tribal identities be-
came formalized, e.g., by attributing peoples’ particular characteristics and 
grouping them to live in territorially demarcated areas (Reid 2012: 219). This 
created – while far from being entirely identical – a strong overlap of regional 
settlements and ethnic identity in postcolonial states.  
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Many invented tribal identities – Akan, Fulani or Yoruba – were extensions of 
groupings which had their roots in the precolonial past (ibid.). From the early 
1900s, the Akan of the Gold Coast was an opportune meta-ethnicity. It consisted 
of several precolonial peoples – amongst them Asante, Akyem, Fante – whose 
members would not have recognized the denotation “Akan” just a few decades 
earlier (Reid 2012: 220). Also the Fulani had been (re)invented as a tribe in the 
early 20th century. Colonial powers defined the “Fulani tribe” to span various 
smaller amorphous and highly fluid identity groups, scattered across the West 
African Savannah, who had never perceived themselves as one community shar-
ing a polity (ibid.). Missionaries who reduced numerous dialects into fewer written 
languages, each of which allegedly defining a tribe, were also influential in 
(re)forming identities (Iliffe 2007: 239). Thus, people “became” Yoruba or Ewe 
through shared language (Reid 2012: 220). By combining communities to a few 
tribes under invented paramount chiefs – examples are the Igbo (today’s Eastern 
Nigeria) and Nyakyusa people (today’s Southern Tanzania and Northern Malawi) 
(see Davidson 1994: 70-71) – through which colonial powers sought to govern, 
colonialism lastingly invented or re-shaped African ethnic identities (Reid 2012: 
218). However, in this process African agency was crucial as well.  
Indigenous elites saw the advantages of adopting the tribal idea because 
they could use the larger group identity as a means of gaining access to re-
sources and political power within colonial systems (Reid 2012: 219). As a re-
sult, Africans formed tribes to belong and constructed identities which could be 
shared within defined groups (Iliffe 1979: 324). The colonial policy of 
(re)inventing chiefs as well as Africans’ adaptive response manipulated and 
transformed the political institution of ‘traditional’ authority (Herbst 2000: 91). In 
addition, ethnic identities which had been fluid and pragmatic in precolonial 
times had become rigid and codified (Reid 2012: 221). Africans’ diverse pre-
colonial identities had blended into each other. For people speaking the same 
language might belong to different chiefdoms, while one chiefdom might span 
people speaking several languages. These highly complex social orders were 
simplified by recurrently stressing one identity over others depending on the 
context (Reid 2012: 218; Iliffe 2007: 239). The stiffening of ethnic identities 
combined with colonial divide and rule tactics significantly strengthened Afri-
cans’ political group consciousness along (re)invented ethnic lines.  
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In Rwanda, colonial powers had bolstered a perceived socioeconomic and 
political dominance of the minority Tutsi over the majority Hutu by establishing a 
hierarchical Tutsi monarchy to administer the Hutu (Reid 2012: 221; Iliffe 2007: 
208.). The fostering of power imbalances and socioeconomic stratification be-
tween (re)invented ethnic groups, intensified political rivalry which has shaped 
lastingly postcolonial politicized societal cleavages in Africa. Yet, (re)devised 
ethnic identities were not the only way colonial rule had impacted deeply on the 
continent’s social fabric.  
Primarily concerned with extracting natural resources for home based in-
dustries and agricultural goods, which could not be acquired within Europe, co-
lonial rule also deeply impacted the economic structures of the African continent 
(Reid 2012: 194; Iliffe 2007: 209). In fact, the economic dimension of colonial 
systems was another instrument of social reorganization (Davidson 1994: 27).  
European industries were craving agricultural raw materials such as cotton, co-
coa and coffee, as well as natural resources like copper, gold and manganese 
(DeLancey 2007: 112). As a result, mines were established in resource rich co-
lonial territories, mainly based in Central and Southern Africa (DeLancey 2007: 
112), while African farmers or white settlers were encouraged by colonial pow-
ers to produce cash crops for exports (Reid 2012: 196). Pushing for the special-
ization in one or a few products led to the development of African mono-crop 
and mono-mineral economies. This structure implied the legacy for post-colonial 
African states’ revenue to depend heavily on export revenues which were highly 
vulnerable to fluctuations in world commodity prices. Many traditional subsist-
ence farmers in West Africa switched to producing key export crops (Gordon 
2007: 61). In parts of Kenya, Tanganyika (today’s Tanzania) and Rhodesia (to-
day’s Zimbabwe, colonial authorities supported European settlers in expropriat-
ing fertile land from African farmers to set up plantations for the production of 
agricultural exports (Gordon 2007: 61-62; Davidson 1994: 16; Reid 2012: 200). 
The demand for labour in mines and on plantations was met by colonies which 
had few easily exploitable natural resources or limited potential for commercial 
agriculture. Therefore, colonies such as Malawi, Mozambique and Burkina Faso 
became reservoirs of labour “migrants” (Gordon 2007: 61).  
Initially colonial rulers forced Africans to work in mines and on plantations 
by using chiefs, appointed headmen or the colonial police to round up people 
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and bring them to work (Davidson 1994: 16). After the First World War, howev-
er, African men were pressured into working for European entrepreneurs by 
introducing taxation (Iliffe 2007: 225; Davidson 1994: 17). Faced with the obliga-
tion to pay taxes in money, which could only be acquired by working for wages, 
plenty of young African men left home and migrated across borders to work in 
the mines run by foreign companies or on coastal plantations (DeLancey 2007: 
112). Thereby African independent producers were turned into wage-workers 
(Davidson 1994: 27). They formed a new social group that had never existed 
before on such scale on the continent (Davidson 1994: 29).  
Most African migrant workers had land rights at home and were therefore 
not proletarians forming an integrated class as the working class which had de-
veloped in Europe (Iliffe 2007:  225). As migrants, they had one foot in the 
wage-work of the mines or plantations, but another foot in their village to which 
colonial governments encouraged them to periodically return (Iliffe 2007: 225-
26; Davidson 1994: 29). Over time, short-term contracts gave way to longer-
term ones strengthening not only the development of an exploitative regional 
economy forming a distinct part of the global trade system, but also set the ba-
sis of an urban settled African labour force (Reid 2012: 203 and  226). Steered 
by colonial powers’ economic interests, job opportunities attracted rural dwellers 
and led to the steady growth of towns and cities across the continent, such as 
Johannesburg which was built on gold (Reid 2012: 226; Iliffe 2007: 226). In fact, 
Reid (ibid.) considers the rural-urban migration as perhaps “the single most im-
portant theme in Africa’s modern social history.” 
The focus on commercial agriculture created – especially in territories with 
few Europeans such as in West Africa – another novel social group (Davidson 
1994: 29; Rhodie 1968: 105). While a majority of Africans farmed their own land 
with family labour producing for home consumption and the domestic market, a 
minority of Africans was able to employ wage-workers, cultivating primarily for 
export and reinvesting profits (Reid 2012: 204-05; Iliffe 2007: 223).   The coloni-
al socioeconomic environment generated a differentiation among Africans which 
gave rise to small groups of new economic elites dominating production in, for 
example, the Gold Coast and Nigeria (Reid 2012: 205). Concerned that the 
evolving new economic elite might develop too much market strength, Europe-
ans were generally hostile to increasingly wealthy and powerful African entre-
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preneurs. Moreover, colonial powers were wary that this new group of actors 
might increasingly dabble in politics because they were progressively in a posi-
tion to challenge the existing colonial system (ibid.). Colonial rulers strove to 
curtail the influence of this new social group by emphasizing the instrumental 
role of “traditional” leaders in colonial power structures (Iliffe 2007: 240).   
Indirect-rule colonialism impacted deeply on the power relations between tra-
ditional leaders and their citizens. By reorganizing traditional authority on the ba-
sis of a fusion of power (merging legislative, executive and judiciary power), colo-
nial rulers dissolved the mechanisms and social structures that had provided the 
basis for a balance of precolonial power relationships between ruled and rulers 
(Mamdani 1994: 41-49). Making chiefs accountable to the colonial state, rather 
than to their people, laid the basis of what Mamdani (1994: 43) has coined “de-
centralized despotism”. Moreover, colonial rule had created a segregation based 
on indirect rule in the rural areas and direct rule in urban centres. This “bifurcated 
state” (Mamdani 1994: 18) was not only characterized by “two forms of power 
(rural decentralised despotism versus urban centralised despotism) under a sin-
gle hegemonic authority”, but also by a division of spatially defined rights turning 
urbanites into citizens with expansive rights and rural dwellers into subjects with 
fewer granted rights and extensive obligations (see Mamdani 1994).  
These colonial structures and the introduction of capitalism into the country-
side planted the seed of further social cleavages: One emerged between new 
elites and ‘traditional’ rulers, as the former gradually rejected the authority of the 
latter and challenged chiefs’ symbiotic relationship with colonial rulers. Another 
evolved between farmers and chiefs (Reid 2012: 205; Mamdani 1994: 19), who 
were less and less capable of reconciling their group-based interests (Reid 
2012: 228). High rents charged by a chiefly class of absentee landlords fuelled, 
for example, economic grievances of cotton farmers in Uganda and strength-
ened politicized farmer consciousness (ibid.; Iliffe 2007: 240). In addition, chiefs, 
whose position of power depended on colonial rulers, were perceived by rural 
producers to uphold commercial oligopolies controlled by expatriates who dic-
tated product prices and excluded local producers from the marketing of exports 
(ibid.; for the case of Ghana see Rhodie 1968: 115-16).  
Another layer of social differentiation in African societies was produced by 
the colonialists’ need for trained African subordinates sustaining colonial admin-
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istration (Iliffe 2007: 229-230). For that purpose, a few elitist secondary high 
schools were established in several colonies such as “Achimota” in the Gold 
Coast, the “Alliance High School” in Kenya and the “Ecole William Ponty” near 
Dakar (Iliffe 2007: 230). The elitist nature of colonial education produced further 
divisions within African societies (Reid 2012: 209). In fact, Foster (1965) argues 
that British policy in the Gold Coast was counting on education’s homogenizing 
function for it had promoted the enrolment of the sons of chiefs in the hope of 
co-opting them to the colonial ruler’s side (Svanikier 2007: 120). Yet, the British 
had failed to realize that the “Akan” matrilineal system of inher-itance barred 
sons of chiefs from the assumption of office (ibid.). Besides West-ern-style edu-
cation had not only a homogenizing function and sympathising effect on Africa’s 
younger generation.   
A few Africans graduated from universities abroad, mainly in the US and in 
Europe (Iliffe 2007: 230). It was largely amongst them, that Western-style edu-
cation sowed the seed of political discontent (Reid 2012: 209), leading to a ris-
ing African self-awareness. A younger intellectual elite developed, who chal-
lenged the notion of colonial rule and began to spread the ideas of African na-
tionalism and led the anti-colonial liberation struggle. Many young intellectuals, 
who began to form a ‘modern’ political elite were striving to build alliances with 
traditional rulers to defend and advance their homelands (Iliffe 2007: 240). 
However, alarmed by nationalist movements and anxious to prevent urban poli-
ticians from mobilizing rural support, colonial rulers stressed the role of chiefs in 
the colonial systems pitting them against the emerging younger, modern elites 
(Iliffe 2007: 240-41). In the case of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, an Achimota 
graduate, managed to forge a comprehensive social alliance to oust the British. 
In fact younger, discontented unemployed, which were products of the expan-
sion of Western style education during colonial rule, became a significant force 
in the nationalist struggle (Svanikier 2007: 123). 
Hence, Western-style education was transforming African politics (Iliffe 
2007: 237). For it provided a key dynamic of social change not only as a reser-
voir of skilled workers, but also as a differentiating agent. The resulting social 
stratification introduced new politicized social cleavages and socio-political con-
flict (Iliffe 2007: 229).  
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This section has briefly highlighted some broader trends regarding how colo-
nialism has reshaped and created new forms of identity on the African continent 
through its mode of governance (ethnicity; urban/rural; old/young), impact on 
economic structures (labour/capitalist; modern/traditional elite) and establishment 
of Western-style education (modern elite/traditional elite). The production of so-
cial stratification – or group inequalities – has had a lasting impact on the for-
mation of salient social cleavages in postcolonial Africa. Sali-ent lines of social 
differentiation are relevant for understanding statebuilding processes because 
today’s political parties, interest groups, etc., tend to be organized along the lines 
of segmental cleavages which may be of religious, ideological, linguistic, regional, 
cultural, racial or ethnic nature (Lijphart 1977: 3-4). It is along these political divi-
sions or politicized societal fissures that distributional conflicts and conflicts of 
interests tend to take place in states and societies.   
 
2.2.3 Actors  
The previous two sections present how actors and ideas have shaped institu-
tions; and how institutions and actors have formed norms and ideas relevant for 
statebuilding processes in the historical context of Africa. In doing so key social 
protagonists – in the broadest sense and in a narrow one – have already been 
introduced. The last section furthermore outlines how the creation and reforming 
of identities (ideas and norms) through actors and institutions has led to the for-
mation of new social groups (actors). Hence, it has been sketched out how insti-
tutions, ideas and actors have a reciprocal moulding impact on each other. While 
state formation processes are driven by power struggles within societies (Boone 
1998: 139), this section highlights how ideas and structures emanating from the 
global level have influenced African actors’ position of power within their respec-
tive societies and statebuilding processes in postcolonial Africa.  
Ideas of nationalism and self-rule had taken shape among African elites 
long before the end of the Second World War (Davidson 1994: 74). Yet, the 
struggles for independence were spurred by the weakening of the main colonial 
powers as a result of World War II and by the rising influence of the United 
States and the Soviet Union. Both had taken an anti-imperial stance and had an 
interest in the demise of old colonial empires (Reid 2012: 251-258; Davidson 
1994: 66 and 80). The promise of the Atlantic Charter of self-determination for 
all nations eroded European imperialism and fuelled African elites’ anti-colonial 
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struggle. New, young elites – some of whom had been schooled at higher edu-
cation institutions in Europe and the US – had recognized and capitalized on 
the changed situation. They played leading parts in forming new political organ-
isations pushing for independence through mass politics. Eventually, the new 
global power structures and international norms paved the way for Africa’s na-
tionalist leaders to achieve independence, through compromise and conflict, 
negotiation and violence, occasionally simultaneously (Reid 2012: 249).  
The globally dominant idea of sovereign nation states led to the creation of 
independent African states. Yet, these new internationally recognized states 
were not characterised by internal cohesion and regime viability (Boone 1998: 
129). Africa’s post-colonial polities were marked and maintained by juridical ra-
ther than empirical statehood (Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Clapham 1999: 15), 
with the latter commonly being conceptualized as a hierarchical, quasi-
bureaucratic institution exercising control over most of its territory defined by 
formal borders (Boone 1998: 130). 
For a few decades the post-colonial international order was defined by the 
fight for political and ideological supremacy between the two new superpowers. 
The US-Soviet rivalry and the ideological contest between liberalism and Marx-
ism-Leninism broadly split the continent between the two blocs and impacted on 
Africa in a variety of ways. Despite the US’s antipathy to colonialism, the Cold 
War provided a justification for initiating a neo-colonial era for the European 
powers portrayed their old empires as a bulwark against the spread of com-
munism (Reid 2012: 321). Perceived as a second front, African states became 
the location of many “proxy wars” (Reid 2012: 324). Depending on perspective, 
some African governments fell victim to such superpower rivalry, while others 
also exploited the array of international patronage for their own purposes. In 
either case, external powers were neither concerned with the challenges of 
state and nationbuilding faced by post-colonial African states, nor their empirical 
statehood at the time. Instead, both blocs were primarily concerned with ex-
panding and maintaining their sphere of influence, even by actively supporting 
authoritarian regimes which systematically suppressed domestic opposition 
(Reid 2012: 326). These external interferences in domestic power struggles im-
pacted on internal constellations of power within African societies and on pro-
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cesses of African post-colonial state formation because they often suppressed a 
reconfiguration of domestic power- and state-society relations.  
The collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 symbolised the shifts in global power 
dynamics which changed the international order significantly. With the dwindling 
power of the Soviet Union, the ideology of socialism, which had shaped political 
and economic institutions in its adapted form in Africa, lost its significance (Lö-
sch 1990; Metz 1982). During the post-Cold War period, Western powers be-
came more concerned with human rights, political structures and sound eco-
nomic systems (Reid 2012: 339).  
Economic liberalisation has been a conditionality for loans from international 
financial institutions since the 1950s, but amplified in the 1980s. Since liberal-
ism has ascended as the new hegemonic international paradigm, international 
aid has been increasingly tied not merely to economic liberalization, but also to 
democratic reforms. Most recently since 11/9, weak states or states lacking 
empirical statehood, are perceived and also framed as a security threat. As a 
result, the promotion of statebuilding based on the Westphalian state model and 
further defined as liberal democracy and free market economy, has become the 
remedy for global peace and development (Chandler and Sisk 2013: xx).  
Domestic pressure groups within African states seized the moment of this 
changed international context to challenge prevalent single-party systems and 
ruling elites in the early 1990s (see Iliffe 2007: 299-309). Widespread severe 
economic stagnation since the 1970s had caused crises of accumulation in 
many African states. This impacted significantly on neo-patrimonial rule, a sys-
tem of personal rule held together by the distribution of economic rents to cli-
ents or cronies (Kelsall 2011). The lack of resources was exacerbated by the 
loss of international patronage which previously had been provided largely by 
the rivalling superpowers. Hence, both factors undermined incumbent African 
elites’ abilities to use co-optation and coercion, so that African state authority 
was in many places in dramatic decline. While domestic opposition groups de-
manded political liberalization to open up political space at home to strengthen 
their positions of power within their political systems, incumbent elites embraced 
the re-introduction of multi-party democracy to address their crises of authority 
and to re-legitimize their rule, both domestically and internationally. Soon multi-
party elections that lived up to internationally specified standards were consid-
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ered to be a prime indicator for democratization; and in several African states 
the rebirth of multipartyism marked a change of formal political institutions.  
This process was accompanied by the re-emergence of issues and societal 
cleavages that had characterised multi-partyism shortly after independence 
(Boone 1998: 135). For the continent’s economic and social structures had not 
transformed enough to make democracy easier to entrench (Iliffe 2007: 301). 
As the thesis demonstrates, the process of liberalizing economic and political 
institutions had a significant impact on the constellation of power between dif-
ferent social forces in Ghana. In fact, it had vital repercussions on Ghana’s 
post-colonial state formation process by reconfiguring domestic power- and 
state-society relations. 
 
 
2.3 Methodological approach 
The following section substantiates the choice to rely on Ghana’s 2012 elec-
tions as a window to observe the country’s current political settlement. Moreo-
ver, the concluding part of this chapter outlines in more detail and critically re-
flects on the applied methods used for data collection and interpretation. 
 
2.3.1 Analysing social change in Ghana through a political settlement 
framework 
By choosing a political settlement approach to analyse social change in Ghana, 
one main challenge arose: any outline of Ghana’s political settlement would be a 
snapshot of the country’s internal power relations at a specific point in time. This 
seems to be at odds with my research interest in social change understood as a 
process evolving over a longer period. To reconcile this contrariety, I decided to 
first address the issue of how to analyse Ghana’s current internal constellation of 
power relations. To do so, I was looking for an entry point which would allow me 
to more firmly ground the analysis of Ghana’s current political settlement and my 
knowledge about the workings of the Ghanaian state as of today. 
Throughout my desk research it became apparent that elections are crucial 
events in political cycles, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, because they em-
body the struggle over the allocation of political power and distribution of mostly 
scarce resources. Since recent election times in Ghana have brought the coun-
try’s politicized social fissures clearly to light and have made mobilization capa-
bilities of social groups explicit, I decided that Ghana’s 2012 general elections 
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would provide a reasonable starting point for me as a political scientist to grasp 
current power dynamics in Ghanaian society.  
Scrutinizing the electoral framework provided a starting point with regards to 
which formal institutions to focus on while grasping their inherent distribution of 
power. To evaluate groups’ holding power, it seemed also useful to investigate 
which groups have been successful in blocking, resisting or delaying political 
decisions, reform processes and their implementations. Moreover, I explored 
how these formal institutions assign distributional advantages to elites and their 
support base in society: Who benefits from the existing formal structure?  
Electoral politics in Ghana are also clearly permeated by informal institutions 
such as political patronage. These need to be taken into account to fully compre-
hend the distributive benefits of Ghana’s institutions, power relationships and the 
workings of the Ghanaian state (see Bratton 2010: 104) for patronage systems 
are characterized by mutually beneficial relationships of exchange between une-
qual actors. They provide a political advantage to the more powerful actor and a 
material advantage to the less powerful one (van de Walle 2012: 113; Eisenstadt 
and Lemarchand 1981). Patron-client networks can represent a limited form of 
political exchange by constituting a selective trickle-down system linking higher-
level factions to lower-level ones, or at least factions of it. 
The approach of using elections as a window to observe a political settlement 
however won’t be suitable for every society. In Kazakhstan, e.g, election times do 
not openly uncover social cleavages because the country’s cultural sphere is 
marked by a rather muted and stiff public debate around election time, as I expe-
rienced as an OSCE short-term election observer in April 2015. Hence elections 
do not per se bring to light existing subliminal, simmering politicized social fis-
sures. Rather this is highly context-dependent. With Ghana being currently char-
acterized by a vibrant and vocal cultural sphere, primary research focusing on the 
country’s 2012 electoral politics provided an adequate empirical foundation to 
analyse Ghana’s current political settlement. Because elections have for most of 
Ghana’s post-independence period been a constant institutional feature, using 
them as a lens provided me furthermore with a reference point to assess how far 
there has been any structural change over a broader timespan. 
To evaluate social change conceptualized as a process through a political 
settlement framework, more complexity was added by zooming out and broad-
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ening the analysis. Various institutions across the different spheres (political, 
economic and cultural) – and actors featured at different levels (global – nation-
al (higher- and lower-level factions) were included. By scrutinizing identified ac-
tors, institutions and themes in a widened-time dimension, eventually Ghana’s 
old (post-independent) settlement could be analysed and sketched out. This 
approach allowed for a qualitative within-case comparison of Ghana’s old and 
new settlement. Engaging with the complex “bigger picture” enabled me to ex-
plore larger societal relationships and to evaluate, in a nuanced way, in how far 
these have structurally changed over a broader timespan. In the end different 
knots and dimensions of the political settlement analysis were tied together to 
form the narrative presented in the subsequent chapters.  
After having addressed the thesis’ general approach of how the political set-
tlement approach has been grounded in Ghana’s 2012 elections, the remaining 
part of the methodology section addresses in more detail which data has been 
used for the analysis, how this data has been obtained, how it has been ana-
lysed and what claims are made with the data. Furthermore, I will reflect on why 
the applied methods of data collection and interpretation have been chosen. 
The methodology section concludes by critically setting out the challenges 
faced during the process of data collection and analysis, and engages with limi-
tations of the applied approach.    
 
2.3.2 What type of data has been used for the analysis and which tech-
niques have been applied to gather it?  
The narrative presented in this thesis is based on an analysis of a mix of differ-
ent sources of qualitative and quantitative data, both primary and secondary in 
nature. The collected primary data has been used first and foremost as founda-
tional for the analysis of Ghana’s current political settlement. Secondary 
sources (see bibliography) have primarily informed the analysis covering the 
historical dimension of the thesis.  
 
Semi-structured interviews 
The main source of primary qualitative data gathered for the analysis is based 
on 41 face-to-face, semi-structured interviews conducted during two fieldwork 
trips to Ghana in 2011 and 2012.  The first stay in Ghana served as an explora-
tory trip to get to know the country and its people and to establish a network of 
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contacts in the field.  Furthermore, it allowed gathering of some data a year 
ahead of the 2012 polls and set the foundation for a basic under-standing of the 
Ghanaian state, its workings and society.  
Most of the 41 interviews have been conducted however during the second 
fieldwork trip, which overlapped with Ghana’s 2012 parliamentary and presiden-
tial elections. Interviewees included members across the political, economic and 
cultural spheres, such as current members of Ghana’s political parties, business 
experts, employees of Ghana’s Electoral Commission, Ghanaian citizens work-
ing for the EC during the elections, representatives of churches, national NGOs, 
think thanks and academic scholars, agents of national media (print and radio), 
political youth groups, voters, members of international observer groups and 
individuals of the international community present in Ghana as well as Ghana-
ians working for them.  
The semi-structured interviews focused mainly on events, processes and 
political developments linked to Ghana’s 2012 elections. Questions guiding the 
interviews were adjusted according to the interlocutors’ expertise, so that inter-
view schedules tended to differ slightly for each interview. In addition to ques-
tions covering the interviewees’ area of expertise, topical issues related to elec-
toral politics have been raised with all interlocutors. Another reason for interview 
schedules to be rather malleable was that the procedural character of the elec-
tion itself demanded adaptation. Issues heatedly debated ahead of the actual 
polling day were different from those discussed during and after the elections. In 
order to verify information provided by interviewees, subsequent interlocutors 
were confronted with similar questions. This approach also allowed following up 
on new issues raised by interview partners.  
 
Personal communications  
In addition to semi-structured interviews, numerous personal communications 
during fieldwork in Ghana as well as before and afterwards in Europe (predomi-
nantly in the UK and Belgium) complemented the gathered primary qualitative 
data. Dialogue partners of these informal conversations included members of 
the political elite such as contesting MPs, members and representatives of 
Ghana’s political parties, business men, taxi drivers, citizens in trotros (minibus-
es for public transport), traders and customers at markets, voters during elec-
tion time, security personnel and Ghanaians living and working in Europe. In-
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formal conversations have been another important technique for collecting pri-
mary qualitative data. Furthermore, this method proved to be particularly fruitful 
for triangulating data received through semi-structured interviews.  
Newspaper articles published by Ghanaian publishing houses in print and 
online throughout Ghana’s 2012 electoral cycle and blogs run by Ghanaians 
covering developments in Ghanaian politics more widely, have both been fur-
ther rich sources of primary data. In addition, government documents such as 
bills regulating Ghanaian elections have been referred to, reports of domestic 
and international election observer missions and records of the Electoral Com-
mission giving information about the process of delimitation of constituencies 
have been taken into account.  
 
Unstructured observation  
Besides collecting primary data in written documentation and through oral 
communication/inter-action, further data has been gathered through unstruc-
tured observation (McKechnie 2008: 907-908). Attending rallies of both domi-
nant parties, press conferences of a presidential aspirant and local and interna-
tional observer groups, lectures organized by various societal groups and of 
course the observation of the election days itself, have enriched my understand-
ing of electoral politics in Ghana. Contemplating election posters and banners, 
listening to radio broadcasts and TV shows such as the IEA presidential and 
vice presidential debates ahead of the 2012 polls also fed into the unstructured 
observations made during fieldwork. Participating in voter education seminars 
run by political parties in Ghana and training sessions for the media ahead of 
the elections, as well as in a workshop for political youth, provided further in-
sights into Ghanaian society and politics.  
 
Quantitative data 
A few sources of primary quantitative data have complemented the primary quali-
tative data acquired through a variety of different techniques. These include rec-
ords of Ghana’s Electoral Commission covering detailed election results for 2012, 
detailed election results of previous elections in Ghana’s Fourth Republic pub-
lished by civil society organizations (e.g., Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) 2010), 
reports published by Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) (2012) covering 2010 cen-
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sus data as well as opinion polls conducted by Afrobarometer (2012) capturing 
Ghanaians’ views on society and politics in 2012.  
To substantiate the economic and historical dimension of the analysis, 
primary quantitative data in the form of time series has been gathered from 
international organizations such as the IMF and World Bank. These include 
amongst others IMF Government Finance Statistics (GFS), IMF International 
Finance Statistic (IFS), IMF Balance of Payments Statistics (BOPS) and World 
Bank Word Trade Indicators (WTI).   
 
2.3.3 Data access and documentation of collected primary data 
Based on my desk research before travelling to Ghana, I identified key groups 
on whose views my analysis and narrative was going to build. Guided by the 
theoretical framework and purposive sampling I focused on stakeholders in 
Ghana’s electoral politics (Palys 2008: 697) comprising members of the three 
different spheres – political, economic and cultural. Informants were supposed 
to include members of political parties, representatives of faith organizations, 
the media, think thanks, women and youth groups, business people, traditional 
leaders, individuals involved in the security apparatus of the Ghanaian state 
and representatives of the international community.  
Ahead of and during my first trip to Ghana, I contacted institutions in Accra 
representing mainly the international community. These included British and 
German NGOs, such as political foundations, and diplomatic missions, to 
which I assumed to have, due to my nationality and institutional research affili-
ation, easier access. Most individuals I contacted responded positively and 
granted me meetings and first interviews. These first interactions with mem-
bers of the international community in Ghana paved the way for gaining ac-
cess to their Ghanaian counterparts and project partners.  
Returning to Ghana a year after my first visit allowed me to reactivate con-
tacts established during my first trip. In fact, the core of my interview partners 
was made up of individuals belonging to the previously established network. 
Yet, since my second stay overlapped with Ghana’s immediate pre-election 
period in 2012, identifying new relevant interviewees to discuss electoral poli-
tics was straightforward. Several interlocutors have therefore been chosen 
more randomly outside the previously established network. Attending events 
organized by Ghanaian civil society organizations, which had been advertised 
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in the local newspapers or that I had been made aware of through my con-
tacts, enabled me to establish further contacts. Workshops, lectures, rallies of 
political parties and press conferences provided numerous opportunities for 
personal informal conversations, but also to arrange dates for several semi-
structured interviews.   
Collected textual qualitative primary data included newspaper articles cov-
ering the electoral cycle in Ghana as well as electoral laws passed by the Gha-
naian legislature. Copies of the legislative documents were bought from Ghana 
Publishing Company Limited (Assembly Press) in Accra. Some texts and re-
ports were provided by interview partners to photocopy or occasionally to keep. 
A collection of newspaper articles covering Ghana’s 2012 election cycle was 
obtained by buying a range of Ghanaian daily newspapers during both field trips 
covering editions from The Daily Graphic; The Mirror; The Daily Guide; The 
Ghanaian Chronicle and The New Statesman (Statesman). Different newspa-
pers have been chosen to ensure a balance in input because most Ghanaian 
papers tend to lean towards one of the two dominant political parties.  
The majority of the primary quantitative data has been gathered online. With 
regards to time series published by the IMF and the World Bank, access has 
been provided by the UK data service (2014), whereas data from Ghana’s Elec-
toral Commission (2012) was accessible directly through its webpage in 2012.   
Even though I had not planned to transcribe my interviews and to analyse 
them in detail with regards to nuances in the language used by interviewees, I 
digitally recorded the first few semi-structured interviews. I thought this was 
the best and for me easiest way to document what my interviewees said. Very 
soon I realized however, that interviewees were much less conscious of what 
they were saying when there was no voice recorder present during the inter-
views, even though my topic is not per se a sensitive one. I decided to stop 
recording my conversations and opted instead for taking jottings. In order to 
keep track of my scribbling made during conversations, I tried to summarize 
key points made by the interviewees after each meeting and captured my 
thoughts and comments by writing “field note diaries”. Data gained through 
informal conversations and unstructured observation was documented in the 
same way. After each insightful and thought provoking conversation – or ob-
servation –, I documented them in my field notebooks, capturing as well the 
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time, date and context of the conversation and usually a few notes on the indi-
vidual I had spoken with. The documentation of the qualitative primary data 
filled about four DIN A5 notebooks. 
 
2.3.4 Data analysis  
Thinking is also research.  
Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics  
 
After returning from the field, I was faced with a few recordings of interviews, 
books full of jottings, newspaper articles, reports, legislative texts, figures, pic-
tures and a few video clips. In the beginning the amount of data seemed over-
whelming and finding a starting point where and how to engage with the collect-
ed data was challenging. Re-engaging with the theory underpinning my re-
search reminded me of the core issues I was looking for in my data: constella-
tion of power relations, institutions and actors at different levels and within dif-
ferent, while overlapping spheres.  
At first I was focusing exclusively on the 2012 elections to set a foundation 
for outlining Ghana’s current political settlement. Engaging with the data I was 
looking for reoccurring issues and themes throughout the different stages of the 
electoral cycle: Which groups seemed to be significant; what did their members 
and other Ghanaians say about them; what had been my perceptions? Which 
institutions related to the elections had been altered, why and how? Who was 
involved in these reform processes and what was the view of different groups of 
actors on the implemented changes, etc.?  
The method of data analysis I applied for my primary qualitative data can 
best be described as thematic coding or thematic analysis. After focusing initially 
merely on Ghana’s 2012 elections for the political settlement analysis, over time I 
was able to link identified themes and patterns with my general ideas and reflec-
tions on the workings of the Ghanaian state. I came up with what Miles et al. 
(2014: 95) call “analytical memos”. These are brief or extended narratives which 
document the researcher’s reflections and thinking process about the data. Ana-
lytical memos aim to synthesize themes into higher-level analytical meanings and 
thereby tie different pieces of data into recognizable clusters (ibid.). 
Zooming out to broaden the historical dimension of the thesis, my analytical 
memos incorporated with time my different sources and types of data into a 
broader historical perspective and cohesive whole. A colleague once aptly de-
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scribed them as “little conceptual epiphanies”. I captured them in conceptual 
mappings sketched in notebooks. The knowledge organizer in Citavi was a 
great tool to document and keep track of my analytical memos because it al-
lowed me to link them digitally with my primary and secondary data.  
The process of data analysis has been by no means linear, nor did it seem 
straightforward at the initial stages. Rather it took several attempts, detours and 
one or other meanderings to put the pieces embedded in the collected primary and 
secondary data together, to form the narrative presented in the following chapters.  
 
2.3.5 Reasoning for applied approaches and their limitations  
Having spent time in Ghana immediately before, during and after the elections 
allowed me to observe firsthand Ghana’s electoral politics. The trip a year 
ahead of the polls provided me with the opportunity to witness and experience 
Ghanaian political and social life also in a non-election year. I chose to collect 
the primary data for my thesis through semi-structured interviews, numerous 
informal conversations and unstructured observation because this com-bination 
of data collection methods allowed me to discover key issues and relations. 
These methods provided sufficient flexibility so that conversations could – if 
needed – be redirected by interlocutors to subjects they regarded as most sig-
nificant. Moreover, the applied data collection methods granted me direct inter-
action with interviewees, to dig deeper and address uncertainties whenever ap-
plicable. A predetermined approach such as the survey method would not have 
given me the flexibility and openness needed to engage meaningfully with the 
perceptions of informants towards the Ghanaian state and electoral politics. The 
applied methods guaranteed high content-related validity and increased subjec-
tivity which suited the epistemological underpinning of the theoretical framework 
guiding my analysis best.  
The main disadvantage of the chosen approach is that it was rather time 
and cost intensive. Moreover, the fruitfulness of the content collected through 
interviews depended not only on the informant, but to a large extent also on my 
own experience and knowledge as interviewer. Therefore, the first field trip pro-
vided an important opportunity to gather first experiences in conducting inter-
views in the field. The downside coming along with the flexibility of the approach 
is that I ended up with plenty of data covering a huge range of issues. As a con-
sequence the process of data analysis was, particularly in the beginning, a chal-
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lenge (see section 2.3.3). The comprehensive and rich data was yet indispen-
sable for the hermeneutic qualitative research I intended to conduct, and to un-
derstand the bigger picture of state (re-)formation in Ghana.  
To tackle the challenge of vast amount of data, I relied on thematic analysis 
as the analytical tool (see section 2.3.3). Mills et al. (2010: 2.) ascribe five pur-
poses to thematic analysis:  
It is a means (1) of seeing, (2) of finding relationships, (3) of analysing, 
(4) of systematically observing a case and (5) of quantifying data. As 
sense making approach, thematic analysis is a tactic for reducing and 
managing large volumes of data without losing the context, for getting 
close to or immersing oneself in the data, for organising and summa-
rizing, and for focusing the interpretation. 
The analytical strategy applied in thematic analysis is “gross coding”. It is a pro-
cess of engaging with the data and looking for recurrent topics, themes or rela-
tionships, and categorizing similarities into analytical memos (see section 
2.3.3). These analytical memos reflect the themes emerging from and grounded 
in the data; the result of the analyses is the narrative presented in this thesis. 
This approach seemed powerful to yield insightful interpretations that are con-
textually grounded (Mills et al. 2010: 4).  
Academics critical of thematic analysis as an analytical tool argue the ap-
proach poses a concern with regards to reliability. Following them, thematic 
analysis is susceptible to observer bias as investigators choose how to process 
and analyse the information. This critique however is made from a different me-
ta-theoretical viewpoint than the one underpinning this thesis. As researcher 
with a reflectivist attitude to scholarship, I am neither claiming to conduct abso-
lute value-free research, nor do I strive to present a narrative which claims ab-
solute truth. Rather, I recognize that what I observe may change as experience 
is gained in the setting. Therefore I acknowledge that with experience the pro-
cess of data analysis will change or even needs to be adapted. The research-
ers’ understanding of the whole is continuously revised in view of the reinterpre-
tation of the parts. Prejudice, pre-judgment and prior knowledge plays a crucial 
part in researchers’ understanding and interpretation of data. As a critical her-
meneutist, my task is to make sense of situations and to judge between alterna-
tive explanations in order to present what I deem a reasonable narrative of the 
issue under scrutiny. With the aim of my research project in mind – offering 
nothing more and nothing less than a narrative based on critical interpretation of 
historical and contemporary political, social and economic developments in 
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Ghana with regards to social and structural change – the applied methods of 
data collection and analysis were most suitable. At the same time the applied 
approach entailed a variety of challenges.  
 
2.3.6 Reflections on the process of data collection and analysis 
Choosing the time of Ghana’s 2012 elections as the main period for my field-
work had the advantage that the topic was extremely fashionable and widely 
talked about at the time. Therefore, finding people from a wide spectrum of 
Ghanaian society who were interested in talking to me about events and devel-
opments related to the elections was fairly easy. Yet, it was challenging to ar-
range meetings in particular with higher ranking individuals involved in one way 
or the other in the electoral process – mainly individuals working for state insti-
tutions such as politicians, members of the electoral commission in manage-
ment positions, etc., because they were incredibly busy throughout the election 
cycle. Even when meetings could be arranged with e.g., members of political 
parties, understandably there was always the issue of time constraints.     
On polling day accessing polling stations, observing the counting as well as 
the tabulating process was simple. Due to my gender as well as the colour of 
my skin, my presence and observation of the election process was not ques-
tioned, whereas several Ghanaian voters had been asked to leave polling sta-
tions after they had cast their votes. Only once was I harshly verbally chal-
lenged by a slightly drunk voter asking what right I had to be there. I indicated 
that I would leave the polling station because I did not mean to stir up any trou-
ble. Queuing voters however intervened so that the man left the premises and 
surrounding voters convinced me to stay.  
As a foreigner not fluent in any of the local languages, there was a set limit 
on my understanding of Ghanaian society and political issues. Most heated po-
litical debates in chops bars, the countryside and on radio programmes were 
held in local languages. Having been fluent at least in Twi would have allowed 
me to further deepen my understanding of observed events and processes.  
The biggest challenge however was how to treat the information I was con-
fronted with. Coming from a society in which news is mainly diffused through 
some kind of “official channel”, dealing with mainly oral, assailing and often con-
tradicting pieces of information was a completely new experience. In order to 
somehow distinguish “facts” from “rumours” I tried to verify, or triangulate, in-
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formation whenever possible. When somebody claimed e.g., at a chop bar po-
lice officers had raided the NPP headquarters, I asked a variety of people from 
different strata about their version of the events. Furthermore, I tried to cross-
check the information I had obtained with what had been – if at all – reported by 
different media and publishing houses. As a result of this experience, I am 
aware that my thesis simply presents a narrative based on a mix of various per-
ceptions – obviously also strongly shaped by my own – of political and societal 
events, developments and processes in Ghana. 
I already mentioned that I struggled finding an entry point to the process of 
analysing the collected data and how this has been addressed. Another chal-
lenge arose – which might come as a surprise – with the analysis of secondary 
sources used to cover the historical dimension of the thesis. The majority of 
secondary sources used for this thesis have been authored by Ghanaians. 
Strikingly, plenty of them have been involved directly in politics in one way or 
another such as Afrifa; Asamoah; Ahwoi; Oquaye; Frimpong-Ansah, etc. While 
their writings have provided invaluable insights, due to the authors’ direct in-
volvement in Ghanaian politics, their narratives featured subliminal biases re-
flecting the authors’ political sympathies. Sometimes I was confronted with op-
posing narratives, so that deciding on the historical narrative presented in this 
thesis was not always easy.   
 
 
2.4 Chapter summary 
Chapter two outlines a Gramscian-inspired theoretical framework of a political 
settlement to guide the in-depth case study analysis of this thesis incorporating 
statebuilding and societal dynamics to evaluate social change in Ghana. With 
its focus on historically grown and the unique constellation of relations of power 
within society –  which characterize the form of a state – the political settlement 
approach allows for a much more nuanced analysis and evaluation of social 
change. Thereby it enriches the current academic discourse on statebuilding. 
The presented theoretical framework provides analytical cornerstones for a po-
litical settlement analysis such as formal and informal institutions, actors and 
ideas within different spheres (political, economic and cultural) and across dif-
ferent levels (domestic level: split into higher-(elite) and lower-level factions 
(non-elite) as well as international forces) (see figure 2.1).  
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The chapter moves on to outline the broader historical context of state for-
mation in Sub-Saharan Africa which contextualized the political settlement ap-
proach by highlighting salient societal cleavages and recurring themes with re-
gards to African state formation. These include the dichotomous dimensions 
urban/rural; old/young; traditional and modern elite as well as ethnicity and so-
cial class. In addition, the influence of global forces, both materially and ideolog-
ically are sketched out. These themes and societal fissures, combined with the 
broader analytical cornerstones mentioned above, are guiding the subsequent 
analysis of state (re-)formation in Ghana. The chapter concludes by outlining 
the thesis methodological approach. It reasons the choice to rely on Ghana’s 
2012 elections as a window to observe the country’s current political settlement 
before outlining in more detail and critically reflecting on the applied methods 
used for data collection and interpretation. 
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III. GHANAIAN POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE  
Wiase di adane dane
2
  
Ghanaian proverb 
 
Committed to a critical political economy approach which emphasizes the im-
portance of historically grown structures and power relationships, this chapter 
traces the evolution of Ghana’s post-independence settlement. To grasp the 
historical roots of societal and elite conflict in Ghana, the first section outlines 
key social dynamics under colonial rule. These have shaped Ghana’s politicised 
societal cleaveages most of which continue to form the basis of political and 
social conflict until today. Based on these key prerequisites, the following part 
sketches out the evolving constellation of power in Ghana’s immediate post-
independent state and how these have been embedded and reflected in formal 
and informal institutions. It will be demonstrated how the overtaxation of rural 
productive entrepreneurs in favour of the urban factions’ consumption, which 
characterised Ghana’s post-independent settlement, had assumed by the end 
of the 1970s proportions eroding the country’s economic base. In fact, it led to 
Ghana’s fiscal and economic breakdown and resulted in the disintegration and 
collapse of the entire state system. In contrast, the last section of the chapter 
will illustrate that Ghana’s more recent historical developments provide the 
building blocs for the currently dominant narrative of its image as “African suc-
cess story”. Ghana’s remarkable macroeconomic recovery coupled with its (re-
)democratization process including incumbent presidents abiding by term limits 
and two relatively peaceful turnovers of power through the ballot box, are not 
only exceptional in view of Ghana’s history. These achievements make Ghana 
also stand out in regional comparision and suggest albeit rather simplistically 
that the country has arrived at a new place. Chapters 4 to 6 will critique and nu-
ance this narrative.  
  
 
3.1 Social dynamics and historical roots of elite conflict 
To grasp the development of Ghana’s post-independent settlement in a Gram-
scian sense, this section will outline the social dynamics within “Ghana”3 under 
                                            
2
 Meaning in English: No situation is permanent.  
3
 To implify matters, the thesis refers to “Ghana” while covering the pre-independance period to 
capture al four territories which had been administered separately under British colonial rule and 
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colonial rule and sketch out the resulting historical roots of societal and elite 
conflict. It will illustrate the development of politisized societal cleaveages, 
namely (1) the nationalists against the British; (2) commoners against chiefs; (3) 
youth against age and (4) the manifestation of regio-ethnic identities, most of 
which continue to shape political and social conflict in Ghana until today.  
 
3.1.1 Impact of colonialism  
The territory of modern day Ghana has been home to well-developed precolonial 
political entities with diverse structures of social organization (Hutchful 2002: 103; 
Austin 1964: 2). In Akan society, for example, social differentiation was often 
based on descent, but differed from the type of social stratification created by 
feudalism and the industrial revolution that exists in some societies of the global 
North (Svanikier 2007: 118-19). Pre-colonial Akan society had a long tradition of 
powerful monarchs supported by extensive aristocracies. Moreover, gerontocratic 
principles were underpinning society and conditioning access to power so that 
generation differences were no small matter.  
To accommodate the generational and royal/non-royal societal cleavage, the 
traditional Akan system integrated its “young men” into the political system 
through the asafo (traditional militia), the nkwakwaa (youth or commoners’ as-
sembly) and nkwakwaahene (chief of the commoners) (Hutchful 2002: 107). 
These institutions allowed commoners4 some means of checks and balances on 
chiefly power (Rathbone 2000, Owusu 1986, Austin 1970), which they used to 
have a frequently rebellious impact on the polity (Hutchful 2002: 107).  
The British did not attempt to abolish these earlier indigenous forms of state. 
Rather, the colonial state aimed at accommodating itself to traditional state struc-
tures and usurped their legitimacy for its own purposes (Hutchful 2002: 103). 
Outside the capital and major urban centres it mediated its relationship with its 
subjects through a system of indirect rule based on the legitimacy and physical 
presence of traditional elites (Hutchful 2002: 103; Rathbone 2000: 10). This co-
opting of traditional rulers by the British undermined chieftancy (Rathbone 2000: 
4); in fact it debased and politicized tradition.  
                                                                                                                                
went on to form together the independent state of Ghana since 1957. The four areas included the 
Northern Territories, Togoland, Ashanti and the Gold Coast spanning the Southern coastal areas. 
4
 The concept of “commoners” refers in the Ghanaian context to individuals who were not of 
aristocratic birth (Svanikier 2007: 124). 
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During colonialism “tradition” was far from being static, since the colonial 
state allowed for the manipulation of traditional norms which enabled chiefs to 
cement and augment their power (Hutchful 2002: 106; see Fordwor 2010: 5). 
The policies of indirect rule upset the delicate equilibrium of pre-colonial power 
relations (Fordwor 2010: 4; Hutchful 2002: 108). They had facilitated a consid-
erable shift of power to the traditional elite and linage elders, so that the societal 
fissures along generational lines and the royal/non-royal divide deepened 
(Hutchful 2002: 107).  
While under the traditional system of social differentiation commoners could 
not have hoped to achieve equal political and social elite status as royals 
(Svanikier 2007: 124), a new kind of status system emerged during the colonial 
period. Western-style education became decisive to social mobility (Foster 
1965) which in turn had lasting ramifications for the configuration of political 
power in the independent state of Ghana (Svanikier 2007: 120).  
Coastal merchant families came to form a highly educated minority and the 
nucelus of a professional elite. Some came from Fante aristocratic backgrounds 
or were the offsprings of European merchants and officials (Foster 1965: 68). 
On the ground of their educational backgrounds, this nascent modern elite be-
lieved that it was they who should swiftly be incooperated by the colonial state 
as its local agents. Hence they challenged the authority of the chiefs and their 
political role in the colonial state (Rathbone 2000: 21; Austin 1970: 9). By the 
end of the 19th century, the British preferences for working with traditional rulers 
had however bit by bit excluded the burgeoning modern coastal elite from such 
roles (Rathbone 2000: 21). Unsurprsingly the modern elite began to oppose 
colonialism and anyone they perceived to support it (see Apter 1970: 262-285). 
The colonial state had impacted not only on the position of power of traditional 
rulers, but also played a crucial role in the formation of a nascent modern elite, 
whose social and political mobility was – at least for some – limited through the 
existence of the same.  
Even though it was not common practice at the time (Svanikier 2007: 121), 
some chiefs’ sons and lower ranking royal descendents did receive Western-style 
education to high levels. It was this group of Western educated royals from the 
next generation which eventually helped to form a coalition between the profes-
sional/modern and traditional elite. By the early 1950s these three societal groups 
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– traditional rulers, professional coastal elites and educated aristoracts – formed 
a political alliance which constituted the core of a nationalist conservative faction. 
Soon it was up against another societal group – educated and semi-educated 
commoners – which formed the heart of political elite disunity in independent 
Ghana (Svanikier 2007: 122; see Rathbone 2000: 50).   
The colonial educational system also contributed to the rise of elementary 
school leavers and hence the growth of a faction of educated commoners, some 
of whom obtained education up to university level (Austin 1964: 17). With educa-
tion and occupation emerging as new determinants of social status, educated 
and semi-educated commoners could for the first time aspire to elite status 
(Svanikier 2007: 124). The unprecedented extension of education to common-
ers especially at the basic level created social tensions between established 
elites and commoners, since the economy could not absorb the supply of 
school graduates. There was widespread unrest as some Asafo companies that 
were organised into youth organisations challenged corrupt practices of some 
traditional rulers whose powers were protected by the colonial authority (Svani-
kier 2007). Couped with an increasing urbanization these developments set the 
foundation to undermine colonial rule (Nugent 2012: 14) and paved the way for a 
fierce conflict amongst higher-level factions for control of the independent state. 
 
3.1.2 Manifestation of societal factions  
The experiences during the Second World War, in which thousands of “Ghana-
ian” soliders had fought under the command of British officers, had altered the 
perceptions of black-white relations in “Ghana” (Israel 1987). Coupled with an 
international shift against imperialism and the declaration of the Atlantic Charter 
proclaiming self-governance, these changed circumstances spurred in the late 
1940s the nationalist movement pioneered and spearheaded by “Ghana’s” 
modern elite.  
Besides the social divisions that had emerged through education, economic 
hardship triggered by general inflation and the swollen shoot disease, which 
had infected a quarter of cocoa trees, caused high levels of discontent in the 
Gold Coast after World War II. The colonial government’s policy of cutting out 
cocoa trees to control the disease stirred severe opposition from farmers and 
chiefs (Danquah 2003: 51). In addition, demonstrations of ex-service men who 
had returned and expected to be paid their end-of-service benefits for their time 
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in the British Army added further to unfolding social unrest. This situation aug-
mented feelings of grievance against repressive colonial governance and fired 
the demand for self-rule (Fordwor 2010: 20-23). 
While the colonial government faced severe post-war difficulties, “Ghana’s” 
different elite factions managed for the first time to build a broad societal alli-
ance against British rule. This was possible since the links between the tradi-
tional elite and the colonial government were slowly dissolving due to different 
vested economic interests (see Danquah 2003: 51).  
In August 1947 the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) was formed, as 
the first “nationwide” movement with the aim to see that  
[…] the control of government should pass into the hands of the peo-
ple and their chiefs in the shortest possible time (Austin 1964: 53).  
Amongst the movement’s founding members were professional and business 
cadre like G.A. Grant, R.S. Blay, and E.O. Obetsebi-Lamptey as well as individ-
uals from the upper class with close family ties to the traditional elite. Most 
prominent amongst this group was J.B. Danquah the younger half-brother of 
Nana Sir Ofori-Atta I, the Okyenhene (king) of the Akyem Abuakwa chiefdom in 
the Eastern Region of Ghana (Ghana Nation 2011). Danquah had acted as his 
brother’s secretary before earning a PhD and a law degree in the UK and be-
coming a prominent lawyer (Svanikier 2007: 122). Others included William Ofori 
Atta, popularly called Paa Willie, who was a son of Nana Sir Ofori Atta I (Ford-
wor 2010: 23; Danquah 2003: 52) and Edward Akufo-Addo who was Nana Sir 
Ofori Atta I’s son-in-law (Danquah 2003: 52). A few individuals with non-royal 
backgrounds like Ako Adjei were also founding members of the UGCC.  
To enable the movement to take root apart from the southern coastal areas 
also in Ashanti and the Northern territories, the UGCC appointed Kwame Nkru-
mah as its General Secretary (Davidson 1973: 52). Nkrumah had studied to-
gether with Adjei in the United States and was, in contrast to most founding 
members of the UGCC and like Adjei, a younger educated commoner.  
Due to Nkrumah’s ability to make common cause with workers, farmers, 
market women, petty traders and underpreviledged, he was able to draw many 
more sections of the masses into the struggle for independence (Fordwor 2010: 
19). While initially united in their common cause to achieve self-government, 
soon ideological differences between Nkrumah and the nationalist conservative 
faction became evident. Nkrumah was sympathizing with communist ideas which 
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the national conservative faction fiercely opposed. However, their views also dif-
fered with regards to which societal groups should form the party’s support base. 
Nkrumah was striving for a broad movement of the masses, while the nationalist 
conservative faction believed that it was they who had the responsibility and the 
right to establish the guiding policies, and not the other way around (Fordwor 
2010: 30). One could say that Danquah, consciously or unconsciously, aimed to 
stage a passive revolution to forge a new ruling coalition made up of the educat-
ed upper class and the chiefs, for the time when the hegemony of the colonial 
power would crumble. The nationalist conservative faction seemed to strive for 
directing this process themselves, rather than it being driven by the masses. 
Soon these fundamental differences led to increased tensions between the 
nationalist conservative faction and Nkrumah, so that he eventually defected 
from the UGCC and established the Convention People’s Party (CPP) under his 
leadership in June 1949 (Davidson 1973: 68).  
Hence, the social dynamics under colonial rule led to a reconfiguration of 
“Ghana’s” political elite and its split into two opposing factions: an “elitist”, na-
tionalist conservative faction with strong ties to traditional rulers, and by trend a 
younger counter-elite striving for a mass movement of the common people. 
Both factions were decisively modernist in outlook, but epitomizing two funda-
mentally different conceptions of modernization (Hutchful 2002: 106).  
 
3.1.3 National power struggle and flaring up of regional-ethnic factions 
By the early 1950s the fight against colonial rule was in many respects over 
(Rathbone 2000: 59). It had been replaced by a new main political conflict which 
centred on demands by newly educated commoners for political inclusion and their 
endeavours to seize power from the established elites (Svanikier 2007: 118). As 
the newspaper Daily Graphic proclaimed in a lead article in Feburary 1954:  
Our problems are more of an internal nature rather than an external 
one (Rathbone 2000: 59).  
While the British initially only allowed incremental reforms leading to limited 
forms of self-government, the two elite factions attempted to mould the emerg-
ing post-colonial formal political institutions in their favour. The UGCC strove to 
curtail the influence of the youth in the political process by recommending to 
increase the voting age to 25 and suggesting that a person would only be quli-
fied to vote if he or she owned property in the constituency (Fordwor 2010: 51). 
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The CPP strongly opposed the UGCC’s advances which were in the end un-
successful. With its attempt to belittle the influence of the youth, the UGCC 
alientated exactly the group which was going to represent a huge bulk of the 
voting population (Forwor 2010: 47). Since the CPP had consciously opted for 
and obtained the active support of the masses, and in particular the commoners 
who represented a significant large part of the population, the CPP won comforta-
bly the elections in 1951.  
As Leader of Government Business, Nkrumah gradually worked towards his 
envisaged constitutional changes which strengthened the influence of the mass-
es and further reduced the formal powers of traditional elites (see Fordwor 2010: 
62). As a result of these constitutional changes another general election was held 
in June 1954 (Frempong 2012: 34). Besides the CPP several parties had 
emerged to contest the elections. Most of them were regional in outlook and eth-
nic based (Frempong 2012: 34). These included amongst others the Muslim As-
sociation Party (MAP) and the Northern People’s Party (NPP). The latter had 
been formed by several traditional rulers and modern political elites from the 
Northern Territories, todays Northern, Upper West and Upper East regions. 
Amongst its leaders were S.D. Dombo, chief of Duori in today’s Upper West re-
gion, Yakubu Tali and J.A. Braimah (Frempong 2012: 34). Another regional-
ethnic cleavage was underlined by the formation of the Togoland Congress Party 
(TCP) which advocated the unification of Eweland as an independent polity 
(Smock and Smock 1975: 69-70).5 In contrast, the Anlo Youth Organisation 
(AYO) which contested the 1954 elections represented an Ewe-sub-group cam-
paigning for the Ewe people under British rule to stay within Ghana after inde-
pendence. Solely the Ghana Congress Party (GCP), which was formed in May 
1952 in reaction to the devastating loss of the opposition parties in the 1951 elec-
tions, aimed for a wider coalition. It enclosed the UGCC, the National Democratic 
Party (NDP), defected former CPP members, and a few individuals such as K.A. 
Busia and M. Dowuona (Fordwor 2010: 60). Busia, the older brother of Nana Kusi 
Appea the Paramount  Chief of  Wenchi (Austin 1964: 181), became the Chair-
man and leader of the GCP. Yet, also the attempt of a broader nationalist con-
servative alliance lost the polls against Nkrumah’s CPP.  
                                            
5
 After the end of World War I, the former German colony of Togoland was divided into a British 
and French mandated area, which resulted in the partition of the Ewe people between the two 
differently administered areas.  
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The outcome of the polls reinforced the politicization of regional-ethnic fac-
tions. In September 1954 the National Liberation Movement (NLM) was formed 
under the leadership of Baffour Osei Akoto, senior linguist to the Asantehene, 
King of the Asante people (Fordwor 2010: 65), to voice and remedy the griev-
ances of the Asante in relation to the central government. The movement clear-
ly saw the emerging post-colonial formal institutions as disadvantagous for its 
people and its traditional elite in particular (Akoto 1992: 36-39). Therefore the 
NLM vehemently called for replacing the unitary system with a federal govern-
ment (Parkinson 2007: 107). It was joined in its call for a considerable devolu-
tion of powers by the Northern People’s Party (Fordwor 2010: 68). Moreover, 
the UN plebiscite held in British Togoland – today’s Volta region – on a separate 
Ewe state in May 1956 emphasized the surge of politicized ethno-regional soci-
etal fissures. In light of these apparent regional-ethnic factions, the CPP strong-
ly opposed the idea of a federal constitutional design for an independent Gha-
na. It feared it would query the unitary nature of the “nation” (Fordwor 2010: 67).  
The British were reluctant to grant independence while in the midst of a 
constitutional controversy and attempted to mediate in the power struggle be-
tween the competing factions. Eventually London believed that only another 
election could establish the majority opinion on the constitutional matter (Ford-
wor 2010: 70). Contrary to the NLM’s expectations, the CPP once again clearly 
won the polls and Ghana gained its independence on March, 6th in 1957 as the 
first sub-Saharan African state with Nkrumah becoming its first President 
(Fordwor 2010: 72). The consecutive election results showed how much the bal-
ance of power had shifted from the chiefs and the UGCC’s intelligentsia to the 
youth and commoners represented by the CPP (Frempong 2012: 33). In fact, 
Owusu (2009: 29) points out that Nkrumah’s greatest source of power was that 
he combined in himself leadership in all three dimensions of societal conflict in 
“Ghana” during the 1940s: (1) the nationalists against the British; (2) the people 
against the chiefs; and (3) youth against age.  
 
 
3.2 Ghana’s post-independent settlement  
After having outlined the historical roots of societal and elite conflict in Ghana, 
the following section will sketch out the evolving constellation of power in Gha-
na’s immediate post-independent state.  
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3.2.1 The origin of the “urbanized vampire state”6  
After wresting power from the colonial rulers, the “progressive” CPP faction of 
newly educated commoners became Ghana’s new ruling elite. It continued an 
open domestic power struggle with the nationalist conservative elite faction for 
control of the state. The evolving post-independence settlement was character-
ised by elite disunity, in particular in terms of persisting elite differences in ideo-
logical convictions for Ghana’s political and economic trajectory. The following 
section outlines how the ideological convictions of the CPP faction have shaped 
Ghana’s formal economic institutions and hence the evolving settlement. They 
established an institutionally entrechend constellation of power in which the  
urban areas benefitted to the detriment of the rural ones. The institutionalised 
over-taxation of rural productive entrepreneurs in favour of the urban masses’ 
consumption soon undermined the economic base of the Ghanaian state and 
led to a deteriorating economic situation. Coupled with a systematic marginalis-
tion of the traditional elite and exclusion of the modern nationalist conservative 
faction from the political sphere, these conditions set the scene for a violent al-
ternation of the ruling elite.  
  
Formation of Ghana’s post-colonial formal institutions in the economic 
sphere 
Ghana’s formal economic institutions have been shaped significantly by the 
legacy of the colonial past and the hegemonic ideology at the time. Nkrumah, 
who had been attracted to socialist ideology, envisioned an outright attack on 
underdevelopment through accelerated industrialization as the basis for eco-
nomic growth (see Killick 2010: 37-60). The structural transformation of the 
Ghanaian economy was to be achieved by a rapid expansion of state initiatives 
in production (Nkrumah 1963: 119), since capital accumulation amongst domes-
tic capitalists did not match the resources needed for the intended social trans-
formation (Opoku 2010: 18; Gyimah-Boadi 1989: 225).  
Even though back then socialism was not a hegemonic ideology in the in-
ternational sphere, mainstream development economics of the fifties was at 
many points highly congruent with Nkrumah’s ideas (Killick 2010: 27; Herbst 
1993: 20; Bates 1981: 97). As a result, statism, the view that the state has a 
                                            
6
 See Frimpong-Ansah (1991) and the outline of the concept further below.   
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necessary and legitimate role in directing the economy, either directly through 
state-owned enterprises, or indirectly through economic planning (Looney 2001: 
1475-1480), became the dominant development paradigm, both internationally 
as well as domestically.  
Despite the agreement amongst development economists to attribute to the 
state a central role, there was much less agreement on whether the instrumen-
talities of the state should be largely indirect, by means such as tariff policy and 
the provision of tax incentives, or direct, through administrative controls and the 
establishment of state-owned industries (Killick 2010: 26). With the establish-
ment of the Cocoa Marketing Board (CMB), the British had however already laid 
the foundation for the post-colonial state’s direct involvement in the cocoa in-
dustry (see Alence 2001: 397; Grossman-Greene and Bayer 2009: 5-7). The 
CMB operated as a monopsony. It had the monopoly on buying the entire cocoa 
production of farmers at a price set by itself, and resold the crop to licensed, 
mainly international firms for global trade.  
Given the CPP’s ideological conviction and the fact that cocoa had been the 
state’s main source of revenue since the 1920s, it was natural for the CPP to 
maintain this institution to ensure the state’s capacity to tax agricultural surplus, 
in particular cocoa, to finance government’s development plans (Gyimah-Boadi 
1989: 226). As Nii Moi Thompson put it: 
[Back then, J.R.] the theory was that, in the early stages of develop-
ment, when industries are low, you necessarily have to finance expan-
sion of industry, or the non-agricultural sector, with the surplus from 
agriculture (Thompson in Agyeman-Duah et al. 2008: 56). 
At the beginning the CPP tried to revitalise the traditional small-scale based 
farming sector through the CMB’s farmer assistance programme and measures 
of price stabilization. Over time these functions were de-emphasized and the 
CMB’s ability to accumulate surplus for the state was greatly enhanced (Gyi-
mah-Boadi 1989: 226). The CPP began to stress state-sponsored, large-scale 
mechanized agriculture (Gyimah-Boadi 1989: 224). State farms were estab-
lished and the state’s control over agricultural production and marketing was 
further expanded by the creation of more parastatals like the Agricultural Pro-
duce Marketing Board and the Timber Marketing Board (ibid.).  
The increased control over the country’s most crucial economic sector was 
also a means to secure the ruling forces’ hegemony. State-controlled structures, 
especially with regards to the cocoa industry, allowed pre-empting of political 
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opposition from the rural areas in general, and the dominant cocoa growing 
Ashanti region, stronghold of the NLM opposition in particular (see Gyimah-
Boadi 1989: 225; Bates 1981: 109-110). In fact, Nkrumah managed to ward off 
the NLM’s threat to unseat the CPP by channelling vital loans and access to 
subsidized inputs through neopatrimonial networks like the CPP’s farmers’ wing 
UGFC. This practice had soon eroded Ashanti cocoa farmers’ support for the 
NLM (Bates 1981: 110).   
To fulfil its ambitious developmental promises, which were supposed to 
provide legitimacy for the regime (Nugent 2010: 49), the CPP had to shift re-
sources from the productive – agricultural – sector. These were used to expand 
state services such as medical and educational facilities; the provision of infra-
structure such as roads, railways and the construction of Tema harbour and the 
giant Akosombo Dam, which gave Ghana strategic control over its energy re-
sources and formed part of the industrialisation plan (Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 
97). The big push in state-led development was however only partly financed by 
the produced agricultural surplus and taxation of cocoa. Nkrumah’s large state 
investments and related high imports were also financed by foreign currency 
reserves (see table 3.2.1 column 8) left by the colonial regime7 and regular 
large budget deficits (see table 3.2.1 column 6 and 7; Jonah 1989: 96; Esseks 
1975: 38; Bates 1981: 101). Ghana’s foreign currency reserves were soon de-
pleted so that the CPP government resorted to domestic borrowing (see table 
3.2.1 column 10)  to fund its twin deficit, the negative balance of payments (see 
table 3.2.1 column 3 and 5) and increasing budget deficits (Esseks 1975: 38-
39). Above all, the international price for cocoa was decreasing in the immedi-
ate independence period, so that Ghana’s external terms of trade deteriorated 
and foreign currency became an even scarcer good (see figure 3.1 and table 
3.2.2 column 3). 
                                            
7
 According to Jonah (1989: 96) the county’s foreign currency reserves dropped from £211,165,000 
in 1955 to £182,622,000 in 1957 and to £150,280,000 in 1960. 
  
 
Table 3.1 Indicators of Ghana’s economic decline (I) 
     Fiscal policy External sector Money & inflation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Year Population 
in million 
Exports 
fob  
in mil-
lion Ce-
di 
Cocoa 
exports  
in 
million 
Cedi  
Imports 
cif in 
million 
Cedi 
Revenue 
current 
prices in 
million 
Cedi 
Expenditure 
current 
prices in 
millions 
Cedi 
Net re-
serves 
ratio to 
GDP 
Measure of 
over- or un-
dervaluation 
base 1960 (%) 
Money 
supply 
change 
over previ-
ous year 
(%) 
Rate of 
inflation 
(%) 
1955 
 
191 131 176 128 141 35.3 4.0 8.5 0.5 
1956 
 
173 102 178 99 118 32.4 2.2 4.4 4.1 
1957 6.2 183 102 193 120 114 25.9 1.7 -10.6 1.0 
1958 6.4 209 125 169 133 151 25.4 0.2 -7.3 0.0 
1959 6.6 226 138 226 140 174 23.7 0.0 13.6 2.9 
1960 6.8 246 133 296 167 224 21.2 0.0 11.4 0.9 
1961 6.9 244 139 326 144 207 12.2 -0.1 15.4 6.2 
1962 6.9 240 134 270 157 253 12.9 4.1 13.3 5.9 
1963 7.0 234 136 290 170 269 12.1 7.4 0.0 5.6 
1964 7.4 247 136 283 254 365 5.5 22.1 41.2 15.8 
1965 7.7 251 135 392 284 371 -0.5 45.4 0.0 22.7 
1966 7.9 222 117 298 231 273 -1.8 60.3 4.2 14.8 
Source: Frimpong-Ansah (1991: 160-169) 
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To gain more control over trade and the allocation of the state’s scant foreign 
exchange resources, the CPP established an import licensing system – with tariffs, 
quotas, exchange control and import bans – as well as rigid foreign exchange poli-
cies (Esseks 1975: 38; Opoku 2010: 19). This rationing regime gave the govern-
ment even more allocating power with regards to scarce and hence well sought 
after goods which strengthened informal institutions such as neopatrimonial net-
works (Opoku 2010: 19). Besides controlling the country’s expenditure of its foreign 
currency, the government funded its budget deficits by interfering in the monetary 
policy of the Central Bank. This practice of domestic borrowing caused Ghana’s 
money supply to grow and set in motion an inflationary spiral greatly compounded 
by the fact that too much money was chasing too few goods (see table 3.2.1 col-
umn 10 and 11; Sowa 1989: 124; Esseks 1975: 39). A deliberately kept fixed ex-
change rate, guaranteed an overvalued Cedi, which in turn upheld the price for 
Ghanaian cocoa on the world market artificially. The loss of competitiveness and 
burden of decreased world prices for cocoa, which had been entirely passed on to 
farmers, eroded farmers real income and caused them to reduce cocoa production 
and investment (see table 3.2.2 column 2 and 4; Opoku 2010: 19; Herbst 1993: 20; 
Esseks 1975: 42). The costs to the farmers resulting from the overvalued Cedi en-
abled the country however to continue purchasing artificially cheap imported goods 
such as food, clothes and consumer goods which benefited predominantly the ur-
ban population (Herbst 1993: 61).  
Figure 3.1 Development of the international price for cocoa, 1960-1985 
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                   Table 3.2 Indicators of Ghana’s cocoa sector (I) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Year 
Cocoa 
production 
in tons 
International 
price for 
cocoa  
(in $/kg, real 
2010$) 
Real pro-
ducer 
price  
(in 1972 
NC) 
1955   799 
1956   733 
1957   679 
1958   598 
1959   560 
1960  3.076972 546 
1961 415,200 2.452238 539 
1962 428,100 2.303734 501 
1963 427,800 2.830320 420 
1964 580,500 2.555764 351 
1965 415,800 1.828495 278 
1966 381,100 2.498808 294 
Source: (1) FAOSTAT (2015); (2) World Bank GEM  
Commodities (2014); (3) Stryker et al. (1990: 101) 
To implement the state-led import substituting industrialization project and hence 
the highly protectionist trade policies, the CPP government expanded its parasta-
tal institutions, whereby it further increased the state’s involvement in the coun-
try’s economic sphere. These institutions did not only enforce the new trade re-
gime of import restrictions, they also provided employment for urban dwellers. In 
fact, the urban population soon benefited not only from the overvalued Cedi, but 
also from the government’s padding of state-owned enterprises with as many 
surplus workers as possible; further job opportunities in a ballooning civil service; 
subsidies on fuel and the provision of government services not usually available 
to the rural population (Herbst 1993: 61; Opoku 2010: 18-19).  
In short, Ghana’s post-colonial formal economic institutions complemented 
by informal ones as concomitants of the rationing system (see Opoku 2010: 19), 
embodied an institutionalised urban bias to the detriment of rural factions in 
terms of the allocation of costs and benefits.   
 
CPP assigns traditional elite its place in the emerging post-colonial politi-
cal settlement 
The political institutions were further moulded by the CPP in the post-colonial 
period. While Nkrumah had already begun to curb the power of chiefs through 
reforming local governance in the early 1950s, following independence the CPP 
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launched an attack on the remaining formal authority of the traditional elite 
(Ninsin 1989b: 167-68; Smock and Smock 1975: 229). The Local Government 
(Amendment) Act of 1959 removed all chiefs from local and municipal councils 
and through the Court Act of 1960 magistrates replaced chiefs and elders as 
Chairman of local courts. Both laws contributed to stiffening the political mar-
ginalization of chiefs. In addition, the Chiefs Recognition Amendment Act of 
1959 confirmed government’s authority to approve or withdraw recognition from 
chiefs. It even gave government the power to send chiefs into exile from their 
traditional states (Smock and Smock 1975: 229). Hence the law could easily be 
used as an instrument to rebuke chiefs in opposition to the regime and to re-
ward supporters (ibid.). 
Driven by the fact that some powerful chiefs were financially backing and form-
ing part of the political opposition confronting the CPP, the government also aimed 
to undermine their independent economic base (Ninsin 1989b: 168). Between 
1958 and 1962 a series of laws were enacted that gave the state power over 
communal and other lands; power to authorize the acquisition and use of such 
lands for either private or public purposes; and to control the collection and use of 
stool revenue. By the early 1960s the CPP had ensured an increased dependency 
of traditional authorities on, and their subordination to, the state (ibid.).  
The economic marginalization of chiefs coincided with Nkrumah’s advances 
to modernize the agricultural sector under the aegis of the state. However, there 
was not only the need to secure land, previously under the control of chiefs, for 
large state farms, but also for the emerging class of domestic entrepreneurs 
aligned with the CPP who needed land for a wide range of industrial and com-
mercial purposes (Ninsin 1989b: 169). Those activities concentrated on the tim-
ber industry that had been dominated by foreigners, but also covered growing 
demands for urban lands for real estate development (Ninsin 1989b: 169-70). 
The passing of the Land Development Protection of Purchasers Act of 1962 
(Act 2) the CPP ensured that the rights of the “new class” of urban landlords 
were protected (Ninsin 1989b: 170). 
Fundamental change to strengthen the position of small scale farmers, who 
were largely depended on access to land and remained after all the country’s 
main productive entrepreneurs, were not rigorously implemented. From the 
CPP’s point of view dispossessing the traditional political elite enabled the party 
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to break their hegemony and move the regime a step further towards gaining 
leadership in the economic sphere as well as within the polity’s cultural sphere.8   
 
Increasing centralization of power – exclusion of opposition factions 
To consolidate the CPP’s hegemony in the political sphere, the regime passed a 
series of legislation depriving the already weak opposition forces of its remaining 
power and rights. Nkrumah regarded the ethnic based opposition parties not only 
as a threat to his own power, but also to the national unity of Ghana. Therefore the 
CPP government adopted the Avoidance of Discrimination Act which banned any  
organisations […] engaging in tribal, regional, racial or religious prop-
aganda to the detriment of any other community, or securing the elec-
tion of persons on account of their tribal, regional, or religious affilia-
tions (Government of Ghana 1957).  
Busia condemned the law in the parliamentary debate by stating  
Our problem is one of nation-building, and you do not do it by repres-
sive legislation, but leaving parties and policies to the choice of the 
people (Fordwor 2010: 80).  
The bill however did not crush the opposition; rather it led to its reorganization. 
The GCP, the NLM, NPP, TCP, MAP and AYO formed an alliance under the roof of 
the United Party (UP) with Busia as its leader (Fordwor 2010: 81). The bond of the 
new party with the traditional elite was expressed in its manifesto which proclaimed: 
[…] to uphold and maintain the institution of chieftaincy and the rights 
of people to their lands; and to ensure that the chiefs play a democratic 
and effective part in the development of Ghana […] (Fordwor 2010: 83). 
The power struggle in Ghana’s political sphere continued, and laws like the 
Emergency Powers Act formed the legal basis for the CPP regime to suppress, 
harass and persecute members of the opposition epitomizing the nationalist con-
servative faction (Fordwor 2010: 85-86). In 1958 Amponsah, the General Secre-
tary of the UP, was detained based on (inconclusive) charges of plotting the as-
sassination of Nkrumah. With the regime’s firm grip on the mass media (see 
Fordwor 2010: 98-99), campaigns to intimidate and discredit members of the op-
position were easily arranged (Fordwor 2010: 86). The persecution worsened to 
the extent that Busia fled into exile to the Netherlands in 1959. In his absence his 
seat in parliament was declared vacant and was filled following a questionable 
by-election with a CPP candidate (Fordwor 2010: 88).  
With the UP’s leader forced into exile and its General Secretary in prison, the 
opposition once again had to reorganise itself (ibid.). Simon D. Dombo, leader of 
                                            
8
 For a detailed analysis of the CPP’s commitment to eliminate chiefly power see Rathbone (2000). 
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the Northern People’s Party and chief of Douri Na in the Upper Region (Daily 
Guide 2010), was elected as the UP’s new leader, and Joe Appiah, a “young” 
Western educated Asante aristocrat became the UP’s new General Secretary. 
While the UP continued to its best ability to counterbalance the CPP, Nkrumah 
moved towards further institutionalizing his position of power in the political 
sphere by transforming Ghana into a Republic. In April 1960 the CPP put to vote 
a new constitution which combined the positions of Head of State and Head of 
Government (Fordwor 2010: 90). Naturally the UP opposed the move and sug-
gested adopting a system under which the position of Head of State would rotate 
amongst senior traditional chiefs of the various ethnic communities (ibid.).  
With its mobilizing party auxiliaries, such as the Trades’ Union Congress (TUC), 
United Ghana Farmers’ Council (UGFC), Young Pioneers, and the National Council 
of Ghana Women (NCGW) (Smock and  Smock 1975: 217-219; Tsikata 1989: 77-
80), the CPP had established however a solid institutional network reaching in and 
impacting on Ghana’s cultural sphere. This mobilization capacity assisted in ensur-
ing Nkrumah's victory in the plebiscite and the presidential race against Danquah 
which was held alongside the referendum. The centralization of power and exclusion 
of the nationalist conservative faction from the political sphere reached its peak with 
the amendment of Ghana’s constitution to become a one-party state. The outcome 
of the 1964 referendum confirmed the CPP as sole legal party with 99,9% “Yes” 
votes and no single “No” vote from the Ashanti region, the opposition’s stronghold 
(Frempong 2012: 36). Afrifa reports on the referendum as follows:  
[…] There was the incident of the fraudulent referendum in January 1964. I 
was horrified that in places like Kumasi the Convention People’s Party re-
ceived 100 per cent vote of confidence. I knew people who had voted 
“No”. A cousin of mine, who was a Returning Officer in one of the constit-
uencies, told me that before the election he was instructed by the Region-
al Commissioner that before the votes were counted all the “Nos” were to 
be either destroyed or transferred into the “Yes” ballot box. Irregularities 
and malpractices were rampant. There was the particular case of a man 
who voted eight times, he walked in, voted, came out, collected another 
paper, voted, and in fact spent the best part of the day just voting […] 
(Afrifa 1966: 94).
9
  
As a consequence of the constitutional changes, general elections were 
scheduled for an enlarged parliament of 198 members in June 1965. Since the 
CPP was the only legal party allowed to contest the elections, candidates were 
selected by the CPP’s Central Committee. In fact, in the absence of any oppo-
nents, the CPP’s “candidates” were in short declared as members of the National 
                                            
9
 For a similar account see also Boahen (1997: 211).  
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Assembly (Fordwor 2010: 99). These institutional changes as well as a worsening 
economic situation eroded the CPP-faction’s solid anchoring in Ghanaian society.  
Consumer goods became scare by the mid-1960s and eventually products 
like milk, flour and fabrics began to disappear from the shops (Esseks 1975: 
38). Municipals’ water systems ran without purifying chemicals and hospitals 
lamented shortages of X-ray fluids and vaccines. Shortages of materials re-
quired for manufacturing and export industries were severe by 1964 and led 
retailers to hoard supplies until maximum profits were likely. By 1966 the eco-
nomic developments had generated grievances amongst most groups of socie-
ty, including cocoa farmers, private businessmen, urban workers whose real 
wages rapidly fell due to spiralling inflation and young people unable to find jobs 
in an environment of raising unemployment (Esseks 1975: 42). As a result the 
CPP regime ruled more through coercion than consent. Moreover, the opposition 
forces realized that their expectations of changing the ruling coalition through the 
electoral process no longer stood (Frempong 2012: 36).  
With centralization of power adopting more and more personalized traits, also 
fissures within the CPP became apparent. Faced with deteriorating living condi-
tions of the masses, Nkrumah opted to turn against long standing allies such as 
K.A. Gbedemah, Kojo Botsio and Ako Adjei (Fordwor 2010: 94) and labelled them 
as saboteurs and self-seekers setting himself aside from party members who were 
perceived to have used their positions in government to accumulate capital for pri-
vate gains (Austin 1975: 4). Nkrumah opted to side with the young and radical left 
wing of the party emphasizing his commitment to promote the interests of the 
common people and even began to persecute his former CPP allies (see Fordwor 
2010: 96). Soon an increasing amount of societal factions was bearing grievances 
against Nkrumah’s regime. None of them had channels to alter it and its embodied 
mechanisms for the distribution of political power and goods.  
Several assassination attempts on Nkrumah led him to impinge as well on 
the composition of the security forces (see First 1972: 195-201). For his own 
protection Nkrumah had established with Soviet help a Presidential Guard un-
der his personal control which was much better resourced than the regular 
armed forces and police (Fordwor 2010: 104; Dowse 1975: 16; Afrifa 1966: 99). 
In addition, lack of proper equipment and training for soldiers sent off to war in 
the Congo and Rhodesia (see Afrifa 1966: 105), combined with interference 
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with promotions in the hierarchically structured armed forces and frequent re-
movals and dismissals caused professional grievance and estranged the mili-
tary from the regime (Kandeh 2004: 66).10 As Afrifa (1966: 99) reports: 
In August 1965 […] Major-General Otu, the then Chief of Defence Staff, 
and his deputy, Major-General Ankrah, were retired from active service. 
Ghanaians were informed that they had “retired”, but most of us in the 
Army knew that they had been dismissed. I was only a junior officer 
and had no means at my disposal for finding from them the reason for 
their sudden “retirement”. But this was not the way to treat Generals. 
  Furthermore, he (1966: 42) states: 
Our army was being run on family sentiments unbefitting any decent 
army. I felt that if this was the way our army was going to be run, then 
there was no future for the young officers who had decided to make it 
their career. 
A professional sense of danger which cut across lines of possible tribal differences 
led to severe grievances amongst the Ghanaian armed forces (Dowse 1975: 18). 
On the 24th of February 1966, they took over the government in cooperation with 
the national police – allegedly supported by the CIA (see Stockwell 1978: 201) – 
while Nkrumah was travelling to Hanoi. The “Operation Cold Chop” was said to aim 
at breaking the enforced monopoly of single party government and restore compet-
itive politics to a disenfranchised electorate (Austin 1975: 5).  
 
3.2.2 Altering constellations of power? 
The alliance against Nkrumah’s regime between the army, police and the na-
tionalist conservative faction of Ghana’s political elite facilitated an alternation in 
power between the two dominant competing civilian higher-level factions. De-
spite different key support bases in Ghanaian society and ideological convic-
tions, the new civilian ruling coalition was not able to implement any structural 
change. While the actors in power had changed, the following section will illus-
trate that the constellation of power within the Ghanaian state did not alter after 
the military coup had ousted Nkrumah from power.    
 
Facilitating shifts of power? 
The coup which ousted Nkrumah from power brought a group of military and 
police leaders into key political positions of the state, which made non-civilians 
for the first time central figures amongst Ghana’s political elite. The leadership 
                                            
10
 For a discussion of the role of corporate grievances in both the 1966 and 1972 coups see Bennett 
(1973; 1975).  
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of the National Liberation Council (NLC)11 was mainly Sandhurst-trained, West-
ern oriented military and police officers who had distaste for Nkrumah and his 
socialist ideology (Chazan 1988: 101). They claimed to ensure a quick econom-
ic recovery, political revival and to return to the barracks soon (Frimpong-Ansah 
1991: 99). The NLC tried to dismantle the Nkrumahist state by pushing it back 
from the economic sphere. Hence it implemented an austerity programme com-
bined with IMF-supported monetary reforms. These reform measure provided 
indeed some macroeconomic recovery (ibid; see table 3.2.3 and 3.2.4). Howev-
er, rearranging the formal economic institutions, including closing uneconomic 
state projects and a general reduction in state expenditure, also led to re-
sistance towards the NLC despite its initially broad support from society.  
A series of severe strikes by mineworkers and railwaymen (Dowse 1975: 28) 
indicated the continued presence of the Nkrumahist state. At the same time re-
storing civil liberties slowly opened up the previously oppressed cultural sphere 
for debates, so that students and other critics of the government used the reo-
pened space to express their dissatisfaction with the regime’s pro-Western orien-
tation and in particular its liberal economic policies. Many Ghanaians critiqued the 
privatisation of state-owned entreprises, since they either believed the state had 
received too little for its assets, and/or regarded the sales as a retreat from the 
pursuit of economic independence (Herbst 1993: 22).  
With Nkrumah’s ideology still very entrenched and present in the cultural 
sphere, the NLC faced severe resistance towards its liberal economic policies. 
The regime was simply not capable of displacing Nkrumah’s ideology on how the 
state should participate in the economy with its own alternative vision. Moreover, 
ethnic undertones soon arose with ethnic leaders from the forest regions and the 
north claiming their political access was confined by the coastal tinting of the NLC 
(Chazan 1988: 102). An attempted counter coup in April 1967, in which Kotoka, 
leader of the coup that overthrew Nkrumah, was killed, was interpreted by some 
as an insurrection of Ashanti and Fanti against the Ga and Ewe dominated NLC 
(Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 99; Chazan 1988: 101; Dowse 1975: 25-27).12 Ethnic 
                                            
11
 The leadership of the NLC was made up by General Joseph Ankrah (Ga), Inspector General of 
Police John Harlley (Ewe), Colonel E.K. Kotoka (Ewe), Commissioner of Police B.A. Yakubu (North-
erner from Gushegu), Colonel A.K. Ocran (Fanti), Assistant Commissioner of Police J.E.O. Nunoo 
(Ga), Major A.A. Afrifa (Asante), and Deputy Commissioner of Police A.K. Deku (Ewe) (Smock and  
Smock 1975: 240). 
12
 Ethnicity had not explicitly been referred to as a factor for the 1966 coup. Yet three key plotters 
were Ewes, a group which had not been represented in Nkrumah’s cabinet since Gbedemah had 
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tensions increased within the NLC and the politicised ethnic-regional cleavage 
was distinct in the 1969 election results (see Brown 1982: 55-59).  
Ahead of the polls the NLC initiated the process of crafting a new constitu-
tion. While most former CPP party leaders were excluded from the Constituent 
Assembly (Chazan 1988: 103; Dowse 1975: 24), Ghana’s traditional rulers en-
joyed renewed influence under the NLC and ensured that their interests were 
secured within the new emerging formal political institutions (Dowse 1975: 22). 
Since the new regime could not rely on forces which had supported Nkrumah, it 
forged an alliance with those least associated with the CPP regime. Ankrah, 
Head of the State under the NLC, declared:  
We shall respect the institution of chieftaincy and recognise the role 
chiefs will play in the development of Ghana (Dowse 1975: 21). 
And Harlley, who had helped Ankrah to topple Nkrumah and was Inspector 
General of Police and member of the NLC, assured that he regarded: 
[…] chieftaincy an essential element in Ghana’s national life (ibid.).  
Both prominent groups opposing the CPP, the NLM and Northern People’s Par-
ty, incorporated chiefly elements – for example Busia and Dombo (Dowse 1975: 
21). Moreover, with chieftaincy still gaining widespread support in both urban 
and rural areas, the NLC might have been seeking to secure a degree of legiti-
macy it was otherwise lacking (ibid.). 
The basis for the composition of Ghana’s new ruling coalition was laid with 
the NLC passing Decree No. 345 which banned senior officials and prominent 
members of the CPP regime from holding any significant political positions within 
the Second Republic (Fordwor 2010: 116). In light of this decision as well as the 
NLC’s incorporation of Busia, who after his return to Ghana in March 1966 ran a 
civic education campaign for the NLC government, many CPP members argued 
that the exclusion of the CPP ran counter to the democratic claims of the NLC. 
Critics reasoned that excluding the CPP, the only party which was able to pose a 
real challenge to Busia’s newly formed Progress Party (PP), would give an unfair 
and clear advantage to the nationalist conservative faction (Fordwor 2010: 116). 
The two leading political parties contesting the 1969 elections were the Na-
tional Alliance of Liberals (NAL), led by Gbedemah who previously had split from 
the CPP, and the Progress Party under the leadership of Busia, which was a re-
                                                                                                                                
been removed by Nkrumah in 1961 (Smock and Smock 1975: 240). The sidelined Ewe faction 
seemed to have forged successfully a temporary broader based ethnic alliance with the nationalist 
conservative forces amongst Ghana’s security forces.   
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vised version of the UP (NLM and UGCC) (Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 99; Chazan 
1988: 103). Even though the PP overwhelmingly won the elections, securing 
105 out of 140 seats, the polls revealed that neither of the two parties was na-
tionally as broadly based within society as the CPP (Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 
100). While the NAL won no seats in the Akan regions, the PP did not manage 
to secure any seats in the Ewe areas, illustrating clearly an ethno-regional vot-
ing pattern (Frempong 2012: 36). The results mirrored the previously mentioned 
ethnic divisions within the NLC, in particular since Harlley and Deku, who were  
both leading the police forces (see footnote 9) preferred their fellow Ewe 
Gbedemah to win, while Afrifa, as NLC member and Asante/Akan, who had 
tried to disqualify Gbedemah from the 1969 election, supported the candidacy 
of Busia. Busia was in contrast a royal decendent of the house of Wenchi in 
Brong-Ahafo and hence also an Akan like Afrifa (Brown 1982: 57-59; Smock 
and Smock 1975: 240-242).  
The previous alliance between the Akan and Ewe in the NLC was replaced 
by an Akan-Ewe rivalry, which was going to shape Ghana’s electoral politics 
lastingly. In fact, since no Ewe had won a parliamentary seat on the ticket of the 
PP and since the 1969 constitution stipulated that ministers had to be chosen 
only from parliament, Busia’s cabinet had no Ewe members (Frimpong-Ansah 
1991: 100; Oquaye 1980: 72). Nevertheless as promised in 1969 the NLC 
handed over power to Busia’s civilian Asante-Brong ruling coalition.  
 
Shifting resources to the rural areas 
The development strategy of the PP government followed the one of the NLC:  
a policy of strengthening the private sector coupled with a renewed stress on 
agriculture and rural development (Chazan 1988: 105). The manifesto of the PP 
for the 1969 elections had claimed that the party was going to  
redress the developmental imbalance between urban and the rural areas 
(Fordwor 2010: 124).  
Once in power the PP regime did improve the transport infrastructure by build-
ing feeder roads which improved the connection between rural areas and the 
urban centres. Besides it ameliorated water supplies, electricity and health ser-
vices in rural communities where its power base lay (Fordwor 2010: 124; 
Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 100).   
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To achieve higher standards of living the PP formed the National Service 
Corp (NSC) whose aim was to increase the production of staple foods crops 
such as maize and cassava. It coordinated the rural labour force and was sup-
posed to demonstrate that those who helped themselves would get further as-
sistance from the government (Fordwor 2010: 124). Moreover, the PP in-
creased the producer price of cocoa from 4 to 8 Cedi per load of 60lb (Fordwor 
2010: 127) and established a Development Fund (Fordwor 2010: 124). This 
fund was provided with resources from taxing workers and civil servants, hence 
primarily the urban constituents. While workers had to pay a percentage of their 
wages towards the Development Fund, senior civil servants who were provided 
with official accommodation by the state were obliged by the government to pay 
15% of their salary as rent (Fordwor 2010: 124; Packham 2001: 192).  
Busia also paid attention to large-scale mechanized agriculture. Like the 
NLC, the PP government encouraged high ranking civil servants, members of 
the professional class, as well as foreigners to invest in agriculture (Gyimah-
Boadi 1989: 229). The state provided considerable support for private large 
scale investments in the sector by subsidizing inputs such as fertiliser and im-
proved seeds, and granting access to soft loans (Ninsin 1989b: 172). Hence, 
while the PP ruling coalition was on the one hand driven to protect stool lands 
and defended the interests of Ghana’s traditional elite, it also ensured that its 
agricultural policy opened up profitable opportunities for members of its modern 
elite (ibid.). Chazan (1988: 105) states 
The big patrons of the PP used the freedom they had within the demo-
cratic framework to appropriate public resources for private wealth. 
 
Entrenched legacies catchup on the PP 
Despite the regime’s liberal economic mindset, Busia shied away from selling 
off any more state-owned enterprises since it was aware of the resistance by 
the urban constituents towards the NLC’s attempts at privatization. In fact, re-
garding the industrial sector the presence of the state continued and even ex-
panded during the late 1960s. Between 1965 and 1969 four new state enter-
prises were created and Busia established the Ghana Industrial Holding Corpo-
ration, to coordinate their management (Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 102). It seemed 
the concept of state ownership and state operational intervention in the busi-
ness sector had become accepted in Ghana (ibid.).  
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The NLC’s initial attempt to withdraw the state from the economic sphere 
was no longer rigorously followed by the PP. The urban pressure groups situat-
ed close to the centre of power imposed policy constraints on Busia. Faced with 
a situation in which the rural factions could not be relied upon to produce, in the 
foreseeable future, the kind of increased productivity upon which to build both 
economic and political security, the PP regime was sensitive to the demands of 
urban pressure groups. To ensure the new ruling coalition’s security, the gov-
ernment needed to mobilize some kind of support from the urban factions 
(Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 101). 
To do so the PP regime reverted to a state led and rapid industrialization 
policy similar to the one adopted under Nkrumah. J.H. Mensah, who had al-
ready played a key role in drawing up Nkrumah’s Seven Year Plan, held on, as 
Busia’s Minister of Finance, to his strategy of enhancing growth by fiscal expan-
sion (Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 101 and  103-108; Herbst 1993: 22). For a short 
time it was possible to implement high spending policies, since the international 
price for cocoa had been exceptionally high (see figure 3.1 for the years 1966-
69 and table 3.2.4 column 3). In the medium term however, fiscal expansion to 
support rapid industrial growth combined with a heavy debts burden from 
Nkrumah’s era increased Ghana’s public deficit.  
Just within two years the PP government had accumulated the same 
amount of debts Nkrumah had compiled over nine years (Chazan 1988: 106). 
Paired with sharply dipping international prices for cocoa in 1969/70 (see figure 
3.1 above and table 3.2.4 column 3), and increasing imports due to the gov-
ernment’s liberalization of its import regime (see table 3.2.3 column 5), the 
Busia government had worked its way back to the structural twin deficit the 
state had faced before (see table 3.2.3 column 3, 5, 6 and 7; Chazan 1988: 
105). With inflation soaring and food prices increasing, the real cocoa producer 
price fell from 1969 to 1971 (see table 3.2.4 column 4). Thus, the fiscal deficits 
and overvaluation of the Cedi entirely offset the government’s incentive policies 
regarding productive entrepreneurs in the rural areas.  
Facing increased fiscal constraints, the regime sought to bridge its per-
ceived short-term balance of payments issue with a credit line from American 
banks. The request however was not granted, since the Americans did not want 
to undermine ongoing multilateral negotiations concerning Ghana’s debts. The 
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negative response was probably equally caused by a seemingly general appre-
hension that Ghana was returning to economic policies similar to Nkrumah’s 
(Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 105). Busia also attempted to ensure bi-lateral financial 
support from Britain, West-Germany and France. It was hoped that the Western 
allies would value Ghana’s democratization efforts and recognise the threat the 
fiscal situation posed to Ghana’s political stability (Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 106). 
The creditors however did not share the PP’s view that the balance of payments 
problem was of short-term character. They refused any immediate foreign capi-
tal flow to Ghana which pushed the Busia government to implement corrective 
measures (Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 107). On the 27th of December 1971 the re-
gime devalued the Cedi by about 42 percent (ibid.). 
The devaluation of Ghana’s currency decreased the Cedi’s purchasing 
power drastically, in particular with regards to imported goods. While the deval-
uation of Ghana’s currency affected all groups within society, the urban constit-
uents had already experienced a reduction of welfare due to the shift of re-
sources in favour of the rural areas (Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 100). Many of the 
privileged elements within society had been reluctant to accept the changes 
implemented by the regime such as the development levy and rent payments 
for official residences. In addition, members of the armed forces and the police 
became aggrieved when amenities and facilities they had previously enjoyed, 
such as free electricity, water and maintenance allowances for their cars, had 
been taken away or reduced. Moreover, the PP regime had decided to increase 
security forces’ rent for accommodation, in some cases by as much as 100% 
(Fordwor 2010: 142). These changes put security forces in a worse position 
than under the regime of Nkrumah. 
  
 
Table 3.3 Indicators of Ghana’s economic decline (II) 
 
     Fiscal policy External sector Money & inflation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Year Population 
in million 
Exports 
fob  
in  
million 
Cedi 
Cocoa 
exports  
in 
million 
Cedi  
Imports 
cif in 
million 
Cedi 
Revenue 
current 
prices in 
million 
Cedi 
Expenditure 
current 
prices in 
millions 
Cedi 
Net re-
serves 
ratio to 
GDP 
Measure of 
over- or un-
dervaluation 
base 1960 (%) 
Money 
supply 
change 
over previ-
ous year 
(%) 
Rate of 
inflation 
(%) 
1966 7.9 222 117 298 231 273 -1.8 60.3 4.2 14.8 
1967 8.1 274 131 315 236 321 -3.5 19.8 -4.0 -9.7 
1968 8.3 396 181 369 298 400 -2.6 4.8 8.3 10.7 
1969 8.4 447 221 428 332 395 -5.2 6.7 11.5 6.5 
1970 8.6 523 301 539 437 468 -1.1 2.5 6.9 3.0 
1971 8.9 537 203 689 451 524 -0.4 6.9 3.2 8.8 
1972 9.1 582 275 428 420 543 4.5 -17.6 43.8 10.8 
     Source: Frimpong-Ansah (1991: 160-169) 
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                    Table 3.4 Indicators of Ghana’s cocoa sector (II) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Year 
Cocoa 
production 
in tons 
International 
price for 
cocoa  
(in $/kg, real 
2010$) 
Real  
producer  
price  
(in 1972 
NC) 
1966 381,100 2.498808 294 
1967 423,500 2.862174 364 
1968 327,000 3.479971 376 
1969 414,300 4.113398 363 
1970 406,000 2.907652 349 
1971 470,000 2.203595 320 
1972 415,700 2.418084 366 
Source: (1) FAOSTAT (2015); (2) World Bank GEM  
Commodities (2014); (3) Stryker et al. (1990: 101) 
 
In addition, ethnic resentments were further fulled by the plan of the mostly 
Asante-Brong regime to sack 568 individuals from the civil service, who were 
predominantly Ewe and Ga. When the Supreme Court ordered their reinstate-
ment, Busia refused to comply with the ruling and hence violated the judiciary’s 
independence (Fordwor 2010: 134-136). Widespread grievances against the PP 
regime were expressed by student protests, a rash of strikes and rural agitation. 
In response to the severe opposition, Busia disbanded the Trade Union Congress 
and threatened the leadership of the National Union of Ghanaian Students (Cha-
zan 1988: 106). The increasing economic deterioration for core factions important 
for the security of the PP regime, led to their alienation from the government and 
eventually to the regime’s decay. On the 13th of January 1972, shortly after the 
devaluation of the currency, Colonel Acheampong overthrew the PP government 
in another military coup (Fordwor 2010: 143).  
Busia’s regime had not succeed in the balancing act of strengthening the 
state’s domestic productive entrepreneurs (Ghana’s rural small scale cocoa 
farmers) and keeping the urban factions, representing a security challenge for 
any ruling coalition in Ghana, at bay. The PP’s failure to curb the demands of the 
wider state, and the urban factions in particular, led to fiscal policy excess which 
coupled with the external shock of falling cocoa prices destabilized the vulnerable 
external sector. Paradoxically the attempt to keep urban factions content eventu-
ally undermined the economic base provided by the regime’s rural constituency 
which was needed to guarantee the regime’s political security.  
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3.3 Gramscian organic crisis and collapse of Ghana’s post-independent 
settlement  
The following section will outline how the overtaxation of Ghana’s rural productive 
entrepreneurs in favour of the urban factions’ consumption which characterised 
Ghana’s post-independent settlement, had assumed proportions eroding the 
country’s economic base. In fact, it led to its fiscal and economic breakdown and 
resulted in the disintegration and collapse of the entire state system.   
 
3.3.1 Reinforcing old institutions and their inherent distribution of benefits? 
The new military coup in 1972 marked not only the point when the military had 
clearly become a mechanism for altering ruling coalitions; but it also represent-
ed the arrival of the military as one of the permanent contenders for political 
power in Ghana (Austin 1975: 5). While the first coup which ousted Nkrumah 
from power could claim to have broken an enforced monopoly of a single party 
regime to reinstall competitive politics, Busia’s administration ruled under a con-
stitution which foresaw elections in 1973/4 (ibid.; Chazan 1988: 107). In 1966 
senior security forces intervened with the intent of passing power to the alterna-
tive civilian faction which had previously been excluded from the political 
sphere. For the upper middle ranks of the officer corps who had toppled Busia 
there was no perceptible civilian alternative to the dismissed nationalist con-
servative ruling coalition. Acheampong, who was mocked by established elite 
groups for not being a university graduate or even attending one of the more 
academic secondary schools (Svanikier 2007: 130), installed himself and the 
military in power with no limit to their rule (Austin 1975: 5). Thereby he estab-
lished the military as a new dominant faction amongst Ghana’s political and 
economic elite adding to Ghana’s high rotation amongst ruling elites.  
A key reason for the coup had been the military’s and civil servants’ re-
duced real income (Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 108). Naturally Acheampong op-
posed the devaluation of the Cedi and the implied redistribution of resources to 
the rural factions implemented by the PP. The first policy decisions of the new 
National Redemption Council (NRC), were to rectify the PP’s policies by restor-
ing allowances and benefits to civil servants and to revalue – at least partially – 
the Cedi (ibid.). Thus Acheampong was setting about re-establishing institutions 
for the benefit of societal factions close to the nucleus of the state. Besides the 
military and the bureaucracy, the NRC included traditional rulers in its ruling 
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coalition aiming to depoliticize public life (Chazan 1988: 107; see also Oquaye 
1980: 204). The PP’s leaders and over 1300 ex-politicians, who the NRC 
blamed for the country’s economic ills, were arrested and detained to underline 
the regime’s intention of establishing an apolitical technocratic/ administrative 
regime (Stryker et al. 1990: 59). The NRC tried to suppress ethnic divisiveness, 
which had come to the forefront again under Busia, by promoting regional bal-
ance and creating the most ethnically balanced cabinet since independence 
(ibid.). The new leadership also denounced the PP for permitting international 
actors’ excessive influence on Ghana’s economic policies and proclaimed a 
return to statism. The new regime tried to distinguish itself clearly from the pre-
vious government in ideological terms, but also differed with regard to its prime 
support base within society.   
In light of Ghana’s history, the open return to socialist-style economic policy 
might lead some to expect a rapid deterioration of the economy. However, the 
economy prospered between 1972-74 (Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 108), since the 
NRC had entered a pact with Ghana’s Central Bank. This pact stated that the 
Bank was going to manage the country’s external sector and ensure that no 
unbearable balance of trade deficits would occur (Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 109). 
A restrictive trade regime was re-established, similar to the one under Nkrumah, 
which gave the NRC a firmer grip on the outflow of foreign currency. Much more 
decisive was the NRC’s unilateral repudiation of Ghana’s international debts. 
This step enabled the regime to disentangle itself from the burdensome com-
mitment of repaying large amounts of foreign currency to creditors and created 
some financial scope (Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 108). The refusal to repay Gha-
na’s debts, which became popularly known as “Yentua” policy – we shall not 
pay – formed part of the NRC’s overall call for self-reliance (Oquaye 1980: 13). 
It stood in harsh contrast to Busia’s “Kafo didi” – the debtor must eat – policy 
(see Busia 1971: 218) which was strongly condemned by his critics as too pro-
West and servile towards the creditor nations (Amamoo 2007: 155). It was evi-
dent that the NRC’s step to refuse any further repayment of its international 
debts ruled out any large inflow of foreign capital in terms of concessional and 
long-term bilateral loans needed for fostering industrialization in the years to 
come. Future economic growth was therefore only feasible through the agricul-
tural sector (Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 109).  
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These circumstances led to the pragmatic policy of aiming for self-sufficiency 
in agriculture and actively promoting the food sector. With “Operation Feed Your-
self” (OFY) the NRC intended to usher in an agricultural revolution (Oquaye 
1980: 12). It aimed to meet a steadily increasing demand for food staples driven 
by a growing population (see table 3.2.1; 3.2.2 and 3.3.1 each column 2) with 
local production (import substitution), rather than food imports further depleting 
Ghana’s foreign currency reserves (Konings 1984: 96). To push for a green revo-
lution, the share for agriculture in the budget rose between 1972-78 about 62.5% 
(Ninsin 1989b: 173) and Ghana’s main development banks were instructed to 
increase their lending to the agricultural sector (ibid.). Agricultural production rose 
and due to extremely favourable world market prices during the first half of the 
1970s (see figure 3.1) the economy prospered under the first three years of NRC 
rule. The pact between the NRC and the Central Bank represented de facto a 
self-imposed austerity programme which ran counter to Acheampong’s initial 
promise to his urban support base (Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 109). Government 
expenditures and imports as ratio of GDP decreased between 1972-74, and 
trade surpluses were registered which allowed Ghana’s foreign currency reserves 
to rise again (see table 3.3.1 columns 3, 5 and 8; Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 108). 
The recovering agricultural production and the regime’s financial support showed 
that investment in land yielded massive profit.  
Members of the ruling coalition took advantage of the opportunities opening 
up and acquired, with state support, large amounts of arable land (Lefore 2012). 
The rice production in the Northern Savannah zone is one example of how 
businessmen, politicians, serving and retired bureaucrats, top military and po-
lice personnel transformed themselves into capitalist rice farmers (Ninsin 
1989b: 172-177). Oquaye (1980: 187) notes: 
Nearly every Commissioner formed a company and became a full-time 
business-tycoon, a part-time Commissioner and for his hobby, an Ar-
my officer.
 
 
The rush for farm lands also involved foreign private capital, so that agricultural 
production was soon penetrated by multinational investments (Ninsin 1989b: 174). 
The enormous flow of capital into the agricultural sector increased the de-
mand for land and intensified competition over it (Lefore 2012). Large scale agri-
cultural projects like the Twifo (Hemang) Oil Palm Project in the Central region; 
the Benso Oil Palm Project in the Western region; and the Cocoa Marketing 
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Board Coffee Plantations in the Ashanti region all represent examples of inter-
ventions which crowded out small scale farmers by depriving them of land (Ninsin 
1989b: 174). In fact, an old colonial law, which vested all communal land of the 
North in the state, had enabled the ruling elite to easily appropriate Northern land 
for private commercial interests (Ninsin 1989b: 175). Like previous ruling elites, 
memebers of the NRC used their access to the state for larger capital accumula-
tion. With military men’s increased role in the country’s economic sphere as well 
as their occupation of key positions in public corporations and government minis-
tries (Chazan 1988: 107), they had established themselves not only as political 
but also as new members of Ghana’s economic elite.  
Large cocoa exports combined with high international prices for cocoa 
boosted government revenue in 1974/75 (see table 3.3.1 column 6). This al-
lowed the NRC to expand state expenditure (see table 3.3.1 column 7), in par-
ticular large wage increases to public sector employees (Stryker et al. 1990: 
62). The regime had resumed negotiations with its creditors and tried to re-
schedule Ghana’s external debts hoping opportunities of external capital inflows 
would reopen. In light of rising revenue and a more relaxed international envi-
ronment, the NRC did not deem necessary to further subdue the demands of 
the wider state. However, the regime’s enlarged spending structure was not 
sustainable in the second half of the 1970s when international prices for cocoa 
crashed (see figure 3.1 above). In 1975 the gap between government expendi-
ture and revenue began to significantly widen again (see table 9.2.2 columns 6 
and 7). Moreover, the pact between the regime and Ghana’s Central Bank with-
ered when its Governor, J.H. Frimpong-Ansah, retired in 1973 and was re-
placed by Amon Nikoi under whom a more accommodating relationship evolved 
between the Bank and the NRC (Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 110). By the mid-
1970s the Central Bank was financing again government’s increased budget 
deficits by increasing money supply (see table 3.3.1 column 10; Woods 2004: 
234-235). As a result, inflation augmented quickly (see table 3.3.1 column 11), 
and a continued overvaluation of the Cedi in combination with rapidly deteriorat-
ing international cocoa prices at the end of the 1970s eventually led to the disin-
tegration of the NRC’s hegemony. 
  
Table 3.5 Indicators of Ghana’s economic decline (III) 
 
     Fiscal policy External sector Money & inflation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Year Population 
in million 
Exports 
fob  
in 
 million 
Cedi 
Cocoa 
exports  
in 
million 
Cedi  
Imports 
cif in 
million 
Cedi 
Revenue 
current 
prices in 
million 
Cedi 
Expenditure 
current 
prices in 
millions 
Cedi 
Net  
reserves 
ratio to 
GDP 
Measure of 
over- or un-
dervaluation 
base 1960 (%) 
Money 
supply 
change 
over previ-
ous year 
(%) 
Rate of 
inflation 
(%) 
1971 8.9 537 203 689 451 524 -0.4 6.9 3.2 8.8 
1972 9.1 582 275 428 420 543 4.5 -17.6 43.8 10.8 
1973 9.4 751 397 600 382               549 6.1                  -9.0 28.3 17.1 
1974 9.6 868 466 1054 584 754 0.0 -5.8 18.6 18.8 
1975 9.9 1023 556 974 810 1146 2.4 6.4 44.3 29.8 
1976 10.3 1025 516 1047 870 1484 0.3 58.2 41.6 55.4 
1977 10.4 1171 680 1289 1171 2137 0.0 177.3 67.1 116.5 
1978 10.8 1754 988 2033 1393 3165 0.1 220.4 72.8 73.1 
1979 11.1 3259 1846 2792 2600 4296 1.2 133.5 13.3 54.5 
1980 11.5 3521 2564 3835 2951 4668 0.5 201.7 30.1 50.2 
1981 11.9 3454 1118 3866 3279 7719 -0.3 563.6 54.5 116.5 
      Source: Frimpong-Ansah (1991: 160-169) 
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                    Table 3.6 Indicators of Ghana’s cocoa sector (III) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Year Cocoa 
production 
in tons 
International 
price for 
cocoa  
(in $/kg, real 
2010$) 
Real pro-
ducer 
price  
(in 1972 
NC) 
1971 470,000 2.203595 320 
1972 415,700 2.418084 366 
1973 343,000 3.661782 374 
1974 385,100 4.147190 354 
1975 397,300 2.980658 333 
1976 326,700 4.834464 263 
1977 277,400 8.285695 220 
1978 268,200 6.402001 252 
1979 280,800 5.552967 237 
1980 277,200 3.991594 147 
1981 246,500 3.184666 211 
Source: (1) FAOSTAT (2015); (2) World Bank GEM  
Commodities (2014); (3) Stryker et al. (1990: 101) 
 
3.3.2 The maximized “urban vampire state”   
As the balance of payments situation worsened, the NRC attempted to structure 
the import bill away from consumer goods and towards industrial raw materials 
and producers’ equipment (Stryker et al. 1990: 63). However, restriction on im-
ports caused shortages of a variety of goods including food stuffs like rice and 
maize. Surges in food prices were the consequence, since shortages were only 
partly dampened by shifts in production towards these importables. This situa-
tion further fuelled inflation and undermined increases in wages, producer pric-
es, and other incentives. Soon formal institutions of market allocation were re-
placed by an informal allocation system which became known as “Kalabule” 
(Oquaye 1980: 17). The NRC issued import licences to family members, friends 
and a few selected regime supporters. With import restrictions in place only 
these individuals were able to import goods. Thus a privileged few with access 
to patronage networks had control over the distribution of scarce goods which 
they resold to “middle retailers” at highly increased prices to make big and quick 
money. “Middle Kalabule traders” again resold those goods at inflated prices to 
make money just like the small market women who vended the goods to the 
public (see table 3.3.3 to get an impression on levels of price increase). 
 83 
 
Some commodities disappeared completely from the market or were only 
sold informally in secret. In addition, market women and other retailers engaged 
in hoarding to pass goods on when prices, and hence profits, could be maxim-
ized. According to Oquaye (1980: 21):  
Kalabule sellers made the buyer feel that the latter was lucky to get any-
thing to buy at all and at whatever price. 
By the mid-1970s a system of profiteering, corruption, and favouritism had been 
superimposed on all formal economic institutions, and in 1978 Ghana was, after 
Argentina, the country with the highest inflation in the world (Oquaye 1980: 27).  
Table 3.7 Market prices in Ghana for commodities in 1972-78 
Source: Oquaye 1980: 21 and 25 
Rampant price increases and overvaluation of the Cedi made selling goods ra-
ther than producing them much more lucrative, so that investments in manufac-
turing and production were neglected. The privileged few who became rich 
through state patronage and the economic anarchy at the time did not reinvest 
their profits in production, but spent it on importing luxurious goods (Oquaye 
1980: 16). Through channelling state patronage primarily to senior military offic-
ers, Acheampong successfully co-opted those who could pose an immediate 
threat to his reign. By the mid-1970s he did not shy away from using national 
resources to buy his (regime’s) security (Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 111). 
The ordinary citizens who had to bear the costs of the regime’s economic 
mismanagement developed different coping mechanisms. Plenty of citizens re-
sorted to “beat-the-system” strategies (Pellow and Chazan 1986: 168). Cocoa 
farmers disengaged from the state by circumventing the Cocoa Marketing 
Board and smuggled their harvest to neighbouring Ivory Coast and Togo where 
they received higher prices for their production. While farmers could expect 
about 80 Cedi per load in Ghana, on the black market they received between 
120-140 Cedi per load (Oquaye 1980: 50). Bulíř (1998: 23) and Stryker et al. 
Commodity 
Price in Cedi Price increase in 
% 1972 1978 
1 tin of milk  0.17 3.00 1664.71 
1 packet of cube sugar 2.00 20.00 900.00 
1 lux soap 0.70 5.00 614.21 
1 tinned tomatoes 0.65 6.00 823.08 
1 loaf of bread 0.40 5.00 1150.00 
1 large margarine 0.80 15.00 1775.00 
1 bottle of large bear 0.55 8.00 1354.55 
1 bottle of Coca Cola 0.20 1.50           650.00 
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(1990: 267) estimate that about 40-60.000 tons of Ghanaian cocoa were sold 
per year through Abidjan during the late 1970s.  
While rural citizens could engage in subsistence farming to feed themselves, 
urban factions, in particular those with fixed incomes and mainly depended on 
purchasing food, were most affected by the drastic price increases (Azarya and 
Chazan 1987: 117). While it was harder for the urban factions to immediately ex-
tricate themselves from the state, plenty of the professions including doctors, en-
gineers, architects, surveyors, accountants and teachers withdrew by emigration 
(see Anarfi et al. 2003: 31; Gravil 1985: 528; Azarya and Chazan 1987: 118). But 
also unskilled and semiskilled labour disengaged from the Ghanaian state by em-
igrating in masses to, amongst others, Nigeria (ibid.). Those of the urban factions 
who could not or did not want to leave, soon engaged in revolts and strikes, chal-
lenging further the crumbling hegemony of the ruling military (see Frimpong-
Ansah 1991: 111; Oquaye 1980: 56-66).       
 
3.3.3 Attempts at realigning the ruling coalition  
With the deterioration of the economic situation Acheampong’s initial ruling coa-
lition of the military, the bureaucracy and traditional rulers crumbled (Frimpong-
Ansah 1991: 110). Since soldiers occupied all key public positions, including 
boards of state financial institutions and the Central Bank, their standing was 
damaged and they were regarded as responsible for the economic misery. 
Aware of the fact that his regime’s hegemony was challenged, Acheampong 
opted for a strategy Gramsci refers to as transformism. In 1975 he chose to re-
organize the structure of his government, rather than reassessing policy (Cha-
zan 1988: 107). Hence, Acheampong reformed his coalition by replacing the 
NRC with the Supreme Military Council (SMC) which was entirely made up of 
service commanders (Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 110). This step amplified the ben-
eficiaries of state patronage and largesse amongst those who could pose an 
immediate threat to Acheampong’s rule. As a result, the regime became even 
more exclusive which removed it further from the ordinary citizens and resent-
ment formed also among the lower ranks of the military. 
The increased side-lining of civilian factions coupled with the economic cri-
sis led to a cycle of ever-widening dissent and protest. Urban elites, predomi-
nantly professionals, organized in the Association of Recognized Professional 
Bodies (ARPB), spearheaded the protest and were joined by students, traders, 
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bureaucrats and chiefs (Chazan 1988: 108). Other movements which called for 
a return to civilian and constitutional government included the Front for the Pre-
vention of Dictatorship (FPD) and the People’s Movement for Freedom and Jus-
tice (PMFJ). The leadership of the PMFJ included many Progress Party stal-
warts like William Ofori-Atta (son of Ofori Atta I, King of Akyem Abudkwa, and 
founder of the UGCC), Jones Ofori-Atta (son of Ofori Atta I, King of Akyem Ab-
udkwa and Deputy Minister of Finance under Busia), A.K. Deku (NLC mem-
ber/Ewe), Adu Boahen (who ran as the presidential candidate for the nationalist 
conservative faction in the early 1990s) and Nana Akufo-Addo (grandson of son 
of Ofori Atta I, King of Akyem Abudkwa, son of Edward Akufo-Addo), who acted 
as the movement’s General Secretary and continues to play a decisive role in 
politics until today as the leader of the current main opposition party NPP 
(Fordwor 2010: 149; Oquaye 1980: 89). To safeguard his and the military’s con-
tinued role in the political sphere, Acheampong intended to reform his coalition 
once again by establishing “Union Government” (Unigov).  
Unigov was to be based on representation of all major groups in society in-
cluding the military (Chazan 1988: 109). The plans evoked an even wider wave 
of protest and culminated in a countrywide strike in July 1977 demanding 
Acheampong’s removal. Instead of bowing entirely to the pressure from below, 
the regime responded with a two-year schedule for a return to civilian rule. The 
first phase envisaged a plebiscite on Unigov which was held in March 1978. 
While opposition forces against Unigov coalesced around PMFJ and FPD which 
were predominantely based in Kumasi (Ashant region), the new realigned re-
gime sponsored the pro-Unigov Ghana Peace and Solidarity Council (GPSC) 
which was led by some ex-CPP stalwarts (Chazan 1988: 109). This situation 
caused old competing political factions to resurge during the referendum.13  
The campaign was intense and heavily distorted. The SMC sold food stuff 
at controlled prices to selected individuals who then resold the goods to gov-
ernment bodies at higher prices. The profit, on which no tax was paid, was fun-
nelled to promote the campaign for Unigov (Oquaye 1980: 23). At the same 
time the campaign efforts of the opposition forces were suppressed and its 
members harassed. In the end only 42.48% of the registered voters participated 
                                            
13
 Since membership in factions remained fluid, the divisions were not as clear-cut as the dichoto-
mous categories suggest. For exmaple K.A. Gbedemah, former minister of finance under Nkrumah, 
was a member of the PMFJ just like Lt.-General Afrifa who had supported Busia’s PP (Oquaye 
1980: 89).   
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in the poll, indicating that most Ghanaians preferred to stand aside (Chazan 
1988: 109). While the official results declared Unigov had won the plebiscite, 
events around the management of the polls resulted in wide-spread rumours 
that the SMC had in fact lost the referendum. Ahead of the poll the government 
had demanded from Justice Abban, acting Electoral Commissioner at the time, 
that the regime could chose its own returning officers. Abban refused not only to 
comply with this demand, but also with the regime’s instruction to count votes at 
regional centres using soldiers and policemen, rather than at the constituency 
level as the electoral law foresaw (Oquaye 1980: 97-105). A temporary disap-
pearance of Abban while counting was ongoing, his dismissal and replacement 
coupled with a ban of the Electoral Commission, PMFJ and FPD caused people 
to believe that the regime had failed to pressurise Abban to alter the results and 
had actually lost the referendum (Asamoah 2014: 243-44). In July 1978 the cri-
sis exploded into a coup in which Acheampong was replaced by Lt.-General 
F.W. Akuffo, Acheampong’s Chief of Defence Staff who became Head of State 
of SMC II.14 In brief, the NRC/SMC I regime under Acheampong had enlarged 
the state, appeased the urban factions, and was thrown out by them when no 
further benefits could be extracted from the shattered productive sectors 
(Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 111). 
 
3.3.4 Collapse of Ghana’s post-independence settlement  
Within the next three years after Akuffo had seized power, Ghana not only ex-
perienced a further deterioration of its fiscal and economic situation (see table 
3.3.1 above from 1978), but also underwent increased political instability. Just 
between 1979-81 Ghanaians experienced four different governments. On June 
4th, 1979 the SMC II regime was replaced by another military coup, this time 
from below, which temporarily established junior officers in power (Kandeh 
2004: 65-96; Hutchful 1998: 211-256).15 They formed the Armed Forces Revo-
                                            
14
 The SMC II was made up of the following members: General Akuffo as Head of State; Major-
General Osei Boateng (Boarder Guards Commander); Major-General Odartey Wellington (Army 
Commander); Lieutnant-General Joshua Hamidu (CDS); Rear Admiral Joy Amedume (Navy Com-
mander); Air Vice Marshal Yaw Boakye (Air Force Commander) and B.S.Y. Kwakye (IGP) (Asamo-
ah 2014:  244). 
15
 The AFRC which governed the country from June 1979 was originally composed as follows: 
Flight-Lieutnant J.J. Rawlings (Chairman); Captain Boakye-Gyan (Official Spokesman); Major Men-
sah-Poku; Major Mensah-Gbedemah; Lt.-Commander Apaloo; Warrant Officer Class II Obeng; Pri-
vate Owusu Adu; Corporal Owusu Boateng; Staff Sergeant Alex Adjei; Leading Aircraftman Gatsiko; 
Lance-Corporal Peter Tasiri; Lance-Corporal Ansah-Atiemo; Lance-Corporal Sarkodee-Addo; Cor-
poral Sheikh Tetteh (Oquaye 1980: 135). 
 87 
 
lutionary Council (AFRC) under the Chairmanship of Flight-Lieutenant Jerry 
Rawlings, who would go on to play a recurrent and decisive role in Ghanaian 
politics throughout the following decades. The AFRC could not accept that the 
SMC II had envisaged to go back to barracks without steps having been taken 
to punish those who had tarnished the image of the Armed Forces. In the view 
of the junior officers this situation posed a threat to the existence of the Armed 
Forces (Oquaye 1980: 138).    
As a result, the AFRC dealt ruthlessly with Ghana’s previous military rulers. 
Acheampong, Akuffo, Afrifa and other notable NLC and SMC leaders were exe-
cuted by firing squad (Oquaye 1980: 138-139). More were sentenced to death, 
life imprisonment or were jailed for several years (Oquaye 1980: 144-146). The 
junior officers were determined to overhaul the existing power structure in the 
political sphere, but also intended to stop black marketeering, hoarding and cor-
rupt practices (Chazan 1988: 110-111). There were investigations, property con-
fiscations and tax collection exercises. Those found guilty were fined, flogged or 
jailed. When exhortations failed, the AFRC regime even razed Makola Market 
Number 1, one of Accra’s main trading centres (Chazan 1988: 111) so that their 
interlude brought unprecedented levels of violence to ordinary citizens. The 
AFRC’s coup however only interrupted and did not stop the SMC II’s plan to re-
turn to civilian rule. Elections were scheduled for June 1979 and for the first time 
in Ghanaian history a National Consultative Assembly comprising members from 
both dominant competing political factions was formed to discuss the way forward 
(Oquaye 1980: 170). Soon political parties re-emerged: The People’s National 
Party (PNP) was formed by Imoru Egala who helped his nephew Hilla Limann 
from Sisalla – based in today’s Upper West region – to the post as the PNP’s 
presidential candidate. Meanwhile the Progress Party representing the nationalist 
conservative faction split in two different parties: The Popular Front Party (PFP) 
represented the Asante faction under the leadership of Victor Owusu, and the 
United National Convention (UNC) led by William Ofori-Atta, who, as son of Ofori 
Atta I, King of Akyem Abuakwa, bundled the coastal forces of the Danquah-
Busia-Dombo tradition around the Akyem faction. The Action Congress Party 
(ACP) became known as “The Farmers’ Party” whereas the Social Democratic 
Front (SDF) represented the faction of labour coalescing around the Trade Union 
Congress (Oquaye 1980: 164-170).  
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Limann won the 1979 general elections and became Ghana’s first northern 
president. His cabinet resembled that of Busia with regards to its “class” com-
position and ethnic bias. This time the bias was however in favour of the Ga and 
Northern factions (Chazan 1988: 113). While the PNP had advocated for re-
forms, old patterns continued. The government carried on with its overspending 
(it had tripled the minimum wage) and as a result inflation soared in the early 
1980s (see table 3.3.1 column 11). Acute food shortages persisted and cocoa 
production reached its lowest level since independence at precisely the time 
when the international price for cocoa dropped into a trough (see table 3.3.2 
column 2 and figure 3.1 above). With economic and ethnic discontent rising, the 
Limann government was clamping down on the cultural sphere: demonstrations 
were supressed and the press was censored.  
During the days of increasing economic suffering, nostalgia spread in Gha-
na’s cultural sphere about the era of Nkrumah and its achievements. Urban la-
bour unrest reached unprecedented levels (Nugent 1995: 31) and radical ideas 
gradually took hold amongst the student body particularly at the University of 
Ghana at Legon (Nugent 1995: 32). The students had already been politicized 
and could claim some political credit for the demise of the NRC regime. Be-
sides, the mutiny of June 4 in 1979 had spurred the proliferation of various polit-
ical associations and heightened political awareness – also in socio-economic 
terms – amongst certain urban factions (Yeebo 1985: 64). Two groups became 
of vital importance: the New Democratic Movement (NDM) and the June 4 
Movement (JFM) (Nugent 1995: 33). The NDM was formed at Legon and con-
sisted of academics and students like Yao Graham, Fui Tsikata16 and Kwesi 
Botchwey, who later became Ghana’s Minister of Finance in the crucial time 
period between 1982 to 1995 (The Insight 2002). The JFM on the other hand 
was named after the mutiny and derived its discipleship initially only from stu-
dents. Soon however the JFM strove to mobilise beyond the student body and it 
pledged to maintain the impetus of AFRC reform. (Baynham 1985: 637). For 
this purpose it quietly began to build a constituency for revolutionary change 
(Nugent 1995: 33). Many JFM members were young Northerners including for 
example Zaya Yeebo, Napoleon Abdulai and Chris Atim in leading positions. 
                                            
16
 He is the older brother of Tsatsu Tsikata who was the lead counsil for the NDC in the election 
petition 2012/13 (see chapter four) and served as Chief Executive of the Ghana Petroleum 
Commpany between 1988-2000.  
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Their nostalgia about Nkrumah’s era and support for the JFM was not surprising 
since they believed that it was Nkrumah’s socialist educational policies which 
had allowed them to reach university in the first place (ibid.). Early in 1980 the 
JFM invited Rawlings and Captain Kojo Tsikata, Rawlings cousin, to join its 
steering committee. Rawlings became Chairman, Kojo Tsikata a member of the 
Central Committee and Chris Atim took on the role of General Secretary (Han-
sen 1987: 186). Both sides benefited from this arrangement: while the JFM 
gained greater political credibility, Kojo Tsikata and Rawlings had won useful 
allies for their resistance to being neutralized by the Limann regime (Nugent 
1995: 33).17 In fact, the continuous harassment and attempts to tarnish Rawl-
ings’ image by the PNP increased his popularity amongst lower-level factions 
(Owusu 1996: 311). Due to their localised support bases and the fact that politi-
cal activities were mainly limited to a few urban areas in Accra, the impact of the 
JFM and NDM on public opinion in Ghana’s cultural sphere at the time should 
not be overestimated. Nevertheless the proliferation of these neo-Marxist organ-
izations is significant, since they are evidence of the alienation of Ghana’s  
more youthful intellectuals (Nugent 1995: 34).  
However, not only the younger generation developed distrust towards the es-
tablished higher-level factions. Owusu (1996: 319) describes this general aliena-
tion of higher- and lower-level factions by referring to one of his interviewees:  
This septuagenarian farmer, with no political party affiliation, frank in 
the manner of senior citizens, angrily described the PNP administration 
[…] as totally inept (wambeye hwee) and corrupt (ewifo). He obviously 
had no sympathy for the “Old Guard”.  
Thus, the distrust towards ruling civilian and military higher-level factions, was 
rather a phenomena spanning wider sections of society and casting doubt – at 
least amongst some – on all forms of accumulation (Nugent 1995: 28-29). As a 
result, rural citizens retreated into a cynical view of the political process and 
large parts of urbanites took refuge in joining the charismatic churches that 
started proliferating from the late 1970s (Nugent 1995: 31; Asamoah-Gyadu 
2003: 433). Repeated ethnic clashes in the Bimbilla district led to Ghana’s worst 
violent ethnic conflict since independence and were a further indication of Gha-
na’s political crisis during the early 1980s (Hansen 1987: 171).  
                                            
17
 See Baynham (1985: 633-42) for more details on how the Limann regime tried to subordinate the 
remaining AFRC and armed forces to its control.   
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In the context of a worsening economic crisis and a general alienation be-
tween established civilian and military higher-level factions on the one side and 
ordinary lower-level ones on the other, Rawlings appeared for the second time 
on Ghana’s national political scene and toppled Limann in another military coup 
on 31 December 1981. Rawlings promised to alienated and politizised lower-
level factions nothing less than a revolution aimed at transforming the social 
and economic order of the country (Rawlings 1982: 1). 
 
By the beginning of the 1980s Ghana’s post-independence political settlement 
had collapsed and the entire state system was disintegrating. The dynamics of 
the “urban vampire state” – taxing productive rural entrepreneurs in favour of 
urban factions’ consumption – had assumed proportions which eroded the 
country’s economic base and led to the fiscal and economic breakdown of the 
post-independence settlement (see table 3.2.1; 3.2.3 and 3.3.1 each column 6). 
While Nkrumah had fostered the Akan conception of the state as active promot-
er of collective benefits (Nugent 1995: 23-25; Owusu 1970: 15), Ghana’s “pro-
ductive social contract” between higher and lower-level factions (Nugent 2010: 
57), was, due to its neopatrimonial crisis, no longer intact by the early 1980s. 
Ruling higher-level factions eventually could no longer sustain production in the 
agricultural sector which implied the loss of the material base to provide mini-
mum material needs for lower-level factions. This situation resulted in an 
enourmous “shredding process” (Callaghy 1994: 144) and dual crisis of legiti-
macy of civilian and military authority (Hutchful 1997b: 560) challenging their 
hegemonic position. What made the situation in the early 1980s so politically 
explosive however was a growing public perception that ruling higher-level fac-
tions were in fact profiting from the crisis at the expense of the ordinary lower-
level factions (Nugent 1995: 27).  
None of the post-Nkrumah civilian or military ruling coalitions had managed 
to change the institutionally entrenched power constellations whose distribution 
of resources and benefits often ran counter to the interests of consecutive ruling 
coalitions’ support bases. Rural factions tended to be diffused, unorganized and 
therefore could not be relied upon to build regimes’ political survival. In contrast, 
urban factions physically close to the nucleus of the state were able to mobilize 
and hence threaten regimes’ security which favoured short-term horizons 
amongst ruling coalitions (see Killick 2010: 278).  
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3.4 Shifting power to the people?  
The previous section illustrated the organic crisis and eventual collapse of Ghana’s 
post-independence settlement. In contrast, the following part addresses the PNDC’s 
initial aim and attempts of transforming Ghana’s social and economic order. 
When Rawlings had seized power, he stressed that he did not intend just to 
change the “palace guard” (Hansen 1987: 172). Rather he aspired to replace 
Ghana’s “sham democracy” with a political system “giving power to the people”:  
Fellow citizens of Ghana, as you would have noticed we are not playing 
the National Anthem. In other words this is not a coup. I ask for nothing 
less than a revolution. Something that would transform the social and 
economic order of this country […] (Rawlings 1982: 1). The military ac-
tion […] was not […] another opportunity for some soldiers and their 
allies in trade and the bureaucracy to come to power for their own 
ends. It is rather to create by this action an opening for real democracy. 
Government of the people, by the people, and for the people (Rawlings 
1982: 4). […] Ghanaians are determined to make democracy really work 
for the ordinary man not just for small groups of people to exploit them 
and ride over their misery (Rawlings 1982: 12). 
The supporters of the revolution – including lower ranks of the military, urban 
workers, radical intellectuals, university students and individuals disenchanted 
with the political establishment – were unified in their critique of the workings of 
the Ghanaian state and its institutionally entrenched power dynamics. This di-
verse societal coalition was also reflected in the composition of the Provisional 
National Defence Council (PNDC), which took on the role of government after 
the coup. With four military and three civilian members making up the immedi-
ate post-coup PNDC leadership, it was obvious that the military was expected 
to play an integral part in the envisioned revolutionary process (Nugent 1995: 
42). In contrast to the AFRC (section 3.3.4) the composition of the military 
members of the PNDC sought to embrace various levels of the military hierar-
chy (Nugent 1995: 43). Sgt Akata-Pore represented the lower ranks while War-
rant Officer Joseph Adjei-Boadi was an exponent of the junior – middle ranking 
– officers. The appointment of Brigadier Joseph Nunoo-Mensah was expected 
to ensure the support of senior officers (Hansen 1987: 176-77). The civilian 
members were supposed to secure the support of critical, yet primarily ideologi-
cally left-leaning urban factions. Chris Atim, General Secretary of the JFM, was 
meant to appease the youth and student movement, whereas Amartey Kwei, a 
popular militant labour leader, was appointed to guarantee the support of the 
urban workers. Reverend Kwabena Vincent Damuah, a Catholic priest with rad-
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ical sympathies, was most likely chosen to appeal to the large Christian sec-
tions of society (Nugent 1995: 43; Hansen 1987: 177). 
Besides the PNDC members’ close relationships with each other (Hansen 
1987: 173) and their organizational links to societal factions building the regime’s 
support base, ethnic origin was another important factor for the composition of 
the new leadership (Nugent 1995: 43; Hansen 1987: 172-73). While Nugent 
(ibid.) speaks of a deliberate effort to achieve a rough ethnic balance in the new 
leadership,18 Hansen (1987: 172-73), a PNDC member between 1982-83, argues 
that the very visible positions of many Northerners in the PNDC, in particular the 
presence of Atim and Akata-Pore, did have a mitigating effect on Northern fac-
tions in the Armed Forces and society in general. It diffused the tendency to in-
terpret the overthrow of Limann’s regime – which had been perceived as being 
dominated by Northerners – in ethnic terms (Hansen 1987: 173).  
Initially the PNDC lived up to its claim to incorporate a wider political spec-
trum of Ghanaian society. It included four members of the defunct political parties 
as members of its Committee of Secretaries, which took on the role as cabinet 
and was led by PNDC member Paul Victor Obeng (Asamoah 2014: 297; Oquaye 
2004: 135). The four members included Obed Asamoah19 (UNC/APP) who took 
on the role as Secretary of Foreign Affairs; Alhaji Mahama Iddrisu20 (UNC/APP) 
who joined as Secretary of Transport and Communications, K.B. Asante21 
(SDF/APP) who became Secretary of Trade and John Agyekum Kufuor22 
(PFP/APP) who joined as Secretary of Local Government and later went on to 
become Ghana’s President between 2001-2009 (Asamoah 2014: 296). The ap-
pointments caused an immediate and vehement storm of protest by the National 
Union of Ghanaian Students (NUGS). The students argued that PNP ministers 
(Nkrumahist tradition) had been replaced by APP men (Danquah-Busia-Dombo 
tradition) running counter to the revolution’s aim of structural change (Asamoah 
2014: 296). Rawlings, who believed that a broad-based government was needed 
                                            
18
 The composition of the initial PNDC members was as follows: Rawlings is an Ewe (on his moth-
er’s side, his father was Scottish); Nunoo-Mensah was a Fanti, Adjei-Boadi was an Ashanti; Akata-
Pore was a Frafra from the Upper Region (Nugent 1995: 43).  
19
 Obed Asamoah served as Foreign Minister and Attorney General under Rawlings between 
1981-1997.  
20
 Alhaji Mahama Iddrisu is the husband of Betty Mould-Iddrisu, former Attorney-General under the 
NDC, who became discredited for her role in the Woyome scandal (see chapter five).  
21
 K.B. Asante had already severed as Secretary to Nkrumah.  
22
 Kufuor had already served as Deputy Foreign Minister in Busia’s government and became 
the protégé of the back then Foreign Minister Victor Owusu. 
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for stability and the success of the revolution (Asamoah 2014: 297), convinced 
critics to permit the politicians to prove their political worthiness (Nugent 1995: 
44). Apart from Kufuor, who left the PNDC regime at the end of 1982, these poli-
ticians were able to establish themselves successfully within the regime through-
out the years to come (ibid.). The incorporation of a wider political spectrum 
amongst the PNDC’s higher-level factions resulted however in an ideologically 
highly diverse body. As a result, the Committee of Secretaries often became the 
scene of intense ideological elite struggle (Hansen 1987: 177-78). In fact, the 
competing ideological convictions amongst the ruling higher-level factions were 
soon to manifest themselves in increased open power struggles.     
While populist forces within the PNDC claimed to strive for a revolution from 
below (Hansen 1987: 175), this societal coalition of middle to lower ranking fac-
tions within the military and selected civilian, predominantly urban higher-level 
factions, acted rather on behalf of the people. Aiming to shift power to the com-
mon citizens, the PNDC established so called Defence Committees.23 These 
new political institutions were envisaged to serve as basic units of the new state 
structure (Oquaye 2004: 143; Hansen 1987: 178; Yeebo 1985: 66). They were 
set up in formal work-places such as textile companies, mining firms and even 
military barracks as well as in neighbourhood areas to foster common citizens’ 
participation in the decision making process (Oquaye 2004: 143). Defence 
Committees also had the mission to expose and deal with corruption; exercise 
price control checks and to terminate smuggling (Agyeman-Duah 1987: 619; 
Yeebo 1985: 68). Initally the JFM helped to recruit individuals with the right po-
litical credentials to fill leadership positions at various levels of the new political 
institutions (Ninsin 1996: 27).  
Even though Defence Committees were intended for ordinary Ghanaians, 
not all societal factions shared the same feelings about the “organs of people’s 
power”. Parts of them were deliberately excluded from membership (Gyimah-
Boadi 1990: 330). In fact, the institutions openly side-lined so called “bastions of 
the old order” including in particular businessmen, members of management, 
professionals, the so called petty bourgeoisie and traditional leaders (Oquaye 
2004: 151; Owusu 1996: 309; Agyeman-Duah 1987: 619). From the revolution-
aries’ point of view they represented part of the problem and could therefore not 
                                            
23
 These included the National Defence Committee (NDC), Workers Defence Committees 
(WDCs) and People’s Defence Committees (PDCs).  
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be part of the solution (Oquaye 2004: 151). Naturally members of excluded fac-
tions were highly suspicious of institutions deliberately omitting societal factions 
from participation while claiming to promote the interests of all (Oquaye 2004: 
151; Owusu 1996: 309). As a result, a dichotomization of Ghana’s society into 
“friends and enemies of the revolution” occurred (Oquaye 2004: 152). While 
some factions felt empowered by the new institutions, others perceived unfold-
ing acts by Defence Committees like beatings, fines and detentions of innocent 
citizens, including elders as excessive behaviour (Oquaye 2004: 153; Owusu 
1996: 308; Agyeman-Duah 1987: 620).24 Indeed an evolving estrangement of 
some previously supportive forces of the coup is illustrated by the septuagenar-
ian farmer already quoted above who condemned:   
the senseless harassment and beating of decent men and women by 
youths and soldiers, who seemed to have lost all respect for their el-
ders (Owusu 1996: 320). 
Since the PNDC aimed at shifting power to the common citizens, one needs 
to address the response of rural citizens who represented in the 1980s about 
70% of Ghana’s population (World Bank 2015). In contrast to the urban fac-
tions, their reaction to the coup was “slow, suspicious and generally cynical” 
(Yeebo 1985: 69; Hansen 1987: 176; Nugent 1995: 72). The predominantly ur-
ban radical intellectuals had assumed a natural bond between urban workers 
and farmers based on “common class interests”. Retrospectively however radi-
cal intellectuals acknowledged that class lines – conceptualised based on socio-
economic developments in Western societies – had not been very sharp in 
Ghana’s rural communities (Hansen 1987: 180). Rather, the rural constituency, 
as Ghana’s main place of economic production, was characterized by more 
complex realities (Nugent 1995: 73). Chiefs, commercial farmers and landlords, 
who formed part of the rural higher-level factions, had been framed as enemies 
of the revolution. Their rural capitalist interests and the fact that they were de-
libearately excluded from the new institutions made them opponents of the new 
structures. The hostile attitude of influential chiefs towards the revolutionary 
processes rubbed off on agricultural labourers (Yeebo 1985: 69-70). Moreover, 
the PNDC imposed controls on the sale and price of food to appease the urban 
                                            
24
 In particular Ghanaian academics linked to the excluded factions of these days – like Agye-
man-Duah, Oquaye and Owusu – highlight the beatings, fines and detentions of innocent citi-
zens, including elders, under the P/WDCs. The antagonism of the time is also reflected in the 
authors generally negative, almost condescending portrayal of P/WDC members who they de-
scribe as “school drop-outs”, “common criminals” or “misfits” (Owusu 1996: 320). 
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factions who represented the PNDC’s initial support base and whose income 
had shrunk significantly under high inflation (Gyimah-Boadi 1990: 330-33; 
Agyeman-Duah 1987: 623; Yeebo 1985: 69-70). Yet, the regime’s arbirtrary 
sale of farm produce which was the rural populace’s main source of income 
(Agyeman-Duah 1987: 623) alienated rural lower-level factions. Another factor 
which made rural factions keep their distance from the regime during its early 
days was the harassment against their “middle-class” sons and daughters often 
living in urban centres (Gyimah-Boadi 1990: 330). These crucial family linkages 
that existed and continue to exist between the urban and rural areas added to 
rural factions’ aversion towards the revolution. The radicals’ assumption that 
smuggling was a big men’s occupation also clashed with rural realities of the time 
(Nugent 1995: 73). For many rural citizens had resorted to these informal means 
to cope with the crisis. Thus the revolution spoke less directly to the concerns of 
the rural population. Nervertheless this did not mean that Defence Committees 
were not been formed. While it was in fact commonly the chiefs who inaugurated 
the first Defence Committees, this compliance should not be misunderstood as 
an endorsement of the revolution (Nugent 1995: 72). Rather, traditional rulers 
tried to avoid possible accusations of obstructionism. Despite this anticipatory 
obedience, Atim and other progressive forces within the PNDC accused tradi-
tional authorities of attempting to hijack the organs of people’s power (Yeebo 
1985: 67-69). While they eyed chiefs suspiciousy as part of the old order, in con-
trast to Ghana’s modern political higher-level factions, the chiefs’ authority was 
not in crisis or affected directly by the decay of the Ghanaian state. For traditional 
leaders had not been perceived to have shared in the prerogatives of the post-
colonial state (ibid.). Hence, one could interpret the formation of Defence Com-
mittees by chiefs rather as an expression of continued adaptability of dominant 
forces in the rural areas to frequently changing circumstances enacted by the 
urban centre. Overall in the early 1980s the revolution had failed to forge a coali-
tion between the politicized urban factions and rural masses:  
[…] none of the policy outcomes at this time reflected the interests of 
the rural population. There was no attempt to mobilise them. […] Here 
the young militants […] set course which counted the most numerous 
class out of the political process. The peasants became onlookers as 
the political process unfolded (Hansen 1987: 191-92).  
As a result the new political institutions echoed diverse reactions. By favouring 
some and excluding others, Defence Committees created once more space for 
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rotations of actors, yet they failed to structurally shift power to the majority of lower-
level factions. Instead the numerously dominant rural factions seemed not quite 
sure yet what to make out of the new structures and in this context they tended to 
be absorbed in one way or another into the existing diverse local realities. 
While some societal factions were deliberately banned from the new politi-
cal institutions at lower-levels, a few members of the established political elite 
had joined the PNDC leadership. This apparent discrepancy was an expression 
and source of the soon manifest tensions and power struggles amongst the 
PNDC higher-level factions (Gyimah-Boadi 1990: 331). Early on tensions had 
arisen between those who had seized power from the PNP over Ghana’s politi-
cal trjectory (see Nugent 1995: 49; Yeebo 1985: 67-68) and economic policy 
(Hansen 1987: 192). At the beginning the PNDC was simply undertaking short-
term initiatives to stabilize the economy which resembled the measures of the 
AFRC period (see Hansen 1991: 102; Asamoah 2014: 342). In addition to these 
ad-hoc measures, which were sold by Rawlings as being largely in congruence 
with the ideological stance of the radical left, a National Economic Review 
Committee (NERC), prepared from the early days of the regime a larger eco-
nomic reform programme (Nugent 1995: 90; Yeebo 1991: 114). The NERC had 
been quietly convened by Rawlings, Kojo Tsikata – Rawlings closest advisor  
(Yeebo 1991: 144) – and a few others since its members comprised for exam-
ple Joe Abbey and Kwame Peprah25 (Yeebo 1991: 114) who were perceived by 
the radical left as right-wing economists, bureaucrats and technocrats. The 
NERC’s stance was that substantial external financial assistance was needed 
for any economic recovery (Hansen 1987: 192). Therefore it had been in touch 
with the IMF as early as of March 1982 (Hansen 1987: 197). The IMF in turn 
had insisted on considerable policy reforms including devaluating the Cedi 
(Nugent 1995: 91) and on containing the radical elements within government 
and other institutions (Yeboo 1991: 119).  
At a meeting in April 1982 the radical left confronted Rawlings to confirm or 
deny rumours of a planned devaluation of the currency which they regarded as 
inconsistent with the objectives of the revolution (Yeebo 1991: 115). Rawlings 
admitted that the NERC had been considering devaluation, but asserted he had 
advised against it (ibid.). The controversy over the general direction of the eco-
                                            
25
 After serving as Minister of Mines and Eenergy under Rawlings between 1993-95, Kwame 
Peprah took over from Kwesi Botchwey as Minister of Finance between 1995-2001. 
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nomic policy was however much more than a narrow debate over devaluation. 
Rather, it reflected a conflict over accepting a different paradigm of develop-
ment in which foreign capital did or did not play a crucial role. Initially none of 
the higher-level faction was strong enough to impose its position (Hansen 1987: 
192). Rather the two opposing factions had arrived at a situation where neither 
the progressive nor regressive ones could triumph. In the wake of this stalemate 
Rawlings could be seen as intervening third force – a situation Gramsci refers to 
as Caesarism (chapter two) – trying to mediate between the two competing 
higher-level factions.  
While mid-1982 suspicions about secret talks with the IMF were rising 
amongst the left, the abduction and killing of three High Court judges and a re-
tired army officer aroused massive outcry and disgust from Ghanaian society 
and the national conservative faction in particular. The question of who was be-
hind the killings ignited the dissolution of the PNDC’s coalition of higher-level 
factions. Conservative forces within the PNDC leadership believed individuals of 
the radical left had committed the crime (Nugent 1995: 88), whereas the radical 
left was convinced that they were being framed with the aim of weakening their 
position.26 Eventually members from the conservative faction within the PNDC 
were replaced by members of the radical left (Hansen 1991: 112). Overall the 
events had caused an atmosphere of increased mutual suspicion amongst the 
PNDC’s remaining higher-level factions (Nugent 1995: 90). In this climate the 
struggle over the direction of economic policy intensified.  
Kwesi Botchwey, the Secretary for Finance and Economic Planning, had 
been secretly sent off to Washington to finalize an agreement with the IMF and 
World Bank by early August 1982 (Yeebo 1991: 116). Yet, radical left-wing forces 
within the PNDC including JFM and NDM members did not regard liberalization 
and an adjustment of exchange rates and prices as the solution to economic re-
covery. Rather they aimed for an economy free of dependence on imperialism to 
uphold a genuine revolution. Therefore they demanded the government not to 
turn to the IMF for help (Nugent 1995: 92). Instead they recommended moving 
closer to friendly socialist countries (ibid.) and emphasised autonomous and self-
reliant development based on domestic mass mobilization (Hansen 1987: 198). 
                                            
26
 Even though it might never be fully known who were the murderers, in August Kwei resigned 
from the PNDC and confessed to having been involved in the killings for which he was executed 
(Herbst 1993: 32).   
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Within this power struggle Botchwey and Rawlings drew on divide and rule tactis 
to play off the old rivals NDM and JFM which led to an increased isolation of the 
JMF/United Front (UF)27 (Nugent 1995: 92; Yeebo 1991: 126). The radical left-
wing faction around Atim (JFM/UP) felt betrayed and openly attacked the IMF 
and Botchwey’s “devaluation pact” to mobilise mass resistance amongst the low-
er-level factions. This confrontation coupled with perceived security challenges 
forming from within the military and exile groups in neighbouring countries 
(Yeebo 1991: 127), made Rawlings and Kojo Tsikata very much aware of the UF, 
and the JFM in particular, as a competing power bloc challenging more and more 
their own ruling positions.  
By October 1982 the dispute over Ghana’s economic trajectory was giving 
way to a violent power struggle amongst the political elite for pre-eminance. Atim 
and Sgt Akata-Pore had formed a coalition of frustrated UF/JFM members and 
ranks within the military. They attempted a coup against Rawlings lead by Akata-
Pore and loyal predominanlty Northern soliders with support from Defence Com-
mittees in Accra. Since their plan had leaked, troops loyal to Rawlings, who were 
predominantly Ewe, however prevented the takeover (Nugent 1995: 94; Hansen 
1987: 198). Yet the rift within the PNDC and in particular Rawlings’ faction; the 
UF/JFM and Northern ranks within the military was now public. The subsequent 
withdrawal of Brigadier Nunoo-Mensah and Kufuor from the PNDC, who both 
represented the nationalist conservative faction (Yeboo 1991: 162), further under-
lined the fragility of the PNDC’s ruling coalition. Another unsuccessful coup was 
attempted on November 23rd in 1982 led by Northern junior officers who opposed 
the revolution (Nugent 1995: 95). Rawlings and Kojo Tsikata had a reasonable 
suspicion of a link between the two coups based on a nested purpose-oriented 
alliance between Akata-Pore (a Frafra from the Upper region) and Nunoo-
Mensah (a Fanti) who had claimed his group had American backing (Nugent 
1995: 95; Yeebo 1991: 162-64).28 Rawlings used the incident to supress the 
power block of the radical left (Hansen 1987: 198). He arrested Akata-Pore and 
soldiers closely associated to him and caused Atim and other members of the 
radical left, and the UF/JFM in particular who had not been arrested or detained, 
to flee the country (Hansen 1987: 198). By the end of 1982 only Rawlings and 
                                            
27
 The United Front had been created mid-1982 by a merger of the JFM and the People’s Revo-
lutionary League of Ghana (PRLG).  
28
 For more details see Nugent (1995: 95). 
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Adjei-Boadi were left of the initial PNDC members. All others had been dismissed 
or resigned because they either felt the revolutionary process had been betrayed 
(Atim, Akata-Pore, Kwei) or that things had gone too far (Damuah and Nunoo-
Mensah) (Nugent 1995: 96). The open power struggle amongst the higher-level 
factions was not over at this point, nor had an ideological consensus on Ghana’s 
political and economic trajectory been achieved. The exit of the radical left-wing 
faction did however create space for pragmatic leftist forces like Rawlings and 
Botchwey (NDM) to solidify their own position in power willing to straddle diverse 
political constituencies within the domestic as well as international sphere 
(Nugent 1995: 124). Thereby the political conditions had been established to 
launch an Economic Recovery Programme based on an understanding with the 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs).  
 
 
3.5 Towards a reconstitution of the Ghanaian state? 
After having outlined the PNDC’s initial aim and attempts at transforming Gha-
na’s social and economic order, the last part of this chapter will highlight the 
elements of Ghana’s more recent history which provide the building blocs for 
the currently dominant narrative of Ghana’s image as “African success story”.  
 
3.5.1 Reform of economic institutions 
By April 1983 the PNDC had agreed with the IMF, World Bank and various 
Western multilateral and bilateral agencies on a comprehensive programme of 
economic recovery and structural adjustment (ERP/SAP). The reform pro-
grammes reflected the new international hegemonic paradigm of state with-
drawal from the economic sphere as prescribed by the ideology of supply-side 
economics (Gyimah-Boadi 1997: 313). The measures included:  
 Liberalizing the exchange rate by moving from a fixed exchange rate re-
gime to a more flexible one achieved through open and disguised deval-
uation of the Cedi; 
 
 Removal of price controls and withdrawal of government subsidies as 
well as introduction of fees with respect to social services such as health, 
education, water, electricity etc.;  
 
 Wage restraint and job retrenchments in the civil service;  
 
 Market retreat by the state through privatization of state-owned enterprises 
and parastatals; 
 
 Control of inflation by restraining expansive monetary policy; 
 
 100 
 
 Rehabilitation of production for the export sector, hence a focus on agri-
culture and in particular cocoa, timber and mining along with the eco-
nomic infrastructure of harbours, railways, roads etc.;  
 
 Liberalization of imports and exports; and 
 
 Establishing liberal investment and trading codes to attract foreign in-
vestments (Gyimah-Boadi 1997: 309). 
 
 
The implementation of the ERP/SAP with its austerity programme and un-
derlying ideology ran counter to the interests of the PNDC’s initial primarily ur-
ban support base. Urban citizens who were the main buyers of imported con-
sumer goods were hit hardest by the devaluation of the Cedi and its accompa-
nying loss of purchasing power (see Bawumia 1995). The group of urban wage 
earners suffered tremendously under the wage restraints, labour retrenchments 
and the introduction of fees for social services such as health, education, water 
and electricity which were first and foremost available to urban dwellers (Hutch-
ful 2002a: 168; Gyimah-Boadi 1997: 316; Herbst 1993: 45 and  61-65). For rad-
ical students and the left intelligentsia the material deprivation was aggravated 
by the PNDC’s perceived retreat from the revolutionary path (Gyimah-Boadi 
1990: 332).  
The alienation of the regime’s key constituencies manifested itself in wide-
spread protest and anti-IMF riots by students and other politizised urban lower-
level factions (Herbst 1993: 45; Yeebo 1991: 189). Another attempted coup on 
June 19 launched by rebels, who infiltrated Ghana from Togo, also proved that 
the physical struggle over power at the centre amongst the higher-level factions 
was not yet over. The reaction of some lower-level factions that greeted the at-
tempted coup with a strong suspicion that the ARPB (right-wing forces) and 
NUGS (left-wing forces) had both received prior warnings of the overthrow, 
showed quite plainly the dangers posed by a broad societal anti-PNDC coali-
tion. These developments strengthened existing intentions within the PNDC to 
approach the economic reform process with utmost caution (ibid.). 
Following the implementation of the ERP/SAP Ghana experienced however 
a remarkable macroeconomic recovery (Fosu and Aryetee 2013: 51; Hutchful 
2002: 57-66; Gyimah-Boadi 1995: 310-11; Jeffries 1992: 207).29 The Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) indicated positive growth rates for the first time in 
                                            
29
 This assessment is based on a “before versus after” analysis of Ghana’s economic 
perormance. For an evaluation of the ERP/SAP’s macroeconomic impact based on “ plan ver-
sus actual outcome” see Aryeetey and  Harrigan (2000: 17-18).   
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many years from 1984 onwards (see figure 3.5.1). Cocoa, gold and timber pro-
duction rose so that Ghana’s export earnings increased despite significantly 
fallen prices for most of its export commodities (see figure 3.5.2 and table 3.5.1 
for the example of cocoa; Gymah-Boadi 1995: 310). As a result, the balance of 
payments recovered (in terms of margins between exports and imports) and 
government’s deficit could be drastically reduced (in terms of margins between 
revenue and expenditure) (see table 3.5.1; 3.5.2 and 3.5.3). In addition, the in-
flation rate decreased and the previous decline in real wages had been re-
versed by 1986 (see table 3.5.1 and 3.5.4) (Fosu and Aryetee 2013: 59).  
Figure 3.2   Ghana’s GDP growth (annual %), 1960-2015 
 
 Source: World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) (2013) 
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Figure 3.3   Ghana’s cocoa production, 1981-2013  
 
 
Table 3.8   Indicators of Ghana’s macroeconomic recovery 
Year Exports  
in million  
Cedi 
Cocoa  
exports  
in milion  
Cedi 
Imports 
 in million  
Cedi 
International 
reserves  
in million 
USD 
Rate of  
inflation  
(%)  
1981 0.3 0.1 0.3 158.2 116.5 
1982 0.2 0.1 0.2 153.7 22.3 
1983 1.0 0.6 1.1 158.9 122.9 
1984 1.9 1.3 2.2 316.7 39.7 
1985 3.3 1.8 4.7 487.2 10.3 
1986 7.8 4.2 9.3 525.1 24.6 
1987 14.3 8.0 17.5 209.1 39.8 
1988 20.6 9.4 18.6 231.5 31.4 
1989 27.5 11.2 34.7 357.5 25.2 
1990 --- 12.1 --- 230.5 37.3 
1991 46.0 12.7 38.8 563.6 18.0 
1992 54.7 11.8 95.1 333.1 10.1 
1993 63.2 16.2 243.9 422.9 25.0 
1994 135.9 26.6 202.9 597.9 24.9 
1995 207.0 45.7 228.9 711.8 59.5 
1996 273.3 79.1 345.2 842.6 46.6 
1997 335.3 82.6 476.9 550.8 27.9 
1998 415.1 143.7 593.2 390.6 14.6 
1999 529.3 142.2 934.7 467.2 12.4 
2000 732.2 217.0 1617.1 244.8 25.2 
       Source: IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) (2013); IMF IFS Nov. (2016) 
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              Table 3.9 Ghana’s internal balance, 1981-1989 
Year Total revenue 
in million  
Cedi 
(excluding 
grants) 
Total expenditure 
in million  
Cedi 
 
1981 3,234 7,719 
1982 4,804 9,530 
1983 10,185 14,755 
1984 21,728 26,694 
1985 38,691 45,763 
1986 69,758 70,660 
1987 105,009 102,135 
1988 142,238 143,897 
1989 193,170 196,466 
                          Source: IMF Government Finance Statictis (GFS) historical (2006)  
 
                     Table 3.10 Ghana’s internal balance, 1990-2010   
 
Year Total revenue  
in million  
Cedi 
(current and  
excluding grants) 
Total expenditure  
in million  
Cedi 
(current) 
1990 122.5 127.1 
1991 145.3 186.1 
1992 181.1 233.2 
1993 229.6 299.2 
1994 258.1 338.1 
1995 382.4 503.3 
1996 533.7 757.8 
1997 679.9 897.4 
1998 1038.2 1312.3 
1999 1518.5 1668.4 
2000 1896.7 1790.3 
2001 2015.1 2560.1 
2002 2618.1 3228.0 
2003 3299.2 4468.5 
2004 4183.8 4904.3 
2005 5513.0 6974.3 
2006 6861.5 8228.0 
2007 8039.3 9387.4 
2008 9966.7 10642.0 
2009 11658.8 12477.0 
2010 13564.2 14563.0 
                  Source: World Bank African Development Indicators (2013) 
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Table 3.11 Nominal and Real Average Monthly Earnings per Employee (in Cedis) 
 
Year Nominal earnings Real earnings 
1960 33.00 5.538 
1965 38.97 3.828 
1970 54.99 4.035 
1975 102.69 3.473 
1980 460.22 1.147 
1985 3633.00 0.996 
1986 7433.00 1.636 
1987 10524.00 1.657 
1988 13805.00 1.655 
1989 24257.00 2.321 
1990 30056.00 2.096 
1991 35212.00 2.080 
                            Source: Fosu and Aryetee (2013: 59) 
 
Alongside the remarkable macroeconomic recovery, Ghana’s economic and 
social infrastructure improved visibly (Gyimah-Boadi 1995: 311). The cash 
(in)flow from the ERP had been used by the regime to expand access to infra-
structures across the country. The railway – in particular the western line –  and 
deep water ports of Tema and Takoradi were rehabilitated (ibid.). Moreover a 
substantial investment was made in the construction and improvement of roads. 
With poor roads having been a source of grievances and symbol of develop-
mental divide for some time, in particular in the Northern parts of the country, 
the political impact of the substantial makeover of Ghana’s road infrastructure 
should not be underestimated (Langer 2010: 182). In the course of the 
ERP/SAP the PNDC had also managed to extend the national electricity grid. 
While in 1988 only 15 percent of the population had access to electricity, the 
PNDC had connected vast amounts of rural areas, particularly in the northern 
parts, to the electricity grid (see Briggs 2013: 71-4; Gyimah-Boadi 1995: 311). It 
had furthermore promised that all district capitals would receive electricity by 
1992 (Langer 2010: 182-83; Nugent 1995: 206). These policies had brought the 
PNDC clearly in touch with the aspirations of the rural areas. 
 Even amongst the urban dwellers who had suffered severely from the im-
plementation of the ERP/SAP, the PNDC regime received some support. Many 
believed that they would have been much worse off without the ERP. The im-
proving macroeconomic situation (Jeffries 1992: 216) and the fight against cor-
ruption had revived national pride and provided a cause for optimism about the 
future (Modern Ghana 2015). By the end of the 1980s there was a notable in-
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crease in the supply and distribution of consumer goods and services (Gyimah-
Boadi 1995: 311). A vast majority of PNDC’s policies were seen to focus on col-
lective goods which credited the regime with probity and social improvements 
like a reduction in crime and re-installing public order earned the PNDC also 
credit amongst urban citizens (Jeffries 1992: 217). The PNDC had cultivated 
also support among the ranks of nascent business men/women, for whom the 
ERP meant new opportunities to achieve personal prosperity (Nugent 1995: 
203). For the PNDC had not only rehabilitated the sociability of wealth through 
economic liberalization, but had also created new chances of accumulation 
(Nugent 1995: 204). According to Nugent (ibid.) by the early 1990s it was pos-
sible to distinguish  
a stratum of individuals whose wealth had been acquired over a matter 
of years rather than decades.  
These nouveau riches entrepreneurs felt more comfortable with the PNDC in 
power, since established wealth tended to be oriented towards the old political 
forces (Nugent 1995: 204; chapter five).  
Until today Ghana has sustained positive GDP growth rates of on average 
above 5% (table 3.5.1). Despite fluctuating international prices, also its cocoa 
production has continuously increased just like the country’s export earnings 
(figure 3.5.2 and table 3.5.5). Nevertheless economic data also indicates sus-
tained trade and budget deficits (table 3.5.6; see also chapter six). However, the 
inflation rate has steadily decreased and remains, compared to the 1970s, 
moderate. Overall, Ghana seems to have continued the positive trends of mac-
roeconomic recovery.  
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               Table 3.12   Ghana’s current macroeconomic performance 
Year Exports  
in million  
Cedi  
(current) 
Imports 
 in million  
Cedi 
(current) 
Intern. 
reserves  
in million 
USD 
Rate  
of  
inflation  
(%)  
2001 1,722.1 2,467.5 310.6 32.9 
2002 2,082.3 2,681.2 553.1 14.8 
2003 2,691.2 3,745.1 1,367.4 26.7 
2004 3,140.0 4,822.6 1,641.9 12.6 
2005 3,545.1 6,003.1 1,767.0 15.1 
2006 4,712.3 7,618.6 2,105.1 10.9 
2007 5,678.6 9,453.8 1,999.6 10.7 
2008 7,553.5 13,424.9 1,785.0 16.5 
2009 10,720.1 15,481.8 3,401.7 19.3 
2010 13,538.8 18,982.0 4,778.4 10.7 
2011 22,529.2 30,312.7 5,498.5 8.7 
2012   5,382.6 9.2 
2013   5,264.4 11.6 
Source: IMF IFS (2013); IMF IFS Nov. (2016) 
 
Table 3.13   Ghana’s trade and budget deficit, 2004-2015 
Year Budget  
deficit  
in percent  
of GDP 
Trade  
deficit  
in percent  
of GDP 
2004 -0.4  
2005 -2.7  
2006 -4.2 -6.5 
2007 -8.1 -14.6 
2008 -24.2 -10.8 
2009 -9.5 -4.0 
2010 -7.5 -8.2 
2011 -5.0 -11.6 
2012 -11.8 -12.1 
2013 -9.5 -12.3 
2014 -10.4 -9.5 
2015 -6.7 -7.5 
                                        Source: Trading Economics (2015a and b) 
   
3.5.2 Reform of political institutions  
Following the economic reforms which paved the way to Ghana’s remarkable mac-
roeconomic recovery, the PNDC regime embarked on reforming once again the 
country’s political institutions. Increasing domestic demands for a return to demo-
cratic civilian rule in the late 1980s led the PNDC regime to rejuventate the idea of 
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local government. The plan grew to establish 110 district assemblies as new local 
government bodies (Owusu 1996: 37) and between  December 1988 till Feburary 
1989 the PNDC held non-partisan local government elections. Some regarded the 
polls as a practical demonstration of the regime’s commitment to place “power in 
the hands of the people” and give ordinary citizens the opportunity for genuine par-
ticipation in the governance process (Ayee 1990: 169). In fact, the local govern-
ment reforms and polls generated much enthusiasm in the countryside (Gyimah-
Boadi 1990: 338) which was also reflected in the relatively high voter turnout in the 
rural areas (Herbst 1993: 90). Overall the district elections provided the PNDC as 
military regime some legitimacy. Moreover, they placed Ghana amongst the first 
African states to decentralise so that Ghana after its economic reforms once more 
became portrayed as a potential role model for Africa also with regards to reform-
ing political institutions (Crawford 2009: 58). 
This image was reinforced by Ghana’s return to competitive politics and 
process of (re-)democratization throughout the 1990s and 2000s. The outcome 
of the 1988/89 polls had reassured the PNDC leadership that it had nothing to 
fear from multi-party elections. In addition, by the early 1990s the international 
setting had changed with the collapse of the Soviet Union and fall of the Berlin 
Wall. This set the scene for IFIs and Western donors to tie continued financial 
support not only to economic reforms, but also to political liberalisation. Hence, 
after the endorsement of a new constitution in April 1992, the PNDC entered a 
transformation process in which it contested the 1992 general elections as the 
National Democratic Congress (NDC). Its main adversary was the National Pat-
riotic Party (NPP) which bundled the nationalist conservative factions coalesc-
ing around the Danquah-Busia-Dombo tradition. Rawlings won the presidential 
race on behalf of the NDC against Adu Boahen, the NPP’s presidential candi-
date. While international observer groups had endorsed the 1992 election re-
sults, opposition forces denounced electoral fraud and malpractices leading to 
their boycott of the subsequent parliamentary elections.  
In contrast, to the transitional polls, contesting parties accepted the de-
clared results in 1996. Rawlings was reeleted as president of Ghana’s Fourth 
Republic and the defeted presidential candidates of the NPP, John A. Kufuor, 
and the People's National Convention (PNC), Edward N. Mahama, attended the 
inaugural ceremony. In comparative perspective, remarkable developments un-
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folded in Ghana in 2000. Unlike many other African leaders, Rawlings abided by 
the two-term limit set in the constitution, so that  John Atta Mills contested the 
presidential elections on the ticket of the NDC. He lost to Kufuor (NPP) as the 
main opposition’s candidate. As a result, in 2000 the NDC became the first par-
ty in Ghana to lose power through the ballot box (Frempong 2012: 95). Moreo-
ver, the NDC’s defeat made Ghana – as often before – the pioneer in Sub-
Saharan Africa to have a smooth civilian-to-civilian transfer of government 
(Fosu & Aryeetey 2013 : 74).  
In 2004 the NPP reasserted itself in power with Kufuor as Head of State. 
Like Rawlings, Kufuor did not attempt to run for a third term in the subsequent 
presidential race. Instead Nana Akufo-Addo contested the election as NPP 
candidate against John Atta Mills. Mills won in 2008 on behalf of the NDC so 
that Ghana experienced yet another change of government decided through the 
ballot box. Compared to Ghana’s immediate post-independence history, the 
overall political situation has drastically changed: Since 1992 Ghana has held 
six consecutive elections, so that the country’s Head of States no longer seize 
power through military coups, but through the ballot box. In addition, despite the 
fact that Ghana’s recent presidential elections have been very close-run, all 
elections have been largely peaceful and considered mostly “free and fair”. 
These achievements are complemented by an open political space and vibrant 
media scene. This outcome of the political and economic reform process make 
Ghana also stand out in regional comparision and suggest that the country 
could be considered a political success story.  
Addressing the people of Ghana in 1998 Bill Clinton stated as first US Presi-
dent to visit Ghana: 
Today, Ghana again lights the way for Africa. Democracy is spreading. 
Business is growing. Trade and investment are rising. […] The world 
admires your success. The United States admires your success. We 
see it taking root throughout the new Africa. And we stand ready to 
support it. […]  
Seung Hong Choi, former World Bank's representative in Ghana commented on 
Ghana’s (apparent) transformation process:  
Up until 1983 Ghana was really a hopeless place – everybody, both 
Ghanaians and donors were abandoning the place. […] If it can happen 
in Ghana, it can happen in any African country (Brooke 1989).  
 
And even US President Barack Obama praised Ghana as success story during a 
bilateral meeting with President Mills in the Oval Office in March 2012:   
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[…] there's sometimes a tendency to focus on the challenges that exist 
in Africa […]. But I think it’s important for us to also focus on the good 
news that’s coming out of Africa, and I think Ghana continues to be a 
good-news story. […] Ghana has proven, I think, to be a model for Afri-
ca in terms of its democratic practices.  And I very much appreciate the 
efforts that President Mills has taken not only to ensure fair and free 
elections, but also to […] make sure that government is working for the 
people of Ghana and not just for the few. So we’re very appreciative of 
those efforts. In addition, Ghana has become a wonderful success sto-
ry economically on the continent. In part because of the initiatives of 
President Mills, you’ve seen high growth rates over the last several 
years.  […] So that’s a good-news story (The Whitehouse 2012).  
 
 
3.6 Chapter summary 
Guided by the theoretical framework developed in chapter two which focuses on 
structures (institutions), ideology and actors within different spheres at various 
levels, chapter three has sketched out the evolvement of Ghana’s post-
independence settlement, its collapse and re-constitution. The chapter started by 
highlighting the origins of Ghana’s historically grown politicized societal cleavages 
which are crucial to understand political and social conflict in Ghana, and hence 
its political settlement. Through its form of rule and introduction of Western-style 
education, the colonial state has played its role in creating politicized societal 
cleavages. They include the fissures of (1) the nationalists against the British; (2) 
commoners against chiefs; (3) youth against age and (4) the manifestation of re-
gio-ethnic identities. The social dynamics under colonial rule led to a reconfigura-
tion of “Ghana’s” political elite and broadly its split into two opposing factions: a 
nationalist conservative faction with strong ties to traditional rulers, and by trend a 
younger counter-elite striving for a mass movement of the common people. Both 
factions were decisively modernist in outlook, but were epitomizing two funda-
mentally different conceptions of modernization. The demands of newly educated 
commoners for political inclusion and their largely successful attempts to wrest 
power from more established elites characterized Ghana’s post-independence 
settlement (Svanikier 2007: 118). Due to the leading role of the state in the econ-
omy, Ghana’s post-independence settlement was characterized by an entangle-
ment of the political and economic sphere causing capital accumulation to occur 
mainly through access to the state. This structure led to fierce elite competition 
over the state and shaped its neopatrimonial character. The elites’ competition 
was reinforced by the highly fragmented nature of Ghanaian society along ethnic 
lines as one dominant politicized societal fissure, and was amplified by a lack of 
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elite consensus with regards to ideological and thus institutional set up – in par-
ticular for Ghana’s economic sphere –  fuelled by systemic rivalry at the interna-
tional level.  A high rotation of fiercely competing civilian ruling coalitions was the 
consequence. Those temporarily in power tended to marginalize members of the 
previous ruling coalition from the political sphere and hence neopatrimonial net-
works. However, since Ghanaian society is highly fragmented along ethnicity as 
one of its key politicized societal fissues and to ensure regime security, Ghanaian 
elites needed to continuously forge cross-ethnic alliances to form new ruling coa-
litions. Despite competing ruling coalitions’ ideological differences and varying 
supported bases in society, no ruling coalition managed to implement structural 
change. Or put differently, neither civilian nor military ruling coalitions till the early 
1980s managed to alter the historically grown and deeply entrenched power con-
stellations in Ghana institutionally embodied by an over-taxation of the productive 
entrepreneurs in the rural areas in favour of the state’s urban masses’ consump-
tion. Hence, while ruling elites fluctuated rather frequently, the power constella-
tion embedded in the structures were characterized by continuity. In the long run 
Ghana’s post-independence institutionalized “urban vampire state” eroded the 
country’s economic base, massively strengthened informal institutions and even-
tually led to its fiscal and economic breakdown. The accompanying crisis of he-
gemony of Ghana’s ruling elites, including both competing civilian factions as well 
as the older generation of military authority, represented a crisis of the entire 
state system and caused the collapse of Ghana’s post-independence settlement.  
In contrast, the last section of the chapter highlighted Ghana’s more recent 
historical developments which provide the building blocks for the currently dom-
inant narrative of its image as “African success story”. Ghana’s remarkable 
macroeconomic recovery coupled with its (re-)democratization process includ-
ing incumbent presidents abiding by term limits and two relatively peaceful turn-
overs of power through the ballot box, are indeed exceptional achievements. 
They make Ghana stand out in regional comparison and suggest that the coun-
try has arrived at a profoundly different place. Whether the notion of an “African 
success story” is well-founded and Ghana has arrived at a new and stronger 
political settlement will form the discussion in chapter four to six.  
 
 111 
 
IV. GHANA’S 2012 PRESIDENTIAL AND PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 
Elections form part of the body politics of this country. The body politics of this country 
never goes away. We are perpetually living under the banner of politics  
A15, interviewed 16/11/2012 
 
Ghana’s drastic image change, from a failed and collapsed state in the late 
1970s to a polity that has been hailed internationally as a beacon of democracy 
and stability in West Africa since the 1990s, suggests a significant change has 
taken place in the country. This thesis aims to contribute to the statebuilding 
debate by evaluating the social change that has occurred in Ghana. In order to 
address the main research question of the thesis, namely whether the Ghana-
ian state has undergone any fundamental structural change as the image of an 
“African success story” suggests, the following two chapters are devoted to a 
critical analysis of Ghana’s current political settlement and the workings of the 
Ghanaian state as it stands today. To empirically ground the analysis and out-
line Ghana’s current political settlement presented in chapter five, this chapter 
focuses on Ghana’s 2012 elections as a lens to observe the country’s current 
power constellation.  
Why do elections matter in the context of analysing Ghana’s current political 
settlement? Since the liberal paradigm became hegemonic in the international 
sphere in the early 1990s, elections turned into the only internationally recognized 
means for deciding the struggle (conflict) over state power. In OECD states hold-
ing state power equates to being able to decide how to redistribute society’s wel-
fare, for example through policies of taxation. In large parts of the Global South, 
however, control of the state is vital for the allocation of welfare or rather re-
sources in the first place. Therefore, in most states of the Global South – includ-
ing Ghana – there is an imperative to win elections; election times represent dis-
tinct periods of societal power struggles. During this deviant time, politicized soci-
etal cleavages are brought out and informal institutions and their handling mani-
fest themselves more clearly. Zooming in on Ghanaian electoral politics and ad-
dressing key issues and the events which occurred during the 2012 electoral cy-
cle – spanning the pre-election, election, and post-election periods – therefore 
illustrates the workings of the Ghanaian state. Moreover, analysis of the election 
reveals the significant actors in Ghana’s political, economic and cultural sphere.  
Moreover, the election results divulge the crucial structural underpinnings charac-
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terizing Ghanaian society today. At the same time, elections generally present an 
opportunity for change – at least a change of actors and therefore of who may get 
a “slice of the national cake” (Lamptey and Salihu 2012: 185) – so that stakes 
tend to be high. Relying on Ghana’s 2012 general elections as a lens to observe 
Ghana’s current political settlement therefore represents a practical starting point 
to gain insight into the current workings of the Ghanaian state and vital societal 
power dynamics. This scrutiny and the subsequently presented narrative, are 
based on fieldwork conducted in Ghana in 2011 as well as during Ghana’s 2012 
presidential and parliamentary elections.    
 
 
4.1 Pre-election period 
Ghana’s 2012 pre-election period was characterized by subtle attempts by key 
stakeholders to deliberately impact the outcome of the polls by moulding Ghana’s 
formal institutions. This was attempted by modifying the legal framework regulating 
the upcoming elections. Endeavours initiated and pushed by the main opposition 
party aimed to curb the malpractice that had previously occurred on election day 
and to downsize the advantage of incumbency for the ruling party. In contrast, 
measures taken by the incumbent party attempted to tip the electoral framework in 
its favour to counterbalance the advance of opposition forces. Equally important to 
understanding the power dynamics and workings of the current Ghanaian state 
and society, are the existing informal institutions. These were crystallized during 
the pre-election period, in particular in the realm of voter mobilization.   
 
4.1.1 The process towards a new voter register   
Shortly after the wafer-thin victory of John Atta Mills for the NDC in the presi-
dential run-off of 2008,30 opposition parties, in particular the NPP led by Nana 
Akufo-Addo, once more demanded electoral reforms. Ahead of the 2008 polls 
the quality of the voter register had already been questioned (CODEO 2012c: 
7). Afari-Gyan, Chairman of the Electoral Commission (EC), stated himself that: 
If our population is indeed twenty-two million, then perhaps thirteen 
million people on our register would be statistically unacceptable by 
world standards. If that is the case, then it may mean that there is 
something wrong with our register (Otchere-Darko 2013). 
                                            
30
 For Ghana’s 2008 election results see annex table 9.4.1 
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The voter register used for the polls in 2008 was known to be bloated with mi-
nors, foreigners, ghost voters, deceased citizens, and double or multiple regis-
trations. Back then Afari-Gyan remarked: 
[…] at the end of the day, the register is as good as the stakeholders 
are prepared to accept. If they think there is nothing wrong with the 
register that is fine. […] they bussed the people, they sent the children, 
they invited the foreigners to come and participate in this. If they think 
that is ok… What else could we use? We have to use a register. That is 
the register that we will use (Yeboah 2008). 
As a result, opposition parties identified the voter registration process and be 
flawed electoral register (Carter Center 2009: 2 & 24; CODEO 2009: 14; EU-
EOM 2009: 15) as key issues to be targeted with their aspired reform for 2012.   
In the emerging post-2008 election debate, the Danquah Institute (DI), as an 
NPP think-tank, advocated electronic voting early on (e-voting) for Ghana’s 2012 
elections (Otchere-Darko 2009). This call for e-voting spanned the demand for 
biometric voter registration (BVR); biometric voter verification (BVV) on the elec-
tion day; and both electronic means of casting a vote and of counting them. In the 
preceding debates, the EC was quick to acknowledge the need for an enhanced 
voter register. Afari-Gyan hinted as a guest of Kwadwo Oppong-Nkrumah’s Su-
per Morning Show on Joy FM in March 2009, that a completely new voter regis-
tration exercise would be undertaken to derive a new electoral roll for the 2012 
general election (Yeboah 2008). Thus, the EC accommodated the push for 
electoral reform which had been reinforced by a call by the Chief Observer of 
the European Union Election Observation Mission (EOM), Nickolay Mladenov. 
He had prompted the EC to tackle the issue of the voter register shortly after the 
2008 election (Ghana News Agency 2009c). 
As keynote speaker at the 5th “Kronti ne Akwamu Lecture”,31 held by Gha-
na’s Centre for Democratic Development (CDD), Afari-Gyan stated:  
The Commission is considering biometric registration of voters, but as 
for biometric voting, I don't think the country is ready for it. If we do, I 
believe some people will start asking whether the Castle
32
 has not pro-
grammed the machines with some figures to their advantage (The 
Statesman 2009).   
After endorsing the idea of BVR in order to provide a clean(er) electoral roll for 
2012, the EC engaged political parties in a series of post-election self-
assessment consultative fora (Ameyibor 2013). By bringing key stakeholders of 
future elections together, the EC aimed at ensuring the integrity of future gen-
                                            
31
 The english meaning of this phrase is: “Democracy and Governance Lecture”. 
32
 “Castle” refers to the seat of Ghana’s government.  
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eral elections so that their results would be acceptable to all participating parties 
(A34 interviewed 14/12/2012; A35 interviewed 14/12/2012; A38 interviewed 
18/12/2012; D3 interviewed 23/10/2012). As an outcome of an Inter-Party Advi-
sory Committee (IPAC) meeting in May 2009, Ghana’s main political parties 
agreed to mandate the EC to compile a new voter list based on BVR (Ghana 
News Agency 2009a). The communiqué of the meeting captured this lowest 
common denominator and in the subsequent months the different positions of 
the stakeholders became apparent. 
 The NPP was trying to push e-voting further up on the agenda of electoral 
reform. To gather support for their stance, the DI, headed by Gabby Asare 
Otchere-Darko,33 organized a few national conferences exploring the viability of 
e-voting (DI 2010). Participants of these conferences included all actors whose 
understanding and support was vital for a potential shift of Ghana’s electoral 
system towards e-voting (DI 2009: 3). When lobbying for e-voting, the NPP 
clearly envisaged the changes to be in place for the 2012 elections. They sug-
gested combining the needed exercise of biometric data collection for the new 
electoral register with the, back then, already ongoing biometric registration pro-
ject for the new national ID (Ghana) cards (A38 interviewed 18/12/2012; Dan-
quah Institute 2010: 2).  
The EC however strongly rejected the idea of e-voting. Its Chairman stated:  
Until we make the people comfortable with the use of the computer, we 
cannot go e-voting (Mac-Jordan 2010).  
The EC’s rejectionist stance might also have resulted from a realistic assessment 
of its own workload capacity. Within the given timeframe, introducing e-voting on 
top of the District Assembly elections scheduled for the end of December 2010, 
and a possible national referendum on constitutional review which was to be held, 
the task of compiling a new biometric voter register for 2012 and the likely re-
demarcation of constituency boundaries as an outcome of the national census of 
2010, might have been too ambitious. Afari-Gyan however, stood by the plan to 
compile the new biometric voter register for 2012.  
In contrast to the EC, the NDC was in general not averse to the introduction 
of e-voting. Yet, unlike the NPP, the NDC opposed the introduction of e-voting 
for the 2012 elections. Haruna Iddrisu, Minister of Communications, said: 
                                            
33
 Otchere-Darko is a nephew of Nana Akufo-Addo and managing editor of the NPP-linked newspa-
per “The Statesman” (The Herald 2014; Arthur 2013). 
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[The] Government is ready to ensure that e-voting becomes a reality in 
2016 (Ghana News Agency 2009b).  
Despite the NDC’s generally proclaimed support for electoral reform (The Vot-
ing News 2011a), some voices queried its commitment to compile and use the 
new electoral register for the 2012 polls. For 18 months ahead of the polls, the 
NDC government had not released the necessary funds to the EC to conduct 
the biometric registration exercise (The Statesman 2011). 
In spite of these differences and after troublesome District Assembly elec-
tions in December 2010, the EC invited vendors at the beginning of 2011 to bid 
for the contract for the procurement of a BVR system (Daily Graphic 2011). In 
October 2011, the EC announced that GenKey, a Dutch company, had been 
awarded the contract for the procurement. By limiting the call for tenders to a 
BVR system, it became apparent that electronic voting and electronic counting 
for 2012 was off the table. The NPP realized that their maximum demand was 
not going to be met. They therefore lowered their demands and soon began to 
lobby for at least complementing the biometric voter list with BVV on the elec-
tion day (CitiFM 2011a). In return, the NDC insisted on sticking to the agreed 
minimal consensus reached in 2009 and vehemently dismissed the introduction 
of biometric voter verification for 2012. Likewise, the EC stressed that biometric 
verification was not a priority on its agenda (Myjoyonline 2011a).  
Over the next few months, more and more actors joined the debate on BVV. 
The Catholic Bishops’ Conference declared its support for BVV in its communiqué 
of 2011 which was heavily rebuked by the NDC (Ghana Business News 2011; Cit-
iFM 2011b). Various individuals from the opposition forces entered the passionate 
debate in favour of BVV and advocacy groups close to the NPP, such as the Cen-
tre for Freedom and Accuracy, and the DI, supported the main opposition party in 
its demands (Amponsah 2011). In mid-November 2011, the EC gave in and budg-
eted for BVV. At the same time the EC stressed that an implementation of BVV for 
the 2012 polls was only possible if the government released the extra funds that 
were needed (Mahama 2011). According to The Statesman, a newspaper close to 
the NPP, the debate finally tipped in favour of BVV when Ghana’s development 
partners declared it as a necessary step towards free and fair elections. The paper 
quoted a senior source at the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MO-
FEP) with the following words: 
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The countries responsible for our multi-donor budget support have made it 
clear to us that they want free and fair elections and see biometric verifica-
tion as a necessary step towards that end (The Voting News 2011b). 
At the end of November 2011, the NDC eventually gave in and agreed that voters 
should be biometrically verified before casting their votes in the 2012 elections (The 
Voting News 2011b). As a result, the EC conducted the BVR exercise between 
March and May 2012. NPP and NDC party agents followed the registration process 
closely and filed most of the challenges regarding questionable applications. These 
challenges were often made on the grounds of age, residency, and nationality (CO-
DEO 2012c: 5). CODEO, the Coalition of Domestic Election Observers, monitored 
the main registration period and noted that particularly in rural and smaller urban 
communities the identity of registrants was in some centres not checked and eligibil-
ity criteria were not strictly adhered to (CODEO 2012c: 4). This observation goes 
hand-in-hand with comments by several Ghanaians (A3 interviewed 14/11/2011; 
A26 02/12/2012; A29 interviewed 04/12/2012; B4 communications 11/2012; B5 
communications 11/2012) who pointed out that: 
Barely anybody would deny an underage mother to register, especially 
in the Northern parts of the country. After all she is a mom and hence 
has reached adulthood which people believe entitles her to vote (A16 
interviewed 19/12/2012).  
The coexistence of formal (de jure) and informal (de facto) institutions and 
their contradiction is a reoccurring common phenomenon as will be illustrated 
throughout this work. During the registration exercise low incidences of violence 
took place. According to CODEO (2012c: 5-6): 
[They] manifested in violent attacks, assaults, intimidation and harass-
ment of EC officials with respect to attempts at registering ineligible vot-
ers, marauding thugs on unregistered motorbikes, and property destruc-
tion, including that of registration kits. Physical abuse, confrontations 
and restraint of those suspected to be ineligible were typical responses 
to instances of EC and party officials challenging eligibility.  
Incidences occurred, amongst others, in the West Mamprusi and Asunafo South 
Districts, Tafo-Pankrono, Tain and Odododiodio constituencies (see CODEO 
2012c: 6). Troubling in this context is that the Ashanti region, known as a strong-
hold of the NPP, topped the list of registration centres marred by violence during 
the BVR exercise (AllAfrica 2012). Despite these incidences and the fact that the 
EC had recorded between12,000 and 15,000 multiple registrations at the end of 
the BVR exercise (Ghana News Agency 2012a), the registration process was still 
broadly assessed as satisfactory. According to CODEO (2012c: 8):  
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[…] the biometric voter register may not be a perfect document, its 
quality is substantial and therefore an improvement that would con-
tribute to credible and peaceful 2012 elections. 
In the end the EC had registered about fourteen million Ghanaians as voters 
for the 2012 elections. Subsequent to the BVR exercise and before the polls, 
Afari-Gyan presented evidence to the political parties and the public at large that 
significant numbers of minors had been detected in the newly compiled bio-
metric register (see figure 4.1). He suggested that the vast amount of underage 
registrations – the estimated figure was 20,000 (see Commonwealth Observer 
Group 2012: 16) – suggested that some of their registrations had been orga-
nized (Ghana News Agency 2012c). Since the Constitutional Instrument (CI) 72, 
which regulates the registration of voters in Ghana, does not provide the EC 
with the power to expunge names from the certified register, Afari-Gyan ap-
pealed to parents of registered minors to discourage them from voting. 
Figure 4.1   Minors registered in Ghana’s 2012 voter list 
 
 
In fact, several civil society organizations (CSO) joined the exhortation made by 
the EC’s and the National Commission for Civic Education’s by campaigning 
against underage voting with radio messages like the following: 
Source: Mac-Jordan 2012 
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This is a warning from the Editors’ Forum of Ghana. You may have reg-
istered as a voter, but if your age is below 18 years do not vote be-
cause underage voting is illegal and you can be arrested and prose-
cuted. Parents please stop your children from voting if they are below 
18. Any person under 18 years who votes may be arrested and prose-
cuted (D16 observation 12/2012).    
Only a court order would have allowed for the removal of names from the register 
which would have required proof, such as birth certificates, for each registered 
minor. With the elections only a few weeks away, juridical resolution of the issue 
was not feasible. Interestingly, despite the fact that the issue of registered minors 
caused an uproar ahead of the polls, the issue seemed to fade after the EC’s 
Chairman had caught out and pointed fingers at the political parties.   
 
4.1.2 Creating new constituencies during the year of the polls – gerry-
mandering? 
While the opposition forces had pushed for electoral reform to curb previously 
occurring malpractices and to downsize the advantage of incumbency, the 
NDC, for their part, attempted to tip the electoral framework in its favour so as to 
counterbalance the advantage it lost due to reform concessions. Parallel to the 
debate on BVR, BVV, and registered minors, another issue which shaped Gha-
na’s electoral framework was passionately debated: the delimitation of constitu-
encies. Due to the results of the population census conducted by the Ghana 
Statistical Service (GSS) in 2010, the government announced in October 2011 
its plan to create new districts. Officially these were to ensure adequate public 
services to all Ghanaian citizens. A Legislative Instrument (LI) was passed by 
parliament to establish 46 new second level administrative units. 
The creation of the new districts only several months ahead of the elections 
had a direct impact on the EC’s preparations. Since some of the newly created 
districts were not covered by any of the existing constituencies, the EC saw it-
self forced to adjust the electoral boundaries and intended to create 45 new 
constituencies. The NPP as opposition party vehemently decried the creation of 
new districts and in particular its timing. Former President John Agyekum 
Kufuor (NPP) cautioned against the creation of new constituencies: 
There is nothing in the constitution that enjoins the EC to create new 
constituencies just because the Ministry of Local Government has de-
cided to create new districts. There is nothing like that. I don't think the 
Commission is bound by law to do that. It may make for trouble (The 
Statesman 2012).
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The NPP was quick in accusing the EC to make common cause with the NDC 
government and claimed gerrymandering behind the pending delimitation pro-
cess. Jake Obetsebi-Lamptey, the National Chairman of the NPP, expressed 
the NPP’s concerns as follows: 
We are worried […] about a number of developments […] the EC must be 
seen to be above suspicion. Even in sports, it is when the people doubt 
the neutrality of the referee that mayhem erupts. The EC is allowing 
doubt about its neutrality to seep into the nation. The 45 constituencies 
that the Commission is determined to create do not yet exist. Why then 
are the Electoral Commission’s officers illegally conducting primaries 
for the NDC in the as yet non-existent constituencies? Why are they 
seeking to give unfair advantage to the NDC at the expense of the law 
abiding parties (Obetsebi-Lamptey 2012)?
 
 
To prevent the creation of new constituencies, NPP associates filed several law 
suits at the country’s Supreme Court (Ghana News Agency 2012b). Eventually, the 
petitions for injunctions against CI 78, the Constitutional Instrument establishing the 
new constituencies, failed and CI 78 passed parliament and established 45 new 
constituencies about ten weeks prior to Election Day.  
One might wonder how the NDC benefitted from increasing the number of con-
stituencies in the presidential election, since the number of voters decisive for the 
outcome remains the same. In recent years, however, the parliamentary and presi-
dential elections have been neck-and-neck races where no political party can be 
assured of a “one touch” victory – meaning winning the presidential elections in the 
first round with the required 50%+1 vote. Several Ghanaians explained that the re-
sults of the parliamentary elections have an impact on voters’ choice for the presi-
dential run-off (A7 interviewed 21/11/2011; A11 interviewed 30/11/2011; A16 inter-
viewed 19/11/2012; A27 interviewed 02/12/2012). They argued that whoever wins 
the majority in parliament will also win the presidency in Ghana. Therefore, so their 
argument goes, political parties have an interest in winning as many constituencies 
as possible (ibid.). Moreover, creating new constituencies increases the number of 
jobs distributed amongst the political elite. More individuals are able to run for office 
which is a sought after job. As Owusu (2009: 41) states: 
Government jobs are good, lucrative, and secure jobs, with the higher 
levels conferring power and influence as well as status and prestige.  
Taking a closer look at the delimitation process suggests that the NDC gov-
ernment indeed tried to use the creation of new districts to tip the electoral 
framework slightly to its favour. The new districts had not strictly been established 
in areas most affected by population growth (see table 4.1 and figure 4.3). 
Roughly speaking the government did two things: First, it split existing districts 
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into two, which were congruent with constituencies. The case of Bia, a district in 
the Western Region illustrates this first scenario (see figure 4.2).            
Figure 4.2   Issue of delimitation in Ghana 2012 
 
           Source: Based on map from peacefmonline (2012) 
By splitting an existing district, one of the new districts was going to lack an MP. 
Due to the way that the Ghanaian state works, the EC saw itself forced to cre-
ate new constituencies in areas where the government had split previous con-
gruent districts and constituencies. Afari-Gyan had publicly wondered: 
What will be the loot of the new district assemblies if elections are not 
held in the 45 new constituencies this December? Will they be doing 
business without MPs (Papran 2012)?
 
 
In the second scenario the government was faced with districts which already 
had several constituencies. Therefore, the government could create a new district 
without the need for the EC to create a new constituency: One example which fits 
this scenario is the former district of Bulisa in the Upper East (see figure 4.2). Bu-
lisa as a district was made up of two constituencies, Bulisa North and South. The 
government formed two districts out of one without the creation of new constitu-
encies. Even though no new constituencies were created in this scenario, it was 
still a strategy by the NDC to mobilize support from voters (see section 4.1.3). 
Table 4.1 indicates that the course of action taken by the government indirectly 
pushed the EC to create a substantial number of new constituencies in NDC 
strongholds such as the Volta, Northern, and Upper West regions as well as in 
the selected swing regions of Western and Brong-Ahafo.  
 121 
 
Table 4.1   Establishment of new districts & constituencies per region34 
Source: Based on election results 2008 (FES 2010); election results 2012 (EC of Ghana 
2012); new districts & nominated DCE’s (Ghanadistricts.com 2012) 
Regions characterized by high population growth and large population size, like 
Greater Accra and the Ashanti region – the stronghold of the NPP – had been 
strikingly neglected in the government’s exercise (see figure 4.4 and table 4.1). 
Out of the top 5 regions mostly affected by population growth according to the 
2010 population census (see figure 4.3) the government strove to create new 
constituencies first and foremost in its own strongholds.35  
Figure 4.3   Annual average intercensal population growth rate in Ghana 
according to region (2000/2010) 
                                            
34
 For a list of new districts and constituencies see annex figure 9.2.2. 
35
 While the Upper East region as an NDC stronghold was not awarded any new constituencies, the 
region benefited from the creation of several new districts (see middle column in table 4.1).   
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Region 
New District 
New Constituency 
(NDC initiated) 
New District 
Old Constituency 
(upgrade) 
Old District 
New Constituency 
(EC initiated) 
Western 3 2 1 
Central 1 2 3 
Greater Accra 1 5 6 
Volta 4 3 0 
Eastern 1 4 4 
Ashanti 2 1 6 
Brong-Ahafo 3 2 2 
Northern 3 3 2 
Upper East 0 4 2 
Upper West 1 1 0 
SUM 19 27 26 
Source: GSS (2012: 2) 
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Figure 4.4 Ranking of Ghana’s regions according to population size 
(2000/2010)
 
 
A clear majority of new constituencies whose creation had been initiated by the 
NDC government, were won by the NDC in the 2012 presidential and parlia-
mentary race (thirteen and twelve out of nineteen) (see table 4.2).  
Table 4.2   Winners of 2012 elections in new districts & constituencies 
Source: Table 4.1 and 2012 election results published by EC of Ghana (2012). 
By creating new constituencies mainly in its own strongholds, the NDC government 
attempted to impact power relations between Ghana’s regions in favour of the 
NDC (see table 4.3). To counterbalance the ruling party’s advance, the EC estab-
lished 26 new constituencies on its own initiative (see scenario three illustrated in 
figure 4.2). The EC targeted primarily Central and Greater Accra as regions with 
high population growth (see figure 4.3), but also the Ashanti and Eastern regions 
as strongholds of the NPP (see table 4.1 column three). The EC’s Chairman noted: 
In Volta Region, four new districts have been created, so automatically, 
the constituencies in the region move from 22 to 26. […] If Volta Region is 
being given additional constituencies, the Commission therefore should 
compensate all the other regions in the country (Daily Guide 2012a).
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Table 4.3   Regional share in constituencies (population size/seats in par-
liament) 
Region Share in 2008 
NDC vision of 
share for 2012 
Share in 2012 
Greater Accra 11.7 11.2 12.4 
Central 8.3 8.0 8.4 
Northern 11.3 11.6 11.3 
Ashanti 17.0 16.5 17.1 
Volta 9.6 10.4 9.5 
Brong-Ahafo 10.4 10.8 10.5 
Eastern 12.2 11.6 12.0 
Western 9.6 10.0 9.5 
Upper West 4.3 4.4 4.0 
Upper East 5.7 5.2 5.5 
Source: Election results 2008 (FES 2010); table 4.1 and election results 2012 (EC of Gha-
na (2012) 
Table 4.3 above shows that the 26 new constituencies initiated by the EC in-
deed re-established to a large extent the old constellation of power between 
Ghana’s regions. The region of Greater Accra, as a highly populous region that 
was mostly affected by population growth, relatively improved its share of con-
stituencies compared to 2008. Again, the results of the 2012 elections support 
this narrative since most of the constituencies added by the EC were won by 
the NPP (see table 4.2 column three). The Centre for African Democratic Affairs 
(CADA) based in Accra commented on the issue of creating new districts and 
the delimitation process this entailed as follows:  
If these districts are split, they cannot meet the minimum population 
threshold for qualification as a district. The fact that there are some exist-
ing districts with lower populations does not justify a repetition of previ-
ous wrongs. The announcement of the creation of new districts has led to 
many agitations as many people want their communities to either be up-
graded to the status of districts or their towns are made capital towns of 
the new districts. Such exercises must be done with transparency and in-
tegrity. There is a perception that the exercise was selective to satisfy a 
parochial political interest. Perception is as important as reality.  
The idea behind the population threshold is that with a minimum popu-
lation […] there will be a sizeable number of people in the economically 
active group who could […] pay basic rate to generate the initial capital 
to fund projects. […] Because some districts have lower populations, 
they cannot generate enough revenue so such districts always wait for 
the release of District Assembly Common Fund before projects are 
started. This defeats the decentralization policy. 
 124 
 
[...] If the rush to create new districts without recourse to the existing 
laws was meant to force the EC to cede constituencies to such areas it 
will not wash […] If the Commission accepts to cede constituencies to 
the new districts that do not adhere to the existing legal provisions, it 
will amount to gerrymandering and therefore unconstitutional and un-
democratic. (Center for African Democratic Affairs (CADA) 2012). 
The NPP loudly cried out foul over the government’s plan to create new 
constituencies. A similar situation had arisen ahead of the 2004 polls when the 
NPP was in power. At the time the number of constituencies was increased by 
the EC on the basis on the 2000 population census. Having lost power in 2000 
and ahead of the first post-alteration election in 2004, the NDC had claimed a 
ploy by the EC to assist the NPP to win several seats through the re-
demarcation exercise (Frempong 2012: 104). Since the NDC had realized that it 
could not prevent the creation of new constituencies, it strove instead to ensure 
the new constituencies could only be used in 2008. Eventually, the Supreme 
Court vindicated the EC’s intent to establish and apply the new constituencies 
for the 2004 polls (ibid.). In 2012, this move by the NDC might have reminded 
the NPP of its own tactics ahead of the 2004 elections.  
Having focused on Ghana’s formal electoral institutions and outlined how 
political elites endeavoured to shift the power relations embedded in them, the 
following section will shed some light on the workings of the current Ghanaian 
state during election times. It will address in particular the matter of informal 
institutions in the context of Ghanaian electoral politics.  
 
4.1.3 The realm of voter mobilization 
Adjusting Ghana’s formal institutions through the establishment of new districts 
was used by the NDC government to ensure the support of voters in these up-
graded areas. Citizens highly welcomed the new districts since they provided 
direct access to state resources for the communities (A40 interviewed 
20/12/2012; A41 interviewed throughout summer 2013; B5 communications 
2012; B17 communications 2013). Inhabitants and chiefs in the Ekumfi (Central 
region) and Pusiga regions (Upper East region) exuberantly celebrated the in-
auguration of their new districts (Paintsil and Essakyire 2012; Ghana News 
Agency 2012d). Naba Ibrahim Ayumah Aguri, Chief of Pusiga, remarked in his 
speech during the festivities: 
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We the chiefs and the good people of the newly created District wish to 
take this opportunity to express our gratitude to His Excellency President 
Mills and the NDC for giving us a district (Ghana News Agency 2012d).   
In Ghana each district is assigned a share of the District Assemblies Com-
mon Fund (DACF) which has its source in a guaranteed share of not less than 
five percent of the country’s tax revenue (see Art. 252 (1) of the 1992 Constitu-
tion of the Republic of Ghana & The District Assemblies Common Fund Act 
1993 (Act 455)). The DACF is distributed among all the District Assemblies on 
the basis of a formula approved by Parliament (see Art. 252 (2) of the 1992 
Constitution of the Republic of Ghana & The District Assemblies Common Fund 
Act 1993 Section 1 (4)). Currently, the administrator of the DACF submits a 
proposal to parliament on how to weight different criteria (see annex figure 
9.2.1) determining the allocation of the DACF to each district. Since the admin-
istrator of the DACF is a member of the ruling party, the majority in parliament 
has always waved the proposed formula through (Banful 2007: 8).  However, 
the promised allocations to districts and the actual disbursements of funds tend 
to differ (Banful 2007:1-2). 
In his study of the DACF, Banful (2008) finds that there is a persistent election 
cycle in the magnitude of annual disbursements and in the proportion of allocation 
that is actually disbursed. In an election year, the disbursement is 25% higher than 
in other years. He also finds that resource allocation is greater in government sup-
porting districts that are at risk of switching their allegiances to another political par-
ty (Banful 2007: 2). Banful’s findings, combined with the fact that each district is 
allocated a certain base amount of the DACF, speaks for the narrative that the new 
districts had been created to channel funds to particular areas as a way of mobiliz-
ing voters support for the NDC. Moreover, areas which are upgraded to constitu-
encies have access to the ”MPs’ Constituency Common Fund” (Ahwoi 2010: 179). 
Before the annually agreed formula for the DACF is applied, an amount of 10% 
previously called “Contingency Fund” and nowadays known as “Reserve Fund” is 
taken from the total DACF allocation (Banful 2007: 7). A proportion of this reserve 
fund is distributed evenly between all MPs and forms the ”MPs’ Common Fund”. 
These resources are supposed to be used for development projects in the constit-
uencies. Besides access to the DACF and a portion of the “MPs’ Common 
Fund”’, a district entails government jobs such as the post of District Chief Ex-
ecutive (DCE), Presiding Member of the Assembly and Assembly Members. 
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Again these jobs come with certain assets such as emoluments, the right for the 
DCE to live in a state-funded bungalow and goods such as cars, motorbikes, 
and computers (A40 interviewed 20/12/2012; A41 interviewed throughout sum-
mer 2013; B5 communications 2012; B17 communications 2013). The estab-
lishment of districts and constituencies has been used in Ghana as an instru-
ment to (re)distribute resources amongst the electorate. With an overwhelming 
majority of 23 out of the 27 upgraded new district areas having voted in the 
2012 elections for the NDC (see table 4.2 column two), this part of the govern-
ment’s mobilization strategy has paid off for the NDC. 
 
Issue of monetization of politics 
Several weeks before the polls, the government distributed around 100,000 free 
laptops to students, secondary, and tertiary educational institutions (B4 com-
munications 11/2012; B7 communications 12/2012; Anane 2012). According to 
the government the distribution was part of its Better Ghana ICT project. The 
timing for the giveaway campaign as well as a lack of transparency regarding 
the selection of beneficiaries suggests that the measure was another compo-
nent of the NDC’s mobilization strategy (A30 interviewed 04/12/2012). The NPP 
harshly critiqued the distribution campaigns, and pro-opposition media pointed 
out that the lists indicating the selected beneficiaries contained hundreds of 
ghost names and several educational institutions which did not exist. On certain 
university campuses the scheme was referred to as “one laptop per NDC sup-
porter” (A27 interviewed 02/12/2012; A30 interviewed 04/12/2012; Radio XYZ 
2012). Papers close to the NPP also claimed that university students across the 
country had been rewarded with cars (see Quartey 2012) given out by the 
groups “Movement For Mahama” and “Youth For Mahama” in exchange for their 
lobbying for NDC support (A27 interviewed 02/12/2012; Ghanaian Observer 
2012). With the youth constituting a large proportion of eligible voters, success-
fully mobilizing students is vital for Ghana’s political parties.  
In addition to the direct distribution of larger goods – such as laptops and 
cars – and widely scattered smaller give-aways such as t-shirts, shoes, flags, 
caps, neck scarves, and stickers all in party colours, the dispersion of cash is 
relied upon in Ghanaian electoral politics as a way of mobilizing voters support:  
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It is common, it is very common to give money to make people vote for 
you. Some are… how should I put it… some are not educated, so you 
can use money to convince them. I have somebody who brought me 
matchboxes. They gave him a matchbox. They saw him and they gave 
him a matchbox like this and when he opened it, it was 50 Ghana. They 
have money sitting governments. They make sure they will use wise 
the money. They are using money from the state for it and everybody 
knows. It’s normal that’s politics. […] Most MP’s do it (A13, interviewed 
07/11/2012). 
Another means of vying for voters’ support is to live up to the electorates’ ex-
pectations of public goods such as education, transportation infrastructure, and 
health facilities (see also Harding 2015):  
She brought a clinic; she bought ambulances for more clinics. She 
brought another school. She was doing a lot, but the constituency was 
big. They just divided it. The NDC people will know she is doing well, but 
then it’s politics. NDC some of them believe she has done some for them 
so they will vote her and vote for their presidential candidate. That’s how 
some people see it […]. Now it’s different. For the presidential everybody 
will vote how they believe. But for parliamentary they see what work has 
been done. The district directors, the DCEs they have been being doing 
roads, but once you are an MP people expect you to be doing roads, to 
bring hospitals and schools. When you don’t do these things for them 
they will vote against you […]. That’s why the political campaign is about 
what they have done and not about what must be done (A13, interviewed 
07/11/2012, cp. also 2012 campaign flyer below). 
Figure 4.5   Campaign flyer of NDC candidate for Krowor constituency in 
Greater Accra  
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A crucial pillar for voter mobilization in Ghana is the distribution or redistribu-
tion of goods and resources amongst the electorate during pre-election times. A 
study conducted in the constituency of Ablekuma Central revealed that the elec-
torate assessed politicians based on how they met the daily needs of the people 
(Lamptey and Salihu (2012:190). This included for example paying school fees 
and giving generous funeral donations. Yet, voters also viewed their political in-
terest in broader communal terms of religion, ethnicity, and tradition. As Ninsin 
(Ninsin in Lamptey and Salihu (2012: 190)) puts it: 
[The] Ghanaian electorate does not vote as sovereign individuals, aim-
ing to implement certain democratic ideals or rights, but as members 
of the community aspiring to improve their own material conditions.  
The “political currency” used during campaigns therefore depends on the nature 
of the addressee(s) and their political sophistication (ibid.). While some goods 
and resources are channelled through networks based on ethnicity, others are 
distributed by some degree of “community-oriented developmental patrimonial-
ism”.36 Incumbent political elites resort to the provision of public goods – such 
as schools, roads, and health infrastructure – in particular in ethnically frag-
mented local communities, so as to benefit the maximum number of potential 
voters and ensure their electoral support (see also chapter five).  
The practice of (re)distributing goods and resources amongst the electorate 
raises the matter of monetization of electoral politics. Without access to a signifi-
cant amount of financial resources or a senior financial mentor it is impossible to 
successfully run for a seat in parliament. In particular younger politicians repeatedly 
denounced the monetization of Ghanaian politics as an impediment to running for 
office (A17 interviewed 11/2012; A 15 interviewed 16/11/2012; B3 communication 
19/11/2012; D18 observation 11/2012). As Owusu (2009: 39) puts it:  
[…] only a person of some means or considerable wealth can aspire to 
or hold office either because of the expenses necessary to compete, 
run for office or maintain it.  
 
                                            
36
 The concept of “developmental (neo)patrimonialism” has been developed by Booth and Golooba-
Mutebi (2011) and challenges the assumption that (neo)patrimonialism hinders economic develop-
ment. Based on case studies from Rwanda and Ethiopia, the authors illustrate that some states 
have harnessed neopatrimonialism for developmental ends. These states have ensured that dis-
bursed rents based on access to the state are used for productive investments that expand society’s 
income in the long term (Kelsall 2011). The concept of “community-oriented developmental patrimo-
nialism” builds on this idea. Yet, it claims that in ethnically fragmented communities, politicians resort 
to providing public goods to maximize patronage benefits and voters’ support for their own ends.   
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Party financing  
Closely linked to the issue of voter mobilization and monetization of politics is 
campaign and party financing. So far there is no limit on campaign spending in 
Ghana which has been critiqued by some Ghanaians and actors of the interna-
tional community (A 31 interviewed 11/12/2012; A 32 interviewed 12/12/2012; 
A33 interviewed 12/12/2012; B3 communication 19/11/2012). Even though reli-
able figures on actual spending are not publicly available due to poor implemen-
tation of political party laws (see Ashiagbor 2005: 7), anecdotal evidence sug-
gests that campaign spending has substantially increased over the years; some 
even say it has become excessive (ibid.; A 31 interviewed 11/12/2012; A33 in-
terviewed 12/12/2012; B3 communication 19/11/2012; B3 communication 
19/11/2012; Asare 2013).37 
A large sum is spent on printing billboards, posters, the production of cam-
paign songs, and campaign paraphernalia. However, a significant portion of the 
spending is also said to be used for buying votes, bribing election officials or 
financing hooliganism (A14 interviewed 08/11/2012; Asare 2013). Some people 
refer to the election year as “cocoa season” (B4 communications 11/2012; B5 
communications 11/2012; B7 communications 11/2012), meaning that it is the 
time of harvest characterized by rent payments of candidates who want to be 
(re-)elected. Normally parliamentary candidates are expected to cover most of 
their expenses from their own pocket (Nugent 2001: 408). Only sometimes do 
the headquarters grant additional support (B1 communication 23/11/2011), 
since presidential candidates take precedence accessing scarce resources to 
fund their campaigns. A successful MP candidate explained:  
Elections are not for the poor. It is an extremely expensive enterprise – 
very very expensive (Nugent 2001: 408).   
Besides the personal and family wealth of candidates, direct or indirect fi-
nancial contributions are vital for party campaigns. These comprise membership 
dues, donations by founders of political parties, party members and sympathis-
ers, local businesses, foreigners but also sources from kickbacks, state subven-
tions and returns on business investments, which often results in the use and 
                                            
37
 Asare (2013) claims that NDC and NPP each spent over £31,498,745 during the 2012 elec-
tions. 
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abuse of state resources (Saffu 2003: 22; Boafo-Arthur 1998: 82).38 In general 
party financing is a major problem for all political parties, except the one that is 
in power (ibid.). Despite the fact that Ghanaian law prohibits foreign contribu-
tions (see 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana Art. 55 (15) and Art. 23 & 
24 of Political Parties Act 2000, Act 574), the NDC and the NPP are both said to 
have benefitted from foreign financing during the 2012 election cycle. Ahead of 
the polls the NDC was accused of receiving indirect financial support from Chi-
na Huawei Technologies (see Africa Confidential 2012b). The Chinese compa-
ny allegedly sponsored campaign materials for the NDC. The claim was put 
forward by the Alliance for Accountable Governance (AFAG), a pro-NPP gov-
ernance monitoring agency based in Accra. The AFAG based its allegations on 
the fact that the company had been awarded the contract for building Ghana’s 
national e-governance infrastructure – said to be worth approximately USD 
127.5 million – and was given a USD 43 million tax exception by parliament. 
Both the contract and the tax exception for Huawei were opposed by the minori-
ty in parliament (Africa Confidential 2012b). Likewise, the NPP was rumoured to 
receive cash and vehicles from the Ouattara regime in neighbouring Ivory Coast 
in support of its 2012 campaign. The allegations spread after the publication of 
an article in “The True Statesman” (2012), a newspaper close to the NDC. 
While both parties were quick to deny the accusations against them, both fac-
tions are known to have benefited from donations from national, foreign, and 
multinational companies. South Africa’s telecommunications company MTN for 
example is said to be close to the NDC, while Britain’s Vodafone, which secured 
a remarkably cheap license from Kufuor’s government (Africa Confidential 
2012d), is regarded as close to the NPP (Africa Confidential 2012b). Campaign 
donations are also said to be flowing in from foreign sources such as from polit-
ical and business elites in neighbouring countries (International IDEA 2012: 24; 
Quartey 2011: 139; Gyimah-Boadi in Ayee et al. 2007: 8). Africa Confidential 
(2012d) reports: 
                                            
38
 According to Ninsin (2006: 17) the income structure of one of the major political parties con-
sists of: 45% donations; 35% contribution by MPs; 15% party membership dues, and 5% of 
other sources. 
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Companies such as United Bank for Africa and Zenith Bank have made 
political friends in Accra as have telecommunications companies such 
as Glo, owned by Michael Adenuga, a close business associate of ex-
President Ibrahim Babangida [of Nigeria]. Adenuga moved to Ghana in 
2007 with encouragement from the Kufuor government. Then Nuhu 
Ribadu, Chairman of Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Com-
mission, was pursuing Adenuga as part of a wider investigation. For 
several months, Ribadu froze Adenuga’s assets in Nigeria; Adenuga is 
now close to the NPP and financed sporting events, such as football’s 
Cup of Nations in January 2008. Nigeria’s Rivers State Governor, Ro-
timi Amaechi, has strong business ties in Ghana and is said to support 
the NDC. The former Chief Executive of the United Bank for Africa, To-
ny Elumelu, is said to be a close ally of the NPP’s Kufuor. Bola Ahmed 
Tinubu, former Lagos State Governor, is close enough to President 
John Mahama to have invited him as guest of honour to his star-
studded 60th birthday party in Lagos in April.  
It seems that Africa’s political elite form transnational supportive alliances (see 
also Africa Confidential 2011b) which, based to hearsay, provide mutual financial 
support during the election season (Saffu 2003: 24; Africa Confidential 1999). 
Another important foreign source for generating an income for political parties 
are donations from citizens living abroad. Both of Ghana’s main parties have es-
tablished branches overseas with the ones in the UK and US being the most sig-
nificant (see Boafo-Arthur 1998: 83). In their disclosure of funds, Ghanaian politi-
cal parties in fact list “citizens living abroad” as a separate category (Saffu 2003: 
24). During the 1996 elections, the NPP’s presidential candidate allegedly re-
ceived USD100,000 from the NPP’s US branch (ibid.). Hence pre-election cam-
paign trips by presidential candidates are not limited to Ghanaian soil, but also 
span trips abroad to mobilise financial support.  As Akufo-Addo explained during 
his stay in Hamburg in 2011: 
Some people criticise this decision, arguing that the campaign is restrict-
ed to the geographical territory called Ghana. I disagree. I still disagree. I 
consider their contribution to the development of Ghana as equally im-
portant. The taxes that they pay at the ports when they ship things home 
form a big part of government revenue (Myjoyonline 2011b). 
The diaspora is not only a valuable source of party financing but with its annual 
remittances of about USD2.0 billion, also represents a crucial source of foreign 
currency for Ghana’s Central Bank and vital pillar in the economy (see Ghana 
Business News 2016).   
 
Traditional rulers, the media, and polarization of ethnicity  
Access to financial resources is key in the context of voter mobilization in Ghana. 
Yet, access to voters is just as important (see Nugent 2001: 407). In this way, 
traditional rulers as well as the media play an important role. Political parties and 
candidates reach voters by spreading their campaign messages through bill 
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boards installed in public places, TV spots, and newspaper ads. Most important 
are radio programmes, the dominant media outlet in Ghana, and campaign rallies 
which allow for direct contact with the electorate (A18 interviewed 23/11/2012; 
D14 observation 04/12/2012; D15 observation 05/12/2015).  
Since the gradual reopening of Ghana’s cultural sphere to private media in 
the early 1990s, FM stations have sprouted up all over the country (A18 inter-
viewed 23/11/2012; A22 interviewed 27/11/2012). Today there are about 300 
radio stations broadcasting in English and/or local languages. Several are 
owned by politicians or individuals close to one of the main parties. Radio Gold 
for example is said to be 50% owned by the 31st December Women’s Move-
ment, suggesting a link to former First Lady Nana Rawlings (Doste 2012), while 
Oman FM is owned by Kennedy Agyempong, a sitting MP for the NPP in Assin 
North (A19 interviewed 23/11/2012). During the election period FM stations are 
frequently used as “parties’ mouth pieces” shaping the campaign discourse 
(ibid.; Danson and Edu-Afful 2012: 122-23).  
Rallies are a highlight of the electoral season within communities and seem 
to be the most vital way of mobilizing voters. In this context traditional rulers 
play a vital role since custom requires political campaigners to pay courtesy 
calls to chiefs before being allowed access to the land and the communities 
(observation fieldwork 11/2012 and 12/2012). While it appears that MPs are 
complying with customs and paying their respect to traditional leaders, a survey 
amongst MPS carried out by Gyampo (2008: 20) clearly shows that half of the 
respondents also made courtesy calls to win chiefs over to their side and to so-
licit more votes (Gyampo 2008: 22). The influence of the chief permeates the 
fabric of social life in Ghana’s rural communities so much (Gyampo 2008: 12) 
that traditional leaders, despite the little formal powers that they have, remain 
extremely influential in the cultural sphere (Ansah-Koi 1998: 152).  
Even though Ghana’s constitution bans chiefs from active party politics, 
Gyampo (2008), Jonah (2003), and Ansah-Koi (1998) demonstrate vividly that 
some have been dragged into politics by politicians who seek the mandate of 
the people. Chiefs can be seen at party rallies, adorned in party paraphernalia 
and sometimes declaring support for the candidates (Gyampo 2008: 10). Ac-
cording to Gyampo (2008: 20), chiefs in Ghana’s Fourth Republic attempted, in 
mostly subtle ways, to influence outcomes of elections at the national and local 
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levels. Some exert their influence by persuading or coercing rival candidates to 
stand down. This is what Jonah (2003: 218) calls “Patronage by Restriction of 
Competitors” (PRC). Moreover, traditional rulers are said to hold secret meet-
ings, make partisan commitments, and offer various opinions of a partisan na-
ture (Gyampo 2008: 22) aiming to mobilize support for their preferred candidate. 
Jonah (2003) terms this “Patronage by Mobilization of the Electorate” (PME) 
Gyampo (2008: 18-19) reports: 
Prior to the 2000 General Elections, an interview with some residents 
of La, a suburb of Accra […] revealed that the Chief convened a meet-
ing of all the seven clan heads in La and called on them to support an 
aspiring member of parliament (MP). […] In the case of the La Chief, he 
was very popular among his sub-chiefs and subjects and so his pre-
ferred candidate won the elections. 
Interesting in this context is also Ansah-Koi’s (1998: 152) remark who confirms 
this narrative but adds that:  
The impression should not be left that queenmothers are not involved 
in the entire drama. 
In the prelude to the 1996 elections, the NDC worked hard to organize queen-
mothers to mobilize, in particular, the support of female voters (ibid.).  
In a country where origins are everything (Nugent 2001: 416) and people 
continue to look up to their traditional rulers for leadership (Gyampo 2008: 12) 
ethnicity plays a key role in voter mobilization. Political parties take this into 
consideration when selecting their candidates: 
After splitting the old constituency, two of the new ones are safe for 
the NPP and one is 50/50. There are more Ga and Hausa. They like 
NDC. And the NDC people have also used the strategy to bring a can-
didate that is a Ga. So now its 50/50 and that man is a popular man. 
When it was the old whole constituency they had small votes then 
(A13, interviewed 07/11/2012). 
Moreover, party representatives play the ethnic card in terms of political rhetoric 
to assure voters’ support. During the 2012 pre-election period much attention was 
paid by Ghanaian society to the issue of politicization of ethnicity. Already in Feb-
ruary 2011, Akufo-Addo addressed his party executives in Korfuridua using the 
phrasing “Owo bia eye owo” – meaning “all-die-be-die” – to get his audience into 
the mood for the upcoming elections. His speech had been recorded and soon 
audio sequences were spreading around the media. With Ghana having a 
longstanding tradition within its political culture of frowning on ethnic appeals 
(Jockers/Kohnert/Nugent 2009: 2) the “all-die-be-die” statement of the NPP’s flag 
bearer was largely critiqued for inciting other ethnic groups, and Akufo-Addo was 
accused of undermining national unity and cohesion (Danso and Edu-Afful 2012: 
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111). Naturally, the most vocal critique came from the NDC, but numerous civil 
society groups joined the outrage and harshly condemned the statement as hate 
speech. Ghanaians seemed however to be split on the issue. While hard core 
NPP supporters tried to downplay the statement as a common Ghanaian saying, 
NDC stalwarts claimed the NPP was “beating tribal war drums”. They stressed 
that the explosive comment was a warmongering call to party sympathizers and 
individuals with a particular ethnic background to adopt violence in the upcoming 
elections (Danso and Edu-Afful 2012: 111). Johnson Asiedu Nketiah (2011), the 
NDC Secretary-General quoted Akufo-Addo in a press conference as follows: 
We Akans are not the cowards we are perceived to be by the other 
tribes. […] The little violence that we displayed in Attiwa is just the tip 
of the iceberg of what the NPP would do in 2012. […] 2012 is going to 
be a do and die affair after all: All-die-be-die!  
A party supporter toned down his flagbearer’s statement:  
Nana said all-die-be-die and it grows a whole lot. He told his supporters 
they have to die for the party. It is time for the party supporters to go 
out and die for the party, to do something for the party to come to 
power. He didn’t say violence talks. When it came out it was politics 
time. He was trying to say we have to fight together, he was not talking 
to the nation, he was talking to his party supporters that this is the time 
that you will die for the party; you have to go around campaigning for 
the party convincing people to come to NPP you understand. 
He was using the word die for his supporters. You understand the word 
die? It was not to kill somebody. But when it was election time people 
used that to say he will bring violence, but its not true (A 13, inter-
viewed 07/11/2012). 
   The debate about the “all-die-be-die” statement is indicative of the fact that 
mobilizing along regional-ethnic lines is still very common in Ghana and pur-
sued by political parties across the board (Danso and Edu-Afful 2012: 98; 
Ninsin 2006: 9). At a rally in Walewale, the hometown of Mahamudu Bawumia, 
the running mate of Akufo-Addo, Mahama stated in 2012:  
I am a Northerner looking for President. My younger brother, Bawumia is 
a Northerner looking for Vice-President. There is a world of difference 
between being President and being Vice-President (The Chronicle 2012). 
In addition to ethnic appeals, other forms of hate speech such as derogatory 
language have been used to gain political capital over opponents and to mobi-
lize support (Danso and Edu-Afful 2012: 109). Sitting NPP-MP for Assin North, 
Kennedy Agyapong, has developed a reputation for provoking his political op-
ponents and using hate speech on air. Ahead of the 2012 polls for example, 
Agyapong warned the NDC that:   
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If we don’t have peaceful elections in this country and Koku Anyidoho 
[Deputy Secretary General of the NDC] thinks he can use the military, the 
macho men to intimidate and rig elections, Ghana would not be like 
Kenya, Ghana would be like Rwanda. When you look at Nana Addo’s age 
and this guy [Koku Anyidoho], Nana Addo can be this boy’s father, but 
because of cheap politics, we do in this country, he gets up and starts 
insulting this man [Nana Addo] with no just reason. We want peace, no-
body wants to fight in this country… but an eye for an eye, a tooth for a 
tooth… this time we would not sit down for NDC to intimidate anybody, if 
they hit one we would hit three (Daily Guide 2011). 
During the pre-election period verbal duels between opposing candidates and 
party representatives are very common and quarrels are played out particularly 
during radio programmes (A20 interviewed 27/11/2012; A21 interviewed 
27/11/2012). One can even say the FM stations are providing a platform for it 
(D8 observation 16/11/2012; D9 observation 27/11/2012). The heated political 
discourse is further fuelled by so-called “serial callers” who receive money or 
phone credit in return for  calling in on radio shows on behalf of their parties 
(Danso and Edu-Affu 2012: 117). It is not only party foot soldiers who are in-
volved in this venture. Parties seem to have made certain members in charge of 
spreading provoking comments, and mobilizing voter support along ethnic lines. 
In this way, leading party members and presidential candidates do not have to 
be associated directly with this “dirty business”. These members often expect 
rewards for their “services to the party” such as appointment to government in-
stitutions or ministerial posts, once the party has gained power (Danso and 
Edu-Afful 2012: 116). As an NDC regional youth organiser put it: 
When high-ranking members in the NPP use derogatory remarks 
against their opponents, their supporters are very happy; the same ap-
plies to us (NDC) – when we insult, you would have people calling to 
congratulate you, and some might even ask you to pass by their shop, 
home or office for monetary rewards (Danso and Edu-Afful 2012: 117; 
B17 conversation in 2013 and 2014).  
As the outcry about the “all-die-be-die” statement has shown, the practice of 
politicization of ethnicity and inciting language co-exists with a strong repulsion 
and repudiation of hate speech and ethnic appeals. Ahead of the 2012 polls, nu-
merous peace campaigns were run by social groups strongly condemning hate 
speech and electoral violence (A3 interviewed 14/11/2011; A6 interviewed 
18/11/2011; A15 interviewed 16/11/2012; A 23 interviewed 28/11/2012). Slogans 
like the following were spread all over Accra before, during, and after the election: 
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 Say no to tribal politics; Say no to politics of insults and violence; Say 
yes to unity and peace; Say yes to Ghana (Youth Action for Progress). 
 When violence erupts; all are affected and there’s no escape (Ark 
Foundation). 
 Promote Peace; Stop Hate Speeches 
In addition smaller and larger events were organized in abundance. Events 
such as peace concerts that particularly targeted   youth and campaigns such 
as “Peace Everybody’s Business” by Ghana Peace Campaign, a “1 Million 
People March for Peace”, were organised in Accra involving leading politicians 
such as Vice President Paa Kwesi Amissah-Arthur (NDC), Jake Obestebi-
Lamptey, Chairman of the NPP and Mayor of Accra Alfred Okoe Vanderpuije 
(NDC) (A15 interviewed 16/11/2012). While some members of the political elite 
engaged in hate speech, political party leadership participated in and endorsed 
the peace events organized by various societal groups countering the increas-
ingly heated pre-election political discourse. 
The death of the sitting president Mills at the end of July 2012 and the passing 
away of Aliu Mahama, NPP Vice-president under Kufuor, close to the polls in mid-
November, interrupted the swelling intense political discourse. The tragic incidents 
called for a period of national mourning. Since funerals represent important social 
events in Ghana celebrating the life of the departed, campaigning was suspended 
by all parties for a few days allowing for a degree of cooling down.  
As the election day approached, peace messages grew. Otumfuo Osei Tutu, 
the Asantehene, Ghana’s most influential traditional leader, together with the Na-
tional Peace Council and the Institute of Democratic Governance (IDEG) invited 
presidential candidates and leading stakeholders to Kumasi to sign for the first 
time a declaration taking a stand against electoral violence, impunity, and injus-
tice (A40 interviewed 20/12/2012; see Kumasi Declaration 2012). The event with 
speeches by Rawlings, Kufuor, and several presidential candidates was widely 
covered by the media. In addition to these big events, peace songs like “Yεn ara 
asase ni”39, Ghana’s unofficial national anthem, combined with countless peace 
appeals dominated the immediate pre-election discourse. Radio presenter Cecil 
Nii Obodai-Wentum called upon Ghanaians on the morning of Election Day: 
                                            
39
 Meaning in english: “This land is our own”. 
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[…] Ghanaians will decide today whether to retain the NDC or bring in a 
new president. We should also be mindful of the fact that the interna-
tional community is paying close attention to the outcome of today’s 
polls. We should go to the polls once again to test our democratic 
strength and […] should have at the back of our minds that Ghana is 
the only country we have. If we destroy this beautiful fabric of unity, we 
are doomed forever. We all heard our president yesterday appealing for 
calm and cool heads. What else can we ask for again but the suprema-
cy of peace and stability? My brothers, my sisters we cannot make any 
meaningful impact in the political environment filled with violence, ac-
rimony, confusion and turmoil. My brothers and sisters our future as a 
nation lies in our ability to sustain and keeping the peace of our demo-
cratic process. Our strength as a people lies in our ability to protect, to 
sustain and to improve our political institutions, economic institutions 
in some way. […] Finally we should remember our image as a country 
lies in our ability to showcase and sustain our hard won reputation and 
enviable democracy by going to the polls as one people (D16 observa-
tion 07/12/2012).  
Radio stations were continuously broadcasting peace messages from eminent 
Ghanaians such as Reverent Emmanuel Asante, Chairman of the National 
Peace Council who stated:  
[…] try to see whether we would like to retain or whether we would like to 
bring in a new government. This is what democracy is all about. It is not a 
matter of war. Politics is not a matter of doing and dying as some people 
want to give us that impression. […] All of us will not agree on one thing, 
but the fact that we have political disagreement does not mean that we 
should engage in political violence. We should learn to live and let others 
also live. My dear fellow Ghanaians be mindful of your language. […]We 
do not want to see those things we currently see on our television where 
there is violence and people are carrying mattresses and other things not 
knowing where to go. Ghana is our only country. Ghana is the only coun-
try that we have. We do not want to become refugees in countries in peo-
ple’s language we cannot even speak. We love mother Ghana. So let us 
conduct our politics in a civil way. Let political civility prevail. At the end of 
the day when all of us have been able to select by majority vote the per-
son we would want to rule, we will rejoice and give praise and thanks to 
the almighty God who has enabled us to go that far. Please let peace pre-
vail! And I speak to you as the Chairman of the National Peace Council 
[…] Let peace prevail in Ghana! (D16 observation 07/12/2012). 
According to some citizens, Ghana’s political discourse has been increas-
ingly marked by verbal abuse and hate speech during the pre-election period 
(A14 interviewed 08/11/2012). This potentially sets the scene for isolated inci-
dences of electoral violence, which have been a recurring feature of all Ghana-
ian elections since 1992, to become endemic (Danso and Edu-Afful 2012: 98-
99). This could pose a threat to national stability, in particular in a context where 
electoral stakes have been raised since Ghana entered the “club of oil produc-
ing countries” at the end of 2010 (A14 interviewed 08/11/2012).40 
                                            
40
 For an introduction to Ghana’s politics of patronage and its evolving oil industry see Boynton 
(2013). 
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There is more hate speech in 2012 than in 2008. But civil society has point-
ed to it more. Civil society has progressively developed more capacity. 
They are more finger pointing and speaking up more but it doesn’t 
necessarily erase it or make it lesser. Civil society has come around to 
say these are the problems watch it, but the problems still exist. [...] 
This year the tensions have been quite new (A15, interviewed 
16/11/2012). 
The perceived need for such a vast amount of peace campaigning could reflect 
a lingering and potentially growing fear of violence and uncertainty linked to 
elections in Ghana (CW-EOM 2012: 33). It is rather difficult to evaluate whether 
this indignation is entirely home-grown or to what extent the substantive finan-
cial support from donors has driven the peace campaigns. There is probably 
some truth in both. Certainly the peace campaigns in 2012 created an atmos-
phere in which the use of hate speech and politicization of ethnicity, at least by 
leading political figures, became socially unacceptable. From a political cam-
paign perspective, Akufo-Addo committed an immense PR mistake with his “all-
die-be-die” statement.  
It all depends on the time you talk, the moment you have been talking. 
Agyempong knows the NPP is too soft. He was telling them they need 
to be hard and fight. The timing wasn’t right, it was this election time 
whenever you use such words, it will come out and it will be wrong. Its 
politics and the politicians are all friends and they know what they are 
doing. In Ghana politics you have friends, an NDC friend while in the 
NPP. After the elections they will all be friends, but now they are not 
friends (A13, interviewed 07/11/2012). 
Akufo-Addo’s statement was gratefully taken up and exploited by the NDC who 
used the mistake to reinforce the image of the NPP as an “Akan party” and tried 
to brand Akufo-Addo as an “arrogant and aggressive” man.  One can imagine 
how in a heated political sphere the phrase could easily be taken literally by 
some NPP stalwarts. This dispute combined with reports about secret training 
camps of about thirty combatants in the Volta region,  among them Ghanaians 
and other African nationals, and the media reporting on an influx of small arms 
and weapons, certainly caused unease among some voters ahead of the polls 
(A14 interviewed 08/11/2012; A31 interviewed 11/12/2012). Again, this appre-
hension during election time and lingering fear of eruptions of pockets of elec-
tion-related violence, existed parallel to an overall generally peaceful intercon-
nected life between ethnic groups in Ghana.41  
 
                                            
41
 Ghana has experienced significant regional ethnic conflicts in the Northern parts of the country 
(see chapter five).  
 139 
 
4.2 Voting day  
The following section will narrate some of the main incidences that occurred 
during the two days of voting in Ghana’s 2012 elections. These events illustrate 
first and foremost that there is an imperative for the two big parties and individ-
ual candidates to win the polls. 
  
Hiccups during voting day  
On December 7th 2012, Ghana’s first day of voting, several polling stations 
throughout the country had to cope with the late arrival of election materials and 
EC officials. At a polling station in the constituency of Ayawaso Central in 
Greater Accra, the voter register was missing and therefore the start of the vot-
ing procedure was substantially delayed. Queuing voters questioned whether 
the missing voter register was indeed accidental as claimed by EC officials or 
whether it was an act intended to delay the election process (D17 observation 
07/12/2012). Rumours were spreading that the person responsible for the miss-
ing voter register was from the NDC and was intended to delay the voting in an 
area where the NPP was rather strong (B12 communication 07/12/2012).  
Of interest were the ways in which the different stakeholders interacted to re-
solve the issue. Polling agents had informed EC representatives who were deal-
ing with logistical challenges and complaints. At the same time a journalist from 
the Daily Graphic passed on the information to his editor claiming that his boss 
would ring up EC officials to increase the pressure (D17 observation 07/12/2012). 
The presiding member of the local assembly quickly appeared on the scene to 
assist in getting the voter register delivered to the polling station. He called EC 
officials numerous times and even offered to pick up the register from wherever it 
was, to deliver it to the polling station quicker (B12 communications 07/12/2012). 
Accordingly, plenty of informal mechanisms were put in place to deal with the 
situation. In the meantime, a team of mobile security forces made up of military 
and policemen checked several times that the situation remained calm (D17 ob-
servation 07/12/2012). Also Henry Quartey, the NPP candidate running for the 
parliamentary seat in the constituency came with his group of “macho men” to 
personally assess the situation (D17 observation 07/12/2012). Eventually the reg-
ister was delivered by the EC around 10.15am and welcomed with great cheer 
from patient voters. Voting started after a three-and-a-half-hour delay at 10.30am. 
In a similar way to the incident described above, logistical challenges have oc-
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curred at various places across the country. The fact that many Ghanaians sus-
pected, or even expected, intended interferences, speaks for itself.   
Throughout the election day several polling stations faced more serious chal-
lenges, in particular the breakdown of verification machines (African Elections 
Project 2012). Technical defects due to the humid climate and sometimes inad-
equate handling of the machines, which had been used for the first time, were 
frequently identified as reasons for the breakdown (B12 communication 
07/12/2012; D17 observation 07/12/2012). With no spare verification devices 
and the previously resolved rule “No Verification, No Voting”, the EC decided to 
run a second day of voting at affected polling stations (B12 communication 
07/12/2012; D17 observation 07/12/2012). Initially the decision caused some 
confusion, with doubtful voters who had been told at their respective polling sta-
tion to return the next day to cast their votes, called local radio stations to verify 
the information. A radio host who could not confirm that voting had been post-
poned till the next day advised voters to remain at or return to their polling sta-
tions. He urged them not to be deceived out of their vote:  
Voter: Hello, good morning! I am Laura […] we have been here since 
5.30 and I have a shop and as I am talking to you now I have closed the 
shop, [I] wanted to come and vote and go early. I have a kid at home, I 
have left the baby at home. And as I am talking to you now I am not so 
sure, cos we have not seen anybody, we are just queuing under the 
sun. We don’t know when we are voting and I heard that we are voting 
tomorrow, cos some of us…  
Radio: No, no, no, no, no! Don’t let anybody deceive you that you are 
you are gonna vote tomorrow! 
Voter: We were told we will be given numbers […] we didn’t get the 
numbers […] this is going to create confusion.  
Radio: I understand! What I suggest is you remain calm and then you 
stay there. It is unfortunate that you’ve left your baby at home and your 
shop. But you exercise that patience ok!?  
Voter: Ok, ok. 
Radio: Don’t let anybody deceive you that you are coming back tomor-
row to vote. The exercise will end at 5pm today (D16 observation 
07/12/2012).  
This incident demonstrates the underlying scepticism and mistrust Ghanaians have 
during election time. Furthermore, it illustrates the informal mechanisms citizens 
rely on to deal with challenges, in this case how to verify information. In the end, 
the news about the second day of voting trickled through and voting continued in 
some 431 polling stations on the following day (D17 observation 08/12/2012). 
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Issue of electoral violence 
During the two days of voting Ghana also experienced sporadic incidences of 
so-called first-order electoral malpractices.42 A group of strong men, for exam-
ple, stormed the collation centre of the Ablekuma North constituency in Greater 
Accra and set the ballot papers ablaze during the tabulation process (Joy 
Online 2012). The parliamentary candidates from the two leading parties ac-
cused each other of being behind the attack. Collation and declaration of the 
results continued at the police station based on the secured cast ballots. The 
perpetrators were arrested and supposed to face trial.   
So far only sporadic incidences of electoral violence have been common dur-
ing the elections in Ghana’s Fourth Republic. However, by now certain areas 
have become known as so-called “hot spots” where electoral violence is said to 
be likely to occur. Interviewees have mentioned such areas as Ashaiman, areas 
around Tema, Nima, Odododiodio (all Greater Accra), Bawku (Upper East) and 
Peki (Volta) as being “hot spots” (A13, A14, A31, A34, A35, A40). There seems 
to be a tendency for areas such as the Northern, Ashanti, and Greater Accra re-
gions to have the highest incidences of election-related violence (Lamptey and 
Salihu 2012: 194). In this context the youth - individuals falling within the 15 to 35 
age bracket - play a significant role (Abdallah and Osei-Afful 2012: 307), as they 
are hired to engage in illegal activities to ensure “their” candidate will win: 
The youth is used for the violence. You know right now the youth don’t 
work. So once somebody gives them money, take this and do this they 
will go. In this area if you give a boy money, take this, do this, they will 
go. There is no work. But if you are working you wouldn’t because how 
much would that person give you? So they are using the youth that has 
no work. So if you want to use those boys you will get. […] I don’t know 
for now if it is an MP, but even if it is some MP, you would not see his 
or her face. They take it through somebody so it will be difficult to get 
to know their IDs. Unless the person that the MP sends, he or she sees. 
They catch the person and tell this is the MP. But before you have tak-
en big money and I swear whenever they catch him they will say it’s 
not me. You don’t know the person who is catching, he did it himself. 
[…] They catch them who did it. But other time they go. It favours the 
party in power. So if NDC now sends people to go and military they 
catch them, definitely they will go out again cos it’s them that sends 
them (A13, interviewed 07/11/2012).   
Another interviewee shared the view that predominately socially deprived mem-
bers of the youth are used by politicians to ensure electoral victory: 
                                            
42
 For a definition of first- and second-order electoral malpractices, see Norris (2012: 155). 
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In Bawku we had about 50 young people who have been directly in-
volved in the things from both sides. And these people are against 
what is happening. They don’t like it. It disrupts their future. When you 
speak to them they are not able to go to school (A15, interviewed 
16/11/2012). In our upbringing as a people we are supposed to respect 
the elderly. We are brought up in a way that it is difficult to say no to 
the elderly. Through political motivation politicians play on the poverty 
in the area to give money to people, they tie them with money and 
some of these kids are 11 or 12 years old, some are even younger. 
They get involved in these things. They are the ones who burn the 
houses (A15, interviewed 16/11/2012). 
Even though the perpetrators are occasionally caught by security forces, as in 
the case of the Ablekuma North constituency, most election-related violence still 
seems to go hand-in-hand with a culture of impunity: 
Even the law cannot take its course cos they always fly under the ban-
ner of the political parties. So depending on which political party is in 
power and I go and do something on behalf of that political party who 
comes for me. The police have no authority. And if it is the biggest op-
position and you arrest their person they also come out in their num-
bers and storm the police station. There are some instances where jails 
have been broken and people taken out of jails. So everybody lives un-
der a certain banner. The banner of the government in power or the one 
of the opposition. These people are like untouchables. The police can-
not arrest them because it is not in the interest of the police to arrest 
them. In Tamale […] he has over 500 boys under his watch that he can 
command at a snap of a finger ready to move (A15, interviewed 
16/11/2012).
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Even though instances of first order electoral malpractices were not wide-
spread, it remains worrying that sporadic instances of election-related violence 
still regularly occur.  
Overall however, the security forces were in control of the situation. Each 
polling station was supposed to be staffed by a police officer or personnel of 
another security agency. In addition, armed roaming patrol teams made up of 
policemen and soldiers were responsible for an assigned area covering several 
polling stations (B15 communication 08/12/2012; D17 observation 07/12/2012). 
Slight tension arose at another polling station in Ayawaso Central due to discon-
tent over the handling of access to the premises of the polling station. As soon 
as the roaming patrol team and in particular soldiers were in sight, people 
stopped quarrelling and promptly followed orders given by the military (D17 ob-
servation 07/12/2012). Several voters remarked that no Ghanaian would want 
to mess with military personnel (B12 communication 07/12/2012). This under-
                                            
43 
Ghana’s youth is a relevant actor in electoral politics as they make up a significant part of the elec-
torate. Moreover, as party foot soldiers the youth plays a decisive role in mobilizing grassroots sup-
port (see Abdallah and Osei-Afful 2012).  
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lines the continuous respect bordering almost on fear Ghanaians have of their 
security forces and in particular the military (A13 interviewed 07/11/2012).   
 
Vote count and tabulation process  
At the observed polling stations, the vote count and tabulation process was 
transparent and not questioned by stakeholders. A brief disquiet erupted at a 
polling station in Ayawaso Central when a police officer chased an individual 
who was said to have attempted to steal one of the ballot boxes (D17 observa-
tion 07/12/2012). In the end no ballot box was stolen and the accused person 
was chased off the premises.  
Counting aloud each single vote per candidate continued as normal with 
polling station staff, media representatives, party and international observers 
present. At the observed polling stations the result protocols, the so-called “pink 
sheets”, were signed by relevant stakeholders. Afterwards the presiding officer 
brought the election material to the constituency’s collation centre at the Koto-
babi District Office and Police Station. Media representatives followed the elec-
tion material to ensure it was brought straight to the collation centre where 
throughout the night more and more results from the polling stations were 
checked and collated (D17 observation 07/12/12 & 8/12/2012).  
 
Second day of voting  
On the second day of voting most Ghanaians were focusing on the results trick-
ling in from the various constituency levels and witnessed the NDC gain ground 
in the 2012 presidential race. In light of these developments a number of in-
stances raised tensions slightly. Despite the fact that results from the NDC 
strongholds in the three northern regions were still outstanding on the second 
day of voting, Kwadjo Owusu Afriyie, the NPP General Secretary, held a press 
conference in the afternoon of the 8th of December in which he declared Akufo-
Addo the winner (D17 observation 08/12/2012; The Informer 2013). Afriyie even 
urged NPP supporters to attend church in white, the colour of victory, on the 
following Sunday to celebrate the NPP’s triumph. The declaration of the NPP’s 
win was promptly condemned by Reverend Emmanuel Asante, Chairman of the 
National Peace Council, who stressed that the announcement was illegal and 
an affront to the peace and stability of the nation. Asante stressed that the EC 
was the only constitutionally mandated body to declare the winner of the elec-
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tions and strongly criticised the NPP for its attempt to usurp the EC’s authority 
(D17 observation 08/12/2012; Ghana News Agency 2012e). 
Another instance attracted public attention on the second day of voting, when a 
number of NPP supporters intended to raid Superlock Technologies Limited 
(STL), an Israeli company which had been contracted by the EC to compile the 
biometric register and to provide IT services during the elections. NPP support-
ers had heard that STL received electoral results from regional EC offices with-
out the knowledge of NPP leaders. Thus, an allegation was quickly spreading 
that STL was involved in manipulating the results favouring the NDC before 
passing them on to the EC’s national headquarters in Accra44 (D17 observation 
08/12/2012). Yet, security personnel soon brought the situation under control. 
Both incidences point to the lingering mistrust, expectations of cheating, and 
heated atmosphere closer to the declaration of results.   
 
Declaration of results 
The official announcement of the election results came with some delay on 
Sunday evening, since the NPP had urged the EC to desist from declaring a 
winner (D17 observation 09/12/2012). Obetsebi-Lamptey argued that the NPP 
had detected a number of anomalies in some of the results announced at con-
stituency level. He claimed that there were significant disparities in the number 
of ballots cast for the presidential and parliamentary elections. As examples he 
cited the Yendi constituency in the Northern region and Korle Klottey in Greater 
Accra. The official validly cast votes for the parliamentary election in Korle 
Klottey were 74,407 votes compared to 74,422 for the presidential race. For the 
Yendi constituency the EC had declared the figures of cast votes as follows: 
49,113 for the parliamentary and 48,741 for the presidential election. In addi-
tion, the NPP alleged that there had been substantial differences in figures de-
clared by media houses and those announced at collation centres such as 
Ledzokuku in Greater Accra. Obetsebi-Lamptey therefore announced that his 
party would not accept the results until these issues had been addressed. A 
meeting was held with representatives of the NPP, the NDC, the EC and the 
National Peace Council as an attempt to pour oil on the troubled waters (Mod-
                                            
44
 Owing to a lack of evidence the NPP had to drop claims against the STL in 2012. A report pub-
lished by Ghana UNDP however challenges STL’s role in allowing multiple registrations to occur in 
2012 and raises the issue of the company’s responsibility for a bloated register (Daily Guide 2015). 
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ern Ghana 2012). Eventually, and despite resistance from the NPP, Afari-Gyan 
held sway and declared the NDC candidate, John Dramani Mahama, the winner 
of the 2012 presidential election.45    
 
 
4.3 Post-election period  
Just like events and incidences during election days, the 2012 post-election pe-
riod illustrates the importance of winning elections for political elites in Ghana. It 
also demonstrates how the NPP walked the tightrope between claiming elec-
toral fraud and simultaneously choosing a path deliberately conforming to inter-
national standards to challenge the declared result. By contesting the validity 
the 2012 presidential election results in court, the NPP not only emphasized its 
commitment to international norms and nurtured Ghana’s image as an African 
role model, but also opted for the court room as one of its members’ prominent 
professional strengths.  
 
A balancing act: Claiming electoral fraud via a process of legal remedies 
that deliberately conform with international standards  
The NDC embraced the declared outcome of the elections with joy. According 
to the official results Mahama had polled 5,474,761 votes while 5,247,898 bal-
lots had been cast for Akufo-Addo. Even though these results left a margin of 
only 226,863 votes, the difference between Mahama and Akufo-Addo was 
much larger than the slim majority of 40,586 votes Mills had secured for the 
NDC in 2008. As was common practice since 1992, the NDC as winner of the 
presidential race had also secured the majority in parliament with 148 seats 
compared to 123 seats for the NPP. While NDC supporters were celebrating 
their party’s victory, NPP supporters joined and reinforced their party leader’s 
claim of electoral fraud (B8 communications 12/2012; B13 communication 
09/12/2012; B16 communication 11/12/2012). Despite the assessment of the 
elections as free and credible by domestic, regional, and international observer 
groups,46 protests began to form quickly on the streets of Accra and Kumasi. 
Soon sheets were spreading around Accra trying to capture in figures where 
and how the NPP had allegedly been robbed of its victory (B8 communications 
                                            
45
 Interestingly, before Afari-Gyan had officially announced the 2012 election results to the press, the 
results had been published on the EC’s facebook page (D13 observation 08/12/2012).  
46
 These included CODEO, ECOWAS, the Commonwealth Observer Group, an EU Observer team, 
and the mission of the African Union.  
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12/2012; B16 communication 11/12/2012). Eventually, NPP leaders decided to 
deflate the daily protests of their supporters by announcing their intention to 
take the remonstration into the court room (see Petitioners/NPP 2012). 
In accordance with the country’s regulation, the NPP – represented by its pres-
idential candidate, his running mate, and the party’s Chairman – filed a petition at 
the Supreme Court challenging the validity of the election of Mahama as president. 
In court the NPP was pitted against the NDC and the EC as respondents, repre-
sented by Mahama and Afari-Gyan respectively (see Petitioners/NPP 2012). The 
petition was based on six irregularities, violations, and malpractices which the NPP 
claimed had occurred during the two days of voting. These included:  
(1) over-voting;  
(2) voting without prior biometric verification;  
(3) unsigned pink sheets (declaration forms of results at polling station level);   
(4) duplicate serial numbers on pink sheets;  
(5) duplicate polling station codes on different pink sheets; and  
(6) voting at unknown polling stations (Petitioners/NPP 2012; 2013).  
In the public realm the NPP alleged the NDC and the EC had rigged the elec-
tions via these statutory violations. Yet, in the witness box Bawumia did not im-
pute any conspiracy by the NDC or the EC to fix the vote. Rather, the NPP 
aimed to demonstrate that tens of thousands of electoral malpractices had been 
committed (Africa Confidential 2013b) revoking the election’s legitimacy. The 
petitioners demanded that the Supreme Court annul 4,670,504 votes stemming 
from 11,916 polling stations which the NPP claimed to be affected by malpractic-
es (see Petitioners/NPP 2013).47 The annulment of the votes would have re-
versed the results of the presidential race. Mahama, who gained 50,7% of the 
valid vote cast, would have dropped to 39.1% whereas, Akufo-Addo who had 
secured 47.7 % of votes, would have increased to 59.7% – implying a “one 
touch” victory for the NPP (Petitioners/NPP 2013). The Supreme Court, with its 
nine-member panel,48 had to decide whether there had been violations and mal-
practice in the way the polls were conducted and if these had affected the results. 
                                            
47
 This number refers to the 2nd amended petition pursuant to court order dated 7
th
 of February 
2013.  
48
 The panel was made up of Justice William Atuguba as presiding judge, Justice Julius Ansah, 
Justice Sophia Adinyira, Justice Rose Owusu, Justice Jones Dotse, Justice Annin Yeboah, Justice 
P. Baffoe-Bonnie, Justice N.S. Gbadegbe and Justice Vida Akoto-Bamfo (see SCRG 2013). 
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After six months of hearings the judges unanimously dismissed three of the 
NPP’s six allegations; namely “unknown polling stations, duplicate polling sta-
tion codes, and duplicate serial numbers of pink sheets” (see SCRG 2013). The 
respondents’ side countered the accusations of ghost polling stations by argu-
ing that Akufo-Addo himself had signed documents assigning NPP polling 
agents to the supposedly unknown polling stations (Modern Ghana 2013). The 
fact that several pink sheets with the same polling station codes indicating dif-
ferent results existed, was explained by Afari-Gyan pointing out that some poll-
ing stations had been used for early voting on December the 5th (see also D13 
observation 09/12/2012). Therefore, several pink sheets for the same polling 
station with different results were in existence (Ghana Web 2013a; Ghana Web 
2013b). Furthermore, he argued that the serial numbers of the pink sheets had 
“absolutely no relevance to the compilation and declaration of results” and that 
they would not represent the unique security numbers of the polling stations. 
Afari-Gyan stressed that pink sheets would be distributed randomly to polling 
stations and that the EC would not rely on the embossed serial numbers of the 
pink sheets when tabulating results (Ghana Web 2013b; Ghana Broadcasting 
Cooperation 2013a). Rather, all polling stations were identified “by their unique 
code and by their names”.  
 
The Supreme Court was split on the three most serious claims – “over-
voting”, “voting without prior biometric verification”, and “unsigned pink sheets”. 
While mooting the claim of over-voting, it became apparent that petitioners and 
respondents differed in their view of what over-voting entailed. The respondents 
limited their definition of over-voting to a situation in which the number of votes 
cast exceeds the number of registered voters. In contrast, the petitioners defined 
over-voting to include cases where the number of ballot papers counted in the 
box exceeds the number of individuals verified to vote (SCRG 2013: 530). The 
court was indeed presented with pink sheets documenting cases of over-voting 
in which the sum of rejected ballots and valid votes cast was higher than the 
amount of verified voters.  However, Bawumia, as a witness for the petitioners, 
had to concede that several of the pink sheets submitted by the NPP to under-
pin its claim of over-voting, did not contain over-voting as defined by the peti-
tioners at a second look. Furthermore, numerous other pink sheets presented 
by the petitioners were said to contain clerical errors. Sometimes this was a re-
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sult of carbonation so that, for example, the figure seventy-one was misinter-
preted as twenty-one (Ghana Web 2013d; 2013e). 
In the context of over-voting it is worth mentioning the discussion of the total 
number of voters registered in the 2012 elections. The EC had initially indicated 
a provisional number of 13,917,366 registered voters. After adding Ghanaians 
working abroad, the EC provided a “raw figure” of 14,158,890, indicating an in-
crease of 241,524 registrations. During the declaration of the results, Afari-Gyan 
had quoted 14,158,890 as the total number of registered voters. On the same 
day however, the excel sheet titled “registered voters per constituency docu-
ment” on the EC’s website listed the total number of registered voters as 
14,031,793 (D17 observation 09/12/2012). The petitioners filed a motion de-
manding the EC provide a detailed list of added voters who were working 
abroad. When prompted by the Supreme Court, the EC was only able to pro-
vide further information on 2,883 of the added voters, falling short by a rather 
large figure of 238,641. The NPP felt reinforced regarding its claim that the 
number of registered voters had “mysteriously metamorphosed”.49 In court Afari-
Gyan conceded that the figure stated in the declaration of results had been incor-
rect (see Respondent/EC 2013). He emphasized that this slip had no effect on 
the total votes cast (10,995,262) which formed the basis of the declaration of re-
sults. The mistake affected solely the percentage of the voter turnout raising the 
national figure from 79.43% to 80.15% (SCRG 2013: 118). Overall the petition-
ers’ claim of a bloated register did not create a massive stir and the majority of 
the judges took the view that the petitioners had failed to raise any concerns 
about the voter list before the election day (see SCRG 2013: 133).  
The court was split on the issue of whether voting without prior verification had 
affected the election results. Ahead of the polls Afari-Gyan had announced that for 
those polling stations where the number of votes cast exceeded the number of 
persons verified by even one vote the results would be cancelled (Ghana Web 
2013d). According to Judge Baffoe-Bonnie, the NPP had filed quite a number of 
pink sheets proving voting without prior biometric voter verification. Sometimes the 
sheets even indicated that every person who voted at a particular polling station 
had cast their vote without verification. Hence, in his judgement he found that the 
                                            
49
 In fact the EC had corrected the figure on its website to 14,031,793 registers voters a few days 
after its declaration of the results so that the published figures again matched (D17 observation 
12/2012). 
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EC did not tender the biometric verification devices as evidence, even though the 
respondents had claimed that the machines had still stored the relevant data 
(Ghana Web 2013d). As a result, Judge Baffoe-Bonnie was one out of the four 
judges who upheld the petitioners’ claim based on voting without verification.50   
Opinions also differed regarding the question of whether missing signatures 
on pink sheets represented significant electoral malpractice. The NPP argued 
that the lack of signatures indicated that presiding officers had vehemently dis-
agreed with the conduct of polling under their supervision. They claimed that the 
omission represented a statutory violation of Ghana’s electoral laws and argued 
respective pink sheets were therefore invalid. The respondents countered the 
argument by pointing out that the signatures of the EC representatives may 
have been missing on several pink sheets, yet accredited NPP party agents had 
signed the disputed documents (Ghana Business News 2013). A tussle fol-
lowed in which NPP supporters claimed their polling agents had been coerced 
into signing the pink sheets. Moreover, allegations were made that the EC re-
turning officer at Savelugu in the Northern Region invited presiding officers to 
retrospectively validate some unsigned pink sheets (Joy Online 2013). In re-
sponse, the NDC accused the NPP of being behind the unfolding pink sheet 
scandal. A five to  four majority interpreted the missing signatures as mainly ad-
ministrative lapses (see SCRG 2013), so that on August 29th, 2013, the Su-
preme Court eventually dismissed the NPP’s petition and validated Mahama as 
the legitimately elected president (Graphic Online 2013).  
In brief, Ghana’s post-election period was characterized by the NPP’s claim of 
electoral fraud and in particular its election petition. The court case revealed vari-
ous electoral malpractices during the election days (see SCRG 2013). These might 
have been accidental or intended. In either case the court has ruled that the mal-
practices did not have a significant impact on the results of the 2012 presidential 
election. The exposed malpractices, suggestions for electoral reform by the judges 
and a call by Kofi Annan (Africa Confidential 2013b) to tackle the raised com-
plaints, will certainly pave the way for a continued strive to further improve Ghana’s 
                                            
50
 He suggested cancelling the results of affected polling stations and rerunning the elections at 
those stations (see SCRG 2013). In the course of the hearing it became evident that the results of 
seven polling stations had been annulled on voting day due to a lack of verification. Afari-Gyan stat-
ed that he had only been aware of the cancellation of votes in the Berekum East constituency. Ac-
cording to his statement in court, he found out about the other annulments when they were cited in 
the petition (Ghana Link News 2013).  
 
 150 
 
electoral framework.51 By challenging the election results in court, the NPP tried to 
withdraw internal legitimacy from the 2012 elections. However, the party also at-
tempted to erode the external legitimacy in the post-election period. Otchere-Darko 
lobbied  relevant international organizations such as the National Democratic Insti-
tute (NDI) and the Carter Center (CC) on behalf of the NPP to try to convince them 
of the seriousness of the electoral malpractices that occurred in 2012 (Africa Con-
fidential 2013d).52 Even though the NPP did not succeed in eroding the election’s 
internal or external legitimacy, the party could vaunt itself for taking the path of le-
gal remedy to address its grievances. The petition, which after a few months had 
been strongly critiqued by many Ghanaians as a money-wasting endeavour (B17 
communications 07/2013), allowed the NPP and its presidential candidate to save 
face in front of its/his supporters. In addition, Akufo-Addo gained cross-party ac-
claim for promptly accepting the verdict even though he disliked and disagreed with 
the court’s decision (Africa Confidential 2013b).  
 
 
4.4 What do the 2012 elections reveal about the structural underpinnings in 
Ghana?  
After having zoomed in on Ghana’s 2012 electoral politics and addressed the 
key issues and events which occurred during the electoral cyle, the last section 
of this empirical chapter analyses what the polls reveal about the structural un-
derpinnings in Ghana.  
 
4.4.1 Pattern of regional-ethnic bloc voting  
One of the recurring themes during the election was ethnicity. One interviewee stated: 
In this country no matter what everybody says here is this tribal he-
gemony and that’s what is at play (A15, interviewed 16/11/2012).  
While it is difficult to make a definite call on which factors determine Ghanaians’ 
choice of how to vote, Lamptey and Salihu (2012: 192) state:  
At least in popular perception ethnicity matters more than any other 
socio-economic perception.  
 
                                            
51
 The implementation of the Representation of People’s Amendment Act (ROPAA) passed by par-
liament in 2006 which gives Ghanaians living abroad the right to vote might be another issue for 
future electoral reform (see Graphic Online 2014).  
52
 This advance was reinforced by Ghanaians demonstrating in front of the White House in Wash-
ington DC – in its front line was the NPP National Youth Organiser for the United States (Kyei 2013).  
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This perception was reinforced by the 2012 election results. The data shows 
that ethnic or at least regional bloc voting as a characteristic of Ghana’s Fourth 
Republic, reflecting ethnicity as one of the key politicized societal cleavages. 
While the Ashanti region voted in the presidential race with an overwhelming 
majority for the NPP candidate, the Volta, Northern, Upper East, and Upper 
West regions voted as clearly for the NDC (see table 5).  
Table 4.4   Regional distribution of valid votes per party in Ghana’s 2012 
presidential election 
Region  NPP NDC 
Western  468,517 482,193 
Central 429,135 492,374 
Greater Accra 1,009,787 1,125,751 
Volta 111,149 734,641 
Eastern 641,074 485,187 
Ashanti 1,531,152 612,616 
Brong-Ahafo 469,909 511,244 
Northern  383,263 570,602 
Upper East 120,814 274,019 
Upper West 83,098 186,134 
TOTAL 5,247,898 5,474,761 
                        Source: EC of Ghana (2012a)  
In fact, since 1992 neither of these regions has voted against “their” party in a 
presidential race (see also Fridy 2007).53 Further statements from interviewees 
confirm the impression given by the results:  
The people from the Volta regions say he speaks my language he is 
great but we need to get to the point that the people will say he speaks 
my language great but what will he do for us. We need to get to the 
point where the people in the Ashanti region will say he is our brother 
but what’s he gonna do for us. We need to start asking critical ques-
tions of politicians. Then we can start identifying philosophies and 
then also we need to start electing our district officers. If the mayor of 
Accra was held accountable to the people of Accra, he would be out. 
Somebody would kick him out. And we will give them five years so that 
they go beyond the normal four-year electoral process then they will 
start thinking and say look you know what I need to start thinking of 
the people of Accra first. As it is now all DCEs are appointed by gov-
ernment. And that’s why the politicians take the people for granted. 
Because he knows that going into elections NDC thinks Volta is mine, 
NPP thinks Ashanti is mine so whether good or not I have my constitu-
ency I have my base (A15, interviewed 16/11/2012). 
While the Ashanti region, home to the Akan people, is known as an NPP strong-
hold, the Volta region, predominantly settled by the Ewe people, is said to be the 
                                            
53
 The results of parliamentary elections display similar voting patterns. The only exception has been 
the parliamentary election of 1992 which was boycotted by the NPP.  
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“World Bank” of the NDC (B8 communications 12/2012; B13 communications 
08/12/2012). Since both big parties can rely on groups of core voters made up of 
“their” respective ethnic group, they tend to successfully mobilize along these two 
competing regional-ethnic lines. The Eastern region, which also voted clearly for 
the NPP, is also perceived as an NPP-Akan stronghold. However, this has not 
always been the case. In 1992 and 1996, a comfortable majority of the Eastern 
region’s citizens voted for Rawlings (NDC). Only since the elections in 2000 has 
the Eastern region continuously voted with an overall majority for the NPP. 
The academic literature tends to treat the Akan people as a homogeneous 
ethnic group. This creates a deceptive picture since the Akan are divided into dif-
ferent sub-groups. In political terms there is an important rift between the Akyem 
and the Asante people which also features in NPP intra-party politics (see chapter 
five). It is important to bear in mind that not all Akan people necessarily vote for the 
NPP. Even if that were the case, number-wise the NPP would not have enough 
Akan voters to automatically emerge as the winner during the elections. The same 
holds true for the NDC. Thus, both parties hark back to a significant amount of re-
gional-ethnic-based core voters; however, demographically, these groups are not 
large enough to guarantee electoral victory. Therefore, both parties have to com-
pete for and mobilise “floating voters” to ensure their support. These “floating vot-
ers” mainly reside in the so-called “swing regions” which are Brong-Ahafo, Central, 
Greater Accra, and Western (B8 communications 12/2012; B10 communications 4 
& 5/12/2012; B13 communications 08/12/2012). Ensuring the support of “floating 
voters” in “swing regions” is decisive for winning elections. The 2012 results show 
that the four swing regions have been contested much more closely than any of 
the regions known as party strongholds (see table 5). The NDC primarily won the 
elections in 2012, since it managed to convince the majority of voters in the Great-
er Accra, Central, Western, and Brong-Ahafo regions to vote NDC.   
 
4.4.2 Rural-urban dynamics reflected in Ghana’s electoral framework 
Comparing the population share of Ghana’s regions in relation to their represen-
tation in parliament discloses another societal fissure (see table 4.6). The fig-
ures in table 4.6 indicate that rural areas tend to be slightly overrepresented in 
Ghana’s parliament. In contrast, the table illustrates that the more populous re-
gions, Greater Accra and Ashanti, are underrepresented in Ghana’s legislature 
compared to their population size. 
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Table 4.5   Share of regions’ population representation in parliament 
Region 
Share of pop. 
based on 
 2010 census 
Number of 
const. 
 per region  
2012 
Share of 
repres. in 
parliament 
Over- & un-
der- repres. of 
regions 
Western  9.6 26 9.5 +/- 0 
Central  8.9 23 8.4 Slightly - 
Greater Accra  16.3 34 12.4 - 
Volta 8.6 26 9.5 + 
Eastern  10.7 33 12.0 + 
Ashanti  19.4 47 17.1 - 
Brong-A. 9.4 29 10.5 + 
Northern  10.1 31 11.3 + 
Upper East  4.2 15 5.5 + 
Upper West 2.8 11 4.0 + 
TOTAL 100.0 275 100.0 Slight rural bias 
 
 
This is an interesting constellation as currently slightly more Ghanaians live in ur-
ban localities than rural ones (see GGS 2012: 92). A look at the five smallest and 
largest constituencies by registered voters hints at a similar pattern: rural areas 
tend to score well in Ghana’s institutional set up (see table 10 and 11). Among the 
five smallest constituencies, four are located in predominantly rural areas, whereas 
of the five largest ones, most are located in urban and populous Greater Accra.  
Figure 4.6   Ghana’s population by type of locality (urban and rural) ac-
cording to region 
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Source: Based on data obtained from the EC of Ghana (2012; 2012a) & GSS 2012 
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Table 4.6   Five smallest constituencies in Ghana by registered voters 
Constituency Region Registered Voters 
Sekyere Afram 
Plains 
Ashanti 12,193 
Salanga North Northern 13,354 
Banda Brong Ahafo 13,575 
Builsa South Upper East 16,945 
Saffiama/Bussie/Issa Upper West 17,317 
Source: EC of Ghana (2012; 2012a) 
Table 4.7   Five largest constituencies in Ghana by registered voters 
Constituency Region Registered Voters 
Ledzokuku  Greater Accra 127,742 
Ketu South  Volta 127,576 
Dome/Kwabenya Greater Accra 126,925 
Ashaiman Greater Accra 126,246 
Ablekuma Central  Greater Accra 122,862 
Source: EC of Ghana (2012; 2012a) 
Prominent exceptions amongst the smallest constituencies are Sekyere Afram 
Plains in the Ashanti region and Ketu South in the Volta region, which one 
would expect to be much smaller. Both constituencies are special cases. 
Sekyere Afram Plains is one of those constituencies which seem to have been 
created deliberately ahead of the 2012 elections to secure another constituency 
for the NDC in the Ashanti region (see EC Ghana 2012 for election results).The 
large size of the Ketu South constituency in the Volta region appears at first 
glance to contradict the pattern of larger constituencies in urban areas and 
smaller constituencies in rural regions. Yet, the high amount of registered voters 
in the Ketu South constituency raises doubts in relation to its population size. 
According to the 2010 census (GSS 2012: 92), the Ketu South district, which over-
laps with the Ketu South constituency, had 160,756 inhabitants. Roughly projecting 
the district’s population in 2012 based on GSS’ own population prediction for 2012 
(see GSS 2015), gives an estimated population figure of 168,368. According to the 
Population & Housing Census, 56.2% of Ketu South’s population were age 18+ in 
2010. Since the composition of Ketu South’s population can be assumed to remain 
rather constant with regard to its age structure, 127,546 registered voters trans-
lates to 75.8% of the population being registered. Interestingly, the number of total 
registered voters for South Ketu differs for the parliamentary race, which the EC 
 155 
 
had indicated was 126,659. Even if one takes this figure as a baseline, over two 
thirds of the population (75.2%) were registered in South Ketu. The constituency’s 
size by registered voters seems therefore questionable. The fact that the con-
stituency boarders on Togo (see figure 6) may also suggest that Togolese Ewe 
may inflate the register. After all, the national border is, like in many African con-
texts, rather porous. Accordingly, Ketu South and the Sekyere Afram Plains do 
not alter the pattern of a slight bias in Ghana’s electoral framework in favour of 
rural areas at the expense of urban ones.  
Figure 4.7   Geographic position of Ketu South constituency 
 
Source: Self-compiled based on map from peacefmonline (2012a) 
The issue of significant discrepancies in the size of constituencies has also 
been picked up by the Commonwealth Observer Group, who noted that equal 
suffrage is not a given in Ghana:    
It is noted that despite the requirement for constituencies to be as equal 
as possible there are in fact quite wide variances in size. Based on figures 
released for the 2012 elections, while the average number of registered 
voters per constituency across the country is some 50.000, the smallest 
constituency has just 12,082 while the largest has 126.659. Equal suffrage 
is therefore not adequately provided for (CW-EOM 2012: 15). 
Since MP’s are expected by their constituents to engage in the provision of de-
velopment projects (B1 communication 23/11/2012), differences in size of con-
Volta region  
 Constituency  
Keta South 
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stituency matters; these differences translate directly into different shares in re-
sources allocated from the centre (see section 4.1.3). In relative terms, smaller 
constituencies tend to receive more resources per citizen. One could justify this 
constellation of power as a bias in favour of rural areas to the detriment of the 
populous urban ones, since rural areas continue to be marginalized in socio-
economic terms.  
 
4.4.3 Strategies of “vote massaging”?  
Attempts by the elites to mould Ghana’s electoral framework, as well as their 
determined strategies of voter mobilization and the contestation of the declared 
results, all substantiate the fact that there is a pressing imperative for the politi-
cal elite to win elections. The following section concludes this chapter by dis-
cussing the alleged strategies through which irregularities and malpractices oc-
curred.  
 
Issue of skirt and blouse voting and high amount of invalid votes 
An issue which gained significant attention from Ghanaian analysts after the 
elections was the matter of “skirt and blouse voting”. Twenty-six constituencies, 
which is equivalent to about 9.5%, voted for a presidential candidate from one 
party and a parliamentary candidate from another. Since the number of “skirt 
and blouse constituencies” had increased, some commentators argued that this 
has become a new trend revoking or at least weakening the historical trend of 
regional-ethnic bloc voting. Speaking of a revision of the trend of regional-ethnic 
voting would however give the matter to much weight. The affected constituen-
cies have been scattered all around the country so that each region has at least 
one “skirt and blouse constituency”. Several of the split results occurred due to 
the fact that independent candidates, who had lost the primaries, had won the 
parliamentary race. Moreover, plenty of “skirt and blouse constituencies” have 
been rather tight races. It could therefore theoretically also be a case of “vote 
massaging” at polling stations, rather than conscious decisions for two different 
candidates/parties by the electorate.  
Another significant issue was the large number of invalid votes. According to 
the EC’s final results 251,729 votes were rejected during the presidential race. This 
is equivalent to 2.24% of the entire votes cast. In contrast, only 178,243 votes were 
declared invalid during the parliamentary elections. Several Ghanaians claimed 
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that rejecting votes at polling stations had been used by party supporters as a 
strategy to minimise the votes for their opponents in the past, particularly in party 
strongholds (B8 communications 12/2012; B 16 communication 11/12/2012). One 
of the interviewees explained:  
The Volta region is their stronghold. You see NDC people like twenty 
and NPP like five. Last time they didn’t even allow some to vote. They 
will know this one is NPP and they won’t allow you to vote. So when 
you are NPP and you are in the Volta region you have to keep quiet, 
you should not even have to talk. That’s what they believe in. They be-
lieve that place is all NDC. But it’s not. So more police there. First the 
police people they are also NDC, but it will not show up. But when NDC 
people are disciplining NPP people they will keep quiet. […] They want 
to reduce NPP votes.  
Given the very tight races between parliamentary and presidential candidates, 
this strategy seems plausible. With only a 226,863 vote difference between the 
NDC and the NPP in the 2012 presidential election, 251,729 rejected votes rep-
resents a significant amount. Taking a closer look at those constituencies which 
are strikingly over the national percentage of 2.24% of invalid votes,54 it is clear 
that the vast majority of these constituencies (89%) were won by one of the two 
big parties with a rather large winning margin. In fact, most had been won by a 
double or triple margin.55 The fact that almost half of these constituencies have 
been affected by the pre-election delimitation reform processes attracts atten-
tion. One might wonder whether there may be some truth to the claims by some 
Ghanaians that high numbers of invalid votes may have resulted from declaring 
votes for the opponent invalid in areas where one party tends to dominate. The 
figures presented here do not speak unambiguously for that narrative. Most of 
those constituencies with rather high percentages of invalid votes are based in 
the Northern, Upper East, and Upper Western regions. Ghanaians have pointed 
out that a lack of voter education in these – to a certain extent still marginalized 
– regions could explain the higher percentages of invalid votes. In absolute 
numbers the sparsely populated regions of Upper East and Upper West are 
also at the bottom of the invalid vote ranking. One exception to this is the 
Northern region which actually leads the ranking in absolute numbers of invalid 
votes for the 2012 presidential election (see table 6).  
 
 
                                            
54
 “Strikingly” is here defined as double the national percentage, or ≥4.48%, leaving 37 constitu-
encies to examine further. 
55
 Compare annex table 9.4.3.  
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Table 4.8  Ranking of regions according to absolute numbers of invalid 
votes in the 2012 presidential election 
Region  
Invalid 
votes 
% of Invalid 
votes 
Total of cast 
votes 
Valid votes 
Northern  34,978 3.45 1,014,956 979,978 
Ashanti 29,373 1.34 2,190,293 2,160,920 
Brong-Ahafo 27,571 2.7 1,020,470 992,899 
Western  27,515 2.51 1,097,274 1,069,759 
Central 26,360 2.71 971,046 944,686 
Eastern 25,673 2.2 1,164,376 1,138,703 
Volta 24,121 2.73 883,739 859,618 
Greater Accra 22,390 1.03 2,174,645 2,152,255 
Upper East 19,611 4.54 432,048 412,437 
Upper West 14,128 4.74 298,135 284,007 
TOTAL 251,720 2.24 11,246,982 10,995,262 
 
The figures on rejected votes, including their historical development,56 do not 
unequivocally tell a narrative of vote massaging in party strongholds. Unfortu-
nately, data broken down to the level of polling stations that would possibly al-
low further investigations, is not available since Ghana’s EC so far only publish-
es election results per constituency. The fact that the level of invalid ballots was 
already much lower, especially in regions considered as strongholds; this com-
bined with the fact that the amount of invalid votes tends to have been increas-
ing since 2000, means this is an issue to keep under review.  
  
Voter turnout  
Another alleged strategy for influencing electoral results is adding votes in party 
strongholds to the election results (B8 communications 12/2012; B 16 communi-
cation 11/12/2012).  
They are using every… I mean in the Volta region you see small town, 
but number of voters coming out of that place is plenty. That’s why 
they brought this biometric. […] I think this time they will bring some 
police from here to there and from there to here, so that there will be 
peace (A13, interviewed 07/11/2011).   
The logic behind this approach can be summarized as maximizing votes for 
your own candidate while minimising those of the opponent. This tactic sug-
gests that voter turnout should be higher in party strongholds. Looking at the 
figures of voter turnout throughout Ghana’s Fourth Republic, one can see that 
rates indeed tend to be higher in party strongholds (see table 7 and 8). Where-
                                            
56
 See annex table 9.4.4.  
Source: Based on EC of Ghana (2012; 2012a) 
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as the Ashanti region has always been among the top three regions in terms of 
voter participation since 1992, the Volta, Northern, Upper East, Upper West, 
and Eastern regions took turns joining the top three regions in terms of voter 
turnout. The figures hint at the fact that adding votes to the election results in 
party strongholds has indeed been used as a strategy to enhance the chance of 
electoral victory.  
Table 4.9   Regional voter turnouts in Ghanaian presidential elections, 
1992-2000 
Region 1992 1996 2000 
2000 
run-off 
Western 47.8 74.5 58.8 55.2 
Central 47.7 79.1 63.9 58.4 
Greater Accra 46.0 78.4 59.5 57.4 
Volta 62.4 81.8 60.3 68.9 
Eastern 51.0 81.1 63.9 60.9 
Ashanti 53.1 79.8 65.1 65.4 
Brong-Ahafo 46.0 71.8 58.4 57.1 
Northern  50.7 74.8 64.2 59.6 
Upper East 51.5 79.8 60.3 57.8 
Upper West 51.0 75.8 59.9 57.4 
National Total 53.8 76.1 61.7 60.4 
Source: EC of Ghana (2012; 2012a); African Elections Database  
(2012) & FES 2010 
 
Table 4.10   Regional voter turnouts in Ghanaian presidential elections, 
2004-2012 
Region 2004 2008 
2008 
run-off 
2012 
Western 83.6 67.3 66.5 76.5 
Central 84.4 69.1 70.0 78.3 
Greater Accra 84.4 67.1 70.0 77.1 
Volta 87.6 67.1 73.1 75.7 
Eastern 82.3 67.4 72.2 80.7 
Ashanti 88.7 73.6 83.8 84.9 
Brong-Ahafo 83.0 68.5 68.8 81.1 
Northern  88.0 74.9 75.3 79.5 
Upper East 81.6 70.7 70.3 75.7 
Upper West 81.2 68.9 67.2 80.8 
National Total 85.1 69.5 72.9 79.4 
Source: EC of Ghana (2012; 2012a); African Elections Database 
(2012) & FES 2010 
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Registered voters by region  
Despite the EC’s continuous efforts to compile a clean(er) voter list, people have 
raised concerns that the register continues to be bloated (see issue of registered 
minors and registered Ghanaians living abroad). Again this is supposedly caused 
by over registration in party strongholds. Since there is no reliable data available 
at the constituency level with which to investigate this issue further, no well-
founded comment can be made. However, interesting in this regard is the fact 
that at least at the national level the figure of 14,031,793 registered voters does 
not seem completely unrealistic in light of other data provided by official Ghana-
ian statistics. According to the GSS’ (2015) own population projection for 2012 
the country’s population was 25,824,920. With 55.3% of Ghana’s population be-
ing 18yrs+ in 2010, a figure of 54.33% of registered voters seems at least con-
sistent with Ghana’s otherwise officially published data.   
 
 
4.5 Chapter summary 
The outline of developments and events throughout Ghana’s 2012 election cy-
cle has clearly shown that there is a strong imperative for the political elite to 
win elections. This has been illustrated by the elite’s continuous power struggle 
over the alteration of the electoral framework (see the introduction of BVR/BVV 
and the creation of new constituencies); the issue of sporadic electoral violence; 
and the NPP’s move to challenge the election results in the Supreme Court. 
Moreover, Ghana’s 2012 electoral politics, in particular the conduct of voter mo-
bilization, has shown that the workings of the Ghanaian state continue to be 
characterized by the prevalence of patronage politics. Referring to election 
times as “cocoa season” and describing it as harvest time for rent payments 
from politicians who want to be (re)elected, captures this. In Ghana, voters 
judge their political elite by their ability to allocate and redistribute goods and 
resources to their respective communities. Furthermore, the analysis presented 
in this chapter has identified a variety of significant groups of actors within soci-
ety that shaped Ghana’s 2012 electoral politics. They include the modern politi-
cal elite, traditional rulers, security forces, the youth, CSOs such as think tanks, 
religious groups, the media, international influences embodied by the donor 
community, transnational alliances amongst the African elites, as well as the 
Ghanaian diaspora. Furthermore, the persisting practise of voter mobilization 
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along regional-ethnic lines and the 2012 election results have exposed two po-
liticized societal cleavages: First, a regional-ethnic fissure which is paralleled to 
some extent by religion, with a Christian South and Muslim North. The religious 
fissure is however not as politicized as ethnicity. Second, the data disclosed a 
rural-urban fault line. Lastly, the analysis identified a simmering fissure between 
the elderly and the youth which continues to shape Ghanaian society. Based on 
this empirical foundation the following chapter will engage in outlining in more 
detail the present configuration of power relations between identified prominent 
social factions. The presentation of Ghana’s current political settlement in chap-
ter five will explain how the constellation of power relations between different 
actors at different levels within different spheres characterises the Ghanaian 
state and its workings.  
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V. GHANA’S CURRENT POLITICAL SETTLEMENT THROUGH THE LENS 
OF ITS 2012 ELECTION 
Based on the analysis of Ghana’s 2012 presidential and parliamentary elec-
tions, chapter five sketches the constellation of power between contesting social 
groups in Ghanaian society and how these relations of power are embedded in 
formal and informal institutions. To do so, the politicized societal cleavages that 
were identified in chapter four – namely (1) a regional-ethnic, (2) a rural-urban, 
and to some lesser extent (3) a fissure between the elderly and the youth – will 
be taken into account. In line with the analytical framework developed in chapter 
two and applied to the scrutiny of Ghana’s post-independence settlement, this 
chapter will focus on the setup and interplay of structures, actors, and ideas in the 
political, economic, and cultural sphere amongst Ghana’s higher and lower-level 
factions. The overall constellation of power will explain why the current Ghanaian 
state is working in the way that was illustrated by Ghana’s electoral politics in the 
previous chapter.  
 
 
5.1 Higher-level factions  
The first section of this chapter analyses the constellation of power between 
Ghana’s elite. It will demonstrate that Ghana’s political elite, just like its society, 
is highly fragmented along regional-ethnic lines. This structure results in a con-
stant need to forge societal alliances taking Ghana’s main politicized societal 
fissures into consideration. The section then moves on to interlink Ghana’s polit-
ical elite with its important economic actors. Their relationship will be explained 
by analysing Ghana’s economic structure and in particular the role of the state 
within the country’s economic sphere. Identifying important sectors and actors 
within Ghana’s economic sphere also provides one of the links to Ghana’s low-
er-level factions, whose position and role within the current Ghanaian settle-
ment will be scrutinized in the second part of this chapter. 
 
5.1.1 Political sphere 
Ghana’s higher-level factions are mainly made up by the country’s modern polit-
ical elite, the economic elite, traditional rulers, and high-ranking members of the 
security forces. In this mix of actors, the political elite is essential (at all times 
rather than during election times only). Since the return to multi-party democra-
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cy, Ghana’s political elite falls broadly into two dominant blocs: on the one side 
the National Democratic Congress (NDC), representing the Nkrumah tradition, 
and on the other the New Patriotic Party (NPP) which has its roots in the Dan-
quah-Busia-Dombo tradition. Both parties have to cope with waves of inter-elite 
factionalism.  
Within the political parties, there are power blocs. Within one political 
party, there are its own power dynamics. So whatever maligning will 
take place will take place (A15, interviewed 16/11/2012).   
This factionalism manifests itself in internal power struggles where alliances are 
regularly reformed, and constellations of power tend to shift, in particular during 
preparations for upcoming elections. Ghana’s underlying politicized societal fis-
sures, including regional origin (North/South), ethnic affiliation, religious denom-
ination (Christian/Muslim), and to some degree age, play a crucial role in taring 
internal power struggles.57   
 
NDC’s factionalism and intra-party power constellations 
After the death of Ghana’s President John Atta Mills six months before the 2012 
elections, John Dramani Mahama took over the leadership of the NDC. Mahama, 
a Christian from Bole in the Northern Region, had served as Vice-President in the 
Mills government. By stepping up directly to the post of Head of State, he has 
been regarded by some in the NDC as accidental President (Africa Confidential 
2013c: 3). Under Mills’ leadership, three different factions had already become 
visible within the party. One camp is said to have been a broadly Akan-Fanti-
Nzema clique whose primary loyalty lies with Ato Ahwoi who serves as Chairman 
of the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC) (ibid.). Its regional alliance 
covers first and foremost the Western region, where Ghana’s new offshore oil 
fields are located on the coast, but also spans parts of the Central region (see 
figure 5.1). Ato Ahwoi served as Secretary for Fuel and Power under Rawlings’ 
PNDC government from 1987-1993. His brother Kamena Ahwoi worked as Minis-
ter for Local Government and Rural Development in the first NDC government 
and continued his political career in various ministerial posts during Rawlings’ 
second democratic turn (see Princeton University 2009). Currently, another Ah-
woi brother, Kwesi Ahwoi, who served in the Mills government as Minister for 
                                            
57
 While gender currently does not represent a major politicized cleavage within Ghanaian society, it 
is taken into consideration when forging ruling alliances and deciding on the composition of the na-
tional government (national portfolios, regional ministers etc.). This seems to mirror mainly interna-
tional donors’ concerns.  
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Food and Agriculture, is Minister of Interior in Mahama’s cabinet (Africa Confiden-
tial 2013c: 3). Kwesi Ahwoi was kept as a member of Mahama’s government de-
spite the fact that he lost a party parliamentary primary to Queenstar Maame 
Pokuah Sawyerr, who is now Deputy Minister of the mainly Fanti-speaking Cen-
tral region (ibid.). The promotion of Emmanuel Armah Kofi Buah to full Minister of 
Energy and Petroleum in January 2013 was a strong signal that the Ahwoi family 
still has financial and political clout (ibid.). In fact, Buah’s appointment seems to 
be the result of successful lobbying by a group of chiefs from the oil-producing 
Western Region (Gadugah 2013), who demanded that the President appoint a 
Minister of Energy from their region. According to them, they could: 
only trust a son of the Western Region to manage the oil resources to 
benefit the indigenes (ibid.).  
The group put forward the former Deputy Energy Minister Buah for the post 
(ibid.). There has been speculation that the Ahwoi family might have encour-
aged the chiefs to lobby for Buah (B17, Bradford, December 2013). At the 
same time Buah, who is Nzema, is said to have steadily built up a power base 
in the Western Region, close to the main offshore oil and gas fields (Africa 
Confidential 2013c: 3-4).  
When Mahama became President in July 2012, he replaced the late Mills 
who himself was a Fanti. In taking office, Mahama sidelined the Fanti faction 
within the NDC – who reside mainly in Ghana’s South-Western coastal region – 
because he brought in more people from his team. Some voices critiqued that 
Mahama’s in-group consisted largely of individuals from the three northern re-
gions (Mensema 2013; Africa Confidential 2013c: 4). Indeed, more than half of 
the President’s appointees, amongst them senior advisors, ministers of state, 
and appointees to Presidential priority projects, originate from the Northern 
parts of the country. Moreover, more than one-quarter of the Deputy Ministers 
and nine out the 25 ministers in Mahama’s cabinet stem from the Northern re-
gions (see figure 9.2.3). Some Ghanaians have eyed criticised the increased 
influence of their Northern fellow countrymen in the political sphere. Notice was 
taken in particular of the policy fields in which members of Mahama’s camp 
have been perceived to be placed. The prime policy fields are said to be the 
energy and petroleum portfolio and the security forces.58 Hanna Serwaa Tetteh 
who served as Minister of Trade and Industry under Mills is also considered to 
                                            
58
 For a detailed list of Northerners’ positions in Mahama’s government see annex table 9.5.1. 
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be a Presidential ally of Mahama (Africa Confidential 2013c: 4). She now runs 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration. 
A third group still influential in the NDC remains loyal to ex-President Jerry 
John Rawlings. The leverage of this group weakened under Mills’ leadership. 
More recently, however, voices from the Akan side have claimed that Rawlings’ 
clique has regained sway under Mahama’s wing, in particular within the area of 
security (Amankwah 2013). The circle is said to comprise Mark Owen Woyongo, 
former Regional Minister in Upper East, who Mahama picked to lead the Ministry 
of Defence. Enoch Teye Mensah who started his long term political career under 
the PNDC regime has been designated by Mahama to coordinate the implemen-
tation of Presidential priority projects. Mensah was Chief Executive of the Accra 
Metropolitan Assembly under the PNDC regime and served as Minister in several 
NDC led governments in Ghana’s Fourth Republic. Also, Shirley Ayittey, current 
Minister of Heath in Mahama’s administration, is thought to belong to the Rawl-
ings camp. Ayittey had been put on trial by the NPP government together with 
Rawlings’ Minister of Finance, Mr Kwame Peprah, and the former First Lady, 
Nana Konadu Agyeman Rawlings. The three were accused of having caused 
massive financial loss to the Ghanaian state. As former Managing Director of 
Caridem Development Company Limited, Ayittey had been involved in the pro-
cess of acquisition of the government GIHOC Cannery through a divestiture pro-
cess, because Caridem Limited had bought the cannery. At that time Caridem 
was owned by the 31st December Women's Movement (DWM) which had been 
founded and run by Mrs Rawlings (Daily Graphic 2007). Paul Victor Obeng, who 
passed away in May 2014, served as a senior Presidential advisor and belonged 
to Mahama’s inner circle. As a long-time political companion and former chief of 
staff for ex-President Rawlings, he was also seen as belonging to Rawlings’ 
clique within the NDC (see figure 5.1).   
To summarize the NDC’s internal power constellation, there are three main 
sub-factions within the party today: (1) a group loyal to ex-President Rawlings 
who are not predominantly Ewe but still have a strong support base in the Volta 
region and hence amongst the Ewe people in Ghanaian society; (2) Mahama’s 
clique which originates predominately from the Northern parts of the country 
and is comprised of both Christian and Muslim factions; and (3) an Akan-Fanti-
Nzema faction loyal to the Ahwoi brothers whose home is the Southern coastal 
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region of Ghana and who are gaining importance due to the region’s offshore oil 
production (see figure 5.1).  
Figure 5.1   Areas of influence of NDC’s factions 
  
Source: Based on map of Ghana's Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development 
(2012) 
Realignment of power constellations and forming intra-party cohesion 
Alliances are formed and reformed regularly within the dominant blocs of Ghana’s 
political elite. After the death of Atta Mills, the Ahwoi brothers are said to have 
favoured an internal election process within the NDC to determine who would 
replace Mills as the NDC’s front-runner for the 2012 Presidential race (B17, Brad-
ford March 2014), rather than the Vice-President automatically getting the Presi-
dential candidate ticket. Rumours spread that the Ahwoi clique intended to nomi-
nate one of them and that they had considered Haruna Iddrisu as a potential run-
ning mate. Iddrisu, a young and ambitious politician from Tamale in the Northern 
region, has been the President of the National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS) 
and national youth organizer of the NDC. He has been the MP for the Tamale 
South constituency since 2004 and joined the Mills administration as Minister of 
Communication. With his Northern roots and strong connections to the Youth 
(issue of voter mobilization – see section 4.1.3), Iddrisu, who is said to have Pres-
 Area of influence of NDC’s  
Akan-Fanti-Nzema faction coalesc-
ing around Ahwoi brothers. 
  
 Area of influence of NDC’s  
Northern faction coalescing around 
Mahama. 
  
 Area of influence of NDC’s 
Ewe faction coalescing around 
Rawlings. 
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idential ambitions (Addo-Tetteh 2012; Mubarak 2009) would, in fact, be –– a rea-
sonable running mate.  
Mahama intended to promote Iddrisu from his former post as Minister of 
Communications to Minister of the Energy Portfolio. However, Iddrisu did not 
get appointed to this post. In fact, with the nomination of Inusah Fuseini, the MP 
for Tamale Central, as Minister of Lands and Natural Resources, the NDC 
Youth in Tamale became worried that their patron Iddrisu would not join Maha-
ma’s administration. In protest the Tamale-based group “NDC Youth Network 
for Peace” tore down and burnt billboards displaying pictures of Mahama and 
Fuseini (Joy News 2013). Eventually, after the 2012 elections, Iddrisu was as-
signed the portfolio of Minster of Trade and Industry in Mahama’s administra-
tion. Rumour has it, however, that the substantial delay in Iddrisu’s nomination 
to Mahama’s government had been linked to his considerations of forming a 
collation with the Ahwoi camp. One might wonder if Iddrisu had been used as a 
pawn the Ahwoi block since the energy portfolio which Mahama initially intend-
ed to assign to Iddrisu is now under the control of Buah from the Western re-
gion, the home of the Ahwoi brothers.  
Power dynamics amongst Ghana’s higher-level factions are always prone to 
shifting. As one interviewee put it:  
We never say it is one year after the election and therefore this is a rest 
period. There is nothing like that in Ghana. It’s constantly political. Be-
cause in between elections we have the district level elections which 
have also been politicized. So the flavour of politics immediately goes 
into that one. And then there will be appointments, and there will be 
dismissals. So the process of dismissals spans a new wave of discus-
sion on the political front. And then there will be politicians who die, 
and they will have to be replaced in parliament, so there are by-
elections. So in Ghana, there is no dry season in politics. There is no 
let off in Ghanaian politics. It’s a perpetual playground down from day 
one to the next elections (A15, interviewed 16/11/2012).   
To remain in control of the intra-party power constellation, Ghanaian Presidents 
and their inner circle rely on the strategy of frequent reshuffling of individuals. It 
is seen as “exercising authority over the government” (Ghana Herald 2012); or 
rather having control over the amount of time individuals have access to state 
resources. The reshuffling process can, therefore, be used either as a means to 
cut off the access of individuals and their support bases to state resources or 
equally, as a way of granting it to them. The strategy has become so common 
that lower- and higher-level factions expect reshuffles to occur regularly. In re-
sponse to persistent rumours of an impending reshuffle being circulated on so-
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cial media at the beginning of 2014, Mahama’s administration released a state-
ment denying that the President intended to reshuffle his ministers in the near 
future(Radio XYZ 2014).  
 
Electoral waves of intra-party factionalism  
In Ghana, the repositioning of intra-party factions tends to occur in electoral cy-
cles. Regarding the NDC this process was illustrated in March 2014 when 
Kwabena Adjei was challenged in his position as NDC Chairman. A group called 
“Friends of Dan Abodakpi” (FDA) had been calling for a new party Chairman to 
“ensure total victory in the 2016 elections” (Mordy 2014). The FDA promoted the 
Dan Abodakpi, Ghana’s High Commissioner to Malaysia, as the candidate. 
Abodakpi, who, like the current Chairman Adjei, stems from the Volta region, was 
Minister of Trade and Industry in Rawlings’ second government (Abodakpi 2013). 
Under Kufuor’s regime, Abodakpi served a ten-year jail term for having caused 
financial loss to the Ghanaian state (Dogbevi 2008). With the NDC regaining po-
litical power, he was amongst those pardoned by President Kufuor and Abodakpi 
re-joined the political scene as MP for the Keta constituency in the Volta region. 
His candidacy as the NDC’s new Chairman is said to be backed by “powerful 
Fanti-Dzelukope confederacies” (Abodakpi 2013).59, 60 
Another candidate for the post of NDC Chairman is Kofi Portuphy, National 
Coordinator of the National Disaster Management Organization (NADMO) (ibid.). 
Portuphy is popular amongst the NDC grassroots and enjoys substantial support 
from the party’s middle ranks (ibid.). His origin from Ada in Greater Accra could, 
however, play to his disadvantage since the Chairmanship position has been 
reserved since the party’s inception for Voltarians. There are voices within the party 
that the NDC should choose its Head based on competence rather than sectarian 
considerations (ibid.).61 While Voltarians seem united in refusing their support for 
Adjei’s third term, younger members from the South, in particular, query whether 
Abodakpi has the necessary energy and dynamism to lead the party. Doubts about 
Abodakpi as Chairman have been raised, in particular since younger candidates 
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 Dzelukope is a town located near Keta in the Volta Region.  
60
 The Ewe represented a unique source of loyalty and viable source of support for Rawlings’ PNDC 
regime (Amamoo 2007: 233; Oquaye 2004: 141; Hansen 1987: 173). Critics referred to the influence 
of the Ewe in the political leadership as “Dzelukope Mafia”, referring to the hometown of Rawlings’ 
and the Tsikatas’ mother and several other strongmen of the PNDC (Oquaye 2004: 121).  
61
 One could interpret this call as a move towards meritocracy. Yet, it seems more likely to be an 
attempt to challenge and shift the institutionalized power relations within the NDC. 
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such as Paul Afoko and Stephen Ntim have indicated their interest in replacing 
Jake Obetsebi Lamptey as Chairman of the NPP. Some NDC members doubt that 
Abodakpi can match the personalities of their biggest political arch-rival (ibid.). 
Hence, the internal power constellation of the other dominant political faction is 
also taken into account during intra-party power quarrels.  
At the beginning of a new electoral cycle, sub-factions begin jockeying for 
influential positions to satisfy the interests of their group. In Ghana, this usually 
finds its climax about half a year ahead of the parties’ national congress. 
Eventually, ad-hoc coalitions are formed and nurtured into a power bloc, which 
is constellated around particular individuals (see Bob-Milliar 2012). A phase of 
maintaining the cohesion of the arranged power bloc then follows.    
  
NPP’s factionalism and intra-party power constellations 
The NPP is regarded and has continuously been portrayed by its main oppo-
nent as, as a predominantly Akan and elitist party. As highlighted before, the 
Akan are not a homogenous ethnic group. Rather, they are divided into several 
different ethnic sub-groups. They include amongst others the Asante, Akuapem, 
Akyem, Agona, Kwahu, Wassa, Fanti, Anyin, Baoulé, Chakosi, Sefwi, Nzema, 
Ahanta, and Jwira-Pepesa (TheGHNetwork 2013). In political terms, there is an 
important rift between the Akyem – who reside mainly in the Eastern region of 
Ghana – and the Asante people –predominantly based in the Ashanti region 
(see figure 5.2). This cleavage shapes NPP’s internal politics.  
The Akyem are rooted in the Danquah tradition, whereas the Asante see their 
alliances with Busia. Just like within the NDC, factionalism within the NPP fluctu-
ates between cooperative and competitive phases. In contrast to the rather in-
tense competitive period ahead of the 2008 election, the NPP’s internal fissure 
between the Danquah and Busia factions tended to blur in preparation for the 
2012 polls. They created a semblance of cooperative factionalism since Nana 
Akufo-Addo had consolidated his position of power within the party (Africa Confi-
dential 2011a; Africa Confidential 2010). Cooperative factionalism within the 
NPP can be interpreted as an unspoken elite consensus amongst the two main 
sub-factions. After Kufuor, an Asante had been President between 2001 
and2009, the Akyem faction led by Akufo-Addo successfully claimed its turn to 
grasp power on behalf of the party. Akufo-Addo’s undisputed leadership posi-
tion within the NPP in 2012 was underlined by the fact that seven out of ten par-
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ty executive positions went to supporters of the Akufo-Addo camp at the NPP’s 
congress in February 2010 (Africa Confidential 2010). Six months later, Akufo-
Addo, with 78.89% of the NPP’s “Special National Delegates Election” votes, was 
unambiguously endorsed as Presidential candidate for 2012. Alan Kwadwo 
Kyerematen, Kufuor’s political protégé and hence representative of the Asante 
sub-faction, came in second with 19.91%. The other three contesting candidates, 
Isaac Osei, Kwabena Frimpong-Boateng and John Kwame Kudua, shared the 
remaining 1.2% of the votes (Ghana News Agency 2011c). According to a Gha-
naian, Kyerematen primarily contested the NPP’s internal election in 2010 “be-
cause he needs to be in the queue” (B17, Bradford, March 2014). While the se-
lection process of the NPP’s 2012 Presidential candidate was characterized as 
rather cooperative, the party’s 2008 Presidential primaries had, in contrast, 
been much more fiercely contested.  
 
Ahead of the 2008 polls – a highly competitive phase amongst NPP’s in-
ternal factions 
The rivalry between the Asante and Akyem factions became evident in 2007 
(Bob-Milliar 2012: 598). Back then, the Busia faction surrounding outgoing Presi-
dent Kufuor favoured their young fellow Asante protégé62 Kyerematen as new 
leader of the party (Africa Confidential 2007a; Kennedy 2009: 15-19). Kyere-
maten’s main opponent in the competition for the 2008 NPP Presidential candi-
dacy was Nana Akufo-Addo, who was representing the Akyem faction. According 
to Bob-Milliar (2012: 582), the Akufo-Addo faction had reproached President 
Kufuor for attempting to“ disrupt the leadership queue and hold on to power” 
within the party structures. NPP establishment figures also disliked Kyerematen 
as a he was a “newcomer who had failed to find a parliamentary constituency in 
the 2004 elections” (Africa Confidential 2007). Nevertheless, in 2007 the Kyere-
maten/Akufo-Addo rivalry dominated the NPP primaries for the position as front 
runner (Bob-Milliar 2012: 581). Already ahead of the congress critical voices had 
been raised about the free-spending campaign-style of the aspirants. In fact, 
Kyerematen became in this context popularly known as “Alan Cash” fitting his 
campaign slogan “jobs for the people, cash for the people” (Africa Confidential 
2008; Ghana News Agency 2008). The lavish campaign practices have even led 
some to describe the NPP hierarchy as a “monetocracy” (Africa Confidential 
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 Kyerematen is son of a Fante mother and an Asante father (Africa Confidential 2005).  
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2007a). In particular younger – and probably less wealthy – aspirants, such as Yaw 
Osafo-Maafo and Kwabena Adjei Agyepong, critiqued the process of choosing 
delegates for the party’s congress, who then elect the party’s new leader. Each 
constituency could elect, select, or recommend six of their ten delegates to 
congress. This system, so the critique went, was prone to manipulation by both 
influential party members and local chief executives (ibid.). With 60% of delegates 
not chosen until a fortnight before the congress, aspirants, with the help of their 
supporters, have been handing out inducements to as many party members as 
possible (ibid.) so as to mobilize support. During the actual voting day for the pri-
mary, accusations of vote-buying had been put forward at the forecourt of the 
Great Hall at the University of Ghana in Legon (Daily Guide 2007). One narrative 
of the events is that when it became apparent that Kyerematen was presumably 
going to tie with Akufo-Addo, Lord Commey, back then the National Organiser, 
who was perceived to be a member of the Akufo-Addo faction, claimed that the 
voting process had been infringed (Bob-Milliar 2012: 582). Lord Commey al-
leged that some of the men close to Kyerematen, amongst them Paul Akofo, an 
ally of President Kufuor, had been distributing dollar bills to delegates to swing 
votes in favour of Kyerematen (ibid.; Daily Guide 2007). This development near-
ly wrecked the congress. The atmosphere was said to be so charged that some 
delegates accused the National Chairman, Peter Mac-Manu, of having lost con-
trol of the event (Daily Guide 2007). Delegates had been disgruntled about the 
fact that the party neglected the promise to allow all ten regions to cast their 
ballots at the same time. Mac-Manu had to consult intensively with aspirants to 
bring the situation back under control (ibid.). In the end, nobody was convicted 
of the allegations put forward. The rather small size of the Electoral College of 
about 2300 delegates, however, lets the accusations appear plausible (Bob-
Milliar 2012: 582), particularly in light of the aforementioned issue of the mone-
tarization of Ghanaian politics (see section 4.1.3). The claims become even 
more convincing given the NPP’s subsequent internal reforms which were put 
into practice for the first time in preparation for the 2012 elections. The NPP had 
substantially increased the number of delegates from 2,300 to 113,000. Moreo-
ver, the number of contenders for the post of Presidential candidate was limited 
to five (Statesman 2009; Bob-Milliar 2012: 583).63  
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 In 2007 the NPP was faced with 18 aspirants for the post as Presidential candidate. These includ-
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The Akufo-Addo faction was in favour of expanding the Electoral College 
and argued that it would “transfer ownership of the leadership to the grassroots 
of the party” (Asare 2009).  
In contrast, the faction around Kufuor and Kyerematen intended to maintain the 
status quo (The Chronicle 2009; Bob-Milliar 2012: 583). The different positions 
of the two factions have been interpreted in the following way. While the Dan-
quah faction around Akufo-Addo was not able to match the Busia faction in 
terms of resources, they supported measures to curb the influence of money in 
internal party competition. The well-resourced Busia faction, on the other hand, 
could “buy” support of 2,300 delegates more effectively than it would with an 
expanded Electoral College of over 100,000 voters. For this reason, the Busia 
faction was perceived to be against an enlargement (Bob-Milliar 2012: 583). 
Ultimately, the proposed internal reforms were implemented for the NPP’s pri-
maries in 2010. Despite the agitation about vote buying during the 2007 prima-
ries, Akufo-Addo won and became the party’s flag bearer for the 2008 presiden-
tial race. Back then Akufo-Addo had secured 47.97% of the votes in the first 
round and was about two points short of an outright win (Ghana News Agency 
2008; Bob-Milliar and Bob-Milliar 2010: 65). According to the NPP’s Constitution 
(NPP 2009: 57-58) a run-off between Akufo-Addo and Kyerematen, who had 
come second with 32.30% of the votes, should have taken place (Ghana News 
Agency 2008). However, the runner-up conceded defeat, and Akufo-Addo was 
declared the NPP’s presidential candidate for 2008.  
 
Challenges to rebuild party cohesion after intense phase of competitive 
factionalism  
Ahead of the 2008 elections, the NPP did not manage a quick transition from the 
highly competitive phase between its two prominent factions to a more coopera-
tive one. Akufo-Addo’s faction went on the campaign trail without the active in-
volvement of President Kufuor. In addition, members of the Busia faction had 
been assigned less eminent positions in the running of the NPP’s 2008 presiden-
tial campaign (Bob-Milliar 2012). The fierce competition between the two camps 
had penetrated down to the grassroots level, with MP aspirants taking either the 
Danquah or the Busia faction side. Party cohesion seemed at a low when 
                                                                                                                                
ed eight ministers of Kufuor’s government – amongst them Akufo-Addo, Addo-Kufuor (President 
Kufuor’s brother), Alan Kyerematen and Aliu Mahama, the sitting Vice-President (Frempong 2012: 
120).  
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Kyerematen submitted his letter of resignation from the NPP only several months 
ahead of the polls (Africa Confidential 2008). As the reason for his resignation, 
Kyerematen cited the ongoing harassment of his supporters since he lost the 
primaries (Daily Guide 2008). Two weeks after his unexpected resignation, 
Kyerematen was convinced by Kufuor to revoke his decision and re-join the party 
in the interest of unity (Africa Confidential 2008b).  
Compared with 2007, the battle between the two factions had considerably 
calmed down ahead of the preparation for the 2012 election. This situation was 
reflected by Akufo-Addo’s clear win in the primaries with almost 80%. Even 
though the regional-(sub)ethnic fissures within the NPP continue to exist, the 
stronger position of Akufo-Addo within the party led the NPP to appear more 
unified ahead of the 2012 polls. Moreover, the NPP’s experience of how 
apparent internal rifts can damage the party’s electoral prospects made them 
realise that ahead of elections the party needed to shift more quickly from the 
competitive to the cooperative phase. 
  
Further internal fissures within the NPP 
Besides the underlying regional-ethnic fissure and in contrast to the NDC, within the 
NPP there is also a rift between the “heirs of natural rulers versus plutocrats and self-
made middling class professionals” (Bob-Milliar 2012: 578; Kennedy 2014).  
So far the “heirs of natural rulers” seem to retain the upper hand. Whereas Adu 
Boahen, the NPP’s presidential candidate in 1992 was an Asante commoner 
perceived to be close to the Danquah tradition (Bob-Milliar 2012: 579); Kufuor, 
Kyerematen, and Akufo-Addo share a privileged, royal background. Kufuor is an 
Asante aristocrat with “deep historical and personal ties to the Golden Stool” 
(see Agyeman-Duah 2004: 7-16; Bob-Milliar 2012: 579).  
Kufuor’s father was the head of the Oyoko clan to which Asante’s royalty traces 
back its roots (Agyeman-Duah 2004: 7); and his sister was married to Prempreh 
II, King of Asante between 1933-1970 (Knierzinger 2011: 42). Additionally, 
Kyerematen has royal roots, being the paternal great-grandson of Asantehene 
Kofi Kakari (McCaskie 2009: 459). Akufo-Addo’s mother, Adeline Yeboakua 
Akufo-Addo, was the daughter of Ofori-Atta I, the Okyenhene and King of 
Akyem. In addition, Akufo-Addo’s father, Edward Akufo-Addo, was a founding 
member of the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) and belonged to the “Big 
Six”, who were detained by colonial authorities in 1948. Edward Akufo-Addo 
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served as Chief Justice and titular President of Ghana’s Second Republic under 
Prime Minister Busia. Joseph Kwame Kyeretwie Boakye Danquah, also a 
member of Ghana’s “Big Six” and one of Ghana’s most influential post-colonial 
politicians, was Nana Akufo-Addo’s great-uncle; and William Ofori-Atta,64 popu-
larly known as “Paa Willie”, was his maternal uncle (The Mirror 2008). These 
family ties demonstrate the deep historical, political legacy characterizing the 
leadership of the NPP and how closely interwoven it is with the traditional elite. 
In contrast to the NPP, the NDC is not characterized by such close and persis-
tent family ties between Ghana’s modern political and traditional elite, which 
also nurtures the NPP’s image as an elitist party. Another non-dominant fissure 
in the NPP – linked to the one just mentioned – is represented by those who are 
sceptical of the NPP’s predisposition to gerontocracy (Bob-Milliar 2012: 579). 
The party advocates for younger leaders to modernise the NPP (Africa Confi-
dential 2010a).  
 
New electoral wave of internal realignment  
Following the 2012 elections and in preparation for the next electoral cycle, the 
NPP held its National Delegates’ Congress in Tamale in April 2014 to elect its 
new national executive officers who would steer the party for the next four years. 
The fact that ten out of eleven national executives have not retained their position 
indicates that realignments of power constellations are already taking place in 
preparation for the next electoral cycle. The NPP’s former National Chairman 
Jake Obetsebi Lamptey, a Ga from the Greater Accra region, lost his post to Paul 
Afoko, an influential NPP financier and descendant from the royal family of the 
Bulsa people in the Upper East Region (Adam 2014; Afoko 2014). While Lamp-
tey was perceived as an ally of the Akufo-Addo/Akyem camp, Afoko is known to 
be close to former President Kufuor and the Asante faction within the NPP. Since 
Akufo-Addo declared his intention to contest the flag-bearer slot again, more 
voices have been demanding that the position of party Chairman not be filled with 
an Akan (PeaceFMonline 2014). The election of Afoko as new party Chairman 
could, therefore, be seen as a strategic move by NPP members to position the 
party as a widely appealing power bloc within Ghanaian society based on the 
                                            
64
 William Ofori-Atta was the son of Nana Sir Ofori-Atta Okyenhene, King of the Akyem between 
1912-1943, and leader of the United National Convention (UNC). 
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assumption that Akufo-Addo, as Akan/Akyem, is likely to run again as the NPP’s 
presidential candidate in 2016.  
Further realignments took place in the NPP’s national executive team in 
preparation for 2016. Freddie Blay, whose origins lay in the Western region, has 
replaced Fred Oware, a banker, and entrepreneur from the Central region, as 
First National Vice-Chairperson (Adam 2014). Blay, who used to be a member of 
the CPP, one of the smaller political parties in Ghana’s Fourth Republic, had 
been supported by the NPP for several years in the sense that the party did not 
nominate its own parliamentary candidate for Ellembele constituency.  Blay rep-
resented Ellembele in parliament from 1996 till Buah, Minister of Energy and Pe-
troleum under Mahama, replaced him as MP in 2008 (Statesman 2011). The co-
operation between the NPP and Blay was further expressed by the fact that the 
NPP nominated Blay for the position of Deputy Speaker of Parliament between 
2005 and 2008 (ibid.). Eventually, in 2011, the NPP entirely co-opted Blay when 
he left the CPP. Besides hailing from the Western region, which due to its energy 
sources is growing in political significance, Blay is the majority shareholder of 
Western Publications Limited, home of Ghana’s second largest newspapers the 
Daily Guide (Ikando 2014).65 
Sammy Crabbe, former regional Chairman of the NPP in Greater Accra, has 
been elected as Second National Vice-Chairperson and replaced Sheik T.B. 
Damba who enjoys widespread support from the Northern parts of the country. 
Crabbe is a businessman who helped to set up the ACS/BPS, an American off-
shore data-entry and transmitting business operating in Ghana's free zone area, 
which at one time became the biggest private company in Ghana. Moreover, 
Crabbe holds shares in Ghana International Airlines Limited and is the founder 
of Omanye Money, a global mobile money platform based in the UK (Saji 2013). 
Frederick Antoh became Third National Vice-Chairperson, the NPP’s Ashanti 
Regional Chairman who replaced Sophia Horner-Sam, a representative of the 
Western region (Adam 2014). Another change with less impact on the regional 
balance of the new NPP alliance is seen by the fact that Kwabena Agyei 
Agyapong from Kumasi, known to be close to the Akyem faction, is becoming 
General Secretary, replacing Kwadwo Owusu Afriyie (Sir John), who also hails 
from the Ashanti region.  
                                            
65
 Gina Blay, wife of Freddie Blay, is CEO of the Daily Guide.  
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Figure 5.2   Areas of influence of NPP’s factions 
  
Source: Based on map of Ghana's Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development 
(2012) 
 
To summarize, like any society Ghana is characterized by underlying politi-
cized social fissures which constitute the basis for the formation of societal ruling 
alliances. In Ghana’s political sphere, two dominant factions tend to form along 
ethnic lines: Broadly speaking the NPP is seen to represent the Akan, with a 
strong support base in the Eastern and Ashanti regions, while the NDC is 
regarded as representing the Ewe people who predominantly reside in the Volta 
region. However, neither of the two factions has a group of loyal supporters large 
enough to guarantee accession to power through the ballot box. In addition, as a 
matter of course, Ghanaian society is not neatly split into Akan and Ewe but is 
much more diverse. To gain political power both dominant factions need to forge 
a societal alliance large enough to win elections. Higher-level factions compete 
for support from lower-level factions and must create a societal alliance cutting 
across politicized societal cleavages. Smaller groups, in particular members from 
the Northern parts, are included or temporally co-opted into a faction’s power 
bloc. Besides regional and ethnic diversity, other prominent fissures such as reli-
gion are vital for the composition of a power bloc to mobilize and maximize elec-
toral support. The forging of a societal alliance – as Gramsci calls it – turns into a 
negotiation process which is constantly in flux so that realignments and slight 
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shifts in power between sub-factions are very common. Since Ghana’s ethno-
demographic composition turns elections into neck-and-neck races between the 
two dominant factions (see section 4.3), smaller groups can play a decisive role 
in forming winning alliances.   
  
Smaller political groupings amongst Ghana’s higher-level factions                
Besides the two dominant factions, Ghana’s political sphere is characterized by 
a few smaller political groups fluctuating in size and societal influence. As men-
tioned in chapter four, the most significant ones in 2012 were the Convention 
People's Party (CPP), Progressive People's Party (PPP), People's National 
Convention (PNC), and the National Democratic Party (NDP). While the CPP 
and PNC have their historical roots in parties formed before Ghana’s Fourth 
Republic, the PPP and NPC are relatively young political groups which emerged 
by splitting away from the established ones.  
Today’s CPP has its origins in the political party founded by Kwame Nkru-
mah in 1949. Through a referendum in 1964, Ghana’s first President trans-
formed the CPP into the only legal party. With 99,91% in favour of the proposed 
amendments, the referendum was said to be clearly rigged (African Elections 
Database 2012;  Anthony 1969: 337). After being overthrown in a coup by the 
National Liberation Council (NLC) in 1966, the CPP was banned. It reformed 
again in 1996 and has since gained a few parliamentary seats. For the 2012 
elections Samia Yaaba Nkrumah, daughter of Nkrumah, was leading the party 
as its Chairman and Abu Sakara Foster was the CPP’s Presidential candidate. 
Even though the CPP managed under Nkrumah to have a wide, cross-ethnic 
appeal, in 2012 the party seemed to have its main power base in Jomoro, in the 
South-Western part of Ghana and home to the Nzema people. With Sakara as 
Gonja from the Northern region as presidential candidate, the CPP aimed to 
forge a larger societal alliance.  
Paa Kwesi Nduom, born in Elmina, Central region of Ghana, owns the Coco-
nut Groves Hotel chain, Gold Coast Security, and First National Savings and 
Loans (International Institute of Sustainable Development 2015; Nduom 2014; 
GN Investments 2011). He ran as the CPP’s presidential candidate in 2008. 
However, due to disunity, he formed the PPP by splitting away from the CPP 
ahead of the 2012 elections. Nduom, who had lost influence in the CPP primaries 
in 2011 to newer candidates such as Samia Nkrumah, ran as presidential candi-
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date for the PPP in 2012. Probably due to the young age of the party and as-
sumed limited societal impact by relying mainly on a power base in the Central 
region, the PPP did not receive the same recognition ahead of the 2012 polls as 
the other smaller, yet established political parties. While the CPP and PNC were 
both represented by their presidential candidates in Ghana’s Presidential De-
bates in 2012, the PPP was left out (D21 observation 10/2012 and 11/2012).  
The PNC has its historical roots in the People’s National Party (PNP). Hilla 
Limann, who had won the presidential elections for the PNP in 1979, became 
the only President of Ghana’s Third Republic and Ghana’s first Northern (Chris-
tian) President. Limann had been sponsored by his uncle Alhaji Imoru Egala 
since Egala himself had been banned from public office by the Military Supreme 
Council (El Alawa 2015; Osei 2012: 109). Having served as Minister of Foreign 
Affairs under Nkrumah, Egala had close ties to the CPP and its former elite. His 
PNP was regarded as having absorbed a significant number of former CPP loy-
alists which caused some Ghanaians to label the CPP as the ancestor of the 
PNP (ibid.; Danquah Institute n.d.: 7). These ties caused the interim military re-
gime to debar Egala from regaining a prominent role in Ghana’s Third Republic. 
As the example of Egala shows, former political elites have been rather suc-
cessful in maintaining their political influence, at least indirectly. Following Rawl-
ings second coup in 1981 which topped the PNP government, the party was 
banned. In 1992 Limann revived the PNP tradition by forming the PNC for which 
he ran again as presidential candidate (Frempong 2012: 47). He was 
succeeded by Edward Mahama (Frempong 2012: 70) who contested the presi-
dential race for the PNC in the subsequent years until Hassan Ayariga took over 
as the flag bearer in 2012 (D21 observation 10/2012 and 11/2012). The PNC is 
still regarded as a party following the Nkrumahist political movement. Most im-
portantly its support has been and still is rooted first and foremost in the North-
ern regions of Ghana, in particular around Tamale.  
Like the PPP, the NDP was formed by breaking away from another estab-
lished party. Former first lady, Nana Konadu Agyeman-Rawlings, founded the 
NDP in October 2012 in response to a clash of the pro-Rawlings faction and 
anti-Rawlings bloc within the NDC over her presidential ambitions (D21 obser-
vation 10/2012 and 11/2012). While the faction “Friends of Nana Konadu 
Agyemang Rawlings” (FONKAR) lobbied for the former First Lady’s endorse-
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ment as the NDC’s presidential candidate for 2012, the group “Get Atta Mills 
Endorsed” (GAME) supported Mills rerunning as the party’s flag bearer (Bob-
Milliar 2012: 575). At the beginning of July 2011, Mills had been, with 2,771 to 
90 votes, overwhelmingly elected as flag bearer by the delegates at the NDC’s 
congress in Sunyani (Ghana News Agency 2011b). Faced with dissonance and 
the weakened position of the pro-Rawlings faction within the NDC under Mills, 
Nana Konadu Agyeman-Rawlings founded her own party and attempted to run 
as Ghana’s first-ever female presidential candidate for the NDP in 2012.66 How-
ever, the EC rejected her candidacy on the grounds of the NDP’s failure to 
comply with the administrative rules and regulations for the nomination process 
(D21 observation 10/2012).  
 
Role of smaller political groupings and their relationship to dominant parties  
Despite a rather limited influence on Ghanaian society as a whole, the CPP and 
PNC have a role to play in Ghana’s Fourth Republic. With presidential elections 
being a tight decision, smaller parties can easily end up as “kingmaker” (Frem-
pong 2012: 96). In 2000 for example, the presidential race ended in a run-off 
between Kufuor and Atta Mills. The NPP had won the second round for which 
the support of the CPP and the PNC had been crucial. In return for assisting the 
NPP to gain political power, members of both smaller parties had been awarded 
political posts. The CPP’s 2000 presidential candidate George Hagan was 
appointed as Chairman of the National Commission on Culture. Defeated CPP 
parliamentary candidate Paa Kwesi Nduom was made Minister of Economic 
Planning, and the defeated CPP incumbent for Evalue Gwira constituency, Kojo 
Armah, was made DCE of the Nzema East District (Frempong 2012: 96/fn. 63). 
The PNC was also paid tribute by appointing Mallam Issah as Youth and Sports 
Minister and its Sisasla MP, Moses Dani Baah, became Deputy Minister of 
Health (ibid.). Furthermore, Charles Wereko-Brobbey, the UGM’s presidential 
candidate, became head of the Volta River Authority (VRA). Three independent 
MPs – Rashid Bawa who had won the Akan constituency, Boniface Saddique 
MP for Salaga constituency and Joseph Akudibillah elected MP for Garu-
Tempane – all became Deputy Ministers (ibid.). Hence the NPP had successful-
                                            
66
 The Ghana Freedom Party (GFP) nominated Akua Donkor as their Presidential candidate in 
2012. Her candidacy had been rejected by the EC (D21 observation 10/2012 and 11/2012).  
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ly co-opted these individuals, and with them the social factions they were repre-
senting, into their societal alliance.  
While some politicians let themselves be absorbed into one of the dominant 
blocs, others are described as “stomach politicians” (B17, Bradford May 2014).  
Where there is bread that’s where they will go (ibid.).  
The PNC, for example, seems to swing its support between the two dominant 
parties. In 2000 it assisted the NPP to gain power, whereas the two PNC MPs 
who were elected in 2012 voted with the NDC’s governing majority (Africa Con-
fidential 2013c: 4). As much as the dominant factions are aware of the necessity 
to include or co-opt smaller factions into their alliance, smaller factions are con-
scious of their importance to the NDC and NPP. Mahama Ayariga, the younger 
brother of Hassan Ayariga, the PNC’s 2012 presidential candidate, hails from 
Bawku in the Upper East. While Mahama Ayariga’s brother and father have 
been active members of the PNC, Mahama Ayariga is a member of the NDC. 
He has served as presidential spokesperson under Mills as well as Deputy 
Trade Minister and Deputy Minister for Education (Okoampa-Ahoofe 2014; Cit-
ifmonline 2011c). After the 2012 elections, he was appointed as Minister of In-
formation and Media Relations to Mahama’s cabinet (Ghana Web 2013f). Some 
families within Ghana’s higher-level factions seem to maximize their chances by 
joining opposing political camps strategically: 
In this NDC government right now, we have one MP that’s brother was 
ex-NPP’s Financial Minister, Osafo-Mafoo. He is having a brother in 
NDC who is a Minister you understand. So once some things come out, 
and some things are going in, it will work (A13, interviewed 07/11/2012).   
Political networks in Ghana are historically grown, tight, and intertwined. They 
are also in constant flux since the two dominant parties are permanently trying 
to broaden their support base to maximize their chances of electoral victory. To 
ensure electoral support attempts to split existing camps are common practice. 
Selecting presidential running mates is vital in this context. While Mahama as a 
Christian Northerner was striving to ensure as many Northern votes as possible 
for the NDC, the NPP attempted to win votes with Mahamudu Bawumia, a 
Northern Muslim, as the running mate of Akufo-Addo in 2008 and 2012. While 
Bawumia’s family has its political roots in the UP/NPP, Bawumia’s wife, Samira, 
is the daughter of Alhaji Ahmed Ramadan, the National Chairman of the PNC 
(Africa Confidential 2008a). Both dominant parties are constantly aiming at win-
ning over smaller societal factions into their power bloc. If that is not possible, 
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they will try to split them and at least appeal to some of the members of these 
smaller groupings. Throughout the process of constant realignment of coali-
tions, all forged alliances are vulnerable to being weakened by factions breaking 
away and possibly joining, or at least indirectly strengthening the opponent.  
 
Further important players amongst Ghana’s higher-level factions in the 
political sphere 
Among Ghana’s elite, the modern political elite is currently the most dominant. 
However, traditional authorities and security forces had supremacy in previous 
settlements. Their remaining role and influence will be addressed in the subse-
quent sections.  
 
The role of traditional rulers in Ghana’s current political sphere 
Besides the modern political elite, the top level of Ghana’s primarily hierarchical 
traditional authorities67 forms part of Ghana’s higher-level factions (see Knier-
zinger 2011: 42).68 Despite the fact that chiefs have lost all formal 
governmental, judicial, and land-revenue management roles (Crook 2005: 2), 
which they used to hold in pre-colonial and to some extent throughout colonial 
times, traditional leaders have managed to hold their ground as influential 
actors in Ghana’s political sphere (see Boafo-Arthur 2006: 152; Crook 2005: 2; 
Mahama 2009: 8). Some authors ascribe the continued influence that the chiefs 
have to the resilience of chieftaincy as an institution (see Boafo-Arthur 2006: 
145; Pinkney 1972: 96). In some people’s view, (see Sennah n.d.: 1; Knier-
zinger 2011: 33) this has led to a parallel mode of governance to modern institu-
tions. Rather than treating the continued existence and influence of traditional 
authorities as a parallel system of governance (discourse on hybridity), this the-
sis interprets it as a crucial and integral part of Ghana’s political settlement, 
characterizing the form and hence the workings of the current Ghanaian state.  
Ghana’s modern political elite has attempted several times to establish local 
institutions to penetrate society to the grassroots level. Nkrumah established 
Town and Village Development Committees (T/VDCs), and Rawlings set up 
                                            
67
 The term “traditional authority” comprises chiefs, queenmothers and other recognised structures 
within the traditional governance structure (see Mahama 2009: 8). 
68
 Traditional institutions vary enormously across the different cultures and localities in Ghana. While 
broadly speaking hierarchical chieftaincy is dominant in the Southern and Northern parts of Ghana, 
there are significant “cultural minorities” in Trans-Volta-Togoland for whom these structures are not  
traditional (Crook 2005: 2). Due to a limited scope, this section will focus on the dominant patterns in 
Ghanaian society.  
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People’s Defence Committees (PDCs). However, a relevant system of local 
government that reliably connects all local spaces throughout the country with 
the central administration does not exist in Ghana (see Harris 2013: 172; 
Quarcoopome 2006: 405). This infrastructural trait of the Ghanaian state com-
bined with the continued and unmatched authority of the traditional elites in 
Ghanaian society assigns chiefs a distinct role. Royals, who exist even in the 
smallest and most remote villages (Knierzinger 2011: 16), have managed to 
hold their ground in a space where the modern state and its elites have not suc-
ceeded in completely replacing previous power structures.69 According to Gya-
pong (2006: 189), in the rural areas, in particular, the only authority visible in 
communities is the chief and his Akyeame, elders, queen mothers and “stool 
fathers”. This situation could explain to a degree why chiefs continue to have a 
large influence over people, particularly those living in rural areas (Boafo-Arthur 
2006: 164; Valsecchi 2007: 5). Sennah (n.d.: 9) further claims that: 
In many regions and districts in Ghana today, some paramount chiefs 
command more respect than Regional Ministers and District Chief Ex-
ecutives; and in the same breath, some chiefs have greater capability 
for social mobilization than many political appointees.      
The continued presence of traditional authorities at all levels, but particularly at 
the grassroots level, combined with their continued and unparalleled powerful 
position in Ghana’s cultural sphere (power through authority), provides chiefs with 
significant capabilities for social mobilization. This position turns them into a link 
between the central government administration and the citizens,  acting as chan-
nels of communication and disseminating government policy and decisions (Ma-
hama 2009: 13). This role of political intermediary between the urban and the 
rural makes chiefs important stakeholders in Ghana’s political sphere.  
In Ghana’s current political system of highly competitive party politics, being 
capable of social mobilization is invaluable. Even though Ghana’s Constitution 
bans chiefs from actively engaging in partisan politics (article 276 of the 1992 
Ghanaian Constitution), modern political elites use the institution of chieftaincy 
to mobilize support during election time (see chapter four). In particular, individ-
uals aspiring to the position of MP or presidential candidate seek the support of 
prominent chiefs to enhance their chance of electoral victory (Sennah n.d: 9). 
George Hagan, presidential candidate for the CPP in 2000, summarized this 
phenomenon as follows:  
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 For an analysis of the roots of resilience of chieftaincy in Africa see Logan (2013).  
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You cannot win an election in Ghana if the chiefs do not support you be-
cause while you are asleep, they are with the people. A chief said to me 
you cannot win; you have no money to give to the chiefs. If you have 
money, I can go from village to village in my domain and tell people to 
vote. At times the voting is done even in the chief’s palace. And people go 
to the chief’s house to greet him in the morning and ask him how they 
should vote. He would not open up his mouth; he would give them a sign. 
[…] So let’s be realistic: The theory is that they should not participate, and 
that is the idea (Knierzinger 2011: 35).  
Even during non-election times, traditional authorities are highly visible in Gha-
naian life (Valsecchi 2007: 4). Numerous public events in rural and urban areas 
take place in settings of chiefly pageantry where political figures from all differ-
ent levels interact with traditional authorities (observation fieldwork 2011 and 
2012). During these occasions chiefs frequently voice developmental requests 
to politicians on behalf of their communities (ibid.). Chiefs are therefore said to 
be and are portrayed as, “agents of development” (D2 observation 17/10/2012; 
Mahama 2009: 12). They took on this role mainly due to their marginalized posi-
tion in formal politics since the 1950s by the, back then, new/modern, predomi-
nantly urban-based political elite. In Ghana’s current political settlement chiefs 
are expected to mobilize resources from external agencies and urban residents; 
hence, transferring resources from the urban metropolis to the economically 
marginalized rural communities (Tonah 2012: 5).70 Since 1992, their role as an 
agent of local development has been more and more taken over by the District 
Chief Executive (DCE), the Assemblymen, and Committee members who con-
trol the resources of the various districts. This overlap of roles between modern 
local political elites and traditional authorities often leads to tension and conflict 
(see Ayesu 2006: 500; Gyapong 2006: 187). To some degree, it is the expres-
sion of the continuing power struggle between these competing forces.71    
 
Relationship of chiefly with modern political elites 
Traditional authorities and formal politics are interwoven to a considerable ex-
tent through personal union and kinship (Knierzinger 2011: 33; see also 
Dziyenu 2011). Even though chiefs are banned from party politics and cannot 
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 The state’s scarce allocation of resources to the local level, has led to the establishment of devel-
opment chiefs, the so called “nkosohene” (Brefo 2014). These positions are primarily awarded to 
individuals who are perceived of being capable to mobilize external funds for communities’ devel-
opment. It has become a trend to enstool even white chiefs: Bob Geldof for example is the nkoso-
hene of Ajumako-Bisease in central Ghana (ibid.) (see also Stänner 2014; WDR 2014). 
71
 Traditional authorities have been striving for more effective participation in the control over re-
sources at the local level (Valsecchi 2007: 9; Crook 2005: 3). In course of Ghana’s constitutional 
review process, initiated by Mill’s in 2010, voices have been raised to lift the ban for chiefs to engage 
in party politics (D2 17/10/2012). 
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become MPs, they are allowed to be appointed to public offices and serve in 
public institutions that are formally non-partisan (Valsecchi 2007: 4). Valsecchi 
(ibid.) cites as a prominent example the Omanhene of New Juaben of the East-
ern region, who served as Statistician of the State under Rawlings for two terms 
during Ghana’s Fourth Republic. The number of chiefs occupying positions of 
responsibility and power in government and public administration is extremely 
high (ibid.). At the same time, chiefly positions and titles are actively sought by 
Ghana’s modern political elite since they provide a notable path to social recog-
nition and political influence (see Tonah 2012: 5).     
As much as Ghana’s traditional authorities are linked to its modern political 
elite, the pro-chief position of the NPP, which it inherited from the UGCC, con-
tinues to be highly visible. As already mentioned, the NPP’s leadership can be 
genealogically linked to the two mightiest chiefs in Ghana. CPP factions within 
post-independence Ghana, on the other hand, have mainly worked towards 
marginalizing and curbing the power of traditional rulers in the political sphere. 
Hostility towards the power of chiefs or at least scepticism towards traditional 
rulers continues mainly amongst more radical CPP political traditions (Crook 
2005: 3). The relationship of both dominant political parties with the traditional 
elite is today overall characterized by its mutually interwoven nature.  
Ghana’s Constitution recognizes and guarantees the institution of chieftain-
cy. As much as it bars traditional authorities from party politics, article 270 
guards chieftaincy against intrusion by the state, at least in theory. In practice, 
the interlocking between traditional and modern elites has not only led national 
parties to seek electoral advantages by engaging with local factions but compet-
ing traditional sub-factions also seek support from national level patrons (Crook 
2005: 3). This constellation has politicized and occasionally intensified chief-
taincy disputes, especially regarding the issue of succession.  
The most significant case represents the Dagbon Skin (throne) dispute. The 
succession to the Yendi throne was vested in the descendants of two royal 
families, the Abudu and Andani (Tonah 2012: 6; Crook 2005: 3). The Ya Na 
(King) of Dagbon used to be chosen “by a system of alternating succession be-
tween the two families” (ibid.).  
The neglect of this principle caused massive dissatisfaction amongst the An-
dani clan who felt robbed of the high office (Tonah 2012: 7). The two disputing 
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sub-factions aligned themselves with the two largest political parties. While the 
Abudus became associated with the anti-CPP faction, today represented by the 
NPP; the Andani family has aligned itself with CPP factions which are nowadays 
mainly represented by the NDC (see ibid; Crook 2005: 3). Since the PNDC re-
gime refused to entertain the Abudu claims to power in the early 1980s, the An-
dani remained enstooled, and most constituencies in Dagbon supported Rawl-
ings’s NDC in the 1992, 1996, and 2000 elections. However, when the NPP 
came to power in 2000, the power constellation shifted slightly between the two 
disputing clans (see Tonah 2012: 8; Crook 2005: 3). The NPP appointed leading 
members and supporters of the Abudus to key ministerial and governmental posi-
tions, probably to reward the sub-faction for its electoral support which contribut-
ed to further stiffening the fissures in Dagbon. The posts occupied by pro-Abudus 
included amongst others the Minister of the Interior, the Head of National Securi-
ty, the Northern Regional Minister, and the Yendi DCE.  
Tensions between the Abudus and supporters of the enstooled Ya Na An-
dani II grew steadily following the changeover of power at the national level in 
2001 (see Tonah 2012: 8). In March 2002, an attack on an emissary of Ya Na 
Andani II by a group of Abudu youth sparked three days of fighting which re-
sulted in the death of the Dagbon King Andani II and over 30 of his supporters 
(ibid.). The failure of national security agencies to intervene in the violent clash-
es caused Andanis to believe that the NPP government, with Abudus occupying 
key security posts, was somehow complicit in the murders (Tonah 2012: 11; 
Crook 2005: 3). Due to public pressure, the Minister of the Interior, the National 
Security Adviser, and the Northern Regional Minister resigned (see Tonah 
2012: 9). Following the Yendi massacre, the NDC strove to benefit from the in-
ability of the NPP to resolve the matter. Media close to the NDC ensured that 
the issue stayed on the agenda (Tonah 2012: 11). In fact, the party used the 
murder of Ya Na Andani II as a major campaign issue in the 2004 and 2008 
elections. In its 2008 election manifesto, the NDC pledged to  
[…] set up a new and truly non-partisan and independent Presidential 
Commission to re-open investigations into the murder of Ya Na Yakubu 
Andani II and his elders in March 2002 (Tonah 2012: 12). 
Political parties continued with their attempts to exploit the factionalism in Dagbon 
to their electoral advantage. This dispute remains unresolved today, and there 
were subtle worries about the conflict flaring up during the 2012 campaign. Maha-
 186 
 
ma however, made clear during his campaign in 2012 that he was not siding with 
any of the disputing parties: 
I say categorically that Dagbon is one. I do not know Andani Dagbon or 
Abudu Dagbon. All Dagombas are one. […] I belong to no side (Sannie 
2012).             
In brief, Ghana’s traditional rulers continue to be crucial actors in national 
and local power struggles (see section 5.1.1). Those whose social positions are 
legitimized by tradition attempt to establish or widen their access to the state, 
while modern political elites try to utilize what is perceived as traditional legiti-
macy and authority for their ends (Sennah n.d.: 12). The inter-linkages and 
overlaps between Ghana’s modern political elite and traditional authorities form 
new alliances between these two groups of actors (Knierzinger 2011: 33) and 
shape Ghana’s current political settlement (see Dziyenu 2011).  
 
Security forces  
Regarding Ghana’s history, security forces and in particular the military cannot be 
ignored as influential actors in the political sphere (see chapter three). Since 31 
December 1981 Ghana has not experienced a successful military coup.72 This 
situation has allowed for the longest period of uninterrupted civilian rule since 
independence. Ghana’s experiences in civil-military relations suggest that civilian 
rule cannot just be equated with civilian control over the military (Hutchful 1997b: 
559).73 Sustained civilian governance allows us to reasonably assume that 
security forces have been subordinated again under civilian rule (see Handley 
and Mills 2001: 29; Hutchful 1997a: 266-68). According to Hutchful (1997a: 273-
77), there is an acceptance within the military hierarchy of the principle of civil 
supremacy. In fact, he claims that a consensus has emerged among both military 
Commanders and elected Government to have a common interest in stabilizing 
their authority (Hutchful 1997a: 274). While there seems to be no doubt about 
civilian supremacy over the security forces, it has been critically noted that it con-
tinues to rest predominantly with the executive (Aning and Lartey 2009:13 Agye-
man-Duah 2002: 20; Handley and Mills 2001: 29). Democratic control or inde-
pendent parliamentary oversight over the security forces remains rather weak 
(see Aning and Lartey 2009: 13). Agyeman-Duah (2002: 30) speaks of a general 
                                            
72
 During the early years of the PNDC regime the country faced however numerous coups attempts 
(see chapter six) and there have been claims of a coup attempt in 2004 (see NDC 2004). 
73
 As a result of weak monitoring capability, even under civilian rule the military has enjoyed consid-
erable autonomy (Hutchful 1997b: 559). 
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de-militarization of governance and regards the fact that soldiers no longer partic-
ipate in political events as a sign of Ghana’s military’s depoliticization and profes-
sionalization. The role taken on by security forces during the days of the 2012 
elections gave the impression of a “republican military” (Agyeman-Duah 2002: 
28). Ghanaians occasionally have broached the issue of politicization of security 
forces by ruling factions related to the issue of electoral violence as highlighted in 
chapter four. How far dynamics of regional-ethnic factionalism within and be-
tween the different security forces74 feeds into this perception cannot be as-
sessed within the scope of this thesis. Overall it can be concluded that Ghana’s 
modern civilian political elite has reclaimed supremacy over its military counter-
parts. With politicians continuing to regard the military as a (potential) “enemy 
from within” some suspicion between political and security elites seems to remain 
(Aning and Lartey 2009: 14 and 29).  
 
5.1.2 Economic sphere 
After outlining the relationship and constellation of power between the major 
groups constituting Ghana’s elite in the political sphere, the following part focuses 
on significant actors within the economic sphere. The section will illustrate that the 
Ghanaian state, and hence the modern political elite, continue to play a prominent 
role in Ghana’s economy. As a result of this constellation, capital accumulation 
tends to occur still, primarily through direct or indirect access to the state. Engaging 
with Ghana’s economic sphere lays the foundation for understanding the workings 
of the current Ghanaian state since it will not only complete the picture on the con-
stellation amongst Ghana’s higher-level factions but also provide first points of ref-
erence how the elite is interlinked to the lower-level factions.  
 
Structure of Ghana’s economy  
To start the endeavour of sketching the constellation of power in Ghana incor-
porating the economic sphere, the structure of Ghana’s economy will be 
analysed first. The following section will highlight the Ghanaian state’s contin-
ued prominent role within the economic sphere.  
 
                                            
74
 These include Ghana Armed Forces (GAF), comprised of the army, navy and air force; Ghana 
Police Service (GPS); Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) and Customs, Excise and Preventive Ser-
vice (CEPS); Bureau for National Investigation (BNI) Military Intelligence and the Research Bureau 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Prison Service (see Aning and Lartey 2009: 3-4) 
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Agriculture 
Agriculture dominated the economy in terms of GDP contribution and employ-
ment in Ghana’s immediate post-independence settlement. Exports were typically 
primary agricultural or mining products, whereas most non-agricultural consumer 
goods needed to be imported. Recently, the service sector started to dominate 
the economy regarding its contribution to GDP. Agriculture continues to be a vital 
sector, still contributing more than one-third of Ghana’s GDP (Kolavalli et al. 
2012: 4). Besides most Ghanaians still tend to work in the agricultural, forestry 
and fishing sectors (see GSS 2012: 75; Kolavalli et al. 2012: 14). 
The agricultural sector is dominated by crop production, and even though 
the sector is transforming through diversification into non-traditional products, 
cocoa beans produced mainly in the rural areas of the southern regions remain 
the most important export crop (Kolavalli et al. 2012: 5). In fact, cocoa continues 
to be one of the country’s main foreign currency earners. During the past dec-
ade, Ghana’s agricultural sector has grown about 5% per year (ibid.). Most of 
this growth, however, has not been achieved by a general increase in 
productivity but has rather been driven by an augmented production of cocoa 
beans achieved primarily through expanding the amount of cultivated land (Ko-
lavalli et al. 2012: 6). This expansion was achieved through the implementation 
of market reforms which passed on an increased share of the world market 
prices of cocoa to farmers, in tandem with an accompanying increase in world 
prices for cocoa (ibid.).  
The sector’s inability to significantly increase productivity caused Ghana to 
become a net agricultural importer of primary foods and agro-processing prod-
ucts (excluding cocoa) (ibid.). Agricultural commodities which traditionally have 
been produced in Ghana are not able to compete with imported goods. Hence, 
almost one-third of foreign exchange earned by cocoa exports is used to pay for 
imported foods and other agricultural products. The increasing demand for 
meat, rice, and processed food, which, according to Kolavalli et al. (ibid.), is a 
result of growing urbanization and an emergent middling class, is increasingly 
met by imports. It is crucial to note that Ghana’s agricultural production is carried 
out predominantly on smallholder farms (Kolavalli et al. 2012: 7). As one of the in-
terviewees put it:  
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We don’t even have plantations to farm cocoa. We grow cocoa on sub-
sistence basis (A15, interviewed 16/11/2012).   
This situation is linked to Ghana’s land tenure system. It vests the rights of land 
ownership in the hands of traditional authorities so that different customary laws 
apply to specific localities (Kolavalli et al. 2012: 7). This situation is said to hamper 
the ability of investors to acquire large tracts of land and hence large scale com-
mercial agriculture (ibid.). As a result, small-scale rural cocoa farmers continue to 
form the backbone of Ghana’s domestic productive entrepreneurs. Since these 
actors tend to be scattered in the rural areas, mobilization amongst cocoa farmers 
remains limited, just like their ability to accumulate capital on a larger scale. 
So far the Ghanaian state and Ghana’s modern political elite continue to 
exercise control over Ghana’s cocoa export including the distribution of its earn-
ings through the Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD). COCOBOD is the central 
government agency responsible for the development of the cocoa sector and is 
set up as an (export) monopsony. Besides fixing the buying price for cocoa in 
Ghana, COCOBOD manages almost all aspects of the internal cocoa marketing 
process and maintains a monopoly on the export of Ghanaian cocoa. While the 
internal marketing of cocoa has been liberalized through the establishment of 
Licensed Buying Companies (LBCs), it needs to be pointed out that the Ghana-
ian government issues these licenses and has, therefore, significant allocation 
power within the sector. Commissioned LBCs who bought their cocoa from co-
coa farmers sell their cocoa to domestic industries for local processing or – and 
that is the most substantial part of the crop – to COCOBOD as Ghana’s legally 
established single buyer of Ghanaian cocoa beans for export. As a major pur-
chaser of cocoa beans and Ghana’s only exporter, COCOBOD has substantial 
control over the domestic cocoa market; assigning the Ghanaian state a crucial 
role within the agricultural sector.   
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Industry 
The share of Ghana’s industrial sector regarding GDP contribution has re-
mained relatively constant since independence with about 25%. One key sub-
sector in Ghana’s industry is mining, dominated by gold-mining. Besides the 
export of cocoa and since 2010 oil, gold is one of Ghana’s main foreign-
currency earners. In addition to paying a significant share of Ghana’s import bill, 
mineral royalties, income tax from those working within the sector and corporate 
tax contribute considerably to government’s revenue. Another important branch 
in Ghana’s extractive industries is the emerging oil sector (see Kastning 2011: 
7). In July 2007, Tullow Oil and Kosmos Energy discovered oil in commercial 
quantities in offshore fields on the coast of Ghana’s Western region. Oil produc-
tion started in 2010 and has since then added to government revenues, even 
though much less than expected (Looney 2014). With several government par-
astatals – like the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC), which has a 
monopoly on the importation of crude oil, and the Tema Oil Refinery – the state 
is the sole wholesale supplier of petrol products to oil marketing companies in 
Ghana (see Whitfield 2011: 23). 
Most countries which have achieved rapid economic growth did so because of 
an expansion of industrial activities, especially in the manufacturing sector (see 
Kolavalli et al. 2012: 7). Even though Ghana rose up to a lower-middle income sta-
tus at the end of 2010, manufacturing was not the driver of Ghana’s growth since 
1992. Despite a few policy initiatives aimed at developing this subsector, 
manufacturing remains small regarding contribution to GDP. Existing firms are 
mainly involved with agriculture-related activities, including food and wood pro-
cessing as well as textiles (Kolavalli et al. 2012: 9).  
The largest subsector in Ghana’s industrial sector is construction which is in 
general non-traded and has much weaker links to the rest of the economy than 
manufacturing. Since the construction sector has been significantly driven by 
infrastructure developments which are commissioned by the state, strong de-
pendencies exist between this sub-sector and the state (see section 5.1.3). As a 
result, the Ghanaian state also occupies a decisive role within the industrial sec-
tor of the economy.    
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Services 
Since the early 2000s, the service sector has replaced agriculture as the most 
important one and makes up almost 50% of the Ghana’s GDP (see annex figure 
9.2.6). In that regard, there has been a modest structural shift. Ghana's service 
sector is dominated by public services and domestic-oriented private services, 
meaning these services are mainly consumed domestically (Kolavalli et al. 2012: 
11). Only a small proportion of the service sector is export related – earns foreign 
currency – such as luxury hotels and restaurants providing services to foreigners. 
Government services, such as administration, health, education and housing, 
have for many decades accounted for the service sector’s GDP growth (Kolavalli 
et al. 2012: 12). Although the state has withdrawn significantly from direct in-
volvement in house production and financing, as well as the communications sec-
tor, as part of liberalization measures (see ibid.), the state still carries significant 
weight in Ghana’s service sector based on the significance of public services. 
Regarding employment, the service sector, and more precisely the sub-
sector of wholesale and retail, provides, after agriculture, most jobs (see GSS 
2012: 75). Typical jobs in the service sector include amongst others market 
seller (numerous Ghanaian market women), petty trader, street vendor, tro tro 
and taxi driver, individuals working in chop bars or barber shops. Many of these 
jobs are, just like in the agricultural sector, in private informal settings. Most 
formal employment is provided by the state:  
The proportion of the population working for wages in the private sec-
tor remains small; the government is still the largest employer of wage 
labour (Owusu 2009: 22).  
According to Sandefur (2010: 20), the growth of micro-enterprises in the 
service and manufacturing sector has accounted for most of the gross and net 
job creation between 1987–2003 (Sandefur 2010: 20). Similar to Ghana’s cocoa 
farmers in the agricultural sector, these micro-enterprises tend not to grow into 
medium or large-scale companies over time (ibid.). This characteristic illustrates 
once again that capital accumulation amongst Ghana’s private entrepreneurs 
remains limited. Sandefur (2010: 20) notes that 
[…] in Ghana […] small enterprises die early and small. Conversely, big 
firms don’t represent successful micro-entrepreneurs that have risen 
through the ranks of smaller firms. Rather, big firms are born big.  
In brief, even though the service sector has replaced agriculture in terms of 
GDP contribution, the agricultural sector remains, with the production of Ghana’s 
third largest export product cocoa, and because it is still the country’s prime 
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labour sector, crucial. Small-scale cocoa farmers continue to be Ghana’s central 
domestic productive entrepreneurs. Capital accumulation amongst them remains 
limited. The country’s extractive industries related to gold and oil are, together 
with cocoa exports, Ghana’s largest foreign-currency earners and vital for paying 
Ghana’s growing import bill. With the state leading the service sector; its role in 
the cocoa and oil market and being a significant customer of the construction 
sector, the Ghanaian state continues to carry heavy weight in the economic 
sphere; or as Owusu (2009: 41) puts it:   
The state is […] deeply involved directly or indirectly in most economic 
activities, often controlling the commanding heights of the economy.  
 
5.1.3 Relationship between political and economic sphere: Ghana’s politi-
cal economy 
Compared to Ghana’s immediate post-independence settlement, efforts have 
been undertaken by both dominant political parties to shift the state’s role in the 
economic sphere to the benefit of the private sector (see Tangri 1992: 97). Dur-
ing its early years, the attitude of Rawlings’ regime has been rather antagonistic 
or even hostile towards domestic capitalists (see chapter six). However, the fact 
that the international community – and in particular IMF and World Bank – pro-
vided vital “policy rents” (see Hutchful 2002a: 165) financing Rawlings’ ruling 
coalition and the Ghanaian state, set in motion the implementation of liberal 
economic reforms. The resulting divestiture of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
particularly in the mining (gold) industry, reduced the role of the state in 
economic production and trading activities. In fact, the share of the private sec-
tor in GDP exceeded that of the public one by 1991 (Tangri 1992: 97). However, 
the structural outline of Ghana’s economy has shown that the state remains 
highly influential the economic sphere.75  
While Ghana’s divestiture programme has been praised by the international 
community for rolling back the state and strengthening the private sector; in 
practice, the reforms have not led to a fundamental structural shift. For the NDC 
used the programme as a major avenue to create an independent economic 
base for itself. It sold SOEs to chosen regime members, their relatives or PNDC 
supporters (Opoku 2010: 152-153; Hutchful 2002a: 223). B.A. Mensah claimed in 
an interview with Opoku (2010: 147):  
                                            
75
 The establishment of the state-owned GNPC which is running the emerging oil industry has re-
strengthened the state’s role in the economic sphere.  
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The P/NDC decimated the fledgling private sector out of jealousy and 
greed only to replace it a decade later with a political party-based private 
sector composed of those who had organised the coup.  
In this context, the Ahwoi brothers, who form one of the poles of power within 
the NDC today, have been referred to as an example illustrating this process 
(Whitfield 2011: 24). Before entering politics, the Ahwoi brothers were all civil 
servants with no business background (Opoku 2010: 147). In the course of the 
privatization of Ghana’s internal cocoa marketing business, their company 
Cashpro was amongst one of the six firms initially granted a license to buy co-
coa beans (Whitfield 2011: 24; Opoku 2010: 148). While Cashpro as Licensed 
Buying Agent (LBA) had to sell the cocoa to state-owned COCOBOD, Cashpro 
and other LBAs received concessionary loans with moderate interests from 
COCOBOD for their operations (Opoku 2010: 148). Several reports speculated 
that Cashpro, which was (despite other publicly announced plans) the only 
company contracted to undertake a cocoa output plan in 2000, operated as an 
arm of the NDC’s rural political machine, just like the Cocoa Purchasing Com-
pany did under Nkrumah (Oelbaum 2002: 303). According to Africa Confidential 
(2004; 2002), Cashpro was a major financier of the NDC party and owed in the 
early 2000s millions of dollars in unpaid loan advances (see also Whitfield 2011: 
25). Based on their access to state resources, the Ahwoi brothers managed to 
expand their business, so that it spans today also a waste disposal firm main-
tained by a lucrative contract with Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA); a hotel 
in the Central region and a haulage company called Comstrans. According to 
Opoku (2010: 147), the Ahwoi brothers furthermore own large parts of land with 
which they plan to enter Ghana’s real estate market. 
 Further examples illustrating that the privatization of SOEs served as a path 
for political elites to enter or anchor themselves amongst the country’s economic 
elite are the following: Nana Rawlings bought several SOEs through Caridem 
Corporation which is a subsidiary organization of the 31st December Women's 
Movement (DWM). The former First Lady is said to be the owner of for example 
GIHOC Cannery, GNTC Bakeries, GIHOC Brick and Tile, GNTC Supermarket 
and the former State Transport Corporation (Opoku 2010: 148). The family of 
Peter Peperah, ex-Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry, bought Mim Timbers 
through the divestiture process – afterward renamed Scanstyle, a timber and 
wood processing company (Opoku 2010: 153). And Kojo Tsikata, Rawlings’ for-
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mer national security chief, became the owner of Gold Coast Motors and holds 
assets of GIHOC, an Accra-based distilleries company (ibid.). While Ghanaians 
close to the P/NDC bought the bulk of divested SOEs – 169 of 212 (~79%) – 
these were mainly small-scale companies whose value accounted for about 10% 
of the total value of sales (Appiah-Kubi 2001: 222). Hence divestiture in Ghana 
did benefit above all foreign capital (Opoku 2010: 152).   
Despite some withdrawal of the state from the economic sphere through 
privatization, Ghana’s political and economic spheres continue to overlap 
strongly. On the one hand, this is the case because of the state’s prominent role 
within all economic sectors as outlined above. This structure leads to the fact 
that the state remains the crucial source for capital accumulation and allocation 
of resources. Therefore, as Owusu (2009: 13) states:  
The extractive view of politics [….] remains a dominant feature of our 
[Ghanaian, JR] political culture.  
It goes in hand with a widespread perception in Ghana that  
politics is all about making money (CDD-Ghana 2005: 25; see as well 
Ashiagbor 2005: 3).  
An interviewee summarized the issue as follows: 
In 2008 the shape of this economy was much smaller than we have 
now, in terms of the opportunities there is oil now. Whoever controls 
that oil sits on big money. Foreign direct investment is increasing. No 
doubt in 2013 housing is gonna become a major issue. There is the op-
portunity to build more housing. Education is gonna become a major 
issue. So we can see the country sits on the cut of an expansion, so 
who controls that expansion. So everybody wants this. They want it not 
because I just wanna be President. They want it because they see what 
the opportunities are and they would like to ride those opportunities 
(A15, interviewed 16/11/2012). 
In fact, the interlocutor conceptualized the consequence of the structural constel-
lation between Ghana’s political and economic sphere as “merchant politics”:  
In Ghana today there is something what we like to call merchant poli-
tics. Invest your time, a little bit of money, and then you get a good po-
sition.  If you are able to break the odds and come to power… If you 
help the party to come to power by being aggressive, by being the guy 
who will die for the party you get a position. You become a deputy min-
ister; they put you on a board somewhere. That’s how you make some 
money, you solidify yourself, and then you become an MP. So that’s 
the merchant, you think like a commercial businessman. You invest 
time and energy, you go out and take the risk, and when the party 
comes to power it rewards you, and when it rewards you, you have the 
opportunity to do this. […] Young people have seen it is quite profita-
ble, it is a merchant industry. There are enough positions to sort out 
everybody, and the winner takes all. […]  There are people who came 
straight from school and went into positions without having had any 
experience in managing people. Ghana runs an executive presidency 
and that executive presidency rewards the system of patronage. 
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So we have what in Ghana we call the Oboro, the big man, and then he 
is the patron, and he rewards everybody. Now, the fundamental flaw 
with this system is that it is occasioned by the constitution and the 
constitution at the time was tailor fitted for President Rawlings. So they 
gave him overriding powers. He could say anything.  
If he sneezed, Ghana could go to war. After eight years they realized ok 
[…] I am sure President Kufuor came and realized woowww how bril-
liant this constitution, I mean not as abrasive or empowering, but I 
would certainly like to live in this constitution. So then President Atta 
Mills comes and says you know this is beautiful but can we make a few 
changes to the constitution. So he set up a constitution restructuring 
review committee, and they brought recommendations. Unfortunately, 
nothing has been changed; nobody has touched them. It’s not always 
when you as the President want something the party would agree with 
you cos of positions (A15, interviewed 16/11/2012). 
The continuing strongly pronounced interwovenness between Ghana’s polit-
ical and economic sphere is based on the fact that key domestic entrepreneurs 
are largely intertwined with the modern political elite. Their relationship was 
firmly characterized by interdependency. Private business tends to be 
politicized and patronage-orientated (Booth et al. 2005: 5). This means the 
existing private sector is quite dependent on the state (Whitfield 2011: 13) since 
the state is the primary source of giving away large contracts for example for 
construction companies (building infrastructures such as roads, schools, clinics 
or housing, etc.) but also printing jobs, or IT infrastructure. To acquire these 
contracts enabling larger capital accumulation, access to the state or close ties 
to the ruling elite is key.  
This interlinkage was illustrated in 2012 by the Woyome scandal. Alfred 
Woyome, a known NDC financier, and businessman, claimed to have had a con-
tract with the Ghanaian state to rehabilitate football stadia before Ghana hosted 
the Africa Cup of Nations in 2008 (Africa Confidential 2012c). In 2009, Woyome 
managed to convince the (new) NDC government that his contract had been 
illegally canceled by the Kufuor administration. Therefore, Woyome sought finan-
cial compensation through the judiciary which granted and paid him rather quickly 
a sum of 58 million Cedis (approx. US$34,5 million) as judgment debt (Africa 
Confidential 2012a).With the 2012 elections approaching, critical voices ques-
tioned why the NDC government had paid, apparently quite willingly, such a large 
sum out of state finances. Soon rumours resonated that several NDC members 
were deeply entangled in the affair of their party’s financier. In particular former 
Attorney-General, Betty Mould Iddrisu soiled her reputation in the course of the 
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scandal.76 At the beginning of 2015, Woyome was discharged by a court ruling. It 
remains to point out that the NPP also is said to have benefited financially from 
Woyome’s largesse (Africa Confidential 2012c). Moreover, it seems reasonable 
to assume that Kobla Mensah Woyome, brother of Alfred Woyome, has received 
support from his sibling to win the parliamentary seat for the NDC in South Tungu 
in the Volta region in 2008 and to recapture it in 2012 (see Radio XYZ 2013).  
The politicization of private business is a key challenge (Booth et al. 2005: 
5-6). Some Ghanaian businesses have become associated with either the NDC 
or the NPP (Booth et al. 2005: 6). According to Opoku (2010: 108-120; 147) the 
following Ghanaian entrepreneurs were/are known to be aligned with the NPP: 
Akenten Appiah-Menkah, former owner of Apino soap (Opoku 2010: 118-119); 
Kwame Donkoh Fordwor, owner of KAS Products Ltd., a quarry company and a 
mining interest (Opoku 2010: 114); Benjamin Amponsah Mensah (former) 
owner of International Tobacco Ghana Ltd. (Opoku 2010: 97 and 109); Justice 
Atta Addision owner of Multi-Wall Paper Sacks (MWPS) and Takoradi Beach 
Hotel as well as shareholder of the cement manufacturer GHACEM (Opoku 
2010: 115; see as well Takoradi Beach Hotel 2001); Kwadwo Gyamfi, owner of 
a pharmaceutical company; and S.C. Appenteng former owner of Vacuum Salt 
Products Ltd. (Opoku 2010: 113-114). Notably, besides NPP party elders, cur-
rent leading NPP party members are well-established entrepreneurs as well. To 
name a few: the NPP’s Second National Vice-Chairperson, Sammy Crabbe, is, 
for example, the founder of Omanye Money and shareholder of Ghana Interna-
tional Airlines Ltd. (Saji 2013). Also, high-ranking chiefs like the Asantehene 
and Okyenhene form part of the Ghanaian business elite. They dispose of sub-
stantial capital and investment potential (Crook 2005: 5). 
Similarly the NDC has aligned entrepreneurs such as the already mentioned 
Ahwoi brothers (Cashpro), Nana Rawlings (Caridem Cooperation) (now NDP), 
Peter Peperah (Mim Timbers/Scanstyle) and Alfred Woyome, owner of Anator 
Holdings Company Ltd., parent company of Stewise Anator Company Ltd. and 
Anator Construction Company Ltd. (Anator Holding 2011). Moreover, Edward 
Annan who owns EA Group Ltd; Masai Developers Ltd. and Masai Computer 
Services Ltd. (MCS); Kate Quartey-Papafio, owner of Reroy Cables Limited and 
Tony Oteng-Gyasi, owner of Sub-Saharan Cable and Conductor Ltd. (TCCL), 
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 Betty Mould Iddrisu is the wife of Alhaji Mahama Iddrisu, who served as Secretary of Transport 
and Communications in the PNDC regime (see chapter six). 
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can be regarded as entrepreneurs close to the NDC (see Annan 2015). While 
Annan was awarded procurement contracts that ensured him a near-monopoly 
on the supply of IT equipment to state institutions and a contract to rehabilitate 
Ghana’s main harbour at Tema (Opoku 2010: 157); both electrical cable 
manufacturing companies were amongst the three firms who were awarded 
contracts totalling GHC 80 million by the Ministry of Energy in 2011 to improve 
local participation in the energy sector (Agyemang 2011). In addition, Quartey-
Papafio has been appointed as board member of Ghana Infrastructure Invest-
ment Fund (GIIF) by Mahama in 2011 (Boadu 2015), and Oteng-Gyasi served as 
board chairman of Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG) under Mahama till 2014 
(The Al-Hajj 2013). 
The politicization of private business and the blurred distinction between 
politicians and entrepreneurs seems further fed by the numerous family ties 
running across Ghana’s political and economic sphere. Often the spouse, fa-
ther/mother, uncle/aunt, brother/sister or cousin is involved in politics whereas 
the son/daughter, spouse, niece/nephew, cousin or brother/sister takes care of 
the family business. For example, David Lamptey, former MP for the NDC in 
Korle Klottey in Greater Accra, founded together with his wife Gifty Lamptey 
Sidalco Ghana Ltd, a fertilizer company (Sidalco 2015), which has become one 
of West Africa’s largest fertilizer distributors used in particular in Ghana’s cocoa 
sector.77 Adwoa Safo, NPP-MP for Dome-Kwabenya constituency in Greater 
Accra is the daughter of Ghanaian entrepreneur Apostle Kwadwo Safo, owner 
of Great Kosa Company Ltd (Kantanka 2015; NPP 2015). The Kosa group has 
several sub-divisions, including firms in the transport, construction and quarry 
sector and is said to be registered with Ghana’s Ministry of Roads and 
Transport as well as the Ministry of Housing and Water Resources. The NPP 
primaries for the Dome-Kwabenya constituency in 2011 were also contested by 
Isaac Amofo, former NPP constituency organizer, and Mike Oquaye Jnr., who 
was sponsored by his father Mike Oquaye – former NPP-MP for the Dome-
Kwabenya constituency (Ghana News Agency 2011d). According to news re-
ports, Amofo claimed to have been disqualified from the 2011 NPP primaries for 
the Dome-Kwabenya parliamentary seat, because – contrary to the other two 
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 David Lamptey has also been CEO of Radio XYZ (Ghana News Agency 2013). After his death in 
2012, Gifty Lamptey, his wife, inherited the family business and is now the CEO of Sidalco (Good-
man AMC 2015). 
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contestants – his “father is not a big man or a party financier”. Reports quoted 
Amofo after his first defeat – he also lost the 2015 NPP primaries against sitting 
MP Safo (Adom online 2015) – stating that:  
I was asked by some of the members of the committee how I will fi-
nance my campaign and what my father brings on board 
(StarrFMonline 2015).
 
 
When in power, each party favours its entrepreneurial allies and discrimi-
nates against those of its opponents (Booth et al. 2005: 6). Hence the patterns 
of government-business relations remain patronage-oriented (ibid.) and play a 
decisive role regarding the issues of monetization of Ghanaian politics and party 
financing (see chapter four). Whitfield (2011: 13) refers to this as primitive capi-
tal accumulation and points out that most of this money is not channeled into 
productive activities. This might be the case, since quick returns from invest-
ments, or rather untied assets, are needed given a four-year electoral cycle. 
Interesting is, in any case, that many of Ghana’s larger companies tend to exist 
in economic sectors which can benefit from state contracts such as transport 
and logistics, construction and quarry, real estates, finance services, media 
houses, printing and infrastructure (in the broadest sense roads, cables, IT, 
etc.). Only a few prominent Ghanaian companies seem to exist in sectors which 
hardly rely on the state or links to SOE for access to inputs or contracts.78 Gha-
na’s merchant politics was furthermore described by an interviewee as follows:  
Even if you are not given a dire work appointment behind the scenes, 
you will be given contracts, constructing six housing blocks and you 
might not even be a constructor. So then you go and look for a 
constructor and give the person the contract and say, you know what, 
do this contract for me, I pay you this, or they give you supplies. We 
would need to change that system […], but we are not gonna do that. 
We would need to run for President. But here is the case Ghana is an 
evolving democracy, our democratic process is 20 years old, so we are 
looking at the opportunity of five elections, five. The first two only a 
few people understood it; the second two really opened our eyes, so 
we are evolving (A15, interviewed 16/11/2012).  
This entanglement of the private and public sector and its actors within both 
spheres continues until the lower-levels. Smaller local business men and wom-
en donate money to individuals running as MPs or DCEs. These businesses 
contribute money to individual campaigns, to be later rewarded with contracts 
for their companies or to enter business activities (B14 communication 
05/12/2012; B17 communication 2013). 
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 One of the few exceptions is Darko Farms, a poultry farm, owned by Kwabena Darko, who con-
tested the presidency in 1992 for the National Independence Party (NIP) (Opoku 2010: 116).  
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Let people decide who rules them on the local level. We have had situa-
tions where the two major political parties… when the NPP was in op-
position, they were going to elect DCEs. But that’s where they make all 
the money; they want loyalist people who will be loyal to them and not 
to the people. NDC also said in opposition we are going to elect DCEs. 
[…] The parliament is not really structured to throw spikes in the wheel 
of the executive. We have a very very strong executive presidency with 
much powers. That’s why the DCEs will never be voted. Because the 
President needs money, you know. Much contracts are from the dis-
tricts. The President needs people loyal to him (A15, interviewed 
16/11/2012).  
As much as certain branches of Ghana’s private sector depend on the state, 
the modern political elite and political parties depend on contributions from party 
supporters and businesses to run their increasingly expensive election campaigns 
(see chapter four; Asare 2013).79 Governments’ increased spending in the run-up 
to elections continues to characterize election times in Ghana (Booth et al. 2005: 
5). They are illustrated by electoral cycles of increased budget deficits (see chapter 
six) contributing to augment public debt. Since the Ghanaian law does not provide 
for direct public funding (see Nam-Katoti et al. 2011; Ayee et al. 2007: 7),80 Ghana 
has a long tradition of private financing of political parties (International IDEA 2012: 
11). Donations, kickbacks (toll-gating) on government contracts (10% commission 
levied on the value of awarded governments contracts) and funneling state 
resources through front organizations and voluntary groups affiliated with the ruling 
party in order to receive state subventions for allegedly doing useful and necessary 
community or welfare work, have been repeatedly identified as prime sources of 
political financing (see International IDEA 2012: 10; Ayee et al. 2007: 4). In connec-
tion with the 2012 electoral cycle, Ghana Youth Employment and Entrepreneurial 
Development (GYEEDA) and the Judgement Debt Commission were associated 
with the latter method of party financing (fieldwork observation 2012). A brief 
survey by the Ghanaian think tank Center for Democratic Development (CDD) 
(2005: 7) captures the interdependency of Ghana’s political and economic elite 
rather well: When asked for the reasons why they donated to political parties, 
respondents cited as first motive gaining personal favours (54%), as second 
kickbacks (31%) and third attaining political appointments (17%).  
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 During the 1992 elections neither foreigners nor private firms were allowed to contribute to party 
financing (Jeffries and Thomas 1993: 338). In response to both domestic and external pressures 
these restrictions were later revised (Opoku 2010: 110-111). Today corporate funding of political 
parties is permitted, if the company is registered in Ghana and ownership rests at least with 75% by 
Ghanaians (2000 Political Parties Act 23 (2)).  
80
 The state provides indirect funding by granting free airtime in the state-owned media and the EC 
provides vehicles for campaign purposes (International IDEA 2012: 11). 
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To sum up, Ghana’s modern political elite dominates the political sphere and 
tends to forge societal alliances around two main blocs: the NDC and NPP. As 
much as the modern political elite depends on the country’s business elite for 
funding highly competitive head-to-head elections, much of Ghana’s business 
sector depends on the state for business and hence capital accumulation. De-
spite successful efforts curbing the state’s role in the economy, in particular in 
the mining (gold) sector, the Ghanaian state continues to be an important actor 
in the economic sphere.  
Since the modern political and economic elite are largely intertwined, Gha-
na’s political and economic spheres continue to overlap, and their relationship is 
characterized by interdependency. By now both dominant parties dispose over 
solid financial bases backed by aligned domestic capitalists. A vigorous and 
independent non-partisan middle class is lacking. This is probably the case 
since the political elite will not have any interest in a more state-independent 
private sector. For it could dismantle the current symbiosis and create a new, 
possibly unpredictable centre of power, altering the current constellation of 
power to the disadvantage of the political elite. 
Ghana has few large-scale productive entrepreneurs. The recovering growth 
during the last two decades has come mainly from a multiplication of the number of 
small enterprises rather than from the upgrading of enterprises from small to medi-
um to large (Booth et al. 2005: 4). Most essential for financing the current settle-
ment including increasing imports are growing revenues from national resources 
such as cocoa, gold, and oil as well as foreign direct investments in the extractive 
industries. Revenues from the extractive economic sectors have grown since inter-
national prices developed favourably for Ghana and the production of these goods 
could be expanded. So the increase has not been achieved through improved 
productivity. In addition to these favourable conditions, Ghana’s ranking as a low, 
middle-income country since 2010 gives the state easier access to loans on the 
international financial markets, since Ghana’s creditworthiness has improved. Be-
sides, the donor’s need for an African success story seems to keep foreign aid 
continuously flowing.  
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5.2 Lower-level factions  
After the outline of Ghana’s higher-level factions in the political and economic 
sphere and their structural constellation with each other, the second part of this 
chapter focuses on the lower-level factions. It will analyse how Ghana’s higher-
level factions are linked to the lower-level ones through their role in the econom-
ic and cultural sphere. The cultural sphere is conceptualized – based on Gram-
sci – as a non-state sphere providing space for formal and informal collective 
action by which ideological hegemony is created within society. The cultural 
sphere captures the realm in which various societal groups voice and shape 
public opinion forming society’s dominant discourse. By also representing the 
space for political mobilization and competing ideas and norms in general, the 
cultural sphere is in itself inherently political. It is distinct from the political 
sphere which has been conceptualized in this thesis first and foremost by state 
institutions.81   
 
5.2.1 Economic sphere 
Amongst Ghana’s lower-level factions, farmers, and in particular the Southern-
based cocoa farmers, as primary productive entrepreneurs represent an im-
portant pillar for financing Ghana’s current political settlement. With cocoa ex-
ports being a significant foreign currency earner, the farmers continue to contrib-
ute significantly to paying the increasing import bill. Growing urbanization as well 
as a growing middling class – which can afford to consume beyond the bare 
necessities, yet does not necessarily build up domestic savings enabling more 
investments in the domestic private sector – have led to an increasing demand 
for goods, including food products, which are met by imports (see Kolavalli et al. 
2012: 6). Besides funding the augmented consumption of primarily urban areas, 
Ghana’s agricultural sector and hence the rural areas are still the dominant sector 
with regards to employment. In Brong-Ahafo, the Volta as well as the three 
Northern regions, more than half of the labour force works in agriculture (see 
GSS 2012: 75). Also in the Western (47%), Central (42%), Eastern (45%) and 
Ashanti regions (30%), the sector carries significant weight concerning employ-
ment (ibid.). To maintain electoral support from these areas and to safeguard this 
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 See as well Whitfield’s (2002) distinction between civil society as process in contrast to civil socie-
ty as idea. 
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financing mechanism of the current settlement, higher-level factions need to en-
sure the profitability of the agricultural sector and cocoa production in particular.  
Chiefs, family heads or – in the Northern regions – tindaana continue to control 
and manage land, if not legally then in practice (Crook 2005: 2). With Ghana’s 
main economic productions – cocoa farming, mining, and oil extraction – being 
highly dependent and linked to land as a production factor, traditional rulers contin-
ue to carry weight in the economic sphere. While the scattered small-scale farmers 
are vital for financing the settlement, they are not leading Ghana’s economic 
sphere. As outlined above a symbiosis of modern political and economic elites is 
taking on this leadership role. Due to the current constellation in Ghana’s cultural 
sphere, however, Ghana’s cocoa farmers, and hence rural areas, have gained rel-
ative strength compared to previous times. 
 
5.2.2. Cultural sphere 
For a complete picture of Ghana’s current constellation of powers, the cultural 
sphere is crucial besides the political and economic one. Following Gramsci, it 
represents the space for competing and conflicting ideas and norms which are 
upheld, proposed and pushed for by various organized societal groups and rep-
resents the source of legitimation of state power. Within its realm, different orga-
nized actors strive to impact on public opinion which is about organizing consent 
and hegemony within society (see chapter two; also Whitfield 2002: 51).  Previ-
ous Ghanaian regimes have either monopolized the mobilization of societal 
groups leading to stifling the cultural sphere by the state’s firm control over it 
(Nkrumah) or pursued selective corporatist modes of politics (Acheampong) 
causing the exclusion of particular forces from political participation (see chapter 
three). In contrast, Ghana’s current settlement is characterized by a re-opened 
cultural sphere providing room for the formation of mobilized societal groups, ar-
ticulation of diverse public opinion and competition of ideas and social forces.  
During Ghana’s 2012 electoral cycle the media, think tanks, churches, 
traditional leaders, CSOs including the Trade Union Congress (TUC), Ghana 
Bar Association (GBA), Ghana National Association of Teachers (GNAT), 
diverse student associations, women’s and youth groups as well as local and 
international NGOs were influential in terms of impacting on public opinion and 
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mobilizing for political support.82 The following sections will sketch the role of a 
few selected groups of actors before moving on to abstracting (1) the relation-
ship of Ghana’s lower-level factions to its higher ones and (2) the power dynam-
ics between Ghana’s lower-level factions.   
 
Media 
Ghana’s current media scene is very vibrant and provides citizens with infor-
mation and diverse opinion through newspapers, TV stations and hundreds of 
FM stations broadcasting in English and local languages. FM stations represent 
the most widely used form of media, reaching most citizens in urban and rural 
areas (Bowen 2010: 40). Therefore, radio stations are essential for official mass 
communication and shaping public discourse. Talk shows like “Alhaji and Alhaji” 
(Radio Gold), “Current Affairs” (Joy FM), “Good Morning” (Oman FM) enable 
political discussions and participation of citizens through phone-ins (Nwokeafor 
et al. 2013: 208). Politicians and other opinion leaders are invited to the shows 
to discuss current topics whereby the guests tend to side with one of the domi-
nant parties (see chapter four). Often these debates occur in a highly emotional-
ly charged atmosphere characterized by the use of inflammatory language, oc-
casionally even leading to physical assaults between arguing guests (see chap-
ter four; also Nwokeafor et al. 2013: 208). Moreover, regular television 
programmes like “Agenda” (TV3), “Good Morning Ghana” (Metro TV) and the 
“Breakfast Show” (GTV) enable discussions on various political topics providing 
the means for political parties to communicate their stances to the voters.  
Similar to the overlap of Ghana’s modern political and economic elite, there 
also exists an entanglement with the media. Numerous politicians own FM sta-
tions and publishing houses. As mentioned before Freddie Blay (NPP) owns 
Western Publication Ltd. which publishes, amongst others, the Daily Guide. 
Kennedy Agyepong, sitting NPP MP for Assin Central, is main shareholder of 
Kencity Media, home of radio stations Oman and Ash FM as well as of the TV 
broadcaster Net2. The Statesman, one of Ghana’s oldest newspapers, used to 
be owned by Akufo-Addo who is said to have sold it after the 2008 elections to 
his cousin Ken Offori-Atta and Keli Gadzepko (Daily Democrat 2009). Kwesi 
Twum is the founder and CEO of Ghana’s most significant private media con-
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 This has been illustrated for example by the issue of introducing BVV and society’s response 
to ethnic voter mobilizing (see chapter four). 
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sortium, Multimedia Group Limited which hosts the radio stations Joy FM, 
Asempa, Adom, Hitz, Nhyira, and Luv as well as MultiTV. Pro-NDC media claim 
the company with its affiliated media outlets is close to the Akyem faction of the 
NPP (see Mensah 2013). 
Also, the NDC disposes of its loyal media. The Palaver, Daily Democrat, 
Enquirer, and Lens are just a few papers regarded as pro-NDC. Word has it that 
the well-known Accra-based FM station Radio Gold is partly owned by the 31st 
December Women’s Movement and hence indirectly controlled by Nana Rawl-
ings (Dotse 2012). Moreover, ahead of the 2012 elections one of Ghana’s most 
important TV stations, TV3 Network Ltd., was said to have been sold to high-
ranking NDC members (see Statesman 2011). While the Statesman (2011) 
claimed Kofi Totobi Kwakye, a leading member of the NDC, was instrumental in 
the reacquisition of TV3 Limited, others suspect the Ahwoi brothers as owners 
of Media General Ghana Ltd. The fact that Stella Ageypong (Wilson), CEO of 
Kencity Media and wife of Ken Ageypong, decried illegal jamming and 
interferences of broadcasts of Net2 TV, Oman and Ash FM during the 
electioneering period (Daily Guide 2012b), indicates as well that Ghana’s 
political elite regard the media as an important means for shaping national 
discourse and mobilizing for electoral support.  
 
Think tanks  
Besides media outlets, think tanks like IEA, CDD, IDEG and IMANI have be-
come prominent actors throughout Ghana’s Fourth Republic influencing and 
facilitating public debate. Ahead of the 2012 elections IEA organized Ghana’s 
First Presidential as well as Vice Presidential Debates Series in cooperation 
with Ghanaian media and funded by STAR-Ghana. The events intended to fos-
ter policy dialogue which was accomplished with limitations. The chosen format 
of a rather exclusive event, gave the impression policy debate was mainly initi-
ated amongst the elite, but not amidst the common citizens.  
Ghanaian think tanks are also involved in policy formulation or at least provid-
ing input for it (Cudjoe 2015). IEA and IDEG are highly active in organizing 
events facilitating dialogue between the different, often competing stakeholders. 
These include, for example, the discussion of electoral reforms, post-election re-
views and peace programmes such as the signing of the Kumasi Declaration 
(see chapter four) (Ghana News Agency 2014). Some think tanks take on the 
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role of “non-partisan watchdogs”. During the 2012 electoral cycle, CDD continued 
its efforts to forge an inclusive and broad coalition amongst citizens observing the 
elections as part of Ghana’s largest domestic alliances of election observers 
CODEO. It recruited observers from a broad range of organized social groups.83 
Like many Ghanaian CSOs, think tanks tend to depend financially however on 
foreign funding. Most receive funds from the international donor community and 
rely on good connections of their founding members to policymakers, business 
leaders and international financial institutions for resource mobilization to support 
their activities (see IEA 2014).   
 
Traditional leaders 
Ghana’s traditional rulers play a vital part in the realm of voter mobilization during 
election times (see chapter four and five). Due to their ubiquity and a general hi-
erarchical structure, they need to be mentioned as well in the outline of Ghana’s 
influential lower-level factions. Moreover, their role in voter mobilization rests on 
their social authority, or what Crook (2005: 2) calls “cultural leadership” assigning 
them a significant place in Ghana’s cultural sphere. While the presence of their 
cultural leadership is beyond dispute, it is hard to determine its basis or roots. 
Orvis (2001: 25) argues that African cultural spheres are characterized by the 
predominant norm of community or reciprocal obligation. It manifests itself in a 
persistently contested sense of mutual obligation under which members of the 
elite are expected to use and share their success to improve the community as a 
whole (ibid.). Following Nugent (2010: 57-63), this can be conceptualized as 
Ghana’s “productive social contract” between higher and lower-level factions 
which is built around state-led economic development and the promise of im-
proved education, health, and infrastructure. One interlocutor stated:  
When you work in the public sector, society expects so much from you 
(B17 personal communications 07/2015). 
Orvis’ reasoning resonates in Chabal’s (2009: 43) critique of liberal thinking 
which considers individuals as the sole building blocks of societies. Traditional 
rulers embody and represent a crucial pillar of the sense of community in Gha-
na. At the grassroots level, they unite an individual’s place of origin and identity 
together to the notion of community. While individuals’ identity is shaped by 
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multifaceted relations, the place of origin remains the primary marker of com-
munity and hence identity.  
The prominent role of traditional rulers at the local level who are by trend 
elderly is further enhanced by the fact that there exists the predominant norm of 
age determining one’s social position. Old age goes in hand with an individual’s 
higher place in the social hierarchy and strengthens an individual’s social au-
thority. Based on the prevalence of these two predominant norms, traditional 
rulers continue to enjoy popular legitimacy (Logan 2013: 357 and 365) solidify-
ing their influential role within Ghana’s cultural sphere.  
 
Organized faith-based organizations 
Another group of actors highly visible during Ghana’s 2012 electoral cycle were 
organized faith groups. They impacted on the national discourse in particular be-
fore and after the polls. In 2011 the Catholic Bishop’s Conference supported the 
opposition’s call for introducing BVV in their conference’s communique (see 
chapter four). Since pro-BVV voices gained more weight and eventually dominat-
ed the cultural sphere backed by international donors, the NDC government gave 
in, and BVV became an integral part of the electoral reform agenda for 2012. In 
the immediate pre- and post-election time religious leaders furthermore made 
ostentatious use of their social influence to appease rising tensions (see chapter 
four). Their cultural leadership is also reflected by their significant representation 
on Ghana’s National Peace Council. Out of twelve seats, five are filled by various 
religious leaders with Emmanuel Asante, Bishop of Ghana’s Methodist Church, 
being its Chairman. With their physical presence and the fact that faith-based 
groups play a significant role in the life of most Ghanaian citizens in urban and 
rural areas, organized religious groups, Christian as well as Muslim, have the 
capacity to reach huge parts of the population. Their prominent role within Gha-
na’s cultural sphere can also be traced back to numerous and strong church-
state partnerships in education. While this endows faith-based organizations with 
a significant capacity to mobilize, in 2012 religious leaders used their social influ-
ence first and foremost in a conciliatory rather than openly partisan way. Reli-
gious affiliation to some extent cuts across ethnic boundaries in Ghana, even 
though this might be limited to a predominantly Christian South and Muslim 
North.  
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Other CSOs and international influence 
In 2012 Ghana’s cultural sphere had also been characterized by numerous ad-
vocacy and organized professional collective actors. Many CSOs in Ghana re-
ceive substantial amounts of their funding – in particular for election-related pro-
jects – from external actors. STAR-Ghana, for example, is a multi-donor pooled 
funding mechanism supported by DFID, DANIDA, EU and USAID aiming at 
strengthening Ghanaian civil society. The organization provided substantial 
support for diverse election-related projects in 2012 organized and implemented 
amongst others by Blogging Ghana; IDEG; IEA; Legal Resource Centre (LRC); 
National Catholic Secretariat for Ghana Catholic Bishop’s Conference; the ARK 
Foundation; West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP); Media 
Foundation for West Africa; Christian Council of Ghana and Ghana’s 
Independent Broadcasters Association (GIBA).84 It is hard to assess whether 
the vast number of peace campaigns, concerts and projects was mainly driven 
by a Ghanaian felt need for them or possibly represented an adaptive response 
of CSOs to access available resources from abroad. Either way, external actors 
indirectly shaped the national discourse by providing funds for local actors and 
occasionally contributing to the discourse directly through statements for exam-
ple on BVV or poster campaigns (see chapter four).  
Other notable CSOs were organized groups coalescing around professions 
such as teachers, lawyers, or students. Equally important were women and, in 
particular, youth groups of parties. These (professional) horizontal-interest-groups 
formed in Ghana during the colonial period and are said to be more frequent and 
powerful than in most other African countries (Booth et al. 2005: 3). However, 
their power lies predominantly within their mobilizing capacity cutting across eth-
nic identities in mostly urban settings (see Orvis 2001: 23 for organized CSOs 
having few roots in rural areas). This capacity makes them attractive and signifi-
cant components of a system for dispensing state patronage in exchange for po-
litical loyalty (ibid.). Moreover, horizontal-interest-groups complement the reper-
toire for political mobilization with recourse to traditional leaders and ethnic identi-
ties. Most of these horizontal-interest-groups represent professions closely linked 
to the public sector and hence the state (teachers, nurses, doctors, midwives, 
students). While members of these organized groups might share similar socio-
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economic positions within society adding to a growing middling class, these 
groups do not occupy the same functional role as the middle class in industrial-
ized societies. Industrialization created a politicized societal fault line between 
capital and labour in Northern societies. Due to different historical experiences 
class differences are however much less deep and sharp in Ghana. While mem-
bership in horizontal-interest-groups adds another dimension to Ghanaian’s iden-
tity, with only a minority of urbanites sharing affiliations to professional associa-
tions, class is not (yet) a salient societal cleavage in Ghana.  
 
Two main points characterize the relationship of Ghana’s lower-level factions to 
the elite. Regarding financing, Ghana’s current political settlement the country’s 
small-scale cocoa farmers, and hence rural areas, are of vital importance. The 
revenue from cocoa exports generates substantial foreign currency and thereby 
contributes significantly to paying the increasing import bill driven mainly by 
growing urban consumption. As a consequence, to maintain electoral support 
from these areas and to safeguard this financing mechanism, the profitability of 
the agricultural sector and cocoa production, in particular, needs to be ensured 
by higher-level factions. This setup, in combination with the constellation of 
forces in Ghana’s cultural sphere, gives significant weight to the rural areas.   
Today Ghana’s cultural sphere is shaped by an elite consensus on building 
and promoting Ghana as “liberal state”. The liberalization of Ghana’s polity in the 
1990s has (re)opened and provided room for an expansion of the cultural sphere. 
The return to multi-party democracy, in combination with Ghana’s given ethno-
demographic composition and predominant norm of reciprocal obligation, has 
created a highly competitive system for Ghana’s higher-level factions. It forces 
political elites to vie for voters along horizontal, though also mainly vertical identi-
ty lines by dispensing patronage in exchange for political support. As a result, 
Ghana’s current political settlement is characterized by competitive electoral cli-
entelism. This situation, in turn, enables lower-level factions – at least once in a 
while – to put pressure on higher-level ones to deliver with regards to articulated 
demands. During the 2012 election cycle a Ghanaian newspaper reported: 
[…] [NDC MP] Lamptey was handling a road project at Haatso to ap-
pease taxi drivers who had threatened to vote against the NDC if the 
Haasto-Ecomog road was not fixed (Ghana Nation 2012).  
Orvis (2001: 27) regards reciprocal obligation as a mechanism – however im-
perfect – of both political participation and accountability for lower-level factions. 
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A Ghanaian interlocutor acknowledged the lower-level factions’ position about 
Ghana’s elite as follows:  
People want to blame the politicians, but it is us the people who are 
milking the system (B17 personal communications 07/2015) 
Due to the fact that Ghanaian society is highly fragmented along its dominant soci-
etal fissures, patronage is not only disbursed through networks along ethnic lines 
to ensure electoral support. To maximise patronage effects and hence support 
from citizens in ethnically fragmented communities, Ghana’s political elite also re-
sorts to a sort of “community-oriented developmental patrimonialism”. The provi-
sion of public goods such as infrastructure, education and health care, etc. is used 
by the political elite to achieve this aim. The benefits from the provision of these 
goods cut across ethnic lines and thereby benefit the maximum number of poten-
tial voters (see chapter four). Besides the example of the Haatso road project 
above, an interviewee captured this as follows:  
He supported the NDC since Jerry’s time, but I have managed to con-
vince him since the last two years, and now he is no longer an NDC or-
ganizer. He saw he was not getting anything from the NDC. He was just 
wasting his time, clapping, singing and paying for them, and he didn’t 
get anything, you understand. When somebody is bringing free educa-
tion that means he also benefits if the party doesn’t give him money, 
his children will benefit (A13, interviewed 07/11/2012). 
Overall Ghana’s higher-level factions depend on political support from the lower-
level ones. The highly fragmented nature of Ghanaian society along with its 
central politicized social fault line ethnicity forces the elite into competition for 
lower-level support. This situation strengthens the position of ordinary citizens. 
While urban areas have at their disposal a higher mobilizing capacity enabling 
them putting pressure on the elite, Ghana’s rural population is not only key for 
electoral victory regarding numbers, but is also of vital economic importance for 
the financing and hence the maintenance of the current settlement.  
 
 
5.3 Chapter summary   
Ghana’s current political settlement as outlined in detail above represents a 
snapshot of the power relations in the country in 2012. The modern political elite 
dominates the political sphere and tends to forge societal alliances around two 
main blocs: the NDC and NPP. Regional-ethnic lines constitute, as dominant po-
liticized societal fissure, the primary basis for the formation of societal alliances. 
Due to its ethno-demographic composition, Ghana’s society is highly fragmented 
along ethnic lines. This situation turns elections into neck-and-neck races which 
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pushes higher-level factions to compete for support amongst lower-level ones. In 
contrast to Ghana’s post-independent settlement (see chapter three) lower-level 
factions are therefore relatively strong in Ghana’s current settlement. This is re-
flected in Ghana’s electoral competitive clientelism which ensures some degree 
of community-oriented developmental patrimonialism (see chapter four).  
Despite successful efforts curbing the state’s role in the economy, in par-
ticular in the mining sector, the Ghanaian state continues to be a major actor in 
the economic sphere. Regarding capital accumulation, the state and therefore 
access to the state remains crucial, just like throughout Ghana’s post-
independence settlement (see chapter three). This is mirrored in the Ghanaian 
perception that politics is “a money-making exercise” (CDD-Ghana 2005: 9). 
Ghana’s modern political elite is largely intertwined with the economic elite lead-
ing to a strong interdependency between the political and economic spheres. By 
now, both dominant factions rest on solid financial bases backed by aligned 
domestic capitalists. A strong and independent non-partisan middle class is 
therefore lacking. Ghana’s economic sphere is furthermore characterized by a 
few large-scale productive entrepreneurs. The country’s major productive en-
trepreneurs are predominantly Southern based rural small-scale cocoa farmers 
amongst whom more substantial capital accumulation is limited. 
Growing revenues from cocoa exports (produced by small-scale farmers), 
national resources such as gold and oil, remittances as well as the inflow of for-
eign capital are decisive for financing the current settlement. This includes the 
augmented bill of imports driven by increased urban consumption. Revenues 
from the extractive economic sectors rose over the last couple of years since 
international prices developed favourably for Ghana and the production of these 
goods could be expanded. Thus, Ghana’s economic growth is not based on 
improved productivity. Besides, Ghana’s ranking as a low middle-income coun-
try since 2010 gives the state easier access to loans on the international finan-
cial markets since Ghana’s creditworthiness has improved and the donor com-
munity’s eagerness for an African success story ensures the continued inflow of 
foreign aid (see chapter six). 
The fact that access to the Ghanaian state is crucial for capital accumula-
tion combined with (1) a high degree of fragmentation along Ghana’s dominant 
politicized societal fissure and (2) the liberal paradigm being hegemonic in 
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Ghana’s cultural sphere, together set the basis for Ghana’s competitive elec-
toral clientelistic politics. With four-year electoral cycles, the delivery of quickly 
visible benefits to a large section of the population is key to ensuring political 
support. Long term investments, such as the acquisition of technologies whose 
benefits could only be recouped after decades and tie up capital, are within the 
framework of competitive electoral clientelism not in the interest of Ghana’s po-
litical elite. However, these investments would be necessary to push Ghana’s 
economic transformation. In brief, Ghana’s current configuration of power is 
characterized by competitive electoral clientelistic politics, relatively easy financ-
ing of the settlement and small scale domestic independent, productive entre-
preneurs (see Whitfield 2011).  
 
Reflections on continuity and change in Ghana  
Continuities in Ghana’s polity are salient. The most important one being that the 
state remains neopatrimonial in character and therefore has not yet undergone 
a substantial transformation as the positive image of Ghana might suggest. The 
workings of the Ghanaian state today are very reminiscent of the workings of 
Ghana’s post-colonial state. Some Ghanaians go as far as to claim  
everything is still pretty much the same (e.g. A14, interviewed 
08/11/2012; A34, interviewed 14/12/2012).  
However, it would be misleading to assert nothing has changed at all in Ghana-
ian society. The thesis argues that while there has not (yet) been a fundamental 
change of the Ghanaian state, incremental structural change has occurred with-
in it. The work at hand claims that the constellation of power within Ghana has 
changed in three different ways. First, the relationship amongst Ghana’s higher-
level factions has changed in the sense that civilian forces have reclaimed su-
premacy over its military counterpart in Ghana’s political sphere and that the 
current settlement re-includes formerly excluded social factions. Moreover, 
higher-level factions have expanded in the sense that more individuals have 
become members of the political and economic elite (horizontal and vertical ex-
pansion of Ghana’s higher-level factions). In contrast to the post-independence 
settlement, an elite consensus has emerged on the ideology determining the 
character of the economic (see Vehnämäki 2000) and political system of Ghana 
which has led to a redefinition of the relationship between the state and the 
economy (see Owusu 2009: 40). The state is still regarded as a major actor in 
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delivering public goods, but Ghana’s modern political elite has realized and 
agrees on the fact that guaranteeing basic macroeconomic stability is essential 
for sustaining Ghana’s current settlement, but more importantly for securing its 
survival. As Tony Oteng-Gyasi puts it:  
As a nation, […] we have reached the stage where we have realized 
that government’s role at the very minimum should be to keep a stable 
macroeconomic environment to allow actors to operate within it 
(Agyeman-Duah et al. 2008: 248).  
Second, the liberalization of Ghana’s polity has re-established the link be-
tween its higher and lower-level factions. It has removed the state’s control over 
the cultural sphere providing space for articulation and later participation of pre-
viously excluded social factions. The opening of space combined with the return 
to multi-party democracy has forced higher-level factions to ground their support 
base amongst various lower-level factions. This has relatively strengthened 
lower-level factions in their relationship with higher-level ones.  
Third, compared to the post-colonial settlement (see chapter three), the re-
lationship amongst lower-level factions has changed in the sense that rural are-
as have gained relative strength compared to urban ones. Ghana has managed 
to build a new settlement – or as Gramsci might say historical bloc – sustained 
by institutions in which numbers translate into political power. The urban popu-
lation, previously posing a threat to the political leadership due to their physical 
proximity and easy mobilization, no longer dominates Ghana’s political system. 
The insight of Ghana’s elite that the small scale cocoa farmers constitute a cru-
cial pillar for financing the settlement has given rural areas weight in economic 
and political terms. Moreover and closely linked to the strengthening of Ghana’s 
rural constituencies, is the fact that Ghana’s new political settlement is currently 
economically viable again – at least with the growth rates Ghana has been en-
joying in recent years. How far this is likely to be sustainable, in light of growing 
public debts resulting from competitive electoral clientelism, is an entirely differ-
ent question.  
Having sketched out three broad trends of changes within the Ghanaian 
state – (1) change in the constellation between higher-level factions, (2) 
between higher-level factions and lower-level factions and (3) amongst lower-
level factions –, the next chapter will outline the complex and very difficult 
process by which Ghana has arrived at its new configuration of internal power 
relations and hence managed to implement incremental structural change. 
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VI. PROCESS OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN GHANA – ARRIVING AT A NEW 
CONFIGURATION OF INTERNAL RELATIONS OF POWER  
If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change 
Oelbaum, Populist Reform Coalitions in  
Sub-Saharan Africa: Ghana’s Triple Alliance  
 
The previous chapters have outlined Ghana’s current political settlement and 
demonstrated on the basis of Ghana’s 2012 electoral politics that the Ghanaian 
state remains neopatrimonial in character. Therefore, the workings of the Ghana-
ian state today are very reminiscent of the workings of Ghana’s post-independent 
state under various civilian and military regimes. Despite Ghana’s drastic image 
change, and praise by the international community as “African success story”, 
there has not (yet) been a transformation of Ghana’s polity. This thesis argues 
however that Ghanaian society has arrived at a new configuration of internal rela-
tions of power, since continuous incremental structural change has occurred with-
in the Ghanaian state over the last few decades. Chapter six will outline how the 
constellation of power within Ghana has changed (1) between Ghana’s lower-
level factions; (2) between the lower-level factions and the higher-level ones; and 
(3) how the relationship amongst higher-level factions has been altered. 
 
 
6.1 Adjusting economic institutions – revolution from above  
The implementation of neo-liberal economic reforms from 1983 onwards in-
duced a structural shift of Ghana’s institutionally entrenched constellation of 
power, in particular amongst its lower-level factions. This process that had sig-
nificant implications for the current settlement, which was seen in the 2012 elec-
toins.  The SAP with its focus on production and hence bias in favour of Gha-
na’s rural areas lead to a material deprivation of the PNDC’s initial primarily ur-
ban support base (Hutchful 2002a: 168; Gyimah-Boadi 1997: 316; Bawumia 
1995; Herbst 1993: 45 & 61-65). Moreover, the reforms of the PNDC were per-
ceived by radical students and the left intelligentsia as ideological betrayal and 
alienated further key constituencies of the regime (Gyimah-Boadi 1990: 332).  
The following section outlines how the PNDC has managed to reconfigure 
the country’s economic institutions from above with their inherent distribution of 
benefits running counter to the interests of the regime’s key support base. This 
achievement is all the more astonishing as politizised urban factions had con-
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stantly posed severe threats to regimes’ survival in the past when attempting to 
alter the relations of power of the “urbanized vampire state” (Frimpong-Ansah 
1991) epitomising an overtaxation of the rural areas to finance urban factions’ 
consumption. By presenting a nuanced analysis of beneficiaries and cost bear-
ers of Ghana’s adjusted economic institutions, the subsequent section address-
es how the regime succeeded in maintaining the reformed economic institutions 
and hence the incremental structural shift in power relations between urban and 
rural factions. The section will conclude by highlighting how the redistributive 
effects of reformed economic institutions demanded the PNDC to realign its rul-
ing coalition and to reanchor itself amongst the lower-level factions. For it had to 
re-build a new ruling coalition amongst higher and lower-level factions which was 
to be in sync with the new distributional effects of the country’s formal institutions 
to form a more stable historic bloc. 
 
6.1.1 Circumstances & applied strategies for altering Ghana’s economic 
institutions 
In contrast to the Busia regime, the PNDC took gradual steps to accustom the 
main cost bearers of the economic reforms to the envisioned changes. In late 
1982 the government took the first steps to prepare the way for its devaluation 
plans by raising the price of imported food so that it was equal to the price of 
locally produced foodstuffs (Herbst 1993: 43). Furthermore, the regime eventu-
ally managed to transform the still existing diversity amongst its higher-level 
factions from a source of tension and conflict to one of strength (Hutchful 
2002a: 179). The fact that Rawlings and Botchwey had belonged to the left-
wing faction within the PNDC enabled them to engage in a delicate balancing 
act mediating between external donors and a sceptical domestic general public.  
IFIs were demanding a fundamental change of the country’s economic insti-
tutions. Likewise Rawlings and Botchwey had been calling for a transformation, 
so that they were rhetorically not only in line with the IFIs, but could also maintain 
an outward appearance of revolutionary continuity at home (Nugent 1995: 124-
42). As Nugent (1995: 134) puts it:  
[…] Botchwey had attempted to demonstrate that the ERP was actually 
revolutionary in spirit, on the grounds that it was designed to squeeze 
the life out of the speculators. 
By introducing a surcharge and bonus system, which is synonymous with estab-
lishing multiple exchange rates, the regime was not only able to reward earners 
 215 
 
and penalize users of foreign currency, but could also sell the changes more 
easily politically at home. For the IMF and World Bank had opposed as a matter 
of principle such a system, which in turn enabled the PNDC to claim it had nei-
ther just simply surrendered to a dictat from the IFIs nor adopted devaluation 
(Nugent 1995: 112; Herbst 1993: 44).  
Another important factor was that Ghana had faced multiple blows in 1983 
and that the PNDC regime was able to use the resulting exacerbated conditions 
to slow down the pace of reforms envisaged by IFIs (Nugent 1995: 112). A se-
vere drought had further decreased local food production in 1983 and a very 
harsh accompanying harmattan as well as bush fires destroyed much of the 
acreage under income-earning crops like cocoa (Brydon 1985: 570). As if that 
were not enough, by mid-January 1983 the Nigerian government, aiming for re-
election in an unfavourable economic climate, introduced an expulsion decree 
forcing between 900,000 and 1,200,000 Ghanaians to return home, who had 
taken advantage of the freedom of movement under the aegis of ECOWAS to 
seek work in Nigeria escaping the crisis in Ghana (Brydon 1985: 568-75). As a 
result, Ghana experienced a population increase equal to about 10% at a time 
of acute economic crisis and food shortages. While in 1982 the general public 
response to any ‘Western’ assistance would have been met with fierce opposi-
tion, in 1983 the country could neither feed its increased population by itself nor 
afford the required imports to cover the shortfalls (Nugent 1995: 112-16).  
In this context, the PNDC regime managed to ask for international assistance 
emphasizing in negotiations with external donors that the crisis was not home-
made and declared to its domestic audience that the national emergency re-
quired a unique response including assistance from outside (Nugent 1995: 113). 
A relief operation was set in motion which spread the relief to the wider communi-
ty rather than channelling it to returnees only (Brydon 1985: 575). By reverting to 
People’s Shops for relief distribution, which had been created as revolutionary 
institutions, the PNDC regime found another way to further uphold an appear-
ance of continuity at home (Nugent 1995: 115). Some might have even regarded 
this as the regime defying the demand of IFIs to curtail the powers and activities 
of the people’s institution (Hutchful 2002a: 172; Yeebo 1991: 188).  
Even though food aid was distributed to rural and urban communities, much of 
it was despatched to rural areas to encourage returnees to head back to their 
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home/birthplace (Nugent 1995: 114). The regime possibly tried to avoid congrega-
tion in overcrowded urban areas in an already tense time regarding the socio-
economic and security situation. In exchange for food relief, returnees to rural are-
as were encouraged to engage in farming projects which helped in cocoa planting 
regions to replant farms affected by the bush fires (ibid.). At the same time this 
strategy preserved at least temporarily the appearance of a continuing commitment 
to mass mobilization by the regime, appeasing the radical left-wing forces.  
While the additional blows clearly exacerbated the socio-economic situation 
of Ghanaians at the time, the situation also enabled the PNDC to create more 
manoeuvring space at home and abroad. Domestically the regime used rhetoric 
skilfully in a situation of extreme scarcity to shift the emphasis away from own-
ership to production which brought it in line with the demands of the IFIs. As 
Rawlings said in August 1983: 
[…] production and efficiency must be our watchwords. Populist non-
sense must give way to popular sense. Many of us have spent too 
much time worrying about who owns what, but there can be no owner-
ship without production first (Rawlings 1983: 32). 
Fortunate timing led the PNDC to tie up the agreement with the IMF to present 
the deal as a natural extension of the relief measures. As a result Botchwey 
was able to pitch it as a self-developed programme solely endorsed by the IMF 
(Nugent 1995: 113).  
 
6.1.2 Distributive effects of adjusted economic institutions – a more nu-
anced picture 
The circumstances of the adaptation of the deal with the IMF illustrate how the 
PNDC initially managed to adopt the reform programme leading to drastic chang-
es of Ghana’s economic institutions and their redistributive effects. However, they 
do not provide answers to the question of how the regime managed to maintain 
reformed economic institutions in the long-term given their bias towards 
politisized urban factions that had posed severe security threats to any previous 
regime striving for such structural change in the past. To shed some light on this 
issue, it is necessary to draw a more nuanced picture with regards to the cost 
bearers and beneficiaries of the redistributive effects stemming from the econom-
ic reform process and their respective responses towards the reform implications.   
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Impact and reaction by urban labour 
Initially the urban constituents against whom the economic reforms ostensibly 
discriminated mobilised and staged mass protests against the reforms (Herbst 
1993: 65; Yeebo 1991: 189). Moreover, the regime was also confronted with 
more physical resistance through further attempted coups in June and October 
1983. In this context the question arises why these historically strong constitu-
encies this time did not succeed in resisting the reforms in the long-term, or as 
Herbst (1993: 65) puts it, what explains their political acquiescence?  
Multiple rifts within the urban constituency form part of an explanation (Hutchful 
2002a: 170). An internal power struggle between the leadership of the Trade Un-
ion Congress (TUC), (Hutchful 2002a: 171) and newly strengthened younger 
forces from below weakened the main voice of urban labour forces (Gyimah-
Boadi & Essuman-Johnson 1993: 201). This confrontation mirrored predominant-
ly the societal conflict between old forces linked to previous regimes and new 
forces represented by P/WDCs. While subaltern forces eventually had swept 
away the former TUC leadership, their own influence was being curbed by the 
PNDC regime when it became evident that the attempted October coup had in-
volved militants of the Accra-Tema WDCs and other elements of the NDC. In re-
sponse to this threat and in line with its previously demonstrated skills of adjust-
ing to changed circumstance, the PNDC leadership unveiled at the end of 1984 
that P/WDCs were no longer to play their initially envisaged role as building blocs 
of Ghana’s new political order (Nugent 1995: 139). The NDC was officially dis-
solved and P/WDCs were transformed into Committees for the Defence of the 
Revolution (CDRs) (Hutchful 2002a: 172; Nugent 1995: 139). This ended their 
independent and central role as mobilizing political institutions and they were sub-
jected directly under the PNDC which moulded them into the political wing of the 
regime (Hutchful 2002a: 172; Nugent 1995: 139; Ninsin 1989: 35).  
With the destruction of the Defence Committees, the TUC regained its role 
as pre-eminent organization of the labour forces, but was significantly weak-
ened. Even though the TUC further engaged in opposing the reforms – and 
eventually the PNDC regime – the organization neither had the capacity to in-
tervene meaningfully in the highly centralized policy process of the PNDC, nor 
the analytical or organizational ability to present an economic alternative to the 
proposed reforms (Hutchful 2002a: 172; Herbst 1993: 68). Another reason for 
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the failure of this anti-reform faction to repel the changes in the economic insti-
tutions lay in the fact that the PNDC regime resorted to strong arm tactics such 
as repression and intimidation. When the TUC e.g. tried to repel the Cocoa 
Board’s retrenchments, the PNDC reacted by encircling the TUC’s headquar-
ters with armoured vehicles (Herbst 1993: 69).  
The PNDC’s strategy of divide and conquer seemed however most im-
portant to contain urban labour discontent (Gyimah-Boadi & Essuman-Johnson 
1993: 202; Herbst 1993: 69). For one central role of the rebranded CDRs was to 
stiffen resistance against the reform programme from labour factions and to 
prevent the formation of a united labour front against the regime (Hutchful 
2002a: 172; Gyimah-Boadi & Essuman-Johnson 1993: 203). According to 
Ninsin (1989: 35): 
It was widely reported with satisfaction how CDR executive members in 
various establishments had held rallies to counter such moves 
[strikes] by the leadership of the TUC. 
It was also rather difficult for the TUC to forge an overarching coalition amongst 
its members, since the ERP with its emphasis on reinvigorating production had 
a differentiated impact on unionized sectors of the economy (Nugent 1995: 
185). This eroded the solidarity of members on the overall issue of adjustment 
(Hutchful 2002a: 174; Gyimah-Boadi & Essuman-Johnson 1993: 203) and 
posed a significant challenge for mobilizing against reform measures.   
While the Timber and Wood-workers' Union (TWU), the Railway Workers 
Union (RWU), the Ghana Private Road Transport Union (GPRTU) and the Min-
eworkers Union were benefitting from the ERP with its focus on production for 
export and rehabilitation of the infrastructure and transport system (see 
Vehnämäki 2000), the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICWU) as 
well as the Agricultural Workers Union (AWU) were massively impacted by the 
retrenchments in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (ibid.). The AWU for instance 
lost a significant part of its members by the dismissal of 50,000 workers from 
the Cocoa Marketing Board alone (Hutchful 2002: 174). Splitting urban workers 
into those relevant to the country’s trade and hence export earnings, and those 
irrelevant to it, weakened the thus far strong anti-reform labour faction. As a 
result, when the TUC called for action in July 1987 the Railway and Harbour 
Workers Union condemned the step and proclaimed its support for the 
ERP/SAP (Hutchful 2002: 174; Gyimah-Boadi & Essuman-Johnson 1993: 204).  
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The split amongst labour became visible once more when the TUC invoked 
its members to boycott the District Assembly elections. GPRTU not only dis-
missed the call, but even supported the regime by providing GPRTU vehicles to 
convey voters to and from polling stations (ibid.). Some of the unions became 
therefore informally known as PNDC unions which has been affirmed by a 
PNDC Secretary telling Hutchful (2002: 174): “We have our own unions”. The 
partial and skilful integration of labour forces into the regime’s new evolving so-
cietal coalition might have been the most crucial factor for the urban faction’s 
ineffectiveness to oppose the ERP long-term.  
 
Impact on and reaction by beneficiaries of adjustments  
The section above demonstrated that some urban labour (sub)factions actually 
belonged to the group of beneficiaries of the adjustment process. As a matter of 
course they were not the only ones. Two other vital groups were perceived to 
benefit from the redistribution of benefits induced by the reforms: the business 
sector and cocoa farmers in the rural areas (Callaghy 1990: 266; Bawumia 1995).   
The ERP programme was designed to promote the interests of the private 
sector (Hutchful 2002a: 176). In return for the implementation of these redistribu-
tive measures, one would assume these societal faction’s political support for the 
regime. However, once again the realities were more complex. While the busi-
ness community in general welcomed the reforms, they continued to feel political-
ly marginalized (Hutchful 2002a: 177). Even though the PNDC was technically 
introducing pro-business policies, rhetorically and in terms of political actions, the 
regime remained rather adversarial towards domestic entrepreneurs. For they 
were perceived by the PNDC as part of the old higher-level factions and contin-
ued to be harassed by the regime through investigation, business closure, deten-
tions and confiscations (ibid.; Opoku 2010: 89-99; Tangri 1999: 84).   
Amongst those affected were, for instance, K. Safo-Adu, owner of Industri-
als Chemicals Limited (ICL) a Ghanaian pharmaceutical company; A. Appiah-
Menkah, founder and owner of Apino Oil Palm Plantation and Ashanti Oil Mills 
(Apino soap); Major K. Asante, founder of Kastena Air Processing; S.C. Appen-
teng, known as Ghana’s salt king and owner of Vacuum Salt Products Ltd as 
well as B.A. Mensah, founder of International Tobacco Ghana Limited (ITG) 
(Opoku 2010: 90-91). Many of these business men had held indeed high rank-
ing positions within previous regimes. Appiah-Menkah had been Deputy Minis-
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ter of Trade and Industry under Busia from 1969 to 1972. Safo-Adu had also 
served in the PP government as Minister of Agriculture and on the Council of 
State in Ghana’s Third Republic. In addition, Asante had held the position of 
commissioner (minister) in the Acheampong regime. Asante and Safo-Adu had 
both set up their companies with loans from the World Bank paid through the 
National Investment Bank (NIB) (ibid.). 
While this does not constitute any justification for their harassment by the 
PNDC, it illustrates the amalgamation of Ghana’s political and economic higher-
level factions and how domestic capital accumulation can be ignited through ac-
cess to the Ghanaian state. It also reveals why domestic entrepreneurs were pri-
marily regarded as political opponents by the PNDC (Opoku 2010: 90). In this polit-
icized context the lack of consultation of the private sector by the PNDC’s econom-
ic policy makers (Hutchful 2002a: 177; Herbst 1993: 55), is the result of the contin-
ued political marginalization of the old higher-level factions – or at least parts of it – 
by the PNDC regime. A report of the World Bank (1990: 54) stated that:  
Until recently the private sector has complained about the lack of 
communication with the senior decision-makers of the Government.  
Furthermore, Tangri (1992: 102) states:  
In all the years of economic reform since 1983, the private sector has 
not felt adequately consulted. Only occasional discussions have taken 
place between spokesmen of the business community and the key 
public officials concerned with fiscal and monetary policies […]. In-
deed, institutional mechanisms for promoting communication between 
the various sectors of the economy have either been largely absent or 
remained moribund.  
The political marginalization, but even more so the experience of harassment 
and a persisting fear that this would reoccur, shaped for a long time the collective 
memory of affected higher-level factions (Opoku 2010: 90). In light of the political 
antagonism between the PNDC regime and the domestic business community at 
the time (Opoku 2010: 99), it is hardly surprising that the PNDC’s pro-business 
policy did not manifest into widespread political support from this societal faction.  
However two additional factors are vital for and complement a comprehen-
sive understanding of a lack of support from domestic entrepreneurs for the 
PNDC’s economic reforms. First, similar to the urban faction, sections of the 
private sector were affected differently by the reforms. While commercial, often 
transnational, interests benefitted especially from the export oriented ERP, do-
mestic manufacturers and industrialists were much more ambivalent in their 
position towards the reforms (Hutchful 2002a: 179). Second, and much more 
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important, the regime tended to depend more on foreign loans and investment 
rather than on the prosperity of domestic entrepreneurs (ibid.). The perception 
amongst domestic business owners that in particular expatriate businesses 
benefited from the reforms added to their (political) marginalization. As Tangri 
(1992: 102) summarises in his survey of Ghanaian enterprises:  
The regime was not perceived as sufficiently supportive of the eco-
nomic interests of domestic capital, let alone abiding those hurt by the 
operational consequences of the ERP policy reforms. Indeed, it was 
viewed as destroying Ghanaian capital by not assisting local concerns 
to stand up to the rigours of international competition.  
While it was part of the liberalization process demanded by IFIs that the PNDC 
would not protect domestic businesses, there was indeed little overt encour-
agement of domestic enterprise to engage in areas where it seemed obvious, 
for instance in the divestiture of state companies. In fact, business representa-
tives were initially not even represented on the Divestiture Implementation 
Committee (Hutchful 2002a: 178; Tangri 1991: 534). Hence the perceived (polit-
ical) marginalization is comprehensible, even more so in light of who benefitted 
primarily from state divestitures (see chapter five). Overall the support from do-
mestic entrepreneurs for the PNDC regime and its ‘pro-private sector’ reforms 
remained therefore limited.  
 
To address Ghana’s current account imbalance the ERP concentrated on rein-
vigorating production for export (Vehnämäki 2000). A central pillar of the reforms 
since 1983 was therefore the promotion of agriculture (Herbst 1993: 81). In the 
first few years most attention was given to the rehabilitation of the cocoa sector 
(Hutchful 2002a: 67), entailing a relative neglect of food crops (Herbst 1993: 81). 
Rawlings proclaimed that the reform of the economic institutions would imply a 
significant redistribution of resources:  
Cocoa and forest products make up about 75 percent of all our export 
receipts and yet the benefits you get from the system [are] small in 
comparison with what you put in. It is with your agricultural products 
that we buy the cars, lorries, petrol, kerosene, matches, soap, sugar, 
etc. and yet how many of you have access to these things? We intend 
to reverse this trend and bring back the wealth of the country to where 
it belongs, in the rural areas (Herbst 1993: 83). 
The adjustment of Ghana’s economic institutions redistributed indeed much 
greater resources to rural and cocoa farming areas in particular (Bawumia 1995; 
Herbst 1993: 86). The first policy reform to affect cocoa farmers was the change 
of the Cedi’s exchange rate, which had the immediate effect of increasing the 
Cedi price of cocoa (Hutchful 2002a: 68; Herbst 1993: 81). Just between 1984 
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and 1988 nominal prices of cocoa increased fivefold raising also the real produc-
er price (Herbst 1993: 81). To improve incentives for production further, cocoa 
farmers began to receive higher shares in the export price of cocoa (table 6.1) 
which de facto meant a reduced taxation of cocoa and hence the rural areas. 
Table 6.9   Share of Producer Price in the Export Price of Cocoa, 1993/94 – 
1998/99 
Crop Year 
Producers 
price per ton  
in Cedis 
F.O.B. Value of 
exports per ton 
in Cedis 
Percentage of 
price received 
by Farmers (%) 
1993/94 308,000 1,012,327 30.42 
1994/95 700,000 1,675,277 41.78 
1995/96 840,000 2,157,051 38.94 
1996/97 1,200,000 2,792,730 42.97 
1997/98 1,800,000 3,795,913 47.42 
1998/99 2,250,000 3,878,206 58.0 
Source: Hutchful (2002a: 68) 
This eventually led to an increase in production – rather than productivity – and 
was also supported by PNDC’s initial policies of increasing the supply of insecticide 
and spare parts for spraying machines, providing improved high-yielding seedlings 
etc. (Fosu 1993: 50-58). As a result, Ghana’s cocoa production did rehabilitate. 
While it bottomed out at 166,700 tonnes in 1984, in the early 1990s the production 
of cocoa had almost doubled to approximately 300,000 tonnes (figure 6.1).  
Figure 6.3   Production of cocoa in Ghana, 1980-1990 
 
 
 
Since it takes about seven years for cocoa trees to yield a crop, some of the 
initial recovery of cocoa production was probably achieved by redirecting previ-
ously smuggled cocoa back into Ghana’s official export marketing chains. This 
was mainly achieved through the incentives for producers provided by the ad-
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justed fiscal and monetary policies. In light of the prolonged slide of world mar-
ket prices for cocoa from the mid-1980s – average price for one metric tonne of 
cocoa in 1985 stood at £2,113 compared to £684 in 1992 (Hutchful 2002a: 69) 
– there is however no doubt that Ghana’s production of cocoa recovered in re-
sponse to the PNDC’s neo-liberal economic policies (table 7.2).  
Figure 6.4   Production of cocoa in Ghana, 1961-2014 
 
 
With Ghana’s rural areas being the country’s prime hubs of production for 
export, the ERP/SAP was positively biased towards the rural parts of the coun-
try (Bawumia 1995; Herbst 1993: 83). Yet, despite the fact that they belonged to 
the main beneficiaries of the reforms, the PNDC’s policies did not – once again 
– automatically translate into political support from this societal faction. There 
are two main reasons for this. First the cocoa-producing regions in Ghana’s 
middle forest belt tend to be dominated by Ashanti, who are regarded as the 
stronghold of the old forces coalescing around the Danquah-Busia-Dombo tradi-
tion. Hence there exists a politicized ethnic overlay (Herbst 1993: 86). Leading 
political figures of the Danquah-Busia-Dombo tradition, who most likely had an 
impact with their views and rhetoric on Ashanti cocoa farmers, tended to strongly 
dislike the PNDC regime which they perceived – the lastest since the northern 
radical faction had been dislocated from the PNDC’s ruling coalition – as being 
Ewe-dominated (Gyimah-Boadi and Daddieh 1999: 141). Adu Boahen, who 
emerged in the early 1990s as a leading figure of this political tradition stated:  
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Is it not strange and rather unfortunate that the Head of State, the Head 
of National Security, the Head of the Police Service, the Head of the 
Army, the acting Governor of the Bank of Ghana and the Head of the 
National Investment Bank, and I am sure there are others – all happen 
to belong to a single ethnic group or at least a single region of the 
country? […] Whether Rawlings is aware of this or not, this situation is 
giving the unfortunate impression that the country is being dominated 
and ruled by that single ethnic group, and this impression is causing 
[…] anger and irritation (Boahen 1989: 53).    
He was born in the Eastern Region and had his ancestoral roots in Juaben/Ashanti 
region. As a leading figure of the Danquah-Busia-Dombo tradition during the early 
1990s he shared the views of Kumasi higher-level factions who expressed accord-
ing to Herbst (1993: 87) similar sentiments in private. They claimed that  
the PNDC was the most tribalized government Ghana had ever had and 
that the region [Ashanti] feels discriminated against.  
Another factor for the wait-and-see attitude of cocoa farmers regarding their 
support for the PNDC regime is the fact that significant income gains for the 
rural areas only materialized slowly. For the profit of newly planted cocoa trees 
cannot be harvested quickly. As a result, the support for the PNDC’s steps to 
reform Ghana’s economic institutions from (intended) beneficiaries did not ma-
terilise immediately. 
 
Overall the PNDC’s neo-iberal economic reforms dismantled Ghana’s “old fiscal 
paradigm” (Hutchful 2002a: 168) epitomising an overtaxation of the rural areas 
to finance urban factions’ consumption. The redistributive effects of Ghana’s 
adjusted economic institutions to the benefit of rural areas therefore structurally 
changed Ghana’s institutionalized constellation of power right up to the current 
day. Yet, the decision to implement the neo-liberal reforms had led to the decay 
of the PNDC’s initial ruling coaltion amongst higher-level factions and coupled 
with the reforms’ open discrimination against urban factions, the PNDC had also 
lost crucial parts of its original support base.  
[The economic reforms] represented a disturbance of the political status 
quo. The ERP/SAP has caused a serious erosion in the PNDC’s original 
support base […] and has not yet produced a viable alternative support 
base to replace the old one […] (Gyimah-Boadi 1990: 328 & 333). 
The  remaining PNDC ruling higher-level factions needed to re-anchor themselves 
amongst Ghana’s lower-level factions. In this process the regime had to re-build a 
new ruling coalition amongst higher and lower-level factions which was going to be 
in sync with the new distributional effects of the country’s formal institutions. But it 
faced the challenge of a time-lag between the introduction of reforms and the re-
sponse from beneficiaries of adjusted institutions (Roemer 1984). Before we turn to 
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shedding some light on how the PNDC managed the task of reconfiguring its ruling 
coaltion, we briefly need to address the issue of how the PNDC asserted itself in 
power facing a crumbling urban support base.  
While one crucial pillar of the PNDC’s capability to hold on to power rested on 
its skill of continuous adaptability and co-option of various societal factions, equally 
important to understand the regime’s survival during the above mentioned time-lag 
was its authoritarian character. A proliferation of para-military and security organi-
zations (Gyimah-Boadi 1990: 334) institutionalised the PNDC’s national security 
apparatus which played a vital role in PNDC rule. While there were 13 coups at-
tempts between 1981 and 1985, at least seven were made between 1985 and 
1986 alone (Akonor 2012: 90-91; 2004). In addition to various assassination at-
tempts, PNDC higher-level factions were convinced that the US Central Intelli-
gence Agency (CIA) had increased its activities in Ghana during the mid-1980s to 
cause the downfall of the regime (Akonor 2012: 91-92; 2004).   
While the security apparatus was used on the one hand to solidify the regime’s 
position in power and ability to push through reforms, the PNDC leadership was 
very much aware that security threats could also arise from within the security forc-
es. To address this issue, the regime relied increasingly on Ewe officers and troops 
and established the 64th bataillon ostensibly to protect the new regime and Rawl-
ings in particular (Handley and Mills 2001: 21; Hutchful 1997a: 258). Furthermore, 
the PNDC applied the strategy of rapid rotation of key commands and postings 
(Hutchful 1997a: 258). Again co-optation not only in form of allocation of political 
posts, but also in the form of resources, became a proven strategy.   
The importance of the security apparatus under the PNDC is also reflected in 
Ghana’s public defence expenditures at the time (Fosu 1993: 51). During the pe-
riod of 1982-86 Ghana’s military expenditure increased in real terms by 103.8% 
per year. In fact, PNDC’s military expenditure was growing faster than expendi-
ture on agriculture, one of the intended prime beneficiaries of the regime’s eco-
nomic reforms (ibid.). Interesting to note is that despite the IMF’s general demand 
for cutting government spending, it did not include military expenditure in its con-
ditionalities. As Fosu (1993: 75) quotes an IMF seminar paper:  
[…] the Fund has taken the position that the question of military spend-
ing is so inherently political in nature that it could not be appropriately 
made the subject of conditionality.  
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Thus, the IFIs not only acknowledged that the social change entailed in their pre-
scribed economic reforms could pose challenges to reforming states’ political sta-
bility, but also accepted the authoritarian trait of reforming states like Ghana to 
ward off resulting threats and to implement IFIs’ envisaged economic reforms 
(Ibhawoh 1999: 160-1; Ake 1989: 62). In fact, some neo-liberal writers believed 
authoritarian politics were necessary to secure the adoption of reforms (Gibbion et 
al. 1992: 11). Deepak Lal (1983: 33), an influential figure in the Research Depart-
ment of the World Bank, wrote in an influential pamphlet at the time: 
a courageous, ruthless and perhaps undemocratic government is re-
quired to ride roughshod over these newly created special interest 
groups (Toye 1992: 109).  
While at the end of the 1980s the international community began to tie the pro-
vision of loans to economic reforms and political liberalisation (Ibhawoh 1999: 
161), during the early 1980s the thinking of IFIs was to financially support re-
form-oriented autocratic regimes to assist them to overcome the short-term do-
mestic pressures expected from aggrieved urban factions (Toye 1992; Beck-
ham 1992; Gibbon et al. 1992). A situation which happened to be advantageous 
timing for Ghana and Rawlings.  
In the context of Ghana, the neo-liberal economic reforms implemented by 
Rawlings’ military regime provoked internal opposition which produced numer-
ous attempted countercoups (Toye 1992: 114). The national security complex 
played its part in warding off these immediate security threats facing the PNDC. 
Yet, it also played a central role in the regime’s repression, intimidation, arrest 
and detention of individual Ghanaians (Hansen 1987). For the regime also 
maintained tight control over Ghana’s cultural sphere by controlling the press 
and broadcasting media (Gyimah-Boadi and Daddieh 1999: 140). Over time 
these authoritarian traits of the PNDC transformed Ghana’s once politically vo-
cal cultural sphere into one characterized by fear. The result of the prolonged 
political repression was a depoliticization of many political issues and the rise of 
a “culture of silence” (see Boahen 1989). 
 
6.1.3 Reconfiguration of the ruling coalition & political institutions  
The turn of the PNDC to implement neo-liberal economic reforms did not only 
entail a structural shift in the constellation of power between Ghana’s lower-
level factions. It also demanded a reconfiguration of the PNDC’s ruling coalition 
and corresponding reforms of Ghana’s formal political institutions which enabled 
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the regime to reanchor itself amongst those lower-level faction benefiting from 
the new distributional effects of the country’s formal economic institutions. Both 
steps allowed members of the previously excluded faction to set foot again into 
the political sphere.   
After the young northern radical faction had been dislocated from the ruling 
forces, significant shifts occurred in the composition of the PNDC’s higher-level 
factions. To consolidate the PNDC’s position in power, the ruling coalition was 
realigned in several ways. First of all, Rawlings adjusted the composition of the 
PNDC’s higher-level factions by turning to the officer corps of the military, to the 
traditional rulers and other parts of the right-wing faction.  
While Rawlings was initially regarded by the officers as somebody directing 
the upsetting of the military hierarchy (Akonor 2012: 75); by March 1983 Rawl-
ings began to distance himself from the ranks (Oquaye 2004: 121; Hutchful 
2002a: 46-48; Gyimah-Boadi and Daddieh 1999: 127 & 141). Instead he began 
to embrace the officers by restoring unified command structures (Hutchful 1997a: 
256) and co-opting them into the ruling coalition through e.g. cabinet posts, lead-
ership positions in state-owned entreprises, and diplomatic assignments (Akonor 
2012: 75). A regular dialogue between the PNDC and the armed forces about the 
reform process created furthermore an “informed consent” which was crucial for 
the PNDC’s political survival (Hutchful 2002a: 48).   
The same strategy – to a lesser extent – was applied to the police forces 
(Kraus 1991: 149). However not only serving, but also retired security personnel 
soon held high positions in various state linked institutions and establishments 
including e.g. the State Fishing Corporation, Ghana Airways Corporation and 
the Black Star Line (Oquaye 2004: 117). These developments allowed them to  
join Ghana’s political and – due to their access to the state soon also – the 
country’s economic higher-level factions.  
The co-opting of significant parts of the military and police leadership was vi-
tal to “contain coup threats and re-establish order” (Akonor 2012: 75). In the past 
the fragmentation of the security forces had repetitively allowed civilian opposition 
higher-level factions to forge ad-hoc alliances with disaffected security factions to 
challenge the ruling coaltion. Oquaye (2004: 117) underlines the significance of 
the security factions for the regime’s stability by stating:  
When the [Ghanaian] military sneezed, the whole nation caught instant cold.   
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Besides the co-option of the leadership of security forces, the reconfiguar-
tion of the ruling coaltion re-included parts of the right-wing faction (Hutchful 
2002: 123) such as chiefs and prominent members of Ghana’s bourgeoisie 
(Kraus 1991: 149). As P.V. Obeng, PNDC member and Chairman of the Com-
mittee of Secretaries noted in 1989:  
[…] we have co-opted the traditional authorities some way into the [po-
litical] structure so that the cultural aspect of our nationhood is main-
tained and that they are involved in the process of development 
(Owusu 1996: 337). 
In contrast to the P/WDCs, the new CDRs soon allowed all lower-level factions to 
participate if they were prepared to uphold and defend the basic objectives of the 
revolution. So it did not take long for the Asantehene, Ghana’s most powerful tra-
ditional leader, to become an honorary member (ibid.). The rapprochement of the 
PNDC and chiefs clearly manifested itself when the Asantehene called Rawlings 
“my son” and thereby publicly embraced the Head of State to express his support 
for the 31st December Revolution (Owusu 1996: 337).  
The PNDC on its part appointed a number of traditional leaders to key posi-
tions: Nandom Na, Polkuu Konkuu Chiiri VI, became PNDC member and Secre-
tary for Defence; Nana Akuoku Sarpong took on the role as Secretary for 
Health; and Emmanual G. Tanoh became Secretary for Chieftaincy Affairs and 
acting Attorney-General (ibid.). Furthermore, the PNDC had also passed sever-
al legal instruments which ensured the role of traditional leaders in the evolving 
new political settlement. These included e.g. the Chieftaincy (Amendment) 
Laws in 1982 and 1985 and the Regions of Ghana (Amendment) Law in 1983, 
which created two new regions – Upper West and Upper East – along with their 
Houses of Chiefs (Owusu 1996: 337). 
Traditional leaders might have regarded the PNDC’s opening towards them 
as a chance to return to a constellation of power in which chiefs per se do not 
regard central authority as their adversary, but as a partner (Owusu 1996: 335). 
In contrast significant parts of the excluded modern political higher-level factions 
coalescing around the Danquah-Busia-Dumbo and Nkrumah tradition, members 
of societal organizations like the TUC, NUGS, ARPB, GBA and the churches, 
remained in strong opposition to the regime. In fact, some deplored that Rawl-
ings was using his wife’s family ties to the Asante royal family to co-opt tradi-
tional rulers more easily (Owusu 1996: 337). 
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The real challenge facing the PNDC was however to re-ground itself firmly 
amongst the lower-level factions. A first step towards that direction had been 
taken by the integration of traditional leaders. The regime had to ensure the po-
litical support of those societal groups benefitting from the re-distributional effect 
of adjusted economic institutions in order to form a more stable historic bloc. At 
the same time the regime had to avoid putting off too many lower-level factions 
which might trigger a formation of an ethno-regional alliance against itself.   
The PNDC was very much aware of the uneven impact of the ERP/SAP 
programme on the country’s different regions (Langer 2010: 181-82) and thus 
on ethnic groups’ share of resources from the state. The rehabilitation of the 
export sector benefitted primarily the cocoa, timber, and mineral producing are-
as and therefore the regions of Ashanti, Brong Ahafo, Western and the port cit-
ies of Tema, Takoradi and Accra (Gyimah-Boadi and Daddieh 1999: 139). Be-
sides its harsh repercussions for urban wage-earners, the SAP-induced austeri-
ty measures, including the introduction of user fees for certain social services, 
impacted heavily on the historically economic marginalized areas like the 
Northern, Upper East and Upper West regions (ibid.). Some studies suggest a 
relationship between the austerity programme and the drop in hospital attend-
ance, enrolment in primary and middle schools and even a link between the in-
troduction of user fees on potable water with the outbreak of the guinea worm 
epidemic in Northern Ghana (Gyimah-Boadi and Daddieh 1999: 139). 
To compensate the negative social effects of the SAP and its induced visible 
deterioration of government services (Gibbon 1992: 157), the PNDC implemented 
in 1988 the Programme of Actions to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment 
(PAMSCAD). Under PAMSCAD, which breached the conditionalities imposed by 
IFIs, the PNDC implemented community projects in health, education, housing and 
sanitation, particularly in the Northern regions (Gyimah-Boadi and Daddieh 1999: 
140). In addition, the regime undertook investment projects in these areas to miti-
gate the impact of economic reforms (Langer 2010: 182). While Nugent (1995: 
174) and others have pointed out that PAMSCAD was far from alleviating poverty 
in those areas, politically it more than likely played an appeasing role. In fact, Cal-
laghy (1990: 284) points out that domestic as well as external actors pursued polit-
ical objectives with the implementation of PAMSCAD: While the PNDC intended 
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the high visable programme to ensure political (electoral) support, external actors 
aimed at increased sustainability of reforms (see 6.2.3).  
The wider challenge for the regime was however to align the political institu-
tions with the new distributional effects of the country’s formal institutions to en-
sure a new support base amongst the lower-level factions. By 1984 the PNDC 
had identified the rural areas and in particular the farmers as the people it 
sought to empower. The PNDC’s Rural Manifesto stated:   
[…] the masses of Ghana and indeed of Africa live in the rural areas. 
There is no doubt that a portion of the masses live in the urban areas - 
described mainly as the urban poor. The organised urban workers, be-
cause they are articulate […] claim to speak for the working classes. 
That claim is grossly erroneous since the majority of the working clas-
ses who happen to live in the rural areas have little or no say in the cit-
ies where negotiations for salaries, wages, prices of commodities and 
other social benefits are carried out between government, management 
and the organised urban working classes. As a group, the urban rich 
and poor have exploited the majority in the rural areas for a long time 
[…] (Ministry of Rural Development and Cooperatives 1982:1).    
The need for a new support base amongst lower-level factions coupled with 
mounting domestic demands for a return to democratic civilian rule, led the 
PNDC to rejuvenate the idea of local government. In 1987 the PNDC published 
a report called District Political Authority and Modalities for District Level Elec-
tions which became popularly known as the Blue Book (Ahwoi 2010: 40). It 
paved the way for the establishment of 110 District Assemblies as new local 
government bodies (Owusu 1996: 37; Nugent 1995: 165). The planned new 
political institutions ought to ensure the proclaimed “true democracy” and to give 
“power to the people” (Asamoah 2014: 303; Ahwoi 2010: 41). At the same time 
it was also an attempt to win rural support for the regime, since it claimed to 
address the rural-urban imbalance and to politically empower the rural areas 
(Nugent 1995: 176; Gyimah-Boadi 1990: 336). A government document stated:  
Each of our constitutional experiments failed because the type of rep-
resentational system we adopted on each occasion made governments 
remote and distant from the primary communities that were alleged to 
have elected them. Consequently, governments remained in the hands 
of a few, and above all represented the interest of the economically 
powerful who had access to these resources (National Commission for 
Democracy in Herbst 1993: 80). 
This process of decentralization was regarded by some observers as a practical 
demonstration and fulfilment of the PNDC’s slogan of giving “power to the peo-
ple” (Ayee 1993: 114; Ahwoi 2010: 41). Thus, the regime continued to direct 
change from above under a cloak of rhetoric providing for an appearance of 
revolutionary continuity to its domestic audience.  
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The establishment of the four-tier local government structure – consisting of 
Regional Co-ordinating Councils (RCC), District Assemblies (DA), Town/Area 
Councils and Unit Committees within each of the ten regions – enabled the 
PNDC to penetrate the countryside. While local government structures were 
nothing revolutionary per se,85 the step allowed the regime to establish, in a 
controlled manner, a political presence across the length and breadth of the 
country (Nugent 1995: 44). None of Ghana’s political parties had been able to 
entrench a permanent presence across the state. Rather they had set up 
branches ad-hoc ahead of polls, most of which slowly disappeared again once 
the electoral contests were over (ibid.). The only exception represented Nkru-
mah’s CPP, which had relied on their tight grip on local government structures 
to penetrate every community.86  
Even though it had never been explicitly stated, the PNDC seemed to emu-
late the CPP’s strategy, since the reformed political institutions were primarily a 
devolution of central administration to the local level rather than of any political 
power (Haynes 1991: 290). The regime created 110 District Assemblies. Be-
tween December 1988 and February 1989 (officially) non-partisan elections 
were held in the communities to directly elect 2/3 of the members for each Dis-
trict Assembly. 1/3 of its members were however appointed by the PNDC. Since 
District Secretaries who occupied a leading role in the new political institutions 
were all PNDC-appointees and with RCCs de facto numerically dominated by 
the PNDC, the regime retained a very firm grip on the proclaimed shift of power 
to the people (Gyimah-Boadi 1990: 338). Moreover, this structure allowed the 
PNDC to find a place for members of the CDRs, even though the regime avoid-
ed packing the new District Assemblies only with its own stalwarts (Nugent 
1995: 117). About 1/5 of the appointees were chiefs and many individuals from 
the professions and workers’ union were included, even though some of them 
were known as firm PNDC opponents (ibid.). Through these steps the regime 
strengthened its ruling coalition with factions of the right and gave regime oppo-
nents the opportunity to set their foot again into the political area in a manner 
strongly controlled by the regime itself.  
                                            
85
 For an overview of the historical development of local government in Ghana compare Haynes 
(1991) and Ahwoi (2010).  
86
 In fact, attempting to break the power of the CPP at local level in the late 1960s, the NLC had 
reduced the number of administrative districts from 185 to 40 (Haynes 1991: 284). 
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According to Gyimah-Boadi (1990: 338) the local government reforms and 
the non-partisan elections generated much enthusiasm in the countryside. The 
high voter turnout in the rural areas (table 6.2) can be read as a sign of the rural 
population endorsing the decentralized new political structures (Herbst 1993: 90).  
Table 6.10   Comparative voter turnout in Ghana (in percentages) 
Region 
1988/89 
District  
Assembly 
1979 
Parliamentary 
1978 
Council 
Western 55.3 34.04 20.6 
Central 59.3 33.34 22.2 
Eastern 60.8 35.95 16.6 
Volta 59.4 33.65 15.3 
Ashanti 60.8 41.99 24.9 
Brong/Ahafo 60.2 33.16 18.7 
Northern 60.6 32.09 18.2 
Uppera 65.7 32.82 16.1 
Greater Accra 44.3 35.59 10.2 
National level 59.0 35.25 18.4 
a 
The PNDC had divided the Upper Region into Upper East and Upper West in Septem-
ber 1987. The results from these two regions are combined here so that they can still be 
compared to previous elections.  
 
At the same time Herbst (1993: 90) and Gyimah-Boadi (1990: 343) both hint at an 
element of gratitude towards the PNDC as reason for the high rural voter turnout:  
[…] the high turnout in rural areas and newly created districts can be 
attributed to effective PNDC propaganda for District Assemblies as 
powerful vehicles for local development. New districts took the elec-
tions as a serious opportunity to catch up with old districts (Herbst 
(1993: 90) quoting Kojo T-Vieta). 
An element of cajolery cannot be ruled out as factor in the generally 
high voter turnout. Gratitude to government may account for the high 
voter turnout in the newly created districts (Gyimah-Boadi 1990: 343). 
In contrast, the lowest voter turnout was recorded in (urban) Greater Accra (ta-
ble 6.2).  
In preparation for the District Assembly elections, the PNDC strove to abol-
ish previous obstacles to the participation of lower-level factions in the decision 
making process (Ahwoi 2010: 42-43). It removed the legislative requirement of 
all candidates for local government to be literate in English which had ruled out 
about 50% of the rural population from running as candidates for local govern-
ment in the past (ibid.). The elections were state-sponsored to eliminate pres-
sures of financing political campaigns. Moreover, prospective assembly mem-
bers had to be ordinary residents in the electoral area to prevent  
Source: Herbst (1993: 90) 
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urban dwellers to contest local government elections in villages where 
they ‘hailed from’ and [to use, JR] […] their monies to get elected, only 
for them to return to the cities and forget about the problems and the 
needs of the villagers (Ahwoi 2010: 43).  
According to Ahwoi (2010: 42) the steps taken by the PNDC removed previous 
impediments for ordinary citizens to run, which was  
reflected in the kind of people who filed to contest the first District As-
sembly elections held in 1988/89 (ibid.).  
He illustrates his point by citing the elections to the Shama-Ahanta East Metro-
politan Assembly as an example in which a conservancy labourer defeated a 
renowned lawyer (Ahwoi 2010: 45).  
According to Ahwoi (ibid.) the reform of Ghana’s political institutions opened up 
space for lower-level factions to join the local political leadership. Nugent (1995: 
176), on the other hand, claims that the same local notables who had hitherto dom-
inated the Town/Village Development Committees had been elected to the DAs. 
However he also states (1995: 260) that many genuinely new faces had been 
elected as MPs on behalf of the NDC in 1992 and that the DAs had provided an 
alternative route into national politics. The contradicting evaluations of Ahwoi and 
Nugent might derive from their own standpoints and thus impact their perception. 
This diverging perception however strengthens the narrative of incremental struc-
tural change which claims that established forces continued to play a role, while 
institutional change also opened up space for movement between higher and low-
er-level factions. Even though this space initially only opened up at the local level, 
in the following years this was going to have an impact on the composition of Gha-
na’s higher-level factions represented as MPs in Accra (see section 6.2).  
Overall the district elections gained Rawlings’ military regime some legitimacy 
and enabled it to present its political reforms as a first step towards democratiza-
tion (Nugent 1995: 178). This was particularly important, since domestic calls for 
a return to democracy – fanned by strikes and street protests in neigbouring au-
thoritarian states like Benin and Burkina Faso – grew louder during the late 1980s 
(Nugent 1995: 186; Bratton and Van de Walle 1992: 419). Moreover, the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and fall of the Berlin Wall set the scene for IFIs and Western 
donors to introduce the concept of good governance into the aid discourse and to 
tie a continued granting of financial loans not only to economic reforms but also to 
political liberalization (Nugent 2012: 187 & 381; Haynes 1991: 283). Interestingly 
the PNDC’s initial revolutionary rhetoric of “participatory democracy” and its local 
government reforms eventually overlapped with donors’ expectations. The con-
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gruence of PNDC’s interests and the internationally dominant neo-liberal devel-
opment and governance paradigm allowed the PNDC to further direct social 
change from above and to set the first steps for its own transformation. Due to 
the fact that Ghana evinced relative successful macroeconomic recovery in com-
parison with other African states (Gibbon 1992: 156) and the fact that it was 
amongst the first African states to decentralize, IFIs and donors could continue to 
frame Ghana as a role model legitimizing the international community’s own re-
form policies (see Crawford 2009: 58). 
 
 
6.2 Ghana’s process of democratization – next step in the revolution from above 
The local government elections in 1988/89 represented a first step of the PNDC 
to anchor itself amongst those lower-level factions benefiting from the re-
distributional effects of Ghana’s adjusted economic institutions. The next sec-
tions will outline how the following (re-)democratization process further altered 
Ghana’s constellation of power, in particular amongst higher-level factions (ver-
tical and horizontal expansion), but also between its higher- and lower-level 
ones. This process beginning in the 1990s continues to have significant rever-
berations today as seen in the 2012 elections (see chapter four). Besides an 
unspoken and previously non-existing elite consenus on a liberal economic tra-
jectory for Ghana, continuous incremental structural change of its electoral 
framework enabled Ghana’s higher-level factions to agree on the rules of grant-
ing access to power again as seen in 2012. This eventually allowed for a re-
inclusion of previously excluded higher-level factions into the political sphere. In 
addition, the re-established political imperative of winning elections brought back 
competitive clientelism which strengthened in relative terms the position of lower-
level factions towards higher-level ones, a third feature which continues to the 
2012 elections and within the new settlement. At the same time it will be pointed 
out how the need of an African success story to legitimise (neo-)liberal reform 
policies prescribed by the international community has led to Ghana’s exception-
al, or prefential, treatment by donors. In fact, a continuous inflow of foreign capital 
provided in particular by the IFIs until today helps to sustain the financial viability 
of Ghana’s current political settlement.     
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6.2.1 General elections & vertical expansion of higher-level factions  
The outcome of the local elections in 1988/89 reassured the PNDC leadership 
that it had nothing to fear from the reintroduction of competitive politics. Moreo-
ver, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and fall of the Berlin Wall the interna-
tional setting had changed by the early 1990s. This set the scene for IFIs and 
Western donors to tie continued financial support not only to economic reforms, 
but also to political liberalisation. Rawlings stated in an interview: 
By that point the IMF and the World Bank were supporting us financial-
ly to build new roads, providing water etc. So to be quite honest, they 
were not going to wait for us to come out with an appropriate formula 
of how to sustain that new culture of [populist grassroots] democracy 
in our people. The US State Department also exerted pressure to go 
multiparty (Bitar & Lowenthal 2015: 127).  
In this situation the regime opted for steering a continuing political reform process 
from above and embarked on a transformation process by holding general elec-
tions in 1992. Following the endorsement of a new constitution through a national 
referendum in April 1992, political parties were allowed to reform a month later 
(Frempong 2012: 46; Fordwor 2010: 187). The New Patriotic Party (NPP) emerged 
out of the Danquah-Busia Memorial Club and chose Professor Adu Boahen, mem-
ber of the Danquah faction within the NPP, as its presidential candidate (Bob-Millar 
2012: 579-80). The Nkrumahist forces splintered into various parties (see Frem-
pong 2012: 47) which worked in favour of the PNDC (Nugent 1995: 243) who ex-
ploited the legacy to its own advantage. As National Democratic Congress (NDC), 
the transformed regime forged an electoral alliance with the NCP and Every Gha-
naian Living Everywhere (EGLE) party (ibid.). Kow Nkensen Arkahh, member of 
the NCP and chief of Senya Breku in Ghana’s Eastern region, became Rawlings 
running mate in the 1992 presidential elections.  
During the electoral campaign – and in fact thereafter – there was no serious 
disagreement over the PNDC’s economic policy (Boafo-Arthur 1999: 55; Nugent 
1995: 272-80). Rather, the NPP argued that the PNDC had just implemented the 
economic policies of the Busia government. Thus, the NPP not only failed to pre-
sent a radical alternative to the regime’s economic policies, but also released it 
from answering tricky questions about retrenchment and the divestiture of state 
enterprises (Nugent 1995: 244). In fact, the NPP was not prepared to come to 
power by opposing the ERP/SAP risking potential curtailment of external financial 
assistance (Boafo-Arthur 1999: 55). As a result, by the early 1990s an unspoken 
and previously non-existing elite consensus had emerged embracing (neo-)liberal 
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economic policies as Ghana’s economic trajectory (Boafo-Arthur 1999: 57), an 
outcome which still has considerable effects now. 
Since the NPP supported the PNDC’s economic policies, it was betting on 
denouncing the regime’s human rights abuses to gain electoral support. How-
ever, this issue mainly appealed to a small and predominantly urban faction  
and seemed rather remote from the concerns of the rural majority (Nugent 
1995: 244). Moreover, neither increased personal attacks on Rawlings by the 
NPP’s campaign nor the exposure of local societal cleavages and attempts to 
use them for electoral gains, helped the main opposition party to gain grounds 
(Nugent 1995: 245-47). In November 1992 Rawlings was thus elected with 
58.4% of the national vote as the first president of Ghana’s Fourth Republic (ta-
ble 6.5). Adu Boahen, the NPP’s presidential candidate, came in second with 
30,3% of the vote and a national voter turnout of 48.3% (ibid.).  
Table 6.11   Overall results of Ghana’s 1992 presidential elections 
Candidate Party/Coalition Vote (%) 
Jerry J. Rawlings NDC/PA 58.4 
Adu Boahen NPP 30.3 
Hilla Limann PNC 6.7 
Kwabena Darko NIP 2.8 
Emmanuel A. Erskine PHP 1.8 
Source: Frempomg (2012: 49) 
 
Table 6.12   Results of Ghana’s 1992 presidential elections by region (in 
%) 
Region 
Rawlings 
(NDC/PA) 
Boahen 
(NPP) 
Limann 
(PNC) 
Darko 
(NIP) 
Erskine 
(PHP) 
Ashanti 32.9 60.5 2.5 3.6 0.6 
Brong-Ahafo 61.9 29.5 5.3 2.3 1.0 
Central  66.5 26.0 1.9 3.5 2.2 
Eastern 57.3 37.7 1.9 2.3 0.7 
Greater 
Accra 
53.4 37.0 4.3 4.1 1.3 
Northern 63.0 16.3 32.5 1.5 8.3 
Upper East 54.0 10.5 32.5 1.4 1.7 
Upper 
West 
51.0 8.9 37.1 1.8 1.2 
Volta 93.2 3.6 1.6 0.7 0.9 
Western 60.7 22.8 22.8 5.6 2.4 
National  58.4 30.3 6.7 2.8 1.8 
 
 
Source: Frempong (2012: 49) 
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Rawlings won a clear majority in all regions with the exception of Ashanti 
(table 6.6). He even substantively won the majority of cast votes in Brong-Ahafo 
which had been a stronghold of the Danquah-Busia-Dombo faction in previous 
elections. If that were not enough, he also secured the majority of votes in the 
region of Greater Accra, which had been the centre of attacks on the regime by 
the broad anti-PNDC coalition. However, Rawlings performed less well in urban 
wage earning areas (Nugent 1995: 233). A closer look at the constituency level 
reveals that he lost to Boahen – albeit mostly closely – in constituencies in 
which the wage earning faction was statistically significant (ibid.). These results 
demonstrate how the support of urban wage earners had faded for the PNDC 
since the days of the revolution (Nugent 1995: 234). In contrast, already the 
District Assembly elections had hinted at the fact that the PNDC was capable of 
making the rural areas a major partner in its new ruling coalition. Gyimah-Boadi 
(1990: 339) argued that  
with a strong rural political machine, the PNDC could revolutionize 
Ghanaian politics […].  
While several international observer groups, including the Commonwealth 
Observer Group, the Carter Center and a mission of the Organisation of African 
Unity, endorsed the election results, the four opposition parties and their sup-
porters fiercely contested the declared results (Frempong 2012: 49). They 
claimed that factors like an uneven playing field due to over-exploitation of in-
cumbency, pro-government election authorities (Interim National Election 
Commission (INEC)) and a bloated and not updated voter register ensured 
Rawlings’ victory (Ayee 1998: 35). Many citizens who had opposed the PNDC 
had not registered for the District Assembly elections. Since this offered the 
PNDC a perceived advantage the same register was used for the 1992 polls, 
claimed the opposition forces (Frempong 2012: 60). The declaration of results 
set off a surge of post-election violence: four bombs detonated in different parts 
of Accra plotted by a group called Alliance for Democratic Forces; the NDC 
Western Regional Chairman was burnt to death and rioting took place in many 
larger cities including Kumasi. Thereupon the regime imposed a curfew and 
state of emergency (Frempong 2012: 50; Nugent 1995: 234). It was claimed 
that even though the electoral process did indicate irregularities and therefore 
left room for improvement, the results did reflect the will of the people (see Jef-
fries & Thomas 1993).        
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Ahead of the parliamentary polls which were scheduled to follow the presi-
dential race, the four opposition parties demanded reforms whose implementa-
tion they declared as prerequisite for their participation in the subsequent parlia-
mentary polls. These included an interim government to oversee the remaining 
part of the transition process, the compiling of a new voter register and a new 
Electoral Commission to include representatives of the opposition forces (Frem-
pong 2012: 50; Nugent 1995: 248). Mediating efforts by traditional and religious 
leaders between the regime and opposition forces did however not succeed.  
The parliamentary elections were postponed twice, but polls were finally held 
on the 29th of December 1992 with a boycott by the opposition parties. As a result 
the NDC secured the vast majority of the 200 parliamentary seats in a race with 
an historically low voter turnout of 29% (Frempong 2012: 50). While the old forc-
es had been allowed to participate in the political sphere under the rules dictated 
by the regime, the excluded factions had not yet been re-incorporated into the 
political sphere at national level at this time. The boycott of the parliamentary race 
was some kind of self-exclusion by the opposition higher-level forces from the 
key formal political institution. While the self-succeeding democratic transfor-
mation of the PNDC ensured continued external legitimacy, the boycott of the 
opposition forces strained the internal legitimacy of the new regime. This situation 
in turn could not be completely ignored by international actors. 
Another significant outcome of the 1992 parliamentary elections had been 
that many individuals who had entered the national political scene as new MPs 
most likely would not have joined Ghana’s higher-level factions if it had not 
been for the Rawlings’ decade (Nugent 1995: 260). Only two of the NDC Mem-
bers of Parliament had a conventional professional background (professors, 
lawyers, doctors etc.); Kwabena Adjei (Biakoye constituency) and Alex Ababio 
(South Dayi constituency) (ibid.). Both had previously held positions within the 
PNDC. Nugent (ibid.) illustrates with recourse to the Volta region that plenty of 
the NDC’s parliamentary candidates had emerged through the District Assem-
blies including Pat Pomary for Hohoe North; Kosi Kedem for Hohoe South; 
Densi Boafo for Nkwanta and Modestus Ahiable for Ketu North (see Ninsin 
1996: 27-28). The new MP for Krachi, Francis Gyefour represented farming in-
terests while Kofi Attoh, who had been the CDR regional organizing assistant, 
was elected as MP for Ho Central (ibid.). Emil Brantuo, a chop bar owner and 
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PNDC District Secretary was elected as MP in Buem while Commodore Steve 
Obimpeh and Dan Abodakpi, who had both been involved in PNDC’s mobiliza-
tion activities, represented the constituencies of North Dayi and Keta respec-
tively in the new parliament. In addition to Obimpeh, another two MPs in the 
Volta region had military backgrounds: Squadron Leader C.K. Sowu (Anlo) and 
Lt-Col. E.K.D. Tsede (Ho West) (Nugent 1995: 260).  
The detailed example of the Volta region illustrates that the regime – apart 
from earlier selective elite co-option – tried to keep its distance from members 
of the established higher-level factions. As a result, through its nominees for the 
1992 parliamentary race, the regime represented truly new individuals on the 
electoral scene (Nugent 1995: 260). With several having secured their candida-
cy through their membership of District Assemblies and the 31st December 
Women’s Movement, a number of new MPs had “entered the political arena 
from below” (ibid.; see also Frempong (2003); Ninsin 1996: 27-28). While Nugent 
(1995: 260) points out that the NDC’s candidates were rarely characteristic of the 
population at large, neither did the majority of the NDC’s new MPs belong to 
Ghana’s previously established higher-level factions. As a result, the composition 
of Ghana’s higher-level factions in the Fourth Republic had been altered vertically 
through the rule of the PNDC. Most likely it was enhanced by the opposition’s 
boycott allowing for some social mobility.  
 
6.2.2 Towards an elite consensus on the process of granting access to power 
After the 1992 polls Ghana’s political system was a “de facto one party system 
through the ballot box” (Frempong 2012: 55). At first the NPP published “The 
Stolen Verdict” in which it documented alleged electoral fraud and malpractices 
in 100 out of 200 constituencies during the 1992 electoral process (NPP 1993). 
Thereby the main opposition party demonstrated to a domestic and international 
audience that it vehemently disagreed with the process which had granted polit-
ical power to the NDC. However, the main opposition force neither limited itself 
to public outcry nor did its self-exclusion from parliament mean it relinquished 
further political struggle. Reflecting on its strengths in judiciary matters, the NPP 
turned the Supreme Court into an arena to mediate political issues that would 
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have normally been dealt with in parliament and achieved some rulings in its 
favour (Frempong 2012: 58).87  
Eventually, the NPP leadership floated the idea of “doing business” with the 
government (Boafo-Arthur 1999: 56) and began to engage in direct talks with 
the NDC to underline its willingness to settle differences through negotiations 
rather than confrontation (Frempong 2012: 58). Most rank and file supporters of 
the NPP severely critiqued the step (Frempong 2012: 59; Boafo-Arthur 1999: 
56). While it is difficult to determine what led to the decision of the NPP leader-
ship to take a step towards the NDC, a statement by Nyaho-Tamakloe, Chair-
man of the NPP’s sector committee on health and social services, lets one in-
terpret the move as a strategic measure of confidence-building aimed at both 
domestic but in particular international actors: 
We just want to prove to the western nations who have put so much 
money into P/NDC ERP/SAP that when we are given the chance we will 
do better than Rawlings and his people. We want them to have confi-
dence in us (Boafo-Arthur 1999: 56). 
At the same time the NPP, whose aim it was to be fully re-included into Ghana’s 
political sphere, needed to work towards ensuring a process which would allow it to 
do so. Both parties began to discuss issues related to the electoral framework such 
as the controversial voter register and the opposition’s demand for unconditional 
amnesty for exiled Ghanaians (Boafo-Arthur 1999: 56). Soon however the inter-
party dialogue collapsed (Boafo-Arthur 1999: 57). Despite this failure, the talks be-
came the precursor of the Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC) which was es-
tablished in 1994 by a newly inaugurated Electoral Commission (EC).  
Since the new EC was led by Afari-Gyan and Kanga, both leading members 
of the defunct and largely discredited INEC, the opposition questioned that the 
election authority was going to be an independent and impartial arbiter (Frem-
pong 2012: 62). However, endowed with donor assistance the EC followed a 
recommendation by the Commonwealth Observer Group to refer to an institu-
tionalized process of dialogue and consultation as building block for democratic 
consolidation (Frempong 2008: 191). In May 1994 IPAC was formed which al-
lowed the EC to draw opposition parties and the ruling NDC into an institutional-
ized process discussing reforms of the electoral framework. IPAC provided a 
space for Ghana’s political elite to bargain over the rules of the game granting 
access to state power and thus elite succession in the new Republic. Despite its 
                                            
87
 For more details see Kotey (1995). 
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initial hiccups, the opposition forces achieved – mediated through the EC and the 
platform provided by IPAC – some compromises reforming Ghana’s electoral 
framework ahead of the next general elections in 1996. One key target for elec-
toral reform was – just like in preparation for the 2012 elections – the voter regis-
ter which was overhauled with party agents actively involved as observers in the 
registration exercise. Moreover, a single day was set for both parliamentary and 
presidential elections; parties agreed on the use of transparent ballot boxes; the 
introduction of photo ID cards for voter identification and approved observation by 
party agents on voting day (Frempong 2012: 63 & 69).  
 
Even though a consensus amongst Ghana’s higher-level factions on electoral 
reforms had been achieved, it does not imply that all differences of opinion had 
tranquilly been discussed. Rather, bitter conflicts and disagreements between 
the opposing parties characterized especially the first years of IPAC (Frempong 
2012: 84). Despite all differences Ghana’s political parties agreed on the above 
outlined electoral reforms and even though IPAC’s discussions were not legally 
binding for the EC, they were given serious attention. By doing so, IPAC – over 
time – became an institutionalised platform for building trust and confidence 
amongst the higher-level factions in the EC itself and the electoral process. The 
EC became a vital mediator in building an elite consensus on electoral reforms 
and hence designing formal political institutions granting access to power in 
Ghana’s Fourth Republic as was seen in 2012. 
A high voter turnout of 78% during the 1996 polls compared to 29% in 1992 
reflected the increased confidence in the electoral process (Frempong 2012: 
71). Rawlings, as before, won the presidential elections in nine regions. John A. 
Kufuor, the candidate of the NPP/Great Alliance, came in second with 39.6% of 
the votes, and Edward N. Mahama,88 the presidential candidate of the PNC, 
secured 3.1% (ibid.). The opposition parties secured a sizable representation in 
parliament – about 40% – and with the NDC and NPP together controlling 97% 
of the presidential votes and seats in parliament, the results indicated an 
emerging two-party system.89  
                                            
88
 Edward N. Mahama and John D. Mahama are not related. They are both Northerners, but 
John D. Is a Gonja from Bole while Edward N. Mahama is a Mampurisi from Nalgerigu.  
89
 For more details on Ghana’s 1992 election results see Electoral Commission of Ghana 
(1992). 
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In contrast to the transitional polls in 1992 the contesting parties accepted the 
declared results due to the consensual electoral reforms. In fact, defeated pres-
idential candidates attended the inaugural ceremony, shoock hands with Rawl-
ings as re-elected president, and Kufuor conceded that the NDC had become a 
“potent third force in Ghanaian politics” (Frempong 2012: 73). The outcome of 
the 1996 elections represented a first step towards re-inclusion of previously 
excluded higher-level factions to the political sphere at national level. However, 
it took a significant amount of financial support from donors to keep Ghana’s 
democratic transition through electoral reforms and support of civil society on 
track a situation which continues to 2012 and today. Besides loans, the interna-
tional community has also supported Ghanademocratic transition by funding 
electoral administration reforms. For example in 1994, the NPP threatened to 
boycott the 1996 election because it did not agree with the voter registration 
procedures. The issue was resolved by the US embassy by paying for improved 
vote ridentification cards (Bitar and Lowenthal 2015: 135). Ghana’s reliance on 
continued international support poses the question of sustainability in case of 
external funding drying up (Frempong 2012: 77).  
 
Ahead of the 2000 elections, IPAC remained the main body for discussing 
continued electoral reform between the higher-level factions. The body was also 
replicated at regional and district levels (Frempong 2012: 83). In preparation for 
the upcoming polls, opposition forces were pushing once again for further elec-
toral reforms. A new voter registration exercise was conducted to improve its 
quality; the EC initiated the Political Parties Act of 2000 and intended to only al-
low photo voter ID cards for the identification of eligible voters in the 2000 polls. 
This plan was however firmly opposed by the NDC who feared that an incomplete 
coverage of the conversation exercise, in particular in the rural areas, would turn 
to its disadvantage. A Supreme Court decision ruled that both could be used, 
leading almost to opposition violence and boycott (Frempong 2012: 84).   
By 2000 Ghana’s higher-level factions had agreed on the process of grant-
ing access to power. Remarkable not only in light of Ghana’s own history, but 
also in regional comparision was the fact that Rawlings complied with the con-
stitutional two-term limit in office, so that Atta Mills became the NDC’s presiden-
tial candidate. In the end, John A. Kufuor won the presidential-run off for the 
NPP with the help of united opposition forces (table 6.7; Frempong 2012: 93) 
 243 
 
and secured, albeit marginally, the majority in parliament (Frempong 2012: 90). 
This time the NPP had managed to forge a broad societal alliance with the 
smaller opposition forces such as the PNC, CPP (previously PCP) and United 
Ghana Movement (UGM). The smaller parties acted as “king-makers” and were 
rewarded for their lower-level factions’ support with a number of influential polit-
ical positions (Frempong 2012: 96): The defeated CPP parliamentary candidate 
Kwesi Ndoum e.g. became Minister of Economic Planning. Mallam Issah from 
the PNC, which had performed well in the Northern regions during the first 
round, became the Youth and Sports Minister, while Charles Wereko-Brobby, 
the UGM’s presidential candidate – and nephew of Victor Owusu – was as-
signed Head of the Volta River Authority (VRA). Also all three independent MPs 
were co-opted into the alliance by becoming deputy ministers in Kufuor’s gov-
ernment (ibid.).90  
The NDC had been aware of the fact that it was not particularly popular in 
the urban areas where structural adjustment policies had left deep cuts. How-
ever, it also knew that the elections would be decided in the rural areas where it 
tried to hold its ground (Nugent 2001: 410). Yet, the NDC failed in its objective 
for several reasons. The resource base for its campaign had been significantly 
eroded, since decreased international prices of Ghana’s primary exports had 
negative effects on both foreign-exchange earnings and government’s revenue 
(Nugent 2001: 419). Besides the international price for oil had increased sharply 
which further contributed to diminishing the NDC’s capacity to strategically 
channel resources to the electorate as a crucial pillar of its campaign strategy. 
In this context, the opposition forces capitalised on emphazising the contrast in 
lifestyle between lower-level factions and the “NDC’s nouveau riches” (ibid.). 
Moreover, the NPP succeeded in its strategic move to mobilize the support of 
the demographically decisive faction of young voters who felt neglected by the 
by now established NDC and had no memory of the revolution with which Rawl-
ings was trying to score electoral points (Nugent 2001: 419-20).  
While the old high-level political factions have gradually worked their way 
back into the political sphere since the end of the 1980s, the polls in 2000 and 
resuting alteration in power denoted their complete re-inclusion. In fact, in 2000 
                                            
90
 For further examples of NPP’s successful co-option of smaller factions in 2000 see Frempong 
(2012: 96).   
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the NDC became the first party in Ghana to lose power through the ballot box 
(Frempong 2012: 95). 
Table 6.13   Results of presidential run-off in 2000 (in %) 
Region  Kufuor (NPP) 
Change in % 
from round 1 
Mills (NDC) 
Change in % 
from round 1 
Ashanti 79.89 +4.16 20.11 -2.38 
Brong Ahafo 58.30 +7.73 41.70 -2.92 
Central  60.31 +10.63 39.69 -4.04 
Eastern 62.41 +7.44 37.59 -3.75 
Greater Accra 59.95 +7.43 40.05 -2.63 
Northern 48.90 +19.34 51.10 +0.41 
Upper East 42.83 +21.37 57.17 +5.10 
Upper West 38.03 +22.52 61.97 -0.32 
Volta 11.53 +3.05 88.47 +2.29 
Western 60.90 +10.36 39.10 -4.83 
National  56.90 +8.73 43.10 -1.44 
 
Electoral reform continued also in preparation for the 2004 polls and once 
more incrementally altered Ghana’s electoral framework. As in all previous election 
reform efforts since 1992, a new voter registration exercise was conducted (Frem-
pong 2012: 104). While the EC facilitated the steady improvements of the voters’ 
list, it also began to assert its independence from the NPP and NDC. In late 2003 
the NPP government had planned a re-demarcation exercise of constituencies and 
the establishment of a government procurement committee for purchasing all elec-
tion-related material (Frempong 2012: 103). The NPP’s venture encountered fierce 
resistance from the NDC who perceived it as a ploy to rig the elections. However, 
the plan was also strongly resisted by the EC with support from CSOs and even 
the lower ranks of the NPP who believed the move would tarnish the party’s pro-
spective electoral victory (ibid.). In the end, the NPP had to allow the EC to consti-
tute its own procurement committee which included government representatives, 
but was dominated by EC members (Frempong 2012: 104). 
The continuous quarrel between higher-level factions over electoral reform 
reflects a power struggle to change the formal institutions embedded in and de-
termining the formal relations of power in Ghana’s polity continuing through to 
2012. As a key part of and actor in Ghana’s electoral framework the EC takes 
part in this power struggle as much as it is subject to it. Attempts by the ruling 
and opposition forces to win the EC in various conflicts over to their sides have 
sorely tested its independence and credibility. By increasingly guarding its inde-
Source: Frempong (2012: 93) 
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pendent role the EC – similar to the Supreme Court – acts by now more as arbi-
ter in this power struggle which has gained its trust and legitimacy amongst 
higher-  and lower-level factions (figure 4.5). 
Figure 6.3   Trust of Ghanaians in their Electoral Commission 
 
Another example illustrating this point is the re-demarcation exercise in prepara-
tion for the 2004 elections. In November 2003 the EC gave notice to increase the 
200 constituencies to 230 based on the 2000 population census initiated by the 
NPP government (Frempong 2012: 104). The NDC however claimed the in-
crease in the number of parliamentary seats was a gimmick by the EC to help the 
ruling NPP to hold on to power. While the NDC went to the Supreme Court to 
ensure the new constituencies would not be used until 2008, the EC stuck to its 
plan. The Supreme Court’s ruling had backed the position of the EC so that the 
number of parliamentary seats for the 2004 polls was increased (ibid.).  
The results of 2004 confirmed Kufuor (NPP) – who had secured 52.45 per-
cent of the votes in the first round – in office for another term, ahead of Atta 
Mills (NDC) coming second with 44.64 percent (Frempong 2012: 109). With an-
other relatively peaceful turnover of power in the subsequent general election in 
2008 – this time from the NPP (Nana Akufo Addo) to the NDC (Atta Mills) –  
Ghana’s higher-level factions had also arrived at an elite consensus on the pro-
cess of granting access to power which had been achieved and sustained by 
continuous incremental structural changes to the formal electoral framework.91  
 
                                            
91
 See Frempong (2012) and Gyekye-Jandon (2006) for a detailed analysis of Ghana’s sutained 
electoral reforms.  
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Regarding the composition of Ghana’s higher-level factions one needs to address 
as well the stepping back of the military. As a major pillar of the PNDC regime, 
members of the security forces had established themselves amongst Ghana’s po-
litical higher-level factions (Agyeman-Duah 2002: 9). The 1992 Constitution had 
provided the impetus for further reform of the security sector with the aim of bring-
ing it more under parliamentary or at least civilian oversight (BICC n.d: 1). In fact, a 
series of reforms was initiated by Rawlings during the 1990s to professionalise the 
Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) (BICC n.d.: 2) and to subordinate them to ministerial 
authority (Hutchful 1997a: 258). This helped to mitigate military intrusiveness in 
politics even though segments of the military remained strong and visible through-
out Rawlings’ rule (Agyeman-Duah 2002: 10).  
A vital factor which curtailed the GAF’s role in the political sphere was its in-
creased involvement in several UN peacekeeping operations since the early 1990s 
(Handley and Mills 2001: 23-24; Hutchful 1997a: 258). The missions had re-
engaged the soldiers in their main field of operation, brought some of the forces 
outside the country and offered valuable training and experience for the military. 
Moreover, the missions provided a lucrative way for government to subsidize the 
GAF which allowed the PNDC regime to scale back military spending to levels 
lower than ever before without provoking serious discontent (Hutchful 1997a: 258). 
Also the NPP government under Kufuor took similar measures to ensure that the 
military would not disrupt democratic processes. In an interview Kufuor stated  
[…] what we did to get them to stay in the barrack is we treated them 
well. For example, Ghana has participated in UN peace missions all 
over the world for a long time. The allowance for going on peace mis-
sions was low: $32 a day. At the time my government came in, soldiers 
were given only half of that, about $15 or $16 a day. My government 
raised the allowance to $27 because the soldiers were risking their 
lives going on these missions. They appreciated that. We ensured their 
upkeep […] (Bitar & Lowenthal 2015: 130).  
Another step to re-adjust the role of the military was taken by the NPP di-
rectly after coming to power by strengthening the police and thereby emphasiz-
ing its leading role in ensuring internal security (Handley and Mills 2001: 26). 
Nevertheless, Ghana’s last coup attempt occurred only about a decade ago in 
2004 and might have reinforced amongst some civilian higher-level factions the 
perception of the military as “enemy from within” (Aning and Lartey 2009: 14). 
Even though civilian control over the military has been reasserted – primarily in 
the form of executive control rather than parliamentary oversight – (Handley and 
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Mills 2001: 29), excessive secrecy in national security matters and lingering 
suspicion between political and security higher-level factions, tend to continue 
(Aning and Lartey 2009: 10 & 29). 
By the late 2000’s both dominant civilian higher-level factions, with their ba-
ses amongst the lower-level ones, were forming together a new historic bloc. 
The constant slight re-alignments of factions into ruling coaltions among higher-
level factions is one vital pillar ensuring Ghana’s current resilience and hence 
stability of the new political settlement.  
 
6.2.3 Impact of Ghana’s political liberalization on lower-levels’ position of power 
The liberalization of Ghana’s political sphere did not only impact on the constel-
lation of power between Ghana’s higher-level factions. The changes within the 
international sphere enabled “good governance” to become the new hegemonic 
paradigm. This in turn also strengthened the position of lower-level towards 
higher-level ones. Societal groups in Ghana’s cultural sphere regained in 
strength compared to previous times under PNDC rule. The P/NDC loosened its 
monopoly on the media scene (Frempong 2012: 88) so that private media out-
lets in particular in the form of FM stations grew (Frempong 2012: 105) reflected 
in the open political space in 2012. The expanded space was used by various 
societal groups to engage e.g. in political activities like peace campaigns, voter 
education and domestic election observation through CSOs as IDEG, CODEO 
and the Christian Council. At least part of the loosening of the P/NDC’s grip on 
the cultural sphere can be understood by policy rents of international donors for 
the regime (Boafo-Arthur 1999: 64).  
Only 6 months after the transitional polls international donors pledged $2.1 bil-
lion in assistance for 1993/94 to Ghana at a meeting in Paris chaired by the World 
Bank. This exceeded by far the needed amount of $1.7 billion estimated by the 
World Bank (ibid.). As one Ghanaian official stated in an interview with Callaghy 
(1990: 283), Ghana was strongly depending on the inflow of external capital:  
We need two legs to walk – a strong and effective state and a strong 
private sector; we have neither and are not likely to have either anytime 
soon. We are like a cripple I saw recently with no legs […] surviving on-
ly by begging and trying to look sympathetic to the potential alms giver 
(Callaghy 1990: 283).  
As much as Ghana required external capital injections, the IFIs and donor 
community were in need of an African success story (Gyimah-Boadi 1997: 314) 
legitimizing their neoliberal reform policies. The decision by the donor communi-
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ty to pledge more financial assistance to Ghana than demanded might have 
been influenced by the dramatic collapse of Zambia’s ERP which left Ghana as 
one of the last remaining African “success stories” (Callaghy 1990: 284). In fact, 
until 1987 Ghana was heavily depending on loans from the IMF and World 
Bank, since major Western donors hestitated to support Ghana with substantial 
financial resources (Callaghy 1990: 283-4). A senior World Bank official for Afri-
ca stated with Ghana in mind: 
The alternative – a series of failed programs in Africa – is not worth 
thinking about, and not only because of the human suffering. […] The 
basic idea of moving to a market economy, shifting policies out of 
grandiosity to step-by-step solid progress will be discredited, and we 
can’t afford to have those ideas discredited. If they fail in a series of 
countries […] then it is a failure of our approach to the economy […] So 
we have a very, very big stake in this (Callaghy 1990: 283).  
Ghana’s dependency on the inflow of external capital coupled with aid 
conditionality illustrates the issue of externalization of political accountability 
states in the Global South like Ghana are facing. However, the statement by 
the World Bank official demonstrates that states in the Global South have their 
own impact on the hegemonic position at least on ideas shaping policies at the 
international level. With Ghana being labeled as success story (Ofosu-Asare 
2011), its experience ought to serve as a model for development. As a conse-
quence, the case of Ghana has acquired an importance that has transcended 
the country's national boundaries, since it has become in some respects a 
measure legitimising the policy recommendations of the IMF and World Bank 
(Tanoh 1992). Also Rawlings stated in an interview the following:  
After the PNDC regime, Western powers and the media kept white-
washing the government’s image because Ghana had become a so-
called star of democracy, and especially when Jon Kufuor and the New 
Patriotic Party came in, it is like the West needed a country that could 
be projected to the rest of Africa and the world as a success story. So, 
in spite of all the corrupt things going on, the Western media kept 
whitewashing Kufuor’s government & image. Things are not quite what 
people outside are made to believe (Bitar & Lowenthal 2015: 130).  
The international community anticipated that the increased financial sup-
port would allow the regime to continue and broaden its structural adjustment 
efforts (Callaghy 1990: 284). In 1988 Ghana received with $40 per capita in 
foreign aid twice the average as the rest of Africa (Brooke 1989). Ghana’s ex-
ceptional or preferential treatment by the donor community (Gibbon 1992: 
161) is underlined by the fact that it tops the ranking – together with Côte 
d’Ivoire – of African states that received structural adjustment loans between 
1980-1999 from the IMF and World Bank (table 6.6). In addition to the relative-
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ly high levels of funding provided by the donor community, the sustained fi-
nancial support to Ghana despite regular non-compliance with IFIs’ condition-
alities adds to Ghana’s exceptional treatment. Non-compliance with IMF con-
ditionality occurred when the political survival of a regime was at stake 
(Akonor 2004). This happened notably prior to elections and periods of elite 
conflict (ibid.). Thus, when the regime needed to muster domestic support to 
stay in power, it enacted schemes like PAMSCAD breaching the consitionali-
ties of the IFIs to mitigate the effects of structural change on cost bearers. This 
was either silently accepted by the donor community or eventually, as in the 
case of PAMSCAD, even financially supported (Callaghy 1990: 284).  
Table 6.6   African states that were in the world’s top twenty of SAP loans 
received beween 1980-1999 
State  Number of IMF & World Bank 
adjustment loans between 1980-1999 
Côte d’Ivoire  
Ghana  
Senegal  
Uganda 
Kenya 
Malawi 
Zambia 
Madagascar  
Mauretania 
Mali  
Togo  
Niger 
26 
26 
21 
20 
19 
18 
18 
17 
16 
15 
15 
14 
            Source: Easterly (2007: 59)  
At the same time Ghanaian higher-level factions in the Fourth Republic have 
helped to nurture the international framing of Ghana as a success story to use 
the resulting leverage for their own purpose (Addai 1991). In the course of politi-
cal liberalization the NDC was less and less able to resort to coercive measures 
to ensure the implementation of economic reforms and its own hold on to power. 
The new context of a liberal polity re-established the political imperative of win-
ning elections and thereby also brought back competitive clientelism (Whitfield 
2011). Since developing countries have in general a rather small tax base, tax 
cuts do not enhance broad electoral support. Therefore election-oriented policy-
making in the Global South tends to occur in the form of government expenditure 
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increases, rather than tax reductions (Schuhknecht 1996: 159; see also Block 
2002). Data on Ghana’s budget deficit since its transition in 1992 shows clear 
evidence for expansionary fiscal policies to ensure electoral support for incum-
bent governments (figure 6.8 & 6.9).92 The fiscal laxity emerges as electoral fiscal 
cycles in states of the Global South just like so-called political business cycles do 
in industrialized countries (Schuhknecht 1996: 155). 
Figure 6.4   Ghana’s budget deficit from 1983-2002 (% GDP, inverted scale) 
 
 
Figure 6.5   Ghana’s budget deficit from 2003-2012 (% GDP, inverted scale) 
 
Source: World Bank (2013) & Bawumia (2013) 
                                            
92
 For a more detailed analysis of Ghana’s electoral fiscal cycles see Akonor (2012: 104-106; 2004) 
and Killick (2010: 410-413).  
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While some authors argue that elections promoted non-compliance of Ghanaian 
regimes with IFI’s conditionalities (Akonor 2004), one can also interpret the elec-
toral fiscal cycles in Ghana as a manifestation of various Ghanaian governments 
managing the precarious balance between externalized political accountability – 
meeting conditionalities to ensure continued external financial assistance – and 
responding to demands of lower-level factions (internal accountability). In that 
regard the liberalization process has strengthened the position of Ghana’s lower-
level factions towards their higher-level ones. This is particularly so, even if lim-
ited to election times, since the highly fragmented nature of Ghanaian society 
with its constant coalitional shifts does not allow higher-level factions to take any 
support from lower-level factions for granted. Data by Fosu and Aryetee (2013: 
52 & 54) suggest that Ghana has been relying more and more on external 
sources to fund its domestic and external deficits. Thus, the continuous inflow of 
foreign capital provided in particular by the IMF and World Bank until today aids 
Ghana’s current political settlement to stay afloat.  
While the figures above clearly indicate recurring increased government ex-
penditures in accordance with general elections since 1992, they also prove 
governments’ efforts to reverse this trend during post-election times (1993/94; 
1998/99; 2001/02; 2011). On the one hand these counter measures are neces-
sary to appease international donors who occasionally suspended payments or 
succession of programmes (Killick 2010: 411). On the other hand Ghanaian 
higher-level factions are now also very much aware that increased government 
expenditure – financed through domestic borrowing, causes monetary expan-
sion, leading to increased inflationary pressure – will eventually be felt by the 
entire electorate. As Ghanaian history has proven, in the worst case severe 
macroeconomic instability caused by lax fiscal policy can lead to high rotations 
amongst higher-level factions. Therefore, Ghanaian ruling coalitions have found 
various ways and strategies to rebalance cyclical overspending by raising state 
revenue in post-election years.  
The NDC was able for example to cover the main part of the 1992 electoral-
ly driven deficit through privatization of SOEs (Killick 2010: 411). In fact, a pro-
gramme of state divestiture and privatization gained momentum between 1993-
1999 (Killick 2010: 412). In particular the sale of government’s shares in Ashanti 
Goldfields – 35% in 1994 – three state-owned banks and Ghana Telecom 
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helped to absorb inflationary deficit financing after the 1992 polls (Killick 2010: 
412 & 463; Opoku 2010: 151). The era of the NPP provides another example of 
how higher-level factions have dealt with domestic demands and higher-level 
factions competition for electoral support on the one hand, and ensuring macro-
economic stability and fulfilment of donors’ conditionality on the other. When the 
NPP came to power in 2001, it had fully comprehended that the P/NDC had 
been rather successful in gathering electoral support by resorting to a political 
formula already adopted by Nkrumah: community-oriented developmental pat-
rimonialism (as described in chapter four). Ahead of the 2000 elections, the 
NPP had campaigned successfully on the abolition of the “cash and carry” 
health care system promising the introduction of a National Health Insurance 
Scheme (Blanchet et al. 2012). Facing increasing debts, the NPP government 
decided to join the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. By joining 
HIPC, qualifying countries were awarded with debt relief, if they met predeter-
mined criteria and were expected to use the freed up resources for social 
spending and poverty reduction in particular (IMF 2014: 2). In that regard do-
nors’ expectations and needs of Ghana’s higher-level factions were easy to ac-
commodate. The allocation of HIPC funds occurred in Ghana – at least during 
GPRS I – based on population size, rather than needs (Abdulai and Hulme 
2014: 11). This practice and the high visibility of HIPC-public goods and -
services, which were associated with the NPP, played its part in mobilizing elec-
toral support for the party’s re-election in 2004.  
During the first term of the NPP, HIPC funds were used as a carrot and 
stick instrument for electoral purposes allocating resources disproportionally to 
regions known as NPP strongholds (e.g. Ashanti) and the main home of swing 
voters such as Greater Accra, Western and Central region. In contrast, at the 
end of the NPP’s second term, the party moved to target particularly opposi-
tions’ strongholds with HIPC funds to widen its potential electoral support base 
ahead of the 2008 polls (Abdulai and Hulme 2014: 14 &19). It remains to be 
seen what impact Ghana’s oil production as new source of state revenue will 
have on distributive electoral politics.93  
However, Ghanaian higher-level factions did not merely rely on external 
sources to bolster state revenues as potential sources of financing highly compet-
                                            
93
 For a basic overview of Ghana’s emerging oil industry see Kastning (2011). 
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itive electoral races. Encouraged by donors, tax reforms with the aim to boost 
state revenues have been implemented (Assibey-Mensah 1999: 77). This further 
alternation of Ghana’s formal institutions complemented the incremental structur-
al change spurred by economic reforms. For it changed who carried the main 
burden of financing the Ghanaian state and therefore mirrored the structural 
change in relations of power among lower-level factions. Since independence 
the Ghanaian state’s main source of revenue was based on an overreliance on 
general tariffs and export duties which were levied on single commodities such 
as cocoa (table 6.10; Osei 2000: 258; Assibey-Mensah 1999: 78). Prior to ERP 
reforms in the 1980s over 33 percent of total revenue was collected from export 
duties on cocoa produced by rural areas and other primary commodities such 
as minerals and timber (Assibey-Mensah 1999: 80). Faced with the need to re-
duce the budget deficit, the NDC attempted in the 1995 pre-election year to 
switch from a system of sales tax to one based on Value Added Tax (VAT) 
(Osei 2000: 255). The aim of the tax reform was to shift from an over-dependent 
tax system on a few goods (from production), towards one which allowed ex-
panding and diversifying the state’s tax base to share its burden (Assibey-
Mensah 1999: 78). With VAT being a general consumption tax on goods and 
services, the reform allowed coverage of the retail and service sector rather 
than focusing predominantely on agriculture (rural areas).  
The redistributive effect of the burden sharing provoked massive public out-
cry especially in urban areas (Osei 2000: 266). Severe street protests a year 
ahead of another general election pushed the NDC to withdraw its VAT law. 
However, the NDC simply postponed its implementation till 1998, a non-
immediate pre-election year (Osei 2000: 272). Since then VAT has been con-
tinuously increased by NPP and NDC regimes (Daily Graphic 2014c) and  
helped to alter Ghana’s tax structure (figures 6.6, 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9). Since the 
mid-2000s Ghana’s tax base has significantly widened and has moved from one 
primarily relying on taxing rural production towards sharing the burden of tax 
with urban consumers and formal wage earners (individual income tax) and 
businesses (corporate income tax).94  
Despite this structural shift in the state’s main revenue source, throughout 
the early and mid-2000s grants increased as vital source of state income, indi-
                                            
94
 Interestingly property tax still does not seem to play a significant role in the Ghanaian state’s 
revenue.  
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cating Ghana’s growing dependency on aid and continuous inflow of external 
capital (Whitfield and Jones 2007: 4; Kpakol 1988). In fact, external grants from 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) have helped to dampen Ghana’s grow-
ing budget deficits since the reintroduction of competitative party politics. In 
2003 for example Ghana’s budget deficit exclusive of grants was 6.8% whereas 
it was only 0.6% inclusive of grants (see figure 3.10). This suggests that the 
continous inflow of external capital is vital to uphold Ghana’s macroeconomic 
stability and hence also for maintaining its current political settlement.  
Figure 6.6   Main pillars of Ghana’s revenue structure 1972-1983 (in millions Cedi) 
 
Source: IMF (2013) / IMF GFS Historical (2006) 
 
Figure 6.7   Main pillars of Ghana’s revenue structure 1984-1989 (in millions Cedi) 
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Figure 6.8   Main pillars of Ghana’s revenue structure 1990-1993 (in millions Cedi) 
 
Source: IMF (2013) / IMF GFS Historical (2006) 
 
 
Figure 6.9   Main pillars of Ghana’s revenue structure 2001-2011 (in millions Cedi) 
 
Source: IMF (2013) / IMF GFS Historical (2006) 
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Figure 6.10   Ghana’s internal balance, 1984-2003 
 
Source: Fosu & Aryeetey (2013: 53) 
 
 
6.3 Chapter summary 
The internationally propagated neo-liberal reforms of Ghana’s economic institu-
tions with its inherent redistribution of benefits have significantly altered the rela-
tions of power amongst Ghana’s lower-level factions. With the open bias of 
ERP/SAP in favour of production and hence the rural areas, Ghana’s cocoa 
farmers were major beneficiaries of economic reforms. The severe hardship 
which resulted from the neo-liberal reform packages prescribed from above they 
have reversed the old fiscal paradigm with its power relations of an “urbanized 
vampire state” (chapter three). However, rural areas as main producer of export 
products no longer carry the main burden of taxation and the fact that numbers 
translate into political power not only enabled the countryside to become, but now 
also ensure rural factions to be, a major partner in any national ruling coalition 
(Harding 2015). Despite rapid and increasing urbanization – more Ghanaians are 
now living in urban settings rather than rural ones (GSS 2012: 4) – both dominant 
higher level factions are highly dependent on strong rural support to gain political 
power through the ballot box (Harding 2015a; 2012). The recouped relative 
strength of rural areas compared to the urban ones is also reflected in the coun-
try’s political setup in which the uneven sizes of constituencies tends to be biased 
towards the rural/low populated areas (chapter four).  
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Besides the structural changes in relations of power amongst Ghana’s low-
er-level factions, the (neo-)liberal economic and political reforms had a vital im-
pact on the reconstruction process of Ghana’s state-society relations. They 
changed the power dynamics between lower and higher-level factions. The cri-
sis of accumulation which the Ghanaian state faced at the end of the 1980s dis-
solved Ghana’s productive social contract (Nugent 2010: 57-63) which had 
been upheld by the provision of community-oriented developmental patrimonial-
ism. The re-establishment of the material base of the Ghanaian state enabled 
the P/NDC to revive this political formula. With the re-liberalization of Ghana’s 
polity – regular elections since 1992 – and a highly fragmented society along 
the country’s main social fissure, higher-level factions have now to compete 
again for lower-level factions’ electoral support. This manifests itself in ongoing 
competitive electoral clientelism. Even if mainly limited to electoral time periods, 
the responsiveness of Ghana’s higher-level factions to demands of the elec-
torate is an indication of the lower levels’ regained strength towards higher-level 
ones. Or as Herbst (1993: 79) might put it, Ghana seems to have  
[…] succeeded in establishing a political system in which numbers 
translate into political power.  
Moreover, Ghana’s current higher-level factions seem to be very much aware of 
the fact that macroeconomic stability allowing for community-oriented develop-
mental patrimonialism is vital for their own political survival and the persistence 
of the current political settlement. 
Another change in the constellation of power has occurred amongst Ghana’s 
higher-level factions. By the 1990s the basis was laid for an unspoken ideological 
elite consensus on Ghana’s economic institutions which has been reinforced by 
the macroeconomic recovery under PNDC rule. Much later an elite consensus 
has also been achieved on the process of granting access to state power through 
continuous incremental structural change of Ghana’s electoral framework – which 
is still ongoing (continuous adaptability as source of resilience). The District As-
sembly elections in 1988/89 and following transitional national elections in 1992 
enabled incremental shifts in the composition of Ghana’s higher-level factions. 
The establishment of genuinely new faces amongst Ghana’s political elite indi-
cates some form of social mobility and hence a vertical expansion of Ghana’s 
higher-level faction. The elite concensus on the process of granting access to 
state power eventually allowed for Ghana’s first electoral turnover of power in 
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2000. It has marked the complete re-inclusion of old and previously excluded 
higher-level factions since the PNDC seized power. Furthermore, with the re-
establishment of civilian oversight over the military, the previous dominance of 
military authority in the political sphere has been replaced.   
This chapter has outlined the (neo-)liberal economic and political processes 
which led to the environment and settlement underpinning the 2012 elections. 
The incremental structural shifts, implying a re-distribution of benefits to societal 
groups allocated by formal institutions, were partially achieved through autocratic 
rule overtly accepted by IFIs and skilfully used by the PNDC. Moreover, the donor 
community who needed a sustained success story to legitimise its policy reform 
recommendations, aided implementing this structural change through an excep-
tional treatment of Ghana in terms of continuous and comparatively high levels of 
funding. Ghana’s labelling as African “success story” based on the country’s mac-
roeconomic recovery and its return to a multi-party system with turnovers in pow-
er, evokes however a distorted idea of a resilient liberal state. The sustainability 
of Ghana’s current settlement characterised by electoral competitive clientelism 
and mounting debts depends on a continued inflow of foreign capital. So far the 
mutually beneficial interest of portraying Ghana as a resilient state and hence 
success story by its elites and international donors ensures the flow of needed 
international financial assistance to maintain the current settlement. Despite un-
ambiguous elements of continuity, it is nonetheless remarkable that this process 
of social change has been achieved. This chapter has endeavoured to analyse 
this process of change which has led to the current dispensation as reflected in 
the 2012 elections.  
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VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS & REFLECTIONS 
During the late 1970s Ghana was described as a collapsed and failed state. In 
contrast, today the country is hailed internationally as a beacon of democracy and 
stability in West Africa. In light of this drastic image change from a fragile and even 
collapsed polity towards a resilient Ghanaian state, this thesis aimed to contribute 
to the statebuilding debate by exploring whether the Ghanaian state has in fact 
undergone any fundamental structural change and, if applicable, how this structural 
change has been achieved. While much research on Sub-Saharan Africa over the 
last decades has highlighted patterns of continuity on the continent, the thesis 
strove to focus on social change actually having occurred. To be able to provide a 
critical and nuanced analysis doing justice to these processes in Ghana, a critical 
theory approach has been opted for this endeavour.  
The Gramscian inspired theoretical framework of political settlement devel-
oped in chapter two, allowed for a differentiated analysis of social change. It 
permitted the scrutiny (1) of the workings of the Ghanaian state, and (2) of the 
constellation of power between contending social forces within the Ghanaian 
state in historical perspective. By comprising structures (institutions), ideology, 
and actors within different spheres at various levels as reference points guiding 
the analysis, the framework of political settlement also allowed for more com-
plexity suiting the subject matter.  
Based on this theoretical lens, chapter three outlined Ghana’s post-
independence settlement, its collapse and the Ghanaian state’s re-constitution. It 
has demonstrated that the workings of the immediate post-independent state 
were neopatrimonial in character, and that internal power constellations were 
marked by highly fragmented and fluctuating ruling elites with no ideological con-
sensus on Ghana’s economic and political trajectory. Moreover, Ghana’s post-
independence political settlement was characterized by an over-taxation of rural 
productive entrepreneurs in favour of urban masses’ consumption. This institu-
tionalized “urban vampire state” eventually eroded the country’s economic base 
and led to its fiscal and economic breakdown. The accompanying neopatrimonial 
crisis eventually unravelled the hegemony of the ruling forces and resulted in the 
collapse of Ghana’s post-independence settlement. In contrast, the last section of 
chapter three highlighted Ghana’s more recent historical developments which 
provide the building blocks for the currently dominant narrative of Ghana’s image 
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as “African success story”. The country’s remarkable macroeconomic recovery 
coupled with its (re-)democratization process make it stand out in regional com-
parison and suggest that it has arrived at a profoundly different place. Whether 
Ghana has arrived indeed at a new and stronger political settlement formed the 
discussion in chapter four to six.  
To present a sophisticated analysis of social change in Ghana, chapter four 
zoomed in on Ghana’s 2012 elections which served as an empirical basis and 
lens to observe the country’s current settlement outlined in chapter five. This 
approach enabled a fine grained within-case comparison with Ghana’s col-
lapsed post-independent settlement. The analysis of Ghana’s competitive 2012 
electoral clientelistic politics demonstrated the continued neopatrimonial charac-
ter of the Ghanaian state. Nevertheless, the thesis also argued that  while there 
has been no transformation of the Ghanaian state, there has been continuous 
incremental structural change within it. The constellation of power within the 
Ghanaian state has changed in three dimensions:  
(1) the relationship between Ghana’s higher level factions has been altered, 
reflected in a horizontal and vertical expansion of Ghana’s elite, and an 
ideological elite consensus has emerged with regard to the form of the 
state’s economic and political institutions;  
 
(2) the relationship between Ghana’s higher and lower level factions has 
changed in a way that lower level factions have gained relative strength 
in relation to higher level factions in previous times; and  
 
(3) the constellation of power between lower level factions has changed in 
the sense that rural areas have gained relative strength compared to ur-
ban ones.95  
Chapter six, as the last substantial part of the thesis, was devoted to illus-
trating how this incremental structural change has been achieved. The specific 
case of Ghana has shown that alterations of its economic institutions resulted in 
a redistribution of resources shifting the constellation of powers amongst Gha-
na’s lower-level faction which demanded also an adaptation of the political insti-
tutions. These institutional reforms and implied change of power relations was 
enabled, pushed for and carried through due to a specific combination of exter-
nal and internal conditions. The most significant ones amongst them were the 
fact that:  
                                            
95
 For a more detailed outline see chapter five. 
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1) the (neo-)liberal paradigm had become hegemonic at the global level re-
sulting in demands to liberalize economic and political institutions in re-
turn for financial assistance;  
 
2) Ghana’s economic fragility and position within the post-bipolar global 
system which made the Ghanaian state, and in particular its ruling elite, 
dependent on conditionalized external funding for its reconstitution; 
 
3) the military ruling elite implementing the institutional change leading to 
incremental structural social changes relied on suppression to curb cer-
tain demands of social forces on the state, and demonstrated an incredi-
ble capability to readapt and skilfully play the two level game: manoeu-
vring the challenge of maintaining external and internal credibility and le-
gitimacy; and  
 
4) a continuous evolution of politics (incremental structural shifts in power 
relations) and usage of outsiders through to the 2012 elections. 
 
While the thesis – and hence these concluding remarks – has been stress-
ing accomplished social change within the Ghanaian polity, it should not be 
misunderstood as a contribution simply joining the existing chorus praising 
Ghana as a pure success story. Agreeing with Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie’s 
view that there is a danger of presenting a single story (see Ngozi Adichie 2009) 
be it either one-sidedly negative or positive – or in the particular case of Ghana 
telling an oversimplified narrative – some comment on Ghana’s remaining fragil-
ity seems necessary. 
After Ghana’s economy had collapsed in the late 1970s early 1980s, Rawl-
ings’ self-branded revolutionary, progressive PNDC regime – pushed by the 
International Financial Institutions – embarked on retrieving and revitalizing a 
rather orthodox order. Based on the structural adjustment programme the 
PNDC recovered the previous imbalance of the orthodox order which however 
in turn enabled or even demanded incremental shifts in the constellation of 
power within the Ghanaian state. The thereby regained economic basis of the 
Ghanaian state, as well as the maintenance of a certain level of macroeconomic 
stability, form a crucial pillar of the current resilience of Ghana’s polity since the 
early 1990s. Although there now exists an elite awareness of and consensus on 
the need for ensuring a minimum level of macroeconomic stability in Ghana 
(see chapter six), reoccurring electoral cycles of increased budget deficits as a 
result of competitive (electoral) clientelism have led to ballooning debts. This not 
only highlights the macroeconomic costs of elections and hence democracy for 
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states in the Global South, but also alludes to the risk of (further) macroeco-
nomic instability in Ghana.  
Following the country’s 2012 election, increased inflation led to a significant 
rise in prices of daily goods and hence increased cost of living. In July 2014 this 
accumulated in a larger societal alliance led by the non-partisan civil society 
group Concerned Ghanaians for Responsible Governance (CGRG), profession-
als, trade unionists and traders joining in regular so called Red Friday demonstra-
tions against worsening economic conditions (Concerned Ghanaians for Re-
sponsible Governance 2014; Africa Confidential 2014). Protesters were wearing 
items of red cloth each Friday such as t-shirts, dresses, wristbands and head ties 
to express and underline their discontent with the government and shouted sar-
castic slogans such as “Somalia’s shilling is doing better than Ghana’s Cedi” (Af-
rica Confidential 2014). While the mounting protests in no way posed any severe 
threat to Ghana’s political stability, they do indicate the need for a sustained min-
imum of macroeconomic stability to ensure the continued resilience of the Gha-
naian state (see also chapter two).  
Over the past few decades the Ghanaian elite has been able to address the 
challenge posed by macroeconomic costs of elections both economically and 
politically rather well: either through the privatization of state-owned enterprises 
bringing money into the coffers of the state while at the same time providing 
economic opportunities for themselves (see section 5.1.3); or by signing up to 
the HIPC initiative which again helped to address the issue of increasing budget 
deficits, but also released funds to meet electorates’ expectations of providing 
goods during election times (see section 6.2.3). So far sustained financial sup-
port from the international community, in particular the IMF and World Bank, 
has enabled Ghanaian elites to significantly buffer budget deficits (see figure 
6.10). This arrangement keeps the challenge of the country’s remaining twin 
deficit for the time being at bay. The inflow of external capital – coupled with 
domestic debts (see Fosu and Aryeetey 2013: 52) – ensures maintaining a min-
imum of macroeconomic stability and thereby contributes to upholding the resil-
ience of the current system. That this mechanism is still in place is demonstrat-
ed by the fact that following the Red Friday demonstrations, Ghana applied to 
the IMF for a new financial assistance programme by the end of 2014 (ibid.). A 
new IMF loan of USD918 million was approved in April 2015 and the World 
 263 
 
Bank has offered another USD700 million guarantee for the implementation of 
energy projects (see IMF 2015; Africa Confidential 2015). This bolstering of state 
finances comes just in time for Ghana’s next big election campaign cycle with 
general elections being held at the end of 2016. In addition to the most recent 
IMF loan and World Bank guarantee, Ghanaian media report that Ghana – in ac-
cordance with World Bank parameters – has been officially classified again as a 
Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) in September 2015, since its debt has now 
reached 71% of its GDP (Myjoyonline 2015). While Ghanaian politicians rhetori-
cally refuse to go back to a HIPC status – Bawumia, NPP vice-presidential candi-
date in 2012, stresses Ghana should be classified as Highly Indebted Middle-
Income Country (HIMIC) – one might speculate, if another HIPC or “HIMIC” debt-
relief might soon be envisioned to provide Ghana with some more fiscal breathing 
space (see Appiah 2015; Myjoyonline 2015a). Overall Ghana’s high dependence 
on continued easy access to and flow of international financial assistance in order 
to sustain a minimum of macroeconomic stability and ease macroeconomic pres-
sures, hints at Ghana’s remaining vulnerability and fragility. For it is questionable 
whether Ghana’s horizontal and vertical pact is economically viable over time 
with its high dependence on the inflow of external funding (see chapter two). 
However, so far the mutually beneficial interest of portraying Ghana as a resilient 
state by its elites and donors ensures the flow of needed financial assistance to 
preserve the current settlement.    
Another vital pillar contributing to the current resilience of the Ghanaian 
state is based on the sustained adaptability of the electoral framework since the 
1990s ensuring elite consensus on access to, and power over, the state. How-
ever also with regards to this pillar Ghana might be facing some changes chal-
lenges. In June 2015 Charlotte Osei replaced Kwadjo Afari-Gyan as Chairper-
son of Ghana’s Electoral Commission (Asmah 2015). Afari-Gyan has played a 
vital role in administering all of Ghana’s election since the countries re-
democratization in 1992. While electoral reforms, in particular of the country’s 
voters’ register, have been common practice since Ghana’s re-democratization 
in 1992, the EC under Osei has stated a categorical no in response to recent 
demands of the opposition party NPP for a new register in preparation for the 
2016 polls (Essel 2015). It remains to be seen what impact a closure of this 
valve, which has up to now allowed for incremental structural changes in the 
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country’s formal political institutions, might have on the continued elite consen-
sus and hence resilience of the Ghanaian state.  
While addressing the issue of remaining fragility of Ghana’s political settle-
ment, one needs to acknowledge however, that changes to Ghana’s electoral 
framework represent just one avenue to alter the country’s formal political insti-
tutions. Another option to maintain the adaptability of Ghana’s political settle-
ment could be pursued by political actors “turning another screw”. It is conceiv-
able for example that political actors set on the agenda and push for the imple-
mentation of directly electing District Chief Executives (DCEs) who have been 
so far appointed by the President. This idea of political reform had already been 
proposed in the constitutional review process initiated under former President 
Atta Mills (see Ghana Constitution Review Commission 2012). The current 
practice structurally assigns the office of the President a rather large neopatri-
monial capacity. Reforms along these lines could therefore, in the specific case 
of Ghana, shift power away from the political power centre and, if linked to real 
scope of governance at local level (issue of fiscal decentralization/control over 
resources and its allocation), open opportunities for opposition forces. For “the-
winner-takes-it-all” set up would be undermined, and opposition forces could 
have the chance for political point-scoring through enhanced governance and 
development performances at the local level. This in turn could provide them 
with a platform to challenge the incumbent party more effectively at the national 
level throughout the next general elections. Even though there are other path-
ways to ensure continued adaptability of Ghana’s political settlement, plenty of 
conceivable fundamental changes to Ghana’s political system would require 
constitutional reform, which seems to be a rather long process. As a result, one 
might wonder how far this avenue could be a viable alternative pathway for en-
suring continued adaptability of Ghana’s settlement in light of looming general 
elections in 2016.  
The issue of incremental structural change of Ghana’s formal political institu-
tions coming to a halt might even assume more weight in a context in which an-
other unwritten “elite arrangement” between the two main power blocks seems 
likely to be no longer valid: Since Ghana’s re-democratization polls, the two main 
parties have been rotating power between themselves in two-term cycles, almost 
resembling the rotation of ascension to chieftaincy stools between different 
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groups in some parts of Ghana. However, with Mahama having replaced the de-
ceased Atta Mills as the NDC’s presidential candidate in 2012 and running again 
for the NDC in 2016, his party might benefit once more from its incumbency. This 
could end the hitherto routine rotation in power after two-terms between the NDC 
and NPP. In addition to potentially side-lining the NPP, who believe it is their turn 
to rule again, another NDC victory could also imply a passing of Akufo-Addo and 
hence the Akyem faction within the NPP. For Akufo-Addo’s third attempt of seiz-
ing power seems to be the last chance for the Akyem faction before the sceptre is 
likely to swing back to the Asante power block within the NPP. Given this political 
context, Ghana’s upcoming 2016 general elections might put the degree of Gha-
na’s resilience to the test.  
One last point remains to be emphasized with reference to Ghana. The the-
sis has demonstrated that incremental structural change has taken place in 
Ghana over the last few decades. It has acknowledged in particular Ghana’s 
accomplishment of having managed its recent process of social change with 
limited bloodshed, despite the severe social ramifications implied in the process 
of social change. However, in spite of this recognition, the present analysis 
should on no account be misunderstood as simply an example of “successful” 
externally prescribed economic and political liberalization in Africa. A substantial 
amount of coercive military force was necessary to implement neo-liberal eco-
nomic reforms, which had been demanded by international financial institutions 
in return for providing large amounts of capital inflow. Moreover, considerable 
political dexterity and compromise have featured in the ensuing years. Overall 
this inflow of capital in return for liberal reforms allowed the re-establishment of 
an “old economic order”, which had previously become unbalanced, making the 
Ghanaian system more compatible again with the prevailing international struc-
ture of global capitalism.  
The thesis has also underlined that Ghana’s “liberal democracy” – in con-
trast to expectations of externally prescribed political liberalization – functions 
completely different from liberal democracies in industrialised societies. Institu-
tions work differently in different settings because of context specific and histor-
ically grown constellations of power amongst social forces. Hence the Ghana-
ian, and in fact African state, while pushed to mimic and hence resembling on 
paper the OECD-prototype, functions fundamentally differently, due to its 
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unique constellation of powers, as well as its place within the global arena. In 
the case of Ghana, the country’s unique constellations of power currently result 
in a system characterized by competitive clientelism which ensures some de-
gree of community-oriented developmental patrimonialism (see chapter four) 
along electoral cycles. It remains to be seen if this form of state might be able to 
provide a path to long-term political stability and economic prosperity.  
 
After having recapped the thesis’ main argument and having addressed is-
sues around the Ghanaian state’s remaining fragility, I would like to conclude by 
reflecting on the contributions of the thesis, with an emphasis on theoretical 
ones. Besides shedding light on Ghana’s 2012 electoral politics, the develop-
ment and application of a Gramscian inspired political settlement analysis to the 
case of Ghana has proven to be able to do justice to processes of social 
change actually taking place in Africa today. Some people might argue howev-
er, that the distinction between change of and change within a state simply 
shifts the problem of understanding social change, yet does not provide a satis-
fying answer. The question remains how much change amongst social forces is 
actually necessary for the workings of a state (in the global South) to transform? 
While the thesis is not able to provide a straight forward and empirically based 
answer to this question – above all since the Ghanaian state has not (yet) un-
dergone a transformation of its working– the presented analysis has evinced 
that alterations in the relationship between the political and economic sphere 
and the hegemonic actors within it, are key for such a process to unfold.  
Closely linked to this is also the issue of the conceptual relationship be-
tween “state” and “political settlement” which tend to be used almost synony-
mously within the thesis. While they are not exactly the same, the two concepts 
are very strongly related and interlinked. For the political settlement approach – 
as developed in this thesis based on the thought of Gramsci – allows for more 
complexity and captures the power constellations amongst social forces within 
the state which are also embedded and reflected in the political and economic 
institutions forming the state and determining its working. In this regard, the the-
sis engages with one of the fundamental challenges of social research, namely 
how actors and structures influence and shape each other. Even though the 
thesis is not able to perfectly resolve this challenge – which it also did not aspire 
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to –, it has provided an analysis demonstrating that actors and institutions are 
equally important and how they mutually shape each other in an African context.  
In addition, following on from the early realizations within the academic dis-
course on statebuilding that “institutions matter” (see Paris 2004) for state per-
formance, and within the field of development theory that “politics matter” (see 
Whitfield and Burr 2014) for policy outcomes; a theoretical quintessence of this 
thesis is that institutions work differently in different settings because of context 
specific and historically grown constellations of power amongst social forces. 
Hence the “African state”, while resembling on paper the OECD-prototype state, 
functions fundamentally differently, due to its unique constellation of powers, as 
well as its place within the global arena. This phenomenon is also embodied in 
the fact that academics and practitioners have struggled with using certain con-
cepts such as “state”, “civil society” or “middle class” in African contexts.96 For 
all of these concepts are heavily normatively loaded based on the historical ex-
periences of societies in the global North. There exists an underlying assump-
tion that “the state”, “civil society” and “middle class” have to work in a specific 
way, namely the way how they do in the OECD-world. The most vivid example 
of this is the concept of “middle class”. The thesis tried to underline this point by 
consciously using the term “middling class” in the Ghanaian context, for it will 
not fulfil the same function as the “middle class” in industrialized states of the 
global North. The mere fact that the middle class in the global North arose in 
course of an industrialization process relatively independent from states, which 
is not the case for the emerging middling class in societies of the global South, 
results in different constellations of powers and hence workings of the state in 
the global North and South respectively. Some people might reproach the thesis 
as being inconsequential, since it – with the exception of applying the term 
“middling class” rather than “middle class” – generally continues to rely on these 
commonly used concepts such as “state” and “civil society”. While an analysis 
and description without relying on any established concepts seemed intangible, 
the work at hand strove to make a conscious effort to move away from focusing 
on what African states are not or what they might be lacking, moving towards 
understanding better how they function and why they function as they do. 
                                            
96
 See titles such as “African civil society or civil society in Africa” (Orvis 2001). 
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Hence the continued use of certain commonly used concepts does not automat-
ically imply the same understanding of them.  
Reflecting on implications stemming from this thesis, there is a continued 
need for future research to identify opportunities for – incremental, adapting, 
“organic” – social change within African states and societies. This need is 
founded on two main insights: (1) the dominant discourse focusing on short-
comings of African states in comparison to liberal states in the Global North has 
so far not been able to reveal pathways of actual change for African societies. 
And (2) the experience of external interventions in conflict-ridden states over the 
last few decades has shown that their impact on social constellations of power 
within states is limited in time, due to the foreseeable withdrawal of international 
actors in the long-term. To explore opportunities for sustainable structural social 
change in African contexts, states like Zambia and Benin could represent inter-
esting case studies. Both countries have – like Ghana – had their experiences 
of political instability in their past, but are today regarded as amongst the conti-
nents’ most stable polities. Further in-depth case studies could in turn lay the 
basis for potential future comparative investigations on how power constella-
tions have changed within states in Africa and what role external actors have 
played within these processes.  
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IX. ANNEX 
9.1 Coded list of primary qualitative data collected during fieldwork 
The primary qualitative data collected during fieldwork can be roughly broken 
down into the following four categories:  
A) face-to-face semi-structured interviews; 
B) personal communications; 
C) sources of written primary qualitative data; and  
D) unstructured observations.  
Interviews are classified as formally arranged meetings/conversations with pre-
viously chosen interlocutors which latest 30 minutes or longer.  Personal com-
munications on the other hand include all conversations which occurred during 
fieldwork without prior planning and provided some relevant information for the 
research project. Sources of written primary qualitative data mainly cover Gha-
naian newspapers in print and online during the time of fieldwork and are men-
tioned here for the sake of completeness of primary qualitative sources. Un-
structured observations span first and foremost events, but also TV and radio 
broadcasts which allowed gathering of further impressions and insights helpful 
to understanding electoral politics and the workings of the Ghanaian state as an 
outsider. Even though the research topic covered by the thesis is not per se a 
sensitive one, since anonymity had been promised to most interlocutors prior to 
conversations, qualitative data stemming from interviews, personal communica-
tions and unstructured observations is referred to only in a coded way in the 
thesis. The following sections therefore present the coded lists of the various 
sources of qualitative primary data as used in this thesis. Sources of written 
primary qualitative data are listed in detail in the bibliography, since coding was 
not necessary.   
 
A) Face-to-face semi-structured interviews 
Code Function of interviewee Location and date 
A1 Representative of the Hanns Seidel Foundation  Accra, 8 November 2011 
A2 Representatives of Presbyterian Church of Ghana 
(two interlocutors) 
Accra, 9 November 2011 
A3 Representative of Presbyterian Church of Ghana Accra, 14 November 2011 
A4 Representative of the German Embassy  Accra, 15 November 2011 
A5 Chief Superintendent and Superintendent based at 
Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) 
Accra, 16 November 2011 
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Code Function of interviewee Location and date 
A6 Representative of Presbyterian Church of Ghana 
working for the Interfaith Committee and running 
peace workshops for Ghanaian Youths ahead of 
election times 
Haatso, 18 November 2011 
A7 Representative of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation  Accra, 21 November 2011 
A8 Representative of Ghanaian-German Economic 
Association (GGEA) 
Accra, 24 November 2011 
A9 Representative of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation  Accra, 28 November 2011 
A10 Representative of Friedrich Naumann Foundation  Accra, 28 November 2011 
A11 Professor in Political Sciences at the University of 
Ghana in Legon  
Accra, 30 November 2011 
A12 Representative of GIZ in Ghana working on Good 
Financial Governance (GFG)  
Accra, 5 December 2011 
A13 Representative of NPP Youth  Accra, 7 November 2012 
A14 Representative of the Kofi Annan International 
Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) 
Accra, 8 November 2012  
A15 Representatives of youth oriented non-
governmental organization (3 interlocutors) 
Accra, Osu, 16 November 
2012  
A16 Representative of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation   Accra, 19 November 2012 
A17 Representatives of NDC Youth 
(3 interlocutors) 
Accra, FES conference, 
November 2012 
A18 Representative of Ghana Independent Broadcasters 
Association (GIBA) 
Accra, 23 November 2012  
A19 Representative of Media Foundation for West Africa 
(MfWA) 
Accra, 23 November 2012 
A20 Journalist for radio station based in Accra Accra, 27 November 2012 
A21 Journalist for radio station in Eastern region Accra, 27 November 2012 
A22 Representative of Ghana Independent Broadcasters 
Association (GIBA) 
Accra, 27 November 2012 
and 5 December 2012 
A23 Representatives of the ARK Foundation  Haatso, 28 November 2012  
A24 Representative of Legal Resource Centre (LRC) Accra, 29 November 2012  
A25 Polling station assistant/verification officer 2012 Accra, 2 December 2012 
A26 EC polling agent 2012 Accra, 2 December 2012 
and 
4 December 2012 
A27 NPP supporter involved in campaigning  Accra, 2 December 2012 
A28 Representative of the German Embassy   Accra, 3 December 2012 
A29 Journalist (Daily Guide) Accra, 4 December 2012 
A30 Journalist (Statesman) Accra, 4 December 2012 
A31 Representative of the Kofi Annan International 
Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) 
Accra, 11 December 2012 
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Code Function of interviewee Location and date 
A32 Representative of the Commonwealth Election Ob-
server Group 2012 
Accra, 12 December 2012 
A33 Representatives of the EU Commission  
(2 interlocutors) 
Accra, 14 December 2012 
A34 Lecturer in Political Sciences at the University of 
Ghana in Legon 
Legon, 14 December 2012 
A35 Professor for Political Sciences at the University of 
Ghana in Legon 
Legon, 14 December 2012 
A36 Representative of the National Catholic Secretariat 
for Ghana Catholic Bishop’s Conference 
Accra, 17 December 2012 
A37 Representatives of the EU expert team observing 
the 2012 Ghanaian elections 
(2 interlocutors) 
Accra, 17 December 2012 
A38 Representatives of the Danquah Institute  
(3 interlocutors) 
Accra, 18 December 2012  
A39 Representative of UNDP/Ghana Office working on 
Ghana’s National Peace Architecture in partnership 
with the National Peace Council  
Accra, 20 December 2012  
A40 Representative of the Institute for Democratic Gov-
ernance (IDEG) 
Accra, 20 December 2012 
A41 Several interviews with representative of Ghana’s 
Foreign Service 
Mainly in Europe through-
out the summer in 2013 
 
B) Personal communications 
Code Interlocutors Location and date 
B1 Candidate running as MP in Greater Accra in 2012  Accra, 23 November 2011 
B2 Son of high ranking NPP politician working in con-
struction business 
Accra, 24 October 2012 
B3 Former MP candidate for 1996 elections Legon, 19 November 2012 
B4 Various guests of the Kokomlemle Guesthouse Accra, before, during and 
after the elections 2012 
B5 Several taxi drivers and co-travelers in trotros while 
traveling through the country before and after the 
elections 
Mainly Accra
97
, before, 
during and after the elec-
tions 2012 
B6 Market women  Before, during and after the 
elections 2012 
B7 Regular conversations with owner of a newsstand in 
proximity to NDC headquarter 
Accra, 2 - 28 December 
2012 
B8 Several visits of party headquarters (NDC and NPP) 
and election campaign offices  
First week of December 
                                            
97
 Several conversations occured as well while traveling through Ghana, meeting and visiting citi-
zens in Agona Swedru, Akosombo, Cape Coast & Elmina, Kumasi, Korfuridua, Madina, and Tema.  
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Code Interlocutors Location and date 
B9 Former member of the Movement for Freedom and 
Justice (MFJ) 
Accra, 9 December 2012 
B10 Party supporters at rallies of NPP and NDC Accra, 4 and 5 December 
2012 
B11 Nephew of a presidential candidate 2012 Accra, 7 and 8 December 
2012 
B12 Voters on election days Accra, 7 and 8 December 
2012 
B13 Party supporters of NDC victory celebrations in front 
of NDC headquarter in Accra 
Accra, night of 9 
th
 of De-
cember 
B14 NDC member based in Switzerland 5 December 2012 
B15 Security personnel during the 2012 elections 7 and 8 December 2012 
B16 NPP supporters at NPP demonstrations against 
election results 
11 December 2012 
B17 Ghanaians living and working in Europe Throughout different phas-
es of the research project 
(2010-2014) 
 
D) Unstructured observation 
Code Events attended/participated in Location and date 
D1 Sessions of parliament budget for 2012 Accra, 16 November 2011  
D2 IDEG forum – speaker: Okyenhene Osagyefuo 
Amoatia Ofori Panin II on “Environment, Sustaina-
ble Development and Peace” 
East Legon, 17 October 
2012 
 
D3 National Human Rights Lectures / Commission on 
Human Rights and Administrative Justice, Theme of 
event: “Ensuring good governance: protecting the 
citizens’ right to vote” – speakers: Dr. Kwesi Aning, 
Dr. Ken Ahorsu and Dr. Afari Gyan   
Accra, 23 October 2012 
D4 The Centre for Freedom and Accuracy (CFA), Ad-
dress by H.E. Jerry John Rawlings, former Presi-
dent of the Republic of Ghana 
Accra, 24 October 2012 
D5 Ga North District Society of the Institute of Char-
tered Accountants, GANDS/ICAG lecture on the 
theme: “Professional and peaceful elections” – 
speaker: Rev. Prof. Emmanuel Asante, Chairman of 
the National Peace Council  
Accra, 15 November 2012 
D6 Alumni Lecture at University of Legon speaker: H.E. 
Rupiah Banda, former President of the Republic of 
Zambia 
 Legon, 15 November 2012 
 
D7 Hon. Lady Chief Justice of the Republic of Ghana, 
Mrs. Georgina Theodora Wood, “Consensus and 
Nation Building: Getting It Right from the Founda-
tions”, Alumni lecture 
Legon, University of Gha-
na, 15 November 2012 
 323 
 
Code Events attended/participated in Location and date 
D8 Media Foundation for West Africa (MfWA), forum on 
the theme: “Radio, hate speech and election-related 
violence in Africa” – presentation of findings moni-
toring language use on Ghanaian radio ahead of the 
2012 polls 
 Accra, 16 November 2012 
D9 GIBA, Forum on responsible reportage for elections 
2012/Southern Sector – speaker: Kabral Blay-
Amihere, Chairman of the National Media Commis-
sion 
Accra, 27 November 2012 
D10 NPP meeting on voter education Santa Maria/Accra, 2 De-
cember 2012 
D11 Press Conference Dr Sakara, CPP headquarter  
 
Asylum Down/Accra, 3 
December 2012 
D12 Press Conference of Commonwealth Observer 
Group at Golden Tulip Hotel 
Accra, 4 December 2012 
D13 Early voting observed at polling station around the 
area of Santa Maria  
Accra, 4 December 2012 
D14 NPP Rally in Santa Maria, with NPP MP candidate  
Shirley Ayorkor Botchway and NPP presidential 
candidate Nana Addo Akuffo  
4 December 2012 
D15 2012 Elections NDC Final Rally  Trade Fair Centre Accra, 5 
December 2012  
D16 Several radio broadcasts (such as Uniiq 95.7 FM 
Breakfast Drive special edition, Host: Cecil Nii 
Obodai-Wentum) 
Accra, 7 December 2012  
D17 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections  
̶ Visit of 7 polling stations in the constituency of 
Ayawaso Central, begin at 7am at Accra Tech-
nical Training Centre, others at Youngster’s In-
ternational School, Star Avenue, School close to 
N.K.G.H. 
̶ Observed the voting period, closure of polling 
stations, counting and announcements of results 
at 4 polling stations 
̶ Visit of coalition centre of Ayawaso central: Ko-
tobabi Police Station to observe the tabulation 
process 
̶ Development leading to the official declaration of 
results 
7- 9 December 2012 
D18 Coalition of Domestic Election Observers’ (CODEO) 
final press conference at KAIPTC 
Accra, 9 December 2012 
D19 Interparty Youth Committee, FES, Coconut Groove 
Hotel 
Accra, FES conference, 
November 2012 
D20 NPP demonstration against election results  Accra, 11 December 2012 
D21 Several Ghanaian TV programmes throughout the 
period of fieldwork in 2012  
Accra, October - December 
2012 
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In addition to the above listed sources, further primary qualitative data was ob-
tained by following the Ghanaian media, including print but also radio pro-
grammes of stations such as Joy FM, Unique or Peace FM and television 
broadcasts related to the elections. These included amongst others the IEA 
Presidential (2x) and Vice Presidential (1x) Debates held in October and No-
vember 2012 and news programmes on Metro TV, VIASAT and GTV. 
 
9.2 Tables and figures referred to in chapters 
 
Figure 9.2.1 Factors determining the sharing formula of the DACF 
Factor  Description  
  
Equality  Percentage of the DACF allocation which is to be dis-
tributed evenly between all districts / percentage of 
base amount for each district 
  
Needs The more developed a district is, the less of the Fund 
the Assembly receives. The development status of the 
district is measured by the number of schools, the ra-
tion of teachers to pupils per class, the number of 
health facilities and the ration of doctors per popula-
tion, the availability of electricity, telecommunications 
and postal services, the presence of banking and other 
financial institutions – all information provided by the 
relevant sectors                       
  
Service Pressure The greater the population of a district, the more of the 
Fund the Assembly will receive. It is argued that the 
more people are covered by a district, the more pres-
sure there will be on the facilities provided by the As-
sembly. The calculation of the service pressure factor 
is determined based on the latest population census as 
recorded by the Statistical Service. 
  
Responsiveness  
(Incentive)  
An increase in locally mobilized revenue in real terms to 
a given base year in a district results in an increase in 
allocation, whilst a no-increase or a decrease results in 
a zero per cent allocation  
Source: Ahwoi (2010: 178-79) and Banful (2007:7) 
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                    Figure 9.2.2 List of new constituencies 2012 
Region Constituency 
Western (4) 
Kwesimintsim 
Mpohor 
Bodi 
Bia East 
Central (4) 
Cape Coast North 
Gomoa Central 
Awutu Senya 
Assin Central 
Greater Accra (7) 
Bortianor – Ngleshie Amanfro 
Anyaa/Sowutuom 
Trobu 
Ayawaso North 
Okaikwei Central 
Ablekuma West 
Tema Central 
Volta (4) 
Akatsi North 
Adaklu 
North Dayi 
Krachi Nchumuru 
Eastern (5) 
Akuapim South 
Asene/Akroso/Monso 
Achiase 
Atiwa East 
Fanteakwa South 
Ashanti (8) 
Obuasi East 
Manso Edubia 
Atwima Nwabiagya North 
Manhyia North 
Juaben 
Asante Akim North 
Sekyere Afram Plains 
Ahafo Ana South East 
Brong-Ahafo (5) 
Berekum West 
Dormaa West 
Banda 
Pru West 
Sene East 
Northern (5) 
Daboya 
Kparibato 
Tatale 
Sagnarigu East 
Yunyoo 
Upper East (2) 
Bolgatanga East 
Tempene 
Upper West (1) Nandom 
                       Source: EC of Ghana (2012c) 
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Figure 9.2.3 Representation of Northerners in Mahama’s government  
Mahama’s  
Northern Ministers  
 
 Akwasi Oppong Fosu (Minister of Local Government) 
 Inusah Fuseini (Minister of Land and Natural Resources) 
 Amidu Sulemama (Minister of Roads and Highways) 
 Mahama Ayariga (Minister of Information) 
 Benjamin Bewa-Nyog Kunbuor (Minister in Charge of Govern-
ment Business in Parliament) 
 Emmanuel Armarh Kofi Buah (Minister of Energy and Petroleum) 
 Dr Henry Seidu Daannaa (Minister of Chieftaincy and Traditional 
Affairs) 
 Mark Woyongo (Minister of Defence) 
 Haruna Iddrissu (Minister of Trade and Industry)  
 Nayon Bilijo (Minister of Fisheries and Aquaculture Development) 
Mahama’s  
Northern Deputy 
Ministers  
 
 Dr Tia Sugri (Deputy Minister of Health) 
 James Agalga (Deputy Minister of Interior) 
 Dr Alhassan Ahmed Yakubu (Deputy Minister of Food and Agri-
culture) 
 John Abdulai Jinapor (Deputy Minister of Energy and Petroleum) 
 Benjamin Dagadu (Deputy Minister of Energy and Petroleum) 
 Ibrahim Murtala Muhammed (Deputy Minister of Information and 
Media Relations) 
 Dr Musheibu Mohammed-Alfa (Deputy Minister of Environment, 
Science, Tech and Innovation) 
 Joyce Bawa-Mogtari (Deputy Minister of Transport) 
Mahama’s  
Northern appointees 
(Senior advisors, 
ministers of state 
and appointees to 
presidential priority 
projects)  
 
 Dr Sulley Gariba (Senior Policy Co-ordinator in the Office of the 
President) 
 Dr Yaymond Akongburo Atuguba (Executive Secretary to the 
President) 
 Abdul Rashid Hassan (Minister of State at the Presidency in 
charge of Public-private Partnership);  
 Alhassan Azong (Minister of State at the Presidency in charge of 
Public Sector Reform) 
 Alhaji Mustapha Ahmed (Minister of State at the Presidency in 
charge of development Authorities) 
 Alhaji Limuna Mohammed Muniru (Minister of State at the Presi-
dency in charge of Human resource development and Scholar-
ship) 
 Alban Bagbin (presidential priority projects)  
 Cletus Avoka (presidential priority projects) 
Mahama’s  
Northern appointees 
with influence on 
the energy and pe-
troleum portfolio 
and the security 
forces 
 
 Moses Asaga (Chief Executive Officer of the National Petroleum 
Authority) 
 Abdulai John Jinapor (Deputy Minister of Energy and Petroleum) 
 Benjamin Dagadu (Deputy Ministry of Energy and Petroleum) 
 Mark Owen Woyongo (Minister for Defence) 
 Mohammed Ahmed Alhassan (Inspector General of Police) 
 Alhaji Mohammed Suraji (Director of the Community Police Unit) 
 Dominic Akuritinga Ayine (Deputy Ministry of Justice and Attor-
ney-General’s Department)  
 Alhaji Nasiru Isahaku (2nd Deputy Governor of the Bank of Gha-
na)  
Source: Peacefmonline (2013) 
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Figure 9.2.4 Organized social groups as members of CODEO in 2012 
 Ghana Registered Midwives Association 
 Ghana Federation of the Disabled  
 Legal Resources Centre  
 Ghana National Association of Teachers  
 Ghana Trades Union Congress  
 International Association for the Advancement of Women in Africa  
 Ghana Bar Association  
 Christian Council of Ghana 
 Ghana Integrity Initiative  
 The Ghana Muslim Mission 
 Islamic Council for Development and Humanitarian Services  
 National Association of Graduate Teachers  
 Federation of Muslim Councils  
 National Network of Local Civic Union  
 Amnesty International 
 Hedge Ghana 
 WILDAF Ghana 
 FIDA Ghana 
 Ghana Pentecostal and Charismatic Council 
 Centre for the Development of People 
 National Union of Ghana Students  
 Centre For Human Rights and Advanced Legal Research  
 Office of the National Chief Imam 
 Ghana Muslim Academy 
 Ghana Journalists Association  
 Regional Council for Islamic Education Unit 
 Ghana Medical Association  
 Youth Bridge Foundation 
 Junior Chamber International-Dansoman 
 Ghana Registered Nurses Association 
 Ghana Institution of Surveyors Council of Independent Churches 
 University Teachers Association of Ghana 
 Association of Ghana Industries 
 Ahmadiyya Muslim Mission 
 Ghana Civil and Local Government Staff Association of Ghana 
 Muslim Dialogue and Humanitarian Organization 
 Eanfoworld 
 ABANTU for Development 
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Figure 9.2.5 Projects funded buy STAR Ghana in 2012 
NGO Title of funded project  
Blogging Ghana Social media support for elections 2012 
IDEG 
Sustaining credible and peaceful elections and national co-
hesion in 2012 
IEA 
The IEA prisoner education and code of conduct enforce-
ment body programme and the IEA Presidential Debates 
Legal Resource Cen-
tre  
Strengthening the judiciary to deal with human rights abus-
es during election 2012 
National Catholic Sec-
retariat for Ghana 
Catholic Bishop’s 
Conference 
Civic agenda for smooth political transition; focus on bio-
metric system, voting and transition law for Ghana’s 2012 
elections 
ARK Foundation 
The Nuisance project – Young women speak peace to pow-
er 
West Africa Network 
for Peacebuilding  
Transforming the culture of political violence 
Media Foundation  
for West Africa 
Using media to promote decent language, issue-based 
campaigning for peaceful, free and fair elections in Ghana in 
2012 
Christian Council  
of Ghana 
Eminent persons group (pre/post elections) 
Ghana’s Independent 
Broadcasters Asso-
ciation  
Developing code of ethics preventing inflammatory lan-
guage during elections 
 
Figure 9.2.6 Composition of Ghana’s GDP according to sectors, 1965- 2011  
 
             Source: World Bank, Africa Development Indicator, (2013) 
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Table 9.2.1 Results of Ghana’s 2008 presidential elections 
Presidential  
elections 2008 
1st round  
(total 
votes) 
1st round 
(%) 
2nd round 
(total votes)  
2nd round (%) 
Akufo-Addo (NPP) 4,159,439 49.13% 4,480,446 49.77% 
Atta Mills (NDC) 4,056,634 47.92% 4,521,032 50.23% 
Margins between 
two main parties 
102,805  40,586  
Source: EC of Ghana (2008)   
 
 
Table 9.2.2 Regional overview of rejected ballots in Ghanaian presidential 
elections as % of total votes, 1992-2012  
Region 1992 1996 2000 
2000 
run-off 
2004 2008 
2008 
run-off 
2012 
Western 2.39 1.66 1.79 1.09 2.78 3.18 1.12 2.51 
Central 3.33 2.16 2.59 1.40 2.26 3.24 1.45 2.71 
Greater Accra 2.24 0.57 0.36 0.58 1.17 1.06 0.52 1.03 
Volta 1.97 0.50 1.16 1.61 1.68 2.12 0.94 2.73 
Eastern 2.74 0.26 1.76 0.92 2.02 2.25 1.10 2.20 
Ashanti 4.56 0.95 1.09 0.54 1.42 1.65 0.63 1.34 
Brong-Ahafo 2.65 1.54 0.38 1.20 2.16 2.60 1.13 2.70 
Northern  4.18 2.86 5.64 2.37 3.88 3.57 1.17 3.45 
Upper East 4.15 6.27 0.43 2.71 3.66 4.17 1.98 4.54 
Upper West 4.43 5.22 1.61 3.08 5.60 5.05 2.10 4.74 
National Total 3.03 1.53 1.58 1.20 2.13 2.32 1.00 2.24 
Source: EC of Ghana (2012); Frempong (2012); FES (2010); African Elections database 
(2012) 
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Table 9.2.3 List of constituencies with high percentage of invalid votes 
Constituency Region % invalid votes 
Jomoro Western 4,93 
Bia East Western 4,92 
Krachi East Volta 4,60 
Krachi Nchumru Volta 5,00 
Nkwanta South Volta 6,91 
Sekyere Afram Plains Ashanti 5,80 
Atebubu/Amantin Brong Ahafo 4,85 
Pru East Brong Ahafo 4,87 
Pru West Brong Ahafo 4,52 
Sene West  Brong Ahafo 4,90 
Sene East Brong Ahafo 5,42 
Bole/Bamboi Northern 4,91 
Sawla Tuna Kalba Northern 7,74 
Tatale/SanguliI Northern 5,33 
Mion Northern  5,01 
Chereponi Northern 4,61 
Gushegu Northern 4,53 
Karaga Northern 5,71 
Walewale Northern 4,96 
Yagaba/Kubori Northern 5,42 
Bulisa South Upper East 6,87 
Bulisa North Upper East 5,71 
Bongo Upper East 5,17 
Talensi Upper East 5,68 
Zebilla Upper East 4,53 
Binduri Upper East 4,88 
Pusiga Upper East 6,43 
Garu Upper East 5,06 
Tempane Upper East 6,61 
Wa West Upper West 7,60 
Wa East Upper West 5,10 
Daffiama/Bussie/Issa Upper West 5,57 
Jirapa Upper West 4,95 
Lambussie-Karni Upper West 5,60 
Lawra Upper West 5,06 
Sissala West Upper West 5,91 
Sissala East Upper West 4,59 
        Source: EC of Ghana (2012) 
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Table 9.2.4 Registered Voters by Constituency in Western Region  
District name Constituency name Total voters 
Jomoro Jomoro 78,913  
Ellembele Ellembele 58,385  
Nzema East Municipality Evalue-Ajomoro-Gwira 41,097  
Ahanta West  Ahanta West   63,792  
Takoradi Sub  Takoradi 53,686  
Effia- Kwesimintsim-Sub  Effia 45,702  
Effia- Kwesimintsim-Sub Kwesimintsim 43,748  
Sekondi Sub  Sekondi  35,444  
Essikadu-Ketan Sub Essikadu-Ketan  56,198  
Shama Shama  49,329  
Wassa East  Wassa East 43,104  
Mpohor Mpohor 23,301  
Tarkwa Nsuaem Tarkwa Nsuaem 98,748  
Prestea/Huni-Valley Prestea/Huni-Valley 100,915  
Wassa Amenfi East  Amenfi East  67,093  
Wassa Amenfi Central  Amenfi Central  51,015  
Wassa Amenfi West  Amenfi West 60,067  
Aowin   Aowin 71,468  
Suaman  Suaman  20,891  
Bibiani-Anhwiaso-Bekwai Bibiani-Anhwiaso-Bekwai 74,128  
Sefwi Wiawso Sefwi Wiawso 72,128  
Sefwi Akontombra Sefwi Akontombra 38,237  
Juaboso Juaboso 50,433  
Bodi Bodi 35,119  
Bia West  Bia West  64,404  
Bia East  Bia East 27,813  
Total  Western Region                                                               1,425,158  
        Source: EC of Ghana (2012) 
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Table 9.2.5 Registered Voters by Constituency in Central Region  
District name Constituency name 
Total 
voters 
Komenda/Edina/Eguaf/Abrem Komenda/Edina/Eguaf/Abrem (Keea) 77,232  
Cape Coast Cape Coast South 50,410  
Cape Coast Cape Coast North  54,655  
Abura/Asebu/Kwamankese Abura/Asebu/Kwamankese 59,615  
Mfantseman Mfantseman 79,869  
Ekumpfi Ekumpfi 33,408  
Ajumako Enyan Esiam Ajumako Enyan Esiam 60,119  
Gomoa West  Gomoa West  66,515  
Gomoa East  Gomoa Central  36,633  
Gomoa East  Gomoa East  48,509  
Effutu Effutu 47,048  
Awutu Senya West Awutu Senya West 63,203  
Awutu Senya East Awutu Senya East 81,665  
Agona West  Agona West  72,745  
Agona East  Agona East  50,422  
Asikuma/Odoben/Brakwa Asikuma/Odoben/Brakwa 59,292  
Assin North  Assin Central  37,297  
Assin North  Assin North  35,855  
Assin South  Assin South  49,320  
Twifo Ato Morkwaa Twifo Ato Morkwaa 50,293  
Hemang Lower Denkyira Hemang Lower Denkyira 33,312  
Upper Denkyira East  Upper Denkyira East 49,457  
Upper Denkyira West  Upper Denkyira West 34,639  
Total Central Region                                                                                 1,231,513                                                                                         
Source: EC of Ghana (2012) 
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Table 9.2.6 Registered Voters by Constituency in Greater Accra  
    District name Constituency name Total voters 
Ga South Bortianor-Ngleshie Amanfro 66,402 
Ga South Weija/Gbawe 78,885 
Ga South Domeabra/Obom 31,238  
Ga South Domeabra/Obom 31,238  
Ga South Domeabra/Obom 31,238  
Ga Central  Anyaa/Sowutuom 105,150  
Ga West  Trobu 100,056  
Ga West Amasaman 73,711  
Ga East  Dome/Kwamenya 125,950  
La-Nkwantanang/Madina 
Municipality 
Madina 105,738  
Ayawaso Ayawaso East 53,523  
Ayawaso Ayawaso North  51,186  
Ayawaso Ayawaso Central   85,084  
Ayawaso Ayawaso Wst Wuogon  82,658  
Okaikwei Okaikwei South   89,646  
Okaikwei Okaikwei Central  61,981  
Okaikwei Okaikwei North  69,900  
Ablekuma Ablekuma North  113,497  
Ablekuma Ablekuma Central   122,009  
Ablekuma Ablekuma South   77,358  
Ablekuma Ablekuma West   80,541  
Ashiedu Keteke Odododiodioo 97,928  
Osu Clottey Korle Klottey  95,068  
La Dadekotopon 112,417  
Ledzokuku  Krowor Ledzokuku 126,432  
Ledzokuku Krowor Krowor 87,918  
Tema Tema East  84,784  
Tema Tema Central 55,906  
Tema Tema West  103,968  
Kpone Katamanso Kpone Katamanso 79,442  
Ashaiman  Ashaiman  125,358  
Total Greater Accra Region                                                                 2,792,576 
    Source: EC of Ghana (2012) 
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Table 9.2.7 Registered Voters by Constituency in Volta 
District name Constituency name Total voters 
Keta  Keta 46,607  
Keta Anlo 50,319  
Ketu South Ketu South 126,659  
Ketu North  Ketu North  60,761  
Akatsi South  Akatsi South 43,153  
Akatsi North  Akatsi North 18,800  
South Tongu South Tongu 52,183  
Central Tongu Central Tongu 39,242  
North Tongu  North Tongu 48,577  
Adaklu Adaklu 17,940  
Agotime-Ziope Agotime-Ziope 26,450  
Ho Municipal Ho Central  87,100  
Ho West  Ho West  48,680  
South Dayi  South Dayi 26,640  
Kpando Muncipality Kpando 32,567  
North Dayi North Dayi 24,162  
Hohoe Municipality Hohoe 67,615  
Afadjato South  Afadjato South 34,183  
Jasikan Buem  37,125  
Biakoye Biakoye 40,136  
Kadjebi Akan  38,553  
Krachi West  Krach East  40,647  
Krach West  Krach West  22,768  
Krachi Nchumuru Krachi Nchumuru 28,957  
Nkwanta South  Nkwanta South 52,363  
Nkwanta North  Nkwanta North 44,553  
Total Volta Region                                                                 1,156,740 
           Source: EC of Ghana (2012) 
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Table 9.2.8 Registered Voters by Constituency in Eastern Region  
District name Constituency name Total voters 
Asuogyaman Asuogyaman 51,164  
Lower Manya Krobo Lower Manya Krobo 60,674  
Upper Manya Krobo Upper Manya Krobo 35,602  
Yilo Krobo Yilo Krobo 55,597  
New Juaben Municipality New Juaben South  77,987  
New Juaben Municipality New Juaben North   34,903  
Akwapim North  Akwapim North 55,392  
Akwapim North  Okere  30,018  
Akuapem South  Akuapem South 32,114  
Nsawam/Adoagyiri Nsawam/Adoagyiri 58,564  
Suhum Suhum 60,217  
Ayensuano Ayensuano 46,900  
West Akim Muncipality Lower West Akim  57,271  
Upper West Akim Upper West Akim 44,552  
Birim Central  Akim Oda 37,399  
Birim Central  Asene/Akroso/Manso 38,489  
Birim South  Akim Swedru 19,035  
Birim South  Achiase 28,554  
Akyemansa Ofoase/Ayirebi 43,647  
Kwaebibirem Kade 62,679  
Denkyembuo Akwatia  46,978  
Birim North  Abirem   39,266  
East Akim  Abuakwa South  46,138  
East Akim  Abuakwa South   38,226  
Atwia Atwai West  27,485  
Atwia Atwia East  28,231  
Fanteakwa Fanteakwa  South  24,363  
Fanteakwa Fanteakwa North  29,770  
Kwahu West Municipality Nkawkaw 65,061  
Kwahu South  Mpraeso 41,593  
Kwahu East  Abetifi 41,503  
Afram Plains North  Afram Plains North 37,431  
Afram Plains South  Afram Plains South 32,879  
Total Eastern Region                                                                1,429,682  
          Source: EC of Ghana (2012) 
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Table 9.2.9 Registered Voters by Constituency in Ashanti Region  
District name Constituency name Total voters 
Adansi South  New Edubiase 40,108  
Adansi South Akrofuom  22,010  
Adansi North  Fomena 24,012  
Adansi North  Adansi Asokwa 37,046  
Obuasi Municipal (Obusasi) Obuasi West 59,118  
Obuasi Municipal (Obusasi) Obuasi East   49,635  
Bekwai Municipal Bekwai 65,480  
Bosome Freho  Bosome Freho 29,888  
Amansie Central  Odotobiri 41,633  
Amansie West  Manso Nkwanta 45,336  
Amansie West Manso Adubia  43,712  
Atwima Nwabiagya Atwima Nwabiagya South  64,617  
Atwima Nwabiagya Atwima Nwabiagya North  53,404  
Atwima Mponua Atwima Mponua 71,564  
Bosomtwe Bosomtwe 59,586  
Atwima Kwanwoma Atwima Kwanwoma 69,450  
Bantama Bantama 68,271  
Kwadaso Kwadaso 79,256  
Nhyiaeso Nhyiaeso 70,233  
Manhyia Manhyia South  49,592  
Manhyia Manhyia North  62,429  
Old Tafo Old Tafo 67,627  
Suame Suame 90,305  
Subin  Subin 78,479  
Asokwa Asokwa 79,228  
Oforikrom Oforikrom 109,597  
Asokore Mampong Asawase 94,813  
Kwabre East Kwabre East  95,424  
Afigya Kwabre Afigya Kwabre South  66,096  
Afigya Kwabre Afigya Kwabre North  29,575  
Ejisu Juaben Municipal  Juaben  34,040  
Ejisu Juaben Municipal Ejisu 74,948  
Asante Akim South  Asante Akim South 61,084  
Asante Akim Central Muncipality Asante Akim Central   41,660  
Asante Akim North  Asante Akim North 40,204  
Sekyere East  Effiduase/Asokore 34,055  
Sekyere Kumawu KUMAWU  30,977  
Sekyere Afram Plains  Sekyere Afram Plains  12,082  
Sekyere Central  Nsuta/Kwamang/Beposo 36,051  
Mampong Municipal  Mampong 55,443  
Ejura Sekyedumase Ejura Sekyedumase 54,695  
Sekyere South  Afigya Sekyere East   56,965  
Offinso Muncipal  Offinso South  60,571  
Offinso North  Offinso North  42,264  
Ahafo Ano South  Ahafo Ano South West  36,422  
Ahafo Ano South Ahafo Ano South East   22,859  
Ahafo Ano North  Ahafo Ano North 45,278  
Total Ashanti Region                                                                              2,557,122  
Source: EC of Ghana (2012) 
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Table 9.2.10 Registered Voters by Constituency in Brong-Ahafo Region  
District name Constituency name Total voters 
Asunafo South  Asunafo South  46,822  
Asunafo North  Asunafo North 67,078  
Asutifi South Asutifi South  34,193  
Asufiti North  Asufiti North  34,957  
Tano South  Tano South  44,233  
Tano North  Tano North 41,339  
Sunyani Municipal  Sunyani East  89,477  
Sunyani West  Sunyani West 59,185  
Dormaa West  Dormaa West 19,417  
Dormaa Municipal  Dormaa Central  52,580  
Dormaa east  Dormaa East 29,226  
Berekum Municipal  Berekum West  22,757  
Berekum Municipal Berekum East   50,494  
Jaman South  Jaman South  50,834  
Jaman North  Jaman North  40,216  
Banda Banda 13,439  
Tain  Tain  42,055  
Wenchi  Wenchi  53,015  
Techniman Muncipal  Techiman South  94,336  
Kintampo North  Kintampo North  53,087  
Kintampo South  Kintampo South 35,829  
Nkoranza North  Nkoranza North 25,676  
Nkoranza South  Nkoranza South  53,427  
Atebubu/Amantin  Atebubu/Amantin  46,662  
Pru  Pru West  25,955  
Pru  Pru East  36,273  
Sene West  Sene West  25,899  
Sene East  Sene East  20,265  
Techiman North  Techiman North  37,228  
Total Brong-Ahafo Region                                                         1,245,954  
        Source: EC of Ghana (2012) 
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Table 9.2.11 Registered Voters by Constituency in Northern Region  
District name Constituency name Total voters 
Bole Bole/Bamboi  34,582  
Sawla/Tuna/Kalba Sawla/Tuna/Kalba 40,696  
West Gonja Damongo 21,142  
North Gonja Daboya/Mankarigu 20,396  
Central Gonja Yapei-Kusawgu 48,254  
East Gonja Salaga South 43,547  
East Gonja Salaga North  13,274  
Kpandai Kpandai 46,711  
Nanumba North  Bimbilla 66,625  
Nanumba South Wulensi 36,444  
Zabzugu Zabzugu 30,109  
Tatale/Sanguli Tatale/Sanguli 27,108  
Yendi Yendi 59,148  
Mion Mion 32,160  
Saboba Saboba 30,121  
Chereponi Chereponi 26,844  
Gushegu Gushegu 44,477  
Karaga Karaga 38,135  
Savelugu/Nanton  Savelugu 44,022  
Savelugu /Nanton  Nanton  22,190  
Tamale Tamale South 91,380  
Tamale Tamale Central 80,753  
Tamale Tamale North  38,123  
Sagnarigu Sagnarigu 49,667  
Tolon Tolon 48,340  
Kumbungu Kumbungu 39,478  
West Mamprusi Walewale 56,236  
Mamprugu/Moagduri Yagaba/Kubori 20,298  
East Mamprusi Nalerigu/Gamgaba 58,160  
Bunkpurugu/Yunyoo Bunkpurugu 35,923  
Bunkpurugu/Yunyoo Yunyoo 19,119  
Total Northern Region                                                              1,263,462  
          Source: EC of Ghana (2012) 
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Table 9.2.12 Registered Voters by Constituency in Upper East Region  
District name Constituency name Total voters 
Builsa South Builsa South 16,757  
Builsa North  Builsa North 27,730  
Kassena/Nankana East  Navrongo Central   44,935  
Kassena/Nakana West  Chiana/Paga 46,017  
Bolga Bolgatanga Central  61,470  
Bolga Bolgantanga East 17,883  
Bongo  Bongo 49,078  
Talensi` Talensi 38,183  
Nabdam Nabdam 18,940  
Bawku West Zelliba 52,718  
Bawku Munipical Binduri 31,987  
Bawku Municipal Bawku Central  58,925  
Pusiga Pusiga 35,856  
Garu-Tempane Garu 27,507  
Garu-Tempane Tempane 37,111  
Total Upper East Region                                                              565,097  
         Source: EC of Ghana (2012) 
 
Table 9.2.13 Registered Voters by Constituency in Upper West Region  
District name Constituency name Total voters 
Wa Municipal Wa Central 75,130  
Wa West  Wa West 40,841  
Wa East Wa East 32,824  
Nadowli/Kaleo Nadowli/Kaleo 35,684  
Daffiama/Bussie/Issa Daffiama/Bussie/Issa 17,177  
Jirapa Jirapa 35,581  
Lambussie-Karni Lambussie-Karni 20,571  
Lawra Lawra 25,327  
Nandom Nandom  24,236  
Sissala West Sissala West 27,085  
Sissala East Sissala East 30,033  
Total Upper West Region                                                            364,489 
 
Grand Total                                                                              14,031,793  
          Source: EC of Ghana (2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
